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ABSTRACT 
General O'Duffy's National Corporate Party/Greenshirt movement was Ireland's 
largest fascist movement. This thesis explores the origins of Irish fascism, arguing 
that it was not simply an imitation of continental models, but that it had its roots in the 
Irish historical and political tradition. 
Previously dismissed by historians as ephemeral or even non-existent, research 
reveals that it was a nationally organized party that presented a raft of policies aimed 
at creating a mass base. The Greenshirts were a small movement and constituted a 
concentration of fascist tendencies developed by an element in its much larger 
forerunner, the Blueshirts. The party was to be short-lived but influenced a number of 
fifth-column and extremist organizations during the war years, as well as the more 
successful post-war nationalist party, Ailtiri na hAiseirighe. 
The NCP blended a number of key ideas borrowed from continental fascism, 
including corporatism and the leadership principle, with a combination of fascist and 
indigenous pseudo-military style and organization. This was embedded in a political 
and cultural mould that was a development of romantic ideas that had been widely 
promoted during the struggle for Irish independence, with a particular focus on 
nationalism, violence and anti-rationalism. 
The Greenshirt movement was completely dependent on its leader General O'Duffy, 
an experienced and able politician, who promoted his movement both at home and 
abroad at a number of international fascist conferences. He looked to participation 
alongside Franco in the Spanish Civil War to raise his domestic and international 
profile. However, the poor record of his Irish Brigade and his absence from Ireland's 
political scene, led to the rapid demise of a movement which had been in decline since 
its inception, and which had failed to gain widespread support amongst the population 
or interest in the national press. 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
A iltiri na hAiseirighe 
ArdFheis 
Blueshirts 
Cumann Poblachta na ý 
Cumann na nGaedheal 
Dail Eireann 
Right-wing, corporatist political party. 
Annual Conference of political party 
Collective name for right-wing uniformed political force 
ýEireann Political party formed by moderates in IRA. 
Pro-Treaty political party forming first IFS government 
The Irish Parliament 
Eire Ireland 
Fenians A revolutionary nationalist movement originating in the 
USA that helped launch the home-rule movement. 
Fianna Fail De Valera's anti-Treaty political party. 
Fine Gael Pro-Treaty, conservative coalition. 
Gaelic Celtic language spoken by minority in Ireland. 
G. A. A. Gaelic Athletic Association founded in 1884 as a 
nationalist body aiming to promote Irish games. 
Gaeltacht Irish-speaking enclaves in the IFS. 
Garda Siochana Civic Police-unarmed police force. 
Irish Free State Dominion created by treaty with Great Britain. 
LR. A. Anti-Treaty para-military organization. 
LR. B. Pre-independence, secretive nationalist group. Irish 
Republican Brotherhood. 
Leinster House Seat of Irish Government. 
Saor Eire Left-wing political party formed by members of I. R. A. 
Seanad Eireann Upper house of Irish Parliament. 
Sinn Fein Political wing of independence movement. 
Stormont Seat of Northern Ireland's Parliament. 
Taoiseach Prime-Minister. 
TD. Teachtai Daila, Member of Parliament. 
Ulster Volunteer Force Para-military force organized in 1913 to coordinate the 
activities of anti-home rule unionists. 
Volunteers Para-military force that fought for independence. 
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INTRODUCTION 
General Eoin O'Duffy had been a key figure in the Irish Free State for nearly twenty 
years when he founded the National Corporate Party in June 1935 after losing control 
of the Blueshirts in an acrimonious dispute the previous year. The NCP was 
O'Duffy's personal creation and its policies reflected his political vision that was 
largely borrowed from the examples of continental fascism. At the centre of 
O'Duffy's programme was a commitment to replacing the liberal democratic 
parliamentary system inherited from the British with a corporate political structure 
which would end the divisiveness of post-Civil War party politics but which would 
also give O'Duffy personal power and authority. O'Duffy stated that he intended to 
create the republic that had inspired the nationalists of the independence struggle but 
within an authoritarian framework that owed much to fascist ideas from the continent. 
The Greenshirts, as the NCP was popularly known, were a fascist force, encapsulating 
those fascist ideas that had been nurtured by a small minority during the Blueshirt 
years. However, O'Duffy's main motivation was his own self-interest and self- 
promotion though, lacking personal charisma, O'Duffy had no chance of emulating 
Hitler and Mussolini in inspiring a mass following. 
O'Duffy revived, reinvented and promoted nationalist and republican ideas in the 
nineteen-thirties, believing that a fascist state was the best way of realizing the united 
Ireland that he, like many others, had fought for after the 1916 Rising. I will argue 
that O'Duffy attempted to root his radical policies in Irish political culture. He had to 
legitimise his movement given the nature of post Civil-War Irish politics. Historians 
have failed to analyse the potential for fascism in Ireland prior to O'Duffy. I will 
argue that the ideas which were synthesized after World War One to form fascist 
movements throughout Europe were in evidence amongst the visionaries and leaders 
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of the Irish independence struggle and O'Duffy was able to twist these ideas, as other 
fascist leaders had done, to his own ends. However, these ideas were only one small 
aspect of the forces driving the nationalist struggle and they did not develop into an 
Irish form of fascism after independence. The ideas of regeneration, the embodiment 
of the National Will, a physical force tradition and hostility to the ideals of liberal 
parliamentary democracy coupled with a vehement hatred of the English had all been 
promoted by Irish nationalists. Fifteen years on, O'Duffy revived and used these 
ideas, placing them in a new setting inspired by the pan-European shirted movement 
of the thirties to create an Irish variant of fascism. 
Following his dismissal as Chief of Police by Eamon De Valera, in 1933, O'Duffy 
took over the leadership of the Army Comrades Association (The Blueshirts). He 
renamed the ACA as 'The National Guard' in order to broaden its appeal and 
membership. Ex-servicemen from the Free State Army had created the ACA in 
February 1932, under the leadership of Austin Brennan, as a non-political benevolent 
organization that aimed to look after the interests of its members, particularly those in 
need. Over the next five years, the organization assumed a number of different names 
and guises. It evolved into a movement to defend free speech, following the 
intimidation of politicians by the IRA, and ultimately into a political party, the NCP, 
advocating corporatist and fascist policies. 
In the months preceding the creation of the NCP, O'Duffy became actively involved 
in the international fascist scene. This had a decisive influence on the direction in 
which he was to lead his new party. Always a staunch nationalist and advocate of 
Irish unity, O'Duffy committed his party to a policy of 'palingenetic ultra- 
9 
nationalism" based on a cynical use of Irish nationalist mythology and a 
commitment to strong government coupled with a marked hostility to liberalism, 
parliamentarianism and communism. O'Duffy was an excellent organizer, and spent 
the months before the launch of the party trying to lay the foundations for a radical 
assault on the Irish political system. It was to be a frustrating period. 
Whilst the party failed to have any lasting impact on Irish politics, its significance 
for the historian lies in the eclectic source of the ideas for its political programme. 
Some of these ideas came from continental models, such as Mussolini's Italy and 
Salazar's Portugal. Other ideas, however, were a continuation and development of 
the ultra-nationalist, anti-democratic tradition strand of the independence movement. 
The myth of an independent Gaelic utopia that had been developed by the Irish 
cultural elite at the turn of the century was used by O'Duffy in an attempt to 
legitimise his movement, which was in reality heavily dependent on foreign political 
models such as Mussolini's Italy. 
The corporatist ideas that were central to the political package offered by the NCP 
were derived initially from the writings of Irish academics such as James Hogan and 
Michael Tierney, who advocated a form of corporatism inspired by Catholic social 
encyclicals. Corporatism was adopted for a time as party policy by Fine Gael under 
O'Duffy. Ernest Blythe took these ideas a stage further and it was this authoritarian 
corporatism that O'Duf4, promoted in the NCP. O'Duffy had nothing but praise for 
Mussolini's corporate state but I will also show that corporatist ideas had been 
advocated by nationalists like Griffith and discussed by Sinn Fein. 
Academics and historians have begun to show more interest in the period, 
particularly as the Irish Government has released a number of key files on the period 
'A term used by Roger Griffin in The Nature ofFascism (London, 199 1), passim. The use of this 
definition in locating O'Duffy's movement in the fascist camp is examined in chapter six of this thesis. 
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that provide new insight into the Blueshirts and other right-wing movements of the 
era. The Blueshirts have been the subject of two major books, Maurice Manning's 
The Blueshirls2 and Mike Cronin's The Blueshirts and Irish poliliCS. 3 A number of 
essays and articles have also appeared in print. The Blueshirt movement has also been 
4 the subject of at least two post-graduate theses. However, none of these historians 
has given serious consideration to the National Corporate Party. 
The only exception to this trend has been research done by Fearghal McGarry as 
part of a larger study on the influence of the Spanish Civil War on Irish politics in the 
nineteen-thirties. 5 McGarry devotes a sub-chapter to a brief overview of the NCP that 
sets the scene for the creation of O'Duffy's pro-Franco Irish Brigade. 6 Maurice 
Manning's The Blueshirts was the first published analysis of the Blueshirt movement. 
It is largely a chronological study, though the book concludes with two short chapters 
that attempt to analyse the political ideas of the Blueshirts and to assess to what extent 
the movement was fascist. Manning concludes that the Blueshirts were essentially a 
product of the Irish Civil War, and that those elements of fascism that did begin to 
emerge were quickly quashed when the movement was absorbed into Fine Gael in 
1933. However, Manning goes on to admit that: 
"... there were some, and especially O'Duffy, who did see the movement in an 
,, 7 international context, and would have been pleased to use the term 'fascist'. 
This faction was in a minority. The result, says Manning, is that "the movement had 
some of the appearance but little of the substance of fascism. "S 
2M. Manning, The Blueshirts (Dublin, 1971). 
3 M. Cronin, The Blueshirts and Irish Politics (Dublin, 1997). 
4 J. A. C. Ebert, , Irish Politics 1932-35. A Study of an Irish Political Movement (The Blueshirts), PhD. Thesis, Ball State University, New York, 1972. 
J. Heatley, The Blueshirt Movement. MSc. Thesis. Queen's University, Belfast, 1987. 
5 F. McGarry, Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War (Cork, 1999). 
6 The Irish Brigade was a volunteer militia, recruited by O'Duffy, which fought on the Nationalist side 
during the early years of the Spanish Civil War. 
7 M. Manning, The Blueshirts p. 243. 
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Manning gives very little space to discussing the NCP. He states that enthusiasm for 
the new party was half-hearted from the start: 
"Indeed, the tiredness and lethargy which surrounded its inception and the absence 
of any manifest enthusiasm for the inaugural meeting were to be characteristic of its 
future fortunes 
... 
No attempts were made to Organize branches on a nationwide basis; 
no attempts were made to hold meetings throughout the country; nor were there any 
attempts at publicity-seeking. "9 
My research will show that O'Duffy initially expended as much energy on this 
venture as on any other of his many projects, with the result that a party with a small 
but active core membership of extremists was in existence by the summer of 1935. In 
spite of his effort I am in agreement with other historians that O'Duffy's movement 
failed to have any lasting impact and quickly went into rapid decline over the year of 
its active life. 
Manning does, however, make it clear that the foundation of the NCP was a move 
in a more openly fascist direction: 
"He saw the Blueshirts as part of a world-wide phenomenon and was quick to 
identify himself as its leader. He was pleased to call himself as Fascist and 
enthusiastically immersed himself in the affairs of international Fascism, supported 
Mussolini's invasion of Abyssinia and fought with Franco in Spain. His Fascism may 
have been emotional and instinctive rather than intellectual but he certainly took it 
seriously ... 
he saw himself as a Fascist leader of a Fascist movement, and that is what 
he wanted. "10 
8 Ibid. p. 244. 
9 Ibid. p. 200. 
10 Ibid. pp. 229-230. 
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Mike Cronin's The Blueshirls and Irish Polilics' 1 takes a thematic approach to the 
subject, looking specifically at leaders and ideology, membership, the economic war 
with Britain, 12 and the social life of the Blueshirts. Ile accepts that there were fascists 
in the movement and discusses the dichotomy between the politics of some of the 
leaders, such as O'Duffy and Ernest Blythe, and the motivation of the rank-and-file 
membership. Ile classifies the movement, using Griffin's definition of fascism, 13 as 
potentially para-fascist. 14 Cronin describes the Blueshirts as: 
"... a movement which skirted around the ideologies of generic fascism, yet 
which had at its core a group committed to a new political order if the Free State 
experiment collapsed under the guidance of De Valera. "' 5 
Cronin argues that it was the influence of the rank-and-file that reduced the fascist 
potential of the Blueshirt movement. Cronin interviewed a cross-section of former 
Blueshirts and discovered that the ordinary Blueshirt member was motivated by the 
disastrous effects of government policies on farming, particularly the economic war 
with Britain. Cronin is able to demonstrate that there was a distinct split between a 
youthful, rural-based rank-and-file membership who were largely concerned with 
domestic and economic issue, and a middle-aged, Dublin-based leadership who 
tended to look to the continent for ideas to solve Ireland's problems. 16 
Like Manning, Cronin is dismissive of the NCP, but agrees that it was "openly 
fascist" 17 and that by 1935, O'Duffy was clearly a fascist. 18 He believes that it was 
11 M. Cronin, The Blueshirts and Irish Politics (Dublin, 1997). 
12 The economic war between Ireland and Britain was a tit-for-tat raising of tariffs on imports and 
exports which followed on from the Free State's defaulting on half-yearly annuity payments to Britain. 
13 R. Griff in, The Nature ofFascism (London, 1991), p. 26: "Fascism is a genus of political ideology 
whose mythic core in its various permutations is a palingenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism. " 
14 Para-fascist movements have much of the trappings, rhetoric and authoritarian nature of fascism but 
44will react to genuine fascism as a threat" (Griffin, R., The Nature of Fascism, p. 122). 
"M. Cronin, The Blueshirts and Irish Politics pp. 62-65. 
16 ]bid, pp. 127-134. 
17 [bid, p. 25. 
" Ibid, p. 63. 
12 
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this overt expression of fascism that precluded most Blueshirts from joining O'Duffy 
after the split from Fine Gael. Cronin cites a membership figure of only eighty for the 
NCP, without acknowledging a source. My analysis of Blueshirt material in the 
National Archives will prove that this figure is a serious underestimate of the party's 
strength. However, it is also clear from research statistics that the movement was 
never a mass party and that it failed to emulate the success of the Blueshirts. 
Fearghal McGarry's Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War' 9 gives useful 
background information on the events leading up to the creation of O'Duffy's Irish 
Brigade. The author provides a brief introduction to the NCP, following a short 
outline of O'Duffy's earlier involvement with the Blueshirts. In discussing the level 
of activity of the NCP, McGarry echoes Manning in concluding that, "O'Duffy made 
little attempt to establish branches or attract publ iCity,,, 20 and goes on to state that 
O'Dufly's involvement in the Spanish Civil War was "a response to his marginal 
position in Irish PolitiCS.,, 21 Ile blames the failure of the NCP on O'Duffy's declining 
leadership skilIS22 and the lack of support for fascism in Ireland . 
23 
Robert Stradling's The Irish and the Spanish Civil War, 1936_1 939 24 gives little 
information about the NCP before the outbreak of the Spanish conflict, but he argues 
that the party played a key role in recruiting, and maintaining support for, O'Duffy's 
Irish Brigade. Stradling describes General O'Duffy as "... the main founder of the 
Irish fascist movement, the Blueshirts, which in 1933-34 mushroomed into what was 
-in relative terms- the largest non-goveming fascist organization in the world. q125 
19F. McGarry, Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War (Cork, 1999). 
20 Ibid, p. 23. 
21 Ibid, p. 26. 22 Ibid, p. 43. 23 Ibid, p. 35. 
24 R. Stradfing, The Irish and the Spanish Civil War 1936-1939 (Manchester, 1999). 
25 Ibid, p. 1. 
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Several historians have analysed the Blueshirt and Greenshirt movements either in 
the context of inter-war Irish political history, or as a manifestation of fascism, but 
most have been over-reliant on Manning's book as their main source of information. 
Roger Griffin's The Nature ofFascism, 26 describes the NCP as "an out-and-out 
fascist movement that was not even worth outlawing.,, 27 In the simplistic An 
Intelligent Person's Guide to Fascism, 28 Richard Griffith concludes that the 
Greenshirts were a form of "Catholic fascism, akin to the Portuguese model . "29 Bew, 
Hazelkom and Patterson in The Dynamics ofIrish Politics, 30 conclude that: 
"O'Duffy personally was a Fascist, albeit one capable of striking a very traditional, 
rural conservative note that was almost bucolic in its SimpliCity., 01 
Richard E. Finnegan, in his essay The Blueshirts ofIreland During the 1930s; 
32 Fascism Inverted describes the Blueshirts as "a peculiar variant in Ireland of 
continental fasciSM.,, 33 He clarifies this by stating that: 
"... the Blueshirts are fascist enough to warrant attention in terms of generic fascism 
but constitute in their creation, their maintenance, and their decay, an organization 
derived from the particular conditions of the Irish Civil War and as a reaction against 
the revived IRA's association with the governing party of Ireland. 1134 
Finnegan analyses the different phases of the movement and in describing its final 
manifestation, the NCP, he notes O'Duffy's commitment to the international fascist 
scene. He erroneously concludes that: 
26 R. Griff in, The Nature ofFascism (London, 199 1). 
27 Ibid, p. 121. 
28 Griffith, R., An Intelligent Person's Guide to Fascism (London, 2000) 
29 Ibid. p. 121. 
'0 P. Bew, E. Hazelkorn and II. Patterson, The Dynamics ofIrish Politics (London, 1989). 
31 Ibid. 
32 R. B. Finnegan , 'The Blueshirts of Ireland During the 1930s; Fascism Inverted, ' in Eire-Irelandxxiv; 2 (Summer, 1989). 
33 Ibid, p. 78. 34 Ibid, p. 79. 
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"No organization was created. No meetings, no publicity and no votes. It was a 
still-born endeavour. , 35 
In the last decade, a large amount of material has become available following the 
release of previously closed government files in the National Archives, 
Dublin. 36 However, the historian is at a distinct disadvantage due to the lack of an 
NCP archive of primary source material. Until recently, the historian researching the 
NCP had to rely heavily on Manning's pioneering study. With the release of 
Department of Justice files on O'Duffy and the Blueshirts, the historian has a new 
source of material with which to correct many of the misconceptions that have led to 
the view that the Greenshirts/NCP was a movement with little or no substance. This 
thesis uses evidence that had been previously unavailable to the historian, in order to 
present the first systematic study of theNCP, the source of its corporatist ideas, and its 
ideological links to earlier Irish political ideas. Whilst agreeing with historians such as 
Cronin and McGarry that the movement was a short-lived, marginal phenomenon in 
Irish politics, this thesis will argue that it was not a paper exercise of O'Duffy's but a 
serious, albeit unsuccessful attempt, to introduce fascism onto the Irish political scene. 
During the war years, a number of small groups emerged with a blatantly fascist 
outlook, such as the Irish Friends of Germany and Ailtiri na hAiseirighe (Architects of 
Resurrection). The chapter on these groups will demonstrate the continued influence 
of leading Blueshirts/ Greenshirts, the overlap in membership, the common policy 
strands, and particularly the continued influence of corporatist ideas on the political 
right. The overtly pro-Axis inclination of these movements and their advocacy of 
fascist policies are evidence of a distinct fascist strand in Irish politics. Whilst 
35 ]bid, p. 79. 
36 Much of the new material on the Blueshirts is to be found in the Justice 8 Series of files, Department 
of Justice, in the National Archives of Ireland, Dublin. 
15 
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acknowledging a debt to continental ideas, however, they continued to claim to be 
rooted in the Irish political experience. 
My analysis of the NCP, its history, organization and successors, will demonstrate 
that a particular form of Irish fascism did arise in Ireland in the thirties and that it had 
its roots in the independence struggle. O'Duffy hijacked the myths of Gaelic 
nationalism, combined them with Catholic social theory and added the trappings of 
continental fascism in an attempt to produce a distinct political programme. The party 
was rightly regarded by many as an irrelevancy and a foreign import. O'Duffy knew 
that to have any chance of success he would have to give his fascism a distinct Irish 
angle by adding the myths of Irish republicanism, thereby hoping to give his 
movement the legitimacy it needed if it was to be successful in the polarised 
nationalist climate of Free State politics. 
16 
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CHAPTER ONE: BUILDING A FASCIST MOVEMENT 
THE LIFE AND TIMES OF GENERAL E01N O'D UFFY 
Eoin O'Duffy was bom in County Monaghan, in the Irish province of Ulster, in 
1890, the son of a farmer. ' As an adult, he found employment an assistant surveyor. 
He was not involved in the Easter Rising of 1916 but he joined the Irish Volunteers2in 
1917. He was also a member of the Irish Republican Brotherhood 3 and became a 
member of the Supreme Council of that organization. 4 He was actively involved in the 
independence struggle in Ulster and, in 1921, he became Director of Organization of 
the Irish Republican Army5 GHQ staff. He was Deputy Chief of Staff of the IRA at 
the time of the Anglo-Irish Treaty (192 1) that set up the Irish Free State. He was 
elected TD (Member of the Dad) for Monaghan in the second Dail .7 
Ernest Blythe, 
later his colleague in the Blueshirts, was elected to the same multi-member 
constituency. O'Duffy supported the Treaty settlement and he became closely 
8 
associated with Michael Collins. During the Irish Civil War, O'Duffy was General of 
South-Westem Command for the pro-Treaty government forces. During the war, in 
September 1922, the Irish Government appointed him as Commissioner of Police 
(Garda Siochana), and for a short while, at the time of the 1924 army mutiny, he was 
appointed as head of the anny. 9 He was Commissioner of Police during the whole 
1 F. McGarry, Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War (Cork, 1999), p. 18. 
2 The Irish Volunteers was a militia founded in 1913 to support Home Rule for Ireland. The Volunteers 
split over the issue of recruitment for the British army. The more radical minority was involved in the 
1916 Rising. 
3 The IRB was a revolutionary, nationalist organization, the Supreme Council of which organized the 
1916 Rising. 
4 F. McGarry, Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War p. 18. 5 The IRA was the successor to the Volunteers and Army of the Republic. 
6 Dail Eireann, the Irish Parliament. 
7 F. McGarry, Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War, p. 18. 8 M. Cronin, The Blueshirts and Irish Politics p. 74. Michael Collins had played a major part in the 
Anglo-Irish War, had signed the Treaty and became Minister of Finance in the new government. He 
was shot by anti-Treaty forces during the Irish Civil War. 
9F. McGarry, Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War p. 19. 
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period of the Cosgravelo administration, but De Valera's Fianna Fail government 
dismissed him after its second election victory in 1933.11 
O'Duffy was an excellent organizer and was largely responsible for creating an 
effective, unarmed police force in the Irish Free State. 12 Members of the Garda 
Siochana held him in great affection for his tireless promotion of their welfare during 
his time as Commissioner. 13 He provided cultural and sporting activities for the 
Gardai through an organization called the Costa Siamsa. He was later to provide for a 
similar range of social activities as the leader of the Blueshirts. 14 He realized the 
importance of a programme of events as a means of recruiting young people to the 
movement, particularly in rural areas where there was little entertainment. 
O'Duffy had been prominent in the National Athletic and Cycling Association' 5 and 
had managed the Irish team as Chefdequipe at the 1932 Los Angeles Olympic 
Games. 16 He was also prominent in the Gaelic Athletic Association. ' 7 O'Duffy was 
responsible for much of the organization surrounding the international Eucharistic 
Congress of 1932 that took place in Dublin. The event attracted huge numbers of 
people, including cardinals and political dignitaries from around the world. 18 
De Valera's dismissal of O'Duffy was a result of political pressure from within 
Fianna Fail and also from the IRA. De Valera needed a man whom he could trust at a 
time of potential social and political unrest caused by the transfer of power to the 
'0 William Cosgrave became President of the Executive Council of the Free State in 1922, and his 
Curnann na nGaedheal party held power until 1932. 
1 Oxford Companion to Irish History, Ed. S. J. Connolly (Oxford, 1998), p. 405. 
12 F. McGarry, Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War p. 19. 
" G. Allen, The Garda Siochana (Dublin, 1999). Chapter 6 is an overview of O'Duffy's role in the 
creation of a modem Irish police force. 
14 M. Cronin, The Blueshirts and Irish Politics Chapter 7, 'Politics as Pastime, ' pp. 168-192. 
15 O'Duffy left the sum of one hundred pounds to the NACA to purchase a silver challenge sup to be 
known as 'The General O'Du ffy Perpetual Challenge Cup, ' to be competed for in an event at the 
discretion of the Association. General O'Dufly's Last Will and Testament, NAL 
16 M. Manning, The Blueshirts p. 67. 
17 The GAA was founded in 1884 by Michael Cusack to promote Irish sports such as hurling and 
Gaelic football. It was closely connected to the nationalist movement. 
" The Roman Catholic Church organized the Eucharistic Congress in order to promote devotion to the 
Blessed Sacrament. Over one million people attended a special Mass in Dublin's Phoenix Park. 
18 
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outgoing government's Civil War enemies. Opposition parties, namely Cumann na 
nGaedheal and the National Centre Party, and some of the Irish press (particularly the 
Irish Times), spoke out against O'Duffy's dismissal, and Cumann na nGaedheal 
politicians such as Cosgrave painted him as a political martyr. 19 In reality, in the run- 
up to the 1932 General Election, the Cumann na nGaedheal administration had 
already begun to discuss his replacement as he had, as Ernest Blythe put it some years 
,, 20 later, "... gradually become too arbitrary and obstinate. One proposal of Cosgrave's 
had been to send him as Ireland's ambassador to Washington. 21 
Officers of the ACA, including Tierney and Blythe, approached O'Duffy on his 
return from holiday in May 1933 with the intention of offering him the leadership of 
the organization. 22At a special ACA convention in Dublin on July 20'h, O'Duffy was 
elected as the new leader of the movement. He used the rest of the conference to 
initiate the major changes that would transform the organization into a major shirted 
movement with its own political agenda. 
IRELAND IN THE THIRTIES: THE EMERGENCE OF THE BLUESHIRTS 
As leader of the Blueshirts, O'Duffy headed a movement whose political 
programme he developed and made his own. O'Duffy had a vision of a corporate, 
authoritarian republic led by himself which he hoped would come to fruition through 
the efforts of the Blueshirts and Fine Gael. However, he was to find out that the 
movement he had co-opted was unwilling to follow him down his increasingly fascist 
path. O'Duffy saw the emergence of the Blueshirts as a response to crisis which 
19 M. Manning, The Blueshirts p. 69. 
20 See Ernest Blythe writing in The Irish Times, 2 November 1970. 
21G. Allen, The Garda Siochana p. 105. 
22 M. Manning, The Blueshirls pp. 69-7 1. 
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threatened the political or economic ruin of Ireland. He even argued that a possible 
revolution might end in a communist seizure of power. The following sub-chapter 
puts the appearance of Ireland's shirted movement in the context of a small nation 
emerging from a bitter war of independence and a bloody civil war. The animosities 
engendered by these military struggles continued to be a deciding factor in politics. 
The Blueshirts were a response to the crisis of politics and economics in nineteen- 
thirties Ireland. During the twenties, a decade of comparative stability after the 
disruption of the War of Independence and the Irish Civil War, the foundations of a 
liberal-democratic constitutional state were laid down kv Cumann na nGaedheal, a 
conservative political party that emerged from the pro-Treaty faction of Sinn Fein. 
Irish political life continued to be polarized by the Treaty issue. The defeat of 
Curnann na nGaedheal in 1932 after ten years in office, and the elevation to power of 
Eamon De Valera and his anti-Treaty, republican Fianna Fail party, threatened to 
challenge the stability of the infant Irish Free State. The Thirties also saw the re- 
emergence of the IPLA as a major, now legalized, para-military force. The Blueshirts 
appeared on the scene at the same time. Civil War animosities, never very deeply 
buried, flared again, and a climate of mistrust, increased lawlessness and political 
violence threatened the stability of the infant democracy. An economic slump, 
exacerbated by Fianna Fail's tariff war with Britain, fuelled the disputes between left 
and right, government and opposition, the IRA and the Blueshirts. It led some to 
question the continued existence of a political structure which seemed to 
institutionalise Ireland's continued dependence on Britain, and to seek a radical 
solution for its replacement. 
A reinvigorated IRA, legalized and tolerated by an acquiescent Fianna Fail 
government, gave rise to a fear of a revival of Civil War animosities. This fuelled the 
20 
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rapid growth of the Army Comrades Association in 1932-33. The ACA had originally 
been formed to support ex-servicemen of the Free State Army. These same men now 
saw their erstwhile Civil War enemies in power. The ACA rapidly broadened its 
appeal and became associated with Cumann na nGaedheal, whose candidates it had 
defended from hecklers during the 1932 and 1933 election campaigns, 23 thereby 
demonstrating their commitment to the right to free speech. 24 The IRA had become 
increasingly violent towards politicians who they believed had betrayed the Irish 
Republic. The outgoing Cumann na nGaedheal government had been formed from the 
pro-Treaty faction in the second Dail and to the doctrinaire republicans of the IRA 
they were regarded as traitors. 25 
Under the leadership of O'Duffy, the Blueshirts began to take on a political 
complexion of their own. Renamed as the National Guard on the 20th jUly 1933, the 
movement initially sought a position in politics independent of Cumann na 
nGaedheal. Under O'Duffy, the Blueshirts adopted policies supporting the creation of 
a corporate state, the reunification of Ireland and the promotion of law and order 
(important in a state where memories of civil war were still fresh, and where an armed 
terrorist organization, the IRA, was still very active). They also took a firm stance 
against communism and strongly opposed the government's policies on land annuities 
and the conduct of the economic war with Great Britain. 26 The Fianna Fail 
government increasingly saw the Blueshirts as a potential threat to democracy, largely 
based on impressions of shirted movements abroad, and banned the organization. 
23 For example, the attack on C na nG candidates by hecklers at Paulstown, Kilkenny as reported in The 
Kilkenny People, 8'h October 1932. 
24 M. Cronin, The Blueshirts and Irish Politics p. 20. 
25 See An Phoblacht, the leading republican newspaper, especially late 1933-early 1934, for an analysis 
of the Blueshirts from a Republican perspective. 
26 Land annuities were loan repayments due to the British government for land purchases under the 
Land Acts of 1891-1909. By the terms of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, they were to be collected by the Irish 
Government and handed over to the British. De Valera continued to collect the annuities but refused to 
transfer them to Britain. A tariff war ensued that was disastrous to the Irish economy, and for the 
farmers who provided the overwhelming majority of exports. 
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However, events were to push the movement into an alliance with Cumann na 
nGaedheal and the National Centre Party. O'Duffy had decided to lead thirty 
thousand Blueshirts in a march to Leinster House, the seat of Dail Eireann, in honour 
27 28 
of Michael Collins, Arthur Griffith and Kevin O'Higgins. The four weeks' notice 
of the march gave the government time to assess the situation. They feared that there a 
serious prospect of public disorder, and perhaps even an attempt to emulate 
Mussolini's March on Rome, and so they responded by not only banning the march, 
but also the National Guard . 
29 Re-named the Young Ireland Association, the 
Blueshirts were forced by further government repression into an electoral alliance to 
form Fine Gael, nicknamed "the cripple alliance" by Fianna Fail's Sean Lemass. 30 
Maurice Manning believes O'Duffy was chosen as President of Fine Gael due to 
Centre Party pressure. The party hierarchy was worried that with Cosgrave as leader 
the new alliance would be perceived as a mere continuation of Cumann na 
31 
nGaedheal. It was an electoral alliance that had to unite different factions promoting 
an eclectic mixture of ideas ranging from traditional conservatism 32 to fascism, 33 each 
vying to see their ideas adopted as official party policy. 
THE ECONOMIC CRISIS A ND THE BL UESHIR T SPLIT 
Post-independence Ireland had a peripheral economy geared to supplying the market 
of its former administrator, and closest neighbour, Great Britain. During the years of 
27 Arthur Griff ith was President of the Dail in 1922 and the founder of Sinn Fein. 
28 Kevin O'Higgins was the assassinated Minister of Justice in the Cumann na nGaedheal 
administration in the twenties. 
29 M. Cronin, The Blueshirts and Irish Politics p. 22. 
3OSean Lemass was Minister for Industry and Commerce 1932-9. 
" M. Manning, Courage to Succeed (Dublin, 1933), p. 23. 
32 Men like Cosgrave and Dillon, as long-standing members of C na nG and the Centre Party were 
Folitical and economic conservatives. 
3 Men like O'Dufly, Blythe and Gunning moved in an increasingly fascist direction as the thirties 
progressed. 
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British rule, Ireland had become a major supplier of agricultural produce to the British 
market. Independence had not fundamentally changed this relationship of economic 
subservience and dependency. 34 The close links with Britain had led to a 
specialization in dairy farming in large parts of the country, particularly in the south, 
in order to supply the British market, whilst the west of Ireland was largely involved 
in subsistence farming on small-scale holdings. 35 The Free State was a classic 
example of a peripheral economy with few manufacturing industries, a small range of 
goods, low living standards and vulnerability to market fluctuations. 36 The effects of 
the economic war on a nation which was only marginally industrialized and relied on 
farming for its main exports were not uniform across the whole country, but mainly 
affected those areas that produced for the metropolitan market. 37 
The economic war fuelled the growth of the Blueshirt movement, coming as so 
soon after the economic privations following on from the Wall Street Crash (1929). It 
was a further threat to the livelihood of larger farmers and the surrounding 
communities. The Blueshirts opposed the government's economic policies, which 
threatened to damage the very infrastructure of the Irish economy. Fianna Fail geared 
its economic policies towards reducing Ireland's dependence on Britain through a 
gradual process that was intended to re-orientate agriculture away from dairy farming 
and the export market to a concentration on tillage and subsistence farming. 38 Fianna 
Fail hoped that by concentrating on the cultivation of wheat, Ireland would be able to 
support a larger population, thereby reducing the number of those forced to emigrate 
due to economic necessity. Fianna Fail used the implementation of more tariffs on 
imported goods to stimulate the creation of an industrial sector catering for the home 
34 A. W. Orridge, 'The Blueshirts and the Economic War' in Poldical Sludies 31: 3 (September, 1983). 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Great Britain was Ireland's metropolitan market. 
38 A. W. Orridge, 'The Blueshirts and the Economic War. ' 
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market. 39 The argument over economic policy produced a cleavage between those 
who sought to loosen ties with Britain, and those who wanted to keep those ties for 
economic reasons. The economic war hurt agriculture badly, the price of cattle 
halving between 1932 and 1935.40 In turn, it raised questions about sovereignty, land 
rights and land use. Irish economic activity had peaked in 1929, and the early Thirties 
saw a rapid decrease in output, trade and employment. 41 
As a major focus of the anti-government campaign, the issue of land annuity 
payments and the economic war had led to violence, illegal activity, and increasingly 
aggressive speeches from O'Duffy and other Blueshirts such as Ned Cronin and 
Major Coughlan. It was O'Duffy's encouragement of illegal activities, such as the 
non-payment of land annuities and the obstruction of the sale of sequestered cattle, 
which finally led the Fine Gael executive to seek his resignation as party leader. 
Contrary to Fine Gael policy, the annual Blueshirt Convention of I 9th August 1934 
had passed a resolution calling on farmers to withhold the payment of land annuities 
42 
and for labourers to refuse to pay their rates. O'Duffy's intemperate speeches were 
out of line with the constitutionalism of men like Cosgrave, Dillon and McGilligan. 
It was a clear threat to the interests of the pro-metropolitan conservatives of Fine 
Gael, and they reacted accordingly. The Executive had failed to control O'Duffy and 
they could not risk being associated with the unconstitutional and illegal tactics that 
he was advocating. Cumann na nGaedheal had spent ten years in office building up 
Ireland's standing as a democratic nation with a liberal, free-market economy, a 
balanced budget and a reputation for financial prudence. 
'9 In 193 1, there were 68 Articles concerning tariffs. By 1936, there were 28 1. P. J. Neary and C. 
O'Grada, 'Protection, Economic War and Structural Change: The 1930s in Ireland, ' in Irish Historical 
Studies, vol. xxvii-. 107, (May 1981). 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Anonymous editorial, 'The Irish Free State: the Split in the Opposition, ' in Round Table, vol. 97 
(December 1934). 
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After he had left Fine Gael, O'Duffy continued to make inflammatory speeches 
such as that in Dublin on 2 nd of November 1934; these were described by the Garda 
as seditious due to his continued advocacy of the non-payment of annuities. 
43 
O'Duffy also wanted to make the economic war a national, rather than a party 
political, issue. He was also advocating an agricultural policy of increased land tillage 
and the breaking up of larger farms, coupled with the redistribution of land, hardly 
ideas likely appeal to the larger farmers who provided so much of Fine Gael's 
electoral base. Such a policy would mean a stress on subsistence rather than dairy 
farming, a policy much closer to that of Fianna Fail than to his colleagues. 
Whilst most members of the Blueshirt movement were concerned with domestic 
issues such as the payment of land annuities, leases, remuneration for ex-servicemen 
and free speech, O'Duffy and a core of influential right-wing academics 44 were trying 
to steer the party in a different direction in which continental political ideas, not 
domestic issues, were the defining mark. As his speeches became more out of step 
with the policies of his Fine Gael colleagues, O'Duffy felt himself pressurized by 
members of the Executive into resigning his position as party President. The demands 
made by his party colleagues, for example that he submit his speeches in advance to 
the Executive for approval, made O'Duffy feel that his position was untenable. 45 He 
felt unable to comply with the demands of the Executive because he believed that this 
would have severely curtailed his freedom to express his ideas publicly. 
Another contentious subject was the Ulster situation. O'Duffy was speaking out for 
more vigorous action on the North. The Executive of Fine Gael had also objected to 
General O'Duffy's belligerent speeches on the Northern problem and his proposal to 
43 Garda Report on Seditious Utterance by O'Duffy on 2 nd November 1934, at Mansion House, Dublin. 
JUS8/70, NAL 
44 These key thinkers included James Hogan, Professor of History, University College, Cork, and 
Michael Tierney, Professor of Greek at University College, Dublin. See Chapter 4. 
45 p. j. Coughlan, The Truth; The Story ofthe Blueshirts p. 6-8. 
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set up Blueshirt branches across the border in Northern Ireland, in defiance of a ban 
on the organization by the government of the province. 46 O'Duffy had even gone so 
far as to advocate military action by the Free State Army against the British 
occupation forces in the North, if necessary. 47 
Government bans had forced O'Duffy into an uneasy alliance with Cumann na 
nGaedheal and the National Centre Party. For a short while, the pressure from his 
party colleagues held O'Duffy back from espousing the more radical ideas that he had 
been developing. As President of Fine Gael, O'Duffy had promoted the corporatist 
ideas of men like Tierney, Hogan and Blythe. Corporatism, introduced into the 
coalition by the Blueshirts, was adopted as official party policy but received only 
lukewarm support from the Executive. The corporate policy involved the creation of 
intermediate quasi-governmental organizations of workers and employees to make 
decisions on issues governing particular industries and occupations. O'Duffy found 
this lack of support from the Executive frustrating. His demand for the end of a 
twenty-six county parliamentary democracy and its replacement with a thirty-two 
county corporate republic clearly put him outside the frame of reference of most of his 
conservative colleagues. None of these radical policies of O'Duffy were acceptable to 
the traditionalists who dominated the Fine Gael hierarchy. In his defence, after the 
split, O'Duffy was to claim that he had been trying to create a populist initiative to 
goad apathetic Fine Gael politicians into action. 48 When the Executive failed to 
respond to his programme, O'Duffy took his radical domestic agenda and combined it 
with a blend of continental-influenced corporatism and ultra-nationalism to form the 
policy basis for his new National Corporate Party. 
46 An Phoblacht, 'O'Duffy Wants to Wade in Blood, '25 th August 1934. 
47 Speech by O'Duffy at Cavan, 29" Au ust 1934, reported in The Anglo-Celt, I" September 1934 
48 Letter from Dillon to MacDermot, 25'ý September 1934, MacDermot Papers, 1065/2/4, NAL 
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By co-opting the Blueshirts, the conservative Fine Gael alliance had hoped to tame 
their radicalism and to use their enthusiasm, youth and numbers to revive their 
political fortunes. Fine Gael was able to control the more radical elements for a short 
time. It was frustrating for O'Duffy as he came to realize that he wanted to move in a 
different direction from his colleagues. Most of the members of the Fine Gael alliance 
were unwilling to follow him and neither were most Blueshirts. 
The constitutional ists on the Fine Gael Executive were unwilling to countenance 
O'Duffy's behaviour and he felt himself forced into resigning as President of the 
49 party, before he was voted out, on 21" September 1934 , though 
he denied that in so 
doing he had also relinquished the post of Director-General of the League of Youth. 50 
He had every intention of remaining as Director-General. The result was a split 
between his supporters and the section now commanded by Ned Cronin that was still 
subsidiary to the Fine Gael party organization. Cronin had been a founder member of 
the Army Comrades Association, and he remained an active Blueshirt. He had joined 
Fine Gael as one of its Vice-Presidents, one of the three appointed by O'Duffy. In 
1933, Cronin had been charged and imprisoned for sedition and had spent three 
months in gaol5l and, like O'Duffy, Cronin could be an intemperate speaker; at 
Tipperary on 14"' July 1934, he had said: 
"De Valera has spoken about dictatorship, but I say here tonight if a dictatorship is 
,, 52 necessary for the Irish people we are going to have one. 
The choice of Cronin to replace O'Duffy seems strange in the light of Cronin's 
background and Fine Gael's concern about constitutional methods, but Cronin was 
popular within the movement. Cronin was not an intellectual and he did not adhere to 
49 M. Manning, The Blueshirts, pp. 151-156. 
50P. J. Coughlan, The Truth; The Story of the Blueshirts (Cork, 1935), pp. 4-6. 51 Ibid. p. 116. 
52 Cited by the Minister for Justice, Dail Debates, Vol. 53. Col. 2566-73, NAL 
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the ideas of the corporatists within the party. 53 At this time, the Blueshirts were at the 
peak of their popularity and Fine Gael could not risk alienating this element in the 
coalition. The Executive of Fine Gael no doubt felt that it would be easier for them to 
control Cronin than O'Duffy. They did eventually close down the League of Youth in 
1936, not without some opposition from Cronin however. At the time of the split, 
many chose to leave rather than take sides, causing irreparable damage to both 
factions of the movement. 54 
Pushed out of the political mainstream, O'Duffy was free to advocate those 
policies for which his erstwhile colleagues had increasingly censured him, inspired by 
his involvement on the international fascist scene. O'Duffy had made the mistake of 
assuming that he could mould the Blueshirts into a fascist movement. He had no 
intention of repeating the mistake and the National Corporate Party he set up in 1935 
was completely under his own personal control. He took with him a small minority of 
the League of Youth who supported his views, or who were personally loyal to him. 
He left the remaining Blueshirts to a slow demise as Fine Gael gradually wound down 
the League of Youth until they disbanded it altogether in late 1936.55 
PREPARING THE GROUND 
A number of attempts were made during October 1934 by the maverick right-wing 
politician, Patrick Belton T. D., 56 to reunite the fractured Blueshirt movement and have 
O'Duffy reinstated as the leader. Belton made several efforts to bring Cronin and 
53 M. Cronin, The Blueshirts ad Irish Politics p. 77. 
54 F. McGarry, Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War p. 118. 
55M. Cronin The Blueshirts and Irish Politics p. 3 7. 
56 During a long political career, Belton sat in the Dail for Fianna Fail, Cumann na nGaedheal, the 
National Centre Party, Fine Gael and as an Independent. fie formed the Irish Christian Front to raise 
money for the Nationalist side in the Spanish Civil War. 
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O'Duffy together in order to come to some agreement and restore unity. Not only did 
he fail to do so, but Belton's persistence led to his dismissal from Fine Gael following 
a motion tabled to the Executive by Dr. T. F. O'Higgins. 57 The next few months saw 
58 
verbal and physical confrontations between the two Blueshirt factions. O'Duffy 
went ahead with the reorganization of his rump Blueshirt following. Few leaders and 
officers in the movement had joined him so he began by appointing new officers and 
reorganizing branches. On 6 th October 1934, he launched a new paper, The Blueshirt, 
59 
which began to appear weekly. It was largely written and edited by O'Dufry. 
It did not take O'Duffy very long to start to prepare for his re-entry into electoral 
politics. On 18'h October 1934, at a Blueshirt convention in Ballytofey, County 
Donegal, Patrick Belton announced that a new party, with O'Duffy as its leader, 
would soon be launched. However, Belton warned that a new party could only be 
launched once the Blueshirt movement had consolidated its organization, "for any. 
new party that may be launched will have to absolutely depend on the Blueshirt 
,, 60 movement. He reiterated that the new party, which he provisionally named 'The 
National Party, ' would be "above everything, a Blueshirt party.,, 6 1 Belton hoped to 
win over to O'Duffy those Blueshirts who had hitherto remained with Cronin and 
Fine Gael. He announced that the party's main platform would be its corporatist 
policy and that an electoral victory at both local and national levels would give the 
party the mandate to carry through a radical programme of constitutional change. 62 
The following month, in Listowel, County Kerry, a convention of western 
Blueshirts discussed the formation of a new party to be called I the National 
57 Dr. O'Higgins was the second leader of the ACA in 1932. lie was a strong supporter of corporatism. 
58 M. Manning, The Blueshirls pp. 170-17 1. 
59 Ibid, p. 169. 
60 Patrick Belton TD, quoted in 'The New Party, ' in The Blueshirt, 24' November 1934. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
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Association. ' In contrast to Belton's earlier statement, those present assumed that 
Belton himself would emerge as the leader as he already had a seat in the Dail , 
63 
whereas O'Duffy did not. The pressure to launch a new party seemed to be gaining 
momentum as on 14 th November, Patrick Belton, speaking at Lifford, County 
Donegal, announced: 
"We intend to build on the Blueshirt organization a national political party that, 
we hope, in a few years will out both Fianna Fail and Fine Gael. 5964 
Belton went on to say that overtures had been made to him to set up a new party, 
and that he was pleased to be associated in this venture with Mr William R. Kent T. D. 
of Cork. 65 
That same month, a meeting of the county and district staff of the Sligo and Leitrim 
Divisions of the League of Youth (O'Duffy Section) passed resolutions calling on 
deputies in the Dail who had been elected with Blueshirt votes to stand by O'Duffy, 
leave Fine Gael, and help set up the new party. The meeting urged county and local 
councillors to do the same. 66 
On December 22 nd 1934, The Blueshirt printed several letter arguing the case for 
and against the League of Youth transforming itself into a political party, 67 a possible 
move on the part of O'Duffy to encourage debate at branch level. On 4 Ih December 
1934, he had issued letters to all branches of the League of Youth appealing for funds 
68 
specifically to launch a new party and to pay for electioneering expenses. The sum 
he asked for was ten thousand pounds, a considerable amount. 69 This financial appeal 
63 'Mr Belton Likely to be Leader, ' The Irish Press, 20th November 1934. 
64 Ibid. 
63 William R. Kent was T. D for West Cork, a stronghold of the Blueshirt movement. lie had been a 
colleague of Belton's in the Centre Party. 
66 'Mr Belton Likely to be Leader, ' The Irish Press, 20'h November 1934. 
67 The Blueshirt, 22 December 1934, 'Letters. ' 
68 E. O'Duffy, Letter Appealing For Funds, 4 December 1934, D/Jus8/286, NAL 
69 Ibid. 
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was accompanied by A Summary of the Policy ofthe New Movement. 70 It was a very 
modest two-page document written by O'Duffy. There were no new policy initiatives 
different from those of previous Blueshirt organizations. The main points were: the 
need for national unity; an end to the economic war; anti-communism; the 
corporatization of economic life and the protection of free speech. 
The defence of free speech had been part of the Blueshirt agenda since its inception 
as the ACA. In 1932, it had referred to the problem of the IRA who had begun a 
concerted campaign to disrupt the electoral speeches of Cumann na, nGaedheal 
candidates. By 1935, it referred to the moves made by the Fianna Fail government to 
control the Blueshirts through legislation such as the bill to ban the wearing of 
political uniforms. 
Several items in the twelve point Summary referred to the awakening of the national 
spirit, patriotic self-reliance and the mobilization of youth "in a movement of 
, 41 constructive national action, an early indication of the direction in which O'Duffy 
intended to take his new party. However, it would be another six months before the 
party appeared. During this hiatus, O'Duffy channelled his energy into the 
international fascist scene through his attendance at several conferences abroad, and it 
was this that was to lead to the creation of a new fascist party in Ireland. 
O'D UFFY A ND INTERNA TIONA L FA SCISM 
O'Duffy had first shown an interest in Italian Fascism after a visit to Italy and a 
72 meeting with Mussolini during a Garda pilgrimage to Rome in 1929 . Thetwo 
hundred and fifty strong Garda contingent had wom the sky-blue ribbon of the 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
72 D. Keogh, Ireland and Europe 1919-48 (Dublin, 1988), pp. 41-42. 
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pilgrimage medal, a colour that was to soon represent O'Duffy's political movement. 
The Italian Government showed an interest in O'Duffy and his Blueshirts from an 
early stage. According to Keogh, O'Duffy was described as a fascist by Dino Grandi, 
the Italian ambassador to Great Britain. 73 
During his time as leader of the Blueshirts, O'Duffy had been careful to avoid the 
fascist label but by late 1934, with the increasing success of fascism abroad, not least 
Hitler's assumption of power in Germany, he was proud to be associated with 
international fascist conferences. It was at this time that O'Duffy made a trip to 
Switzerland to attend a conference sponsored by the German Nazis. A year later, in 
September 1935, he made a trip to Germany where he was feted by the Nazis. In the 
early days of the Irish Free State, the Irish Government attended a range of 
international conferences in order to build up its legitimacy as a genuine independent 
nation. 74 In like manner, O'Duffy seemed to be using the international fascist scene to 
appear as a major political figure playing an almost statesman-like role. 
Only the month before his resignation from Fine Gael, O'Duffy met with Terje 
Ballsrud, a member of the recently banned Norwegian Greyshirts, who was visiting 
Dublin. 75Ballsrud had already met with Oswald Mosley, leader of the British Union of 
Fascists, in London. The Norwegian fascist made a visit to Leinster House 
accompanied by Ernest Blythe, Tom Gunning and Ned Cronin, all leading members 
of the Blueshirts and Fine Gael. The meeting with Ballsrud is a further indication of 
the direction in which key figures in the movement were heading. Whilst in Dublin, 
Ballsrud also met with Lodi Fe who had been appointed by the Italian Government as 
cultural attachd to the Irish Free State. Lodi Fe was also in Dublin to promote Italian 
7' D. Keogh, Ireland and Europe 1919-48 pp. 41-2 
74 G. M. MacMillan, State, Society andAuthority in Ireland (Dublin, 1993), p. 202. 75 An Phoblacht, 'Greyshirt Leader's Visit, ' 18 August 1934. 
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fascism and he organized a section of the Italian community into the Fascio, Dublino 
Michel Angelo with Edward Tomacelli as its secretary. 76 
It was late in 1934 that O'Duffy made contact with other European corporatists and 
fascists in a series of meetings that were covered by the national press and The 
Blueshirt. In December 1934, he attended the International Action of Nationalism 
Conference in Zurich, which the Nazis had organized. Others in attendance included 
Oswald Mosley from Great Britain, General Pouderoux from France and Mr J. F. Hirst 
from the USA. The Nazis funded the conference, which was a forum for the 
discussion of Nazi ideas, including racist doctrines. 77 
The same month, O'Duffy attended the Montreux Conference organized by the 
Comitati dAzione per I'Universalita di Roma (CAUR), and sponsored by Mussolini's 
Government. CAUR had already shown some interest in the Blueshirts. Nicola 
Pascazio, representing CAUR, met with O'Duffy in Dublin, where the latter had 
confessed to him, in spite of all past and future statements to the contrary, that the 
MaTch on Leinster House, which led to the Goverment ban on the Blueshirts, had 
been intended to imitate Mussolini's March on Rome. He also informed Pascazio that 
he was not afraid of being labelled a dictator or a fascist. 78 Pascazio also met with 
Tom Gunning, O'Duffy's secretary. The Italian ambassador in London, Dino Grandi, 
believed that by August 1933, Ireland had progressed to the point where an Irish 
fascist revolution was inevitable. 79 Reporting to Mussolini Count Grandi stated: 
"We are witnessing a political movement that has courageously raised the standard 
of Fascism, the wish to pursue a revolutionary path. This is beyond all doubt. And this 
76 D. Keogh, Ireland and Europe 1919-1948 p. 9 1. 77 M. Cronin, The Blueshirts and Irish Politics p. 53. 7' Report of Signor Nicola Pascazio's mission in Ireland, February-March 1934, LImperio Briltanica, 
P. 14, as quoted in Ledeen, Universal Fascism (1972). 
79 D. Keogh, Ireland and Europe 1919-48 p. 46. 
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is the road that the younger Irish generation wishes to follow in order to achieve a 
united nation more quickly.,, 80 
O'Dufry left Dublin for Liverpool in December 1934, mis-infon-ning the Irish Press 
that he was going on holiday to PariS. 8 1 Two days later, under the headline, 'General 
O'Duffy at Secret Fascist Congress, ' the same newspaper detailed the activities of the 
Blueshirt leader at Montreux. 82 The Irish Press detailed the proceedings, but hinted 
that not all was above board about the conference. O'Duffy's original statement that 
he was on his way to Paris for a vacation did not help his case. 
Mussolini had set up the Montreux Conference in order to spread the fascist 
message and to boost his own prestige in the process. It was essentially a propaganda 
exercise. The Italian, Eugenio Coselschi, organized the conference. The conference 
admitted those organizations: 
"... who have their spirit open to the principles of political, economic and social 
renovation, based on the concepts of the hierarchy of the State and the principle of 
,, 83 collaboration between the classes. 
The conference laid stress on the universal aims of fascism. Whilst respecting the 
autonomy of national groups, the conference also accepted Coselschi's definition of 
the universal aspect of fascism: 
"... the reconstitution of a State on new bases, of a unified, strong and disciplined 
State, the organization of labour, liberties contained within sane and honest limits: 
installation of order and justice, agreement between classes; co-ordinated and solid 
go Dino Grandi to Mussolini, 3 Oth August 1933, No. 3020/1038 serie politici 193145, Irlanda, busta 
(box) 2 (1933) fasc. (file)'Rapporti Politici ASMAE', as cited in Keogh D., Ireland and Europe 1919- 
48, p. 46. 
8' Irish Press, 15'h December 1934. 
92 Irish Press, 17 th December 1934, 'O'Duffy at Secret Fascist Congress. ' 
83 Ottobre 1933, as cited in M. A. Ledeen, Universal Fascism (New York, 1972), p. H 6. 
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collaboration between producers ... And so the 'supernational' idea harmonizes 
perfectly with the national idea. iM 
CAUR would only admit those organizations committed to national revolution, "a 
revolution inspired by a true mysticism and an elevated idea founded on 
,, 85 corporativism. Clearly for the Italian organizers of the conference, O'Duffy and his 
movement satisfied these criteria. 
O'Duffy informed Irish journalists that the aim of the conference had been to 
discuss the corporate system, "as a means of promoting social justice and equality, 
and harmony between peopleS,,, 86 allowing each national group to share its views 
whilst encouraging each to follow its distinctive national path. The Blueshirt 
condemned the Irish Press for labelling the conference as both secret and fascist. The 
party paper pointed out that of the six sessions of the conference, all but one were 
open to the world's press. 87 On the issue of fascism, the Irish Press recorded that in 
his speech to the conference, O'Duffy had said that "the most that we can do at this 
,, 88 meeting is to recognize the general principles of fascism. 
O'Duffy was later to say that the term 'fascist' only referred to the corporate state 
in Italy and that, except for the corporatists in Britain '89 no-one else used this title. 
90 
Speaking at Creggs, County Galway in January 1935, O'Duffy remarked that 
Germany had not been represented at the conference at Montreux because Nazi policy 
was not compatible with the corporatist system. 91 In fact corporatist ideas were an 
important part of only some fascist party programmes, namely those of the fascist 
84 Ibid. 
"' Ibid. 
86 The Blueshirt, 22 nd December 1934, 'Corporate System Discussed. ' 
87 Ibid. 
88 Irish Press, 17'h December 1934, ' General O'Duffy at Secret Fascist Congress. ' 
89 By whom he meant the BUF. 
90 Irish Press, 29'h December 1934, 'General O'Duffy: His Interview with 11 Duce. ' 9' Irish Press, 7h January 1935, 'Montreux Conference. ' 
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parties of Italy, Great Britain, Belgium, France, Norway, the Netherlands and 
Ireland. 92 
The other groups represented at the conference were the Austrian Heimwehr, the 
Belgian Legion National Beige and Ligue Corporative du Travail, the Danish 
National Copset and National Socialist Party, the French Francistes, the Greek 
National Socialists, the Norwegian Nasjonal Samling, the Dutch Front Noir, 
representatives from the Portuguese government of Doctor Salazar, the Romanian 
Iron Guard, the Swedish National Union of Youth, the Spanish Falange, the Swiss 
Fascist Federation and the Lithuanian Nationalist Party. 93 
O'Duffy did not wear his Blueshirt uniform at the Congress, and did not explain 
why. His speech to the assembled delegates began by briefly outlining the history of 
his organization in Ireland. He claimed that the movement had: 
"... taken its present shape because it is based on the fundamental Christian 
,, 94 principles of hierarchy as opposed to Socialistic or Communist principles. 
The Blueshirts, he said, were not a movement rooted in the Irish Civil War, but had 
arisen "to prevent the Communists and her allies from terrorizing the civilian 
population. "95 Nonetheless, he appealed to Britain to give freedom to the whole of 
Ireland, without which there never could be lasting peace between the two nations. 
The Blueshirts, he continued, were educating the people of Ireland in the principles of 
corporatism. But, he added, and in keeping with one of the themes of the conference, 
,, 96 "that we must always reserve our right to adapt the system to an Irish mould. He 
cited the example of the corporatist organization of agriculture in Italy, a system 
which would not work in Ireland due to the overwhelming number of small farmers. 
92 O. E Shudekopf, Revolutions ofOur Time. Fascism. (London, 1973) p. 144 93 M. Cronin, The Blueshirts and Irish Politics p. 52. "The Blueshirt, 22nd December 1934, 'Corporate System Discussed. ' 
9' Ibid. 
% Ibid. 
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Ile concluded his speech with a tribute to Mussolini, particularly for respecting the 
97 
rights of religion. 
The conference unanimously passed a resolution purporting to condemn racial 
persecution in all its forms. However, the resolution at the same time denounced 
certain groups of Jews "... who installed themselves as if on foreign territory, openly 
or occultly [sic] exercising an influence harmful to the material and moral interests of 
the nation which shelters them, thus constituting a State within a State, profiting by all 
benefits while refusing all duties. "98 
O'Duffy informed the conference that there was no Jewish problem in Ireland and 
that he could "not subscribe to the principles of persecution of any race. "99 The 
Blueshirt reported that General O'Duffy had "strongly opposed any resolution which 
would countenance any hostile action against Jews, "100 but his agreement, by 
signature, to the above resolution belies this statement. However, anti-Semitism was 
not a key feature of all fascisms. Indeed, leaders such as Mussolini, Quisling and 
Mussert, with whom O'Duffy had close ideological links only adopted anti-Semitism 
at a late date largely in response to German ideological and political pressure. 
The Montreux Conference concluded by setting up a committee (to be known as 
'The Secretariat') to arrange future meetings and act as a co-ordinating committee for 
fascist propaganda and communication. ' 01 The Secretariat, also known as the 
Committee of Seven, was made up of the seven members who were to meet on a more 
regular basis than the full membership. O'Duffy was selected by the delegates as one 
of the Secretariat. 
97 This was O'Duff-y's perception of Mussolini's attitude towards Catholicism. In reality, Mussolini had 
little time for religion and his Concordat with the Papacy was a tactical move, not one motivated by 
faith. 
98 Irish Press, l8th December 1934, 'Fascist Congress and Jews. ' 
99 Irish Press, 29'h December 1934, 'General O'Duffy: His Interview with 11 Duce. ' 
100 The Blueshirt, 22 nd December 1934, 'Corporate System Discussed. ' 
10 1 M. Ledeen, Universal Fascism p. 123. 
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At the end of December 1934, after Montreux, O'Duffy went to Rome where he met 
with Mussolini and discussed such items as agriculture and the need for a nation's 
population to be physically fit and healthy. ' 02 The Duce invited him to return the 
following year. Whilst in Rome, O'Duffy also attended a meeting organized ky the 
right-wing Catholic organization Italia efide and was appointed to the recently 
created International Centre for Corporate Studies. Also in attendance at the meeting 
were Meyer, Fonjallez and Loutkie who had also been at Montreux. 103 This group 
represented a cleavage in those attending the Montreux Conference. Italia efide was 
trying to maintain a strong Catholic influence over the developing corporatist 
movement in the hope of stifling the more statist element in favour of a more Catholic 
approach in line with the Papal social encyclicals. 104 
The Committee of Seven met for the first time in Paris on 30th January 1935, in 
order to discuss the issue of the position of labour in the corporate system. O'Duffy's 
colleagues on the Secretariat were: Eugene Coselschi (Italy), Dr F. Clausen 
(Denmark), Marcel Bocard (France), M. Mercouris (Greece), Colonel A. Fonjallos 
(Switzerland), and Vidkun Quisling of Norway. The Secretariat discussed recent 
Italian legislation, which had reduced the working week to 40 hours, without reducing 
wages, as a possible way of reducing unemployment. The Secretariat also called for 
increased contacts at an international level, and for the creation of a Congress of 
Workers, as class collaboration was seen as the solution to the economic crisis., 05 The 
four main resolutions passed by the meeting were: 
102 Irish Press, 29'h December 1934, 'General O'Duffy: 11 is Meeting with 11 Duce. ' 103M 
. Ledeen, Universal Fascism p. 123. 104 Leo XIII'sDeRerumNovarum, (1891) and Pius X11's QuadragessimoAnno (1931). The encyclicals 
offered a critique of capitalist society and the need to deal with social issues, workers' rights and 
employers' responsibilities to avoid class warfare 105 The Blueshirt, 9'h February 1935. 
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1. Corporatist movements must work above all "... for peace, understanding and 
mutual goodwill amongst peoples, so that, by a reform of both existing 
outlooks and institutions, European unity might be attained ... The Committee 
therefore decides to undertake a programme of work and propaganda to 
achieve, by any possible means, this European unity. 
2. " The Committee urges youth to ... fight every sort of materialism, against 
every form of Capitalist egoism, against paganism in all its manifestations, to 
restore spiritual values, to keep alight the light of faith, the essence of nobility 
in life, the holiness of sacrifice- up onward, to protect all the virtues by which 
the human race is elevated. 
3. "The Committee recommends all to consider a 40 hour week to lessen 
unemployment as Mussolini has done in Italy. 
4. "The Committee, pledging itself to work for the oral and political 
organization of European life, affirms the supreme value of the spiritual life 
and the intellectual and rational liberty of the individual. It wishes to bring 
about harmony, not standardization, and it recognizes all currents of life and 
thought except that which annihilates spiritual individuality, and seeks to 
submerge the most sacred traditions of peoples and nations in an international 
materialism. " 
106 
The final, meeting of the Secretariat took place on 29th March 1935 in 
Amsterdam. One resolution called for all groups to work for peace and added: 
"We condemn all materialist pretensions to dominance by any race over other 
races. " 
107 
'06 The Blueshirt, I' March 1935, 'Corporative Committee of Seven. ' 
107 Ibid. 
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The following day, O'Duffy, along with his colleagues Quisling, Bucard and 
Coselschi, attended a rally of Dutch Blackshirts, addressed by their leader Anton 
Mussert. At the rally, the crowd of fascists enthusiastically greeted O'Duffy with a 
prolonged outburst of applause, after which he signed autographs. 108 
CAUR did not last long once Count Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister, had 
received a damning report that included a scathing denunciation of the delegates. 
They were portrayed in the report as men of little consequence who were trying to 
elicit funds from the Italian Government for their own diversion and 
advancement. 109 O'Duffy's involvement with CAUR had put him firmly in the 
fascist camp and raised his international profile. In spite of the lack of influence of 
the conferences, they inflated O'Duffy's ego even more. He could now claim to 
be a player on the international political scene, a statesman in the making. 
O'Duffy's enthusiasm was fuelled by the conferences and he went ahead with the 
creation of a new political party to promote an idea, fascism, whose time, he 
believed, had come. He was creating his own fascist party on the model of 
continental examples. Over half of the European fascist parties were formed after 
1933, including those of Norway, the Netherlands and Ireland. 
O'Duffy was once again in Italy in September 1935, following a visit to Geneva. 
He returned to Ireland via Germany, where he visited a number of camps for 
young people and camps for Stormtroopers. On his return from Germany, he 
spoke to the press. Ile admitted that though he did not entirely approve of I litler's 
policies, he believed that the media had misrepresented the German dictator. ' 10 
In spite of the geographical proximity, shared language, and recent common 
history, there appears to have been no contact between O'Duffy and Oswald 
'08 Ibid. 
'09M. Ledeen, Universal Fascism pp. 124-6. "0 Irish Press, I 91h September 1935. 
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Mosley. The Republican journal, An Phoblacht hinted at Bluesbirt links with 
Mosley in late 1934, without going into any detail. ' 11 In January 1934, the same 
journal had claimed that its London correspondent had learned of an alliance 
between Mosley and the Blueshirts, and that General Ilickiel 12 had gone to 
England to secure fascist funds for the Blueshirts. 113 It quoted an article in 
Mosley's Fascist Week which prophesied that there would soon be fascist 
governments in London, Belfast and Dublin. 114 An Phoblacht had also noted that 
the Norwegian fascist, Terje Ballsrud, visited O'Duffy after meeting with Mosley, 
hinting at some sort of connection. Undoubtedly, O'Duffy would have come into 
contact with Mosley at the Zurich Conference which they both attended in 
December 1934, but Mosley did not attend the CAUR conference at Montreux. It 
would appear that the Irish and British fascists kept to themselves. There is no 
record ofjoint meetings or cooperation. In spite of Mosley's earlier sympathy for 
the cause of Irish nationalism, and his opposition to the heavy-handed approach of 
the Black and Tans' 15 after the Easter Rising in 1916, he was an avowed 
imperialist who wanted to maintain Ireland's dominion status. By 1935, O'Duffy 
had moved to an extreme republican position and therefore he was in direct 
opposition to the imperialist policies of Mosley who saw a continued role for 
Ireland within the British Empire. 
As late as May 1937, the Garda were still reporting links between NCP 
members and international fascism. A Garda report on Kevin Patton of Raglona, 
Mullingar described him as a member of the NCP and an "ardent admirer of 
111 An Phoblacht, 25 1h August 1934, 'O'Duffy Wants to Wade in Blood. ' 
112 Ifickie was a fonner general in the Free State Army. 
113 An Phoblacht, 27h January 1934, 'Anglo-Fascist Alliance. ' 
114 The Fascist Week, 29th December 1933, 'The Blueshirt Case. ' 
"5 The Black and Tans were a force recruited by the British to assist the Royal Irish Constabulary in 
dealing with the IRA. The OxfordCompanion to Irish Hisloty (1998), p. 47. 
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General O'Duffy. "' 16 The Garda wrote this report in response to an article 
appearing in a Belgian j ournal, La Grifife, which contained an appeal to students 
from an organization called Union Mondial d'Ordre Nouveau. The police reported 
that Kevin Patton, who had been a local secretary for the NCP, was the 
movement's promoter in Ireland. ' 17 He did not appear to have any success in 
recruiting for the organization. The Union's political philosophy can be gauged 
from the avowed aims of the movement: 
"... pour lutter contre le marxisme etfavoriser Vavenement dun monde nouveau 
base sur lafoi, la patrie, lafamille et la profession. "118 
SEEKING ALLIES 
In a surprise move in the spring of 1935, O'Duffy began to make overtures to 
his erstwhile enemies, the IRA. His proposal to make the 1916 Easter 
Proclamation 119 the basis of his party's national policy, coupled with his desire to 
unite nationalists under a common banner, may have inspired him to seek allies 
amongst the IRA. Recently, the IRA had split, losing many of its left-wing 
activists to the Republican Congress, a party which aimed to create a mass base to 
campaign for a socialist republic in Ireland. 120 The nationalist philosophy of both 
the IRA and the O'Duffy Blueshirts provided a common policy element. Both 
organizations found themselves the victims of government repression and 
coercion. O'Duffy hoped to use this as a means to bind the two forces. A police 
116 Garda Metropolitan Division Police Report on Kevin Patton, 60'May 1937, Jus8/470, NAL 
117 Pot ice Report from J. P. Walsh, 29 May 1937, Department of External Affairs, Jus8/470, NAL 
11' Ibid. 
119 The declaration of Irish independence and the creation of an Irish republic proclaimed by the Irish 
revolutionary, Patrick Pearse, on the steps of the Dublin General Post Off ice on Easter Monday, 24th 
A ril, 1916. 
12F Republican Congress had been created in part as a response to the perceived threat from the 
Blueshirts. It was short-lived, dissolving itself in 1935. 
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report described the initiative as an effort "to bring members of the new and old 
IRA and opponents of the Government into the Organization. " 12 1 Garda 
surveillance discovered that O'Duffy approached, via intermediaries, 122 Miss A. 
Nevin of Cashel, a long-standing supporter of the IRA. O'Duffy was under the 
impression that she had considerable influence in the local republican movement. 
His intention was to win her support for his new initiative, but since she refused to 
meet with him, 123 the initiative failed to get off the ground. 
O'Duffy, now advocating his own brand of extreme republican nationalism, 
found himself alienated from the constitutionalists of Fine Gael and the militarist 
IRA. O'Duffy's attempt to seek an alliance with the anti-democratic forces of 
republican extremists that he had spent years opposing never had any real chance 
of success. In the light of the IRA's and Republican Congress's intense physical 
and vocal opposition to Blueshirtism in all its manifestations, O'Duffy's political 
naivety was never more in evidence than in this failed initiative. 
In the light of his aggressive statements on the question of partition prior to his 
resignation from Fine Gael, it is also surprising to find O'Duffy proposing another 
co-operative initiative, this time with Job Stott's' 24 Ulster Fascists. 125A meeting 
had been held at Wynn's Hotel in Dublin onl9th February 1935 in order to set up 
a non-political organization to promote the voluntary reunification of Ireland 
12 1 Garda Report, J. J. Moore, Cahir, I' May 1935, Proposed Change in the Constitution of the League 
of Youth, D/Jusg/296, NA1. 
122 These intermediaries were local Blueshirts, Dr John Hennessey of Golden and Patrick Nolan of 
Cashel. Nolan was the Vice-Director of Cashel District Division (O'Duffy Section). 
123 Report of the Superintendent of Cahir Garda to Chief Superintendent at Thurles, I' May 1935, 
D/Jus8/296, NAL 
124 Job Stott was an ex-RUC B-Special and director of the Ulster Centre of Fascist Studies (F. 
McGarry, Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War p. 21. ) 
12' Founded in the autumn of 1933, the Ulster Fascists were closely linked to the BUF. F. McGarry, 
Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War pp. 20-2 1. 
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through the cultivation of constructive cross-border relations. 126 The organization 
was named 'The 32 Club, ' a title symbolizing a united Ireland. This was not the 
first time that the idea had been aired. The Royal Irish Constabulary in the North 
had been monitoring an organization by that name, whose principle organizer was 
Captain The O'Donovan, since the end of 1934.127 
The Wynn's Hotel meeting passed the following resolutions: 
"I. That the meeting forms itself into a club having for its aim the reunion of 
Ireland. 
2. That it be called 'The 32 Club' to symbolize the thirty-two counties of Ireland. 
3. That it be the primary object of the club to cultivate through social, cultural, 
business and other contacts, friendly relations between Irishmen living North and 
South of the border. 
4. That membership be given to all Irish men and women, irrespective of religious 
or political affiliations, who accept the object and rules of the Club. -)1128 
The organizer of each branch would wear a silver badge and would be known as 
a 'Pioneer'- a possible tribute to O'Duffy's admiration for the Pioneer Total 
Abstinence Association. 129 Fearghal McGarry states that: 
"... the most curious detail was the instruction that at each meeting 'a chair 
shall be left vacant in a prominent position reserved for the personage who is to 
give embodiment to the idea of National unity. ' This 'personage' was not 
126 F. McGarry, 'General O'Duffy, the National Corporate Party and the Irish Brigade, ' in Ed. J. 
Augusteijn, Ireland in the 1930s (Dublin, 1999). 
127 Ministry of Home Affairs Minute Sheet, 12'h June 1935-The Blueshirts, HA/32/1/615, PRONI. 
128 The Blueshirt, V May 1935, 'Corporative Commission Meeting. ' 
129 F. McGarry, 'General O'Duffy, the National Corporate Party, and the Irish Brigade, ' in Ed. J. 
Augusteijn,, Ireland in the 1930s p. 120. 
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identified but it seems likely that O'Duffy's ambitions had now risen from 
dictatorial to monarchical. " 130 
There is a curious precedent set by D'Annunzio during his Fiume experiment. In 
his Carnaro Charter, which D'Annunzio drafted with De Ambris and which laid 
down the organization of a corporate order in the city republic of Fiume, was the 
declaration that the tenth corporation was to be left empty, "... dedicated to the 
unknown genius, to the appearance of the Very New Man (Nuovissimo Homo), to 
the ideal transfiguration of human industry and time. 431 
A meeting was arranged in Belfast at the Grand Hotel, on the I 01h April 1935, 
presided over by Captain The O'Donovan, 132 with the purpose of setting up a 
branch of the 32 Club in the North, effecting an alliance between the Blueshirts 
and the Ulster Fascists. The motion to set up the branch, proposed by a Blueshirt 
named McKeaveney, and seconded by Job Stott of the Ulster Fascists, was, for 
some unknown reason, defeated by the counter-proposal of two Blueshirts, 
Brendan Kielty and Jack Hewitt. Three delegates abstained from voting. The final 
vote was four to three against setting up a branch in the North. 133 The Northern 
Ireland Special Branch report stated: 
"From what can be ascertained, the meeting resolved itself into a huge farce, no 
one apparently taking the proceedings very seriously. McKeaveney is described as 
a 'mental case' and The O'Donovan may be described as failing within the same 
category. No attempts have been made to hold further meetings. " 134 
130 Ibid. 
131 Quoted in Griffin, The Nature ofFascisin p. 65. 
132 'The' being a title, not his Christian name. 
133 F. McGarry, Irish Polifics and 1he Spanish Civil War p. 2 1. 134 Inspector General's Office, RUC, to Secretary, Minister of Home Affairs, 12'h June 1935, HA 
32/1/615, PRONI. 
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The list of the objectives of the Club had changed in a significant way by the 
time they reached the Belfast meeting, which led the RUC to declare that the 
Club's principal aim was "apparently the fusion of North and South under an 
independent monarchy. "135 The following item had been added by the Blueshirts 
to the Club's aims: 
"Realizing that the effect of the present political aligm-nents is to emphasize 
these divisions and that no friendly or enduring basis can be found for these 
contacts unless there is common ground between them, the original members are 
of the opinion that this common ground can best be provided by a movement 
aiming at the restitution of an independent Irish Monarchy linked by dynastic ties 
to the British Commonwealth of Nations. 
"They believe that an independent monarchy in this country would not only 
solve our political and religious differences but would, from the National aspect, 
raise our social and political status as people by giving a new emphasis to our 
millennial culture and historical traditions. Monarchy alone, as linked to Gaelic 
Ireland and evolved in modem Britain, can satisfy the dual aspirations of 
humanity for an arbitral paternal authority and democratic social forms. 
"The original members hold that, as a mother country of the Commonwealth of 
Nations, Ireland's station should be equal in every respect to that of Great Britain- 
the other mother country. They believe, moreover, that the monarchical form of 
government is the only one that would adequately convey the value of this 
equality. " 136 
Membership of the Club was to be open to: 
135 Ministry of Home Affairs- The Blueshirts, Inspector General's Office, Letter to the Minister of 
Home Affairs, 21 "June 1935, HA/32/1/615, PRONT. 
136 Ibid. 
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" ... people of Irish nationality or affiliation regardless of political or religious 
attachment who are interested in promoting friendliness and cooperation between 
Irishmen living North and South of the border. " 137 
This membership detail recognized, and at the same time accepted, the religious 
and political differences of the two factions at the meeting. In spite of all these 
efforts, the meeting failed to win over enough delegates for a branch to be set up 
in Belfast. The differences between the nationalist philosophies of the two 
movements were too great. 
The next issue of The Blueshirt 138 made no reference to the monarchy item in 
the 32 Club's agenda, and falsely claimed that a branch of the 32 Club had been 
set up in Belfast. The reason for the introduction of such a drastic move, 
especially in the light of O'Duffy's avowed republicanism, is difficult to explain. 
His need to widen his support base through an alliance with the Ulster Fascists 
may have prompted the move. Perhaps he had decided that Arthur Griffith's idea 
of a dual monarchy was a practical solution to the problem of Ireland's division, 
even though at the time it was often condemned as an unsuitable foreign import. 
Griffith himself had hoped that the Ulster Protestants could be won over by the 
creation of a dual-monarchy. 139 The fact that it was quickly abandoned would 
indicate it was a tactical move on O'Duffy's part, but it also reveals that he was 
prepared to be flexible if a strategic advantage could be gained from a situation. 
It is not clear why the initiative failed. Neither side gave their reasons. There 
was a history of animosity between the two organizations. A probable cause is the 
fact that the brief of the Ulster Fascists was to maintain dominion status, which 
137 The Blueshirt, I" May 1935. 
"8 The Blueshirt, V May 1935. 
139 E. Rumpf, E and A. C. Hepburn, Nationalism andSocialism in Twentieth Century Ireland 
(Liverpool, 1977), p. 5. 
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went against the avowed republicanism of O'Duffy. The reference to the 
monarchy would have had little appeal for the republicans in the Blueshirt 
delegation. There was some common ground; both organizations were fierce 
opponents of communism and the Stormont administration, 140 but it was not 
enough to forge an effective alliance. 
It had not been the first attempt at seeking an alliance between the two groups. 
The Ulster Fascists had been formed in 1933, with the aim of uniting North and 
South in an all-Ireland fascist dominion within the British Empire. 141 In August 
1934, a deputation of twenty-six Ulster Fascists, acting independently of the party 
leadership, met with O'Duffy in Cork City with the express intention of seeking 
clarification of the Blueshirt policy on the North. 142 There had been rumours that 
O'Duffy had been planning to appoint a Commissioner for the North to set up 
branches of the Blueshirt movement in the six Northern counties, 143 in spite of the 
fact that his agent had told O'Duffy that there was no enthusiasm for the 
organization there. A meeting of the Executive Council of the Ulster Fascists met 
on the I't and 2'd of September 1934, to discuss the issue. 144 The delegation that 
met with O'Duffy in Cork was concerned about whether the two organizations 
should merge. However, Job Stott had not authorized the deputation, and, in 
response to hearing about the mission, said: 
"'As we stand at present, our organization cannot have any compromises with 
the Blueshirts. They are not fascists, but merely an adjunct of a political party. " 145 
140 Stormont was the seat of government of the Northern Ireland Unionist administration. 
14 1 F. McGarry, Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War, p. 2 1. 
142 The Derry Journal, 7th September 1934, 'O'Duffy's New Recruits. '. 
143 The Derry Journal, 22 nd August 1934. 
144 Irish News, 3 rd September 1934, 'Deputation from Dublin. ' 
145 The Derry Journal, 7 th September 1934, 'O'Dufry's New Recruits. ' 
48 
49 
In the aftermath of the Cork meeting, Stott expelled about two hundred members 
from the Ulster Fascists. The cross-border initiative, an attempt by O'Duffy to ally 
himself with what he perceived as his ideological counterpart in the North, was a 
failed effort to seek a union of anti-Free State forces. That he failed to do so 
reveals that the ideological bond between the two movements was not as strong as 
their historical antipathy towards each other. By the time of their meeting in 1935 
however, Stott was willing to concede that O'Duffy had moved on ideologically. 
He conceded that O'Duffy was now a fascist: 
"The BLUESHIRT movement in the Free State is to a great extent FASCIST 
minded. From a FASCIST viewpoint ITS ONLY HOPE for the SALVATION of 
IRELAND is to remain WITHIN THE EMPIRE ... A DOMINION OF IRELAND 
within the British Empire of FASCIST NATIONS would receive our full 
support. " 146 
As the leader of the Blueshirts in 1933, O'Duffy had been faced with the issue of 
whether to admit members of the British Fascisti into his organization. The British 
Fascisti had been in existence since 1924 and the Dublin branch, under the 
leadership of H. R. Ledbeater, met on a regular basis. The branch only had about 
twenty-five active members, but the Garda believed that there were about a 
thousand on the membership roll. 147 The members were described by the Garda as 
"being chiefly ex-officers of the British army and persons holding imperialist 
views. " 148 The pro-Nazi Fascisti held views directly at odds with the nationalism 
of the Blueshirts, though they did share a marked hostility towards communism. 
The British Fascisti were also virulently anti-Semitic, distributing the German 
publication The DestrQvers ofInternalional Goodwill to Jewish candidates in local 
146 j. Stott, A Brief Introduction to Fascism, (Pamphlet, no date). 
147 Garda Siochana Report on the British Fascisti, 12 th April 1933, D/Jus8/719, NAL 
148 Ibid. 
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elections. 149 The appearance of the Blueshirts on the Irish political scene had 
stimulated discussion amongst the British Fascisti, and Ledbeater encouraged 
members to attend Blueshirt meetings. Initially, there was no bar on members 
joining the movement. ' 50 Frank MacDonald, Officer Commanding IFS, British 
Fascisti, rescinded the decision at the next meeting, on the 24 th jUly 1933, pending 
further instructions from headquarters. This decision was pre-empted by General 
O'Duffy the next day when he stated that members of the B. F. were not eligible 
for membership of the Blueshirts. Considering the avowed imperialism of the 
group and its attachment to the British monarchy, this decision of O'Duffy's is 
hardly surprising. The British Fascisti, in spite of their professed adherence to 
fascism, were basically conservative, anti-socialist, pro-British and unionist 
imperialists and sympathisers with no relevance to Irish politics in the thirties. 
O'Duffy's opportunistic attempts to gather allies to bolster up his proposed new 
party were a complete failure. O'Duffy must have been aware that the Blueshirt 
rump he had carried with him was a precarious foundation for any new venture 
but, ever the optimist, and convinced of his own organizational skitts, he decided 
to carry on regardless. 1- le was over-confident when it came to assessing his own 
abilities and charisma. Unfortunately, his recent aýoeardnce on the internatiotial 
fascist scene had not only boosted his self-confidence, but had convinced him that 
fascism's future in Ireland was inevitable. When he did launch his new party, he 
put all his organizational skills to work. Ile was to be disappointed, though the 
NCP was not to mark the end of his political career. 
"9 Garda Siochana Report on The British Fascisti, 291h June 1933, D/Jus8/719, NAL 
150 Garda Siochana Report on the British Fascisti, 12 July 1933, D/Jus8/719, NAL 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE ORGANIZATION AND HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL 
CORPORATE PARTY. 
THE FO UNDA TION OF THE PA R TY 
Bolstered by his active participation on the international fascist scene, but aware 
that he had failed to attract any new allies or significantly increase the number of his 
following, O'Duffy felt that by the summer of 1935 the time was right to launch his 
new political party. The next year would see O'Duffy struggling to create a viable 
alternative to the existing political organizations, and failing in the process. The 
organization that he created was hampered in its bid for power by the small number of 
active members. But, more significantly, O'Duffy failed to capture the imagination of 
the Irish public and the lack of media coverage of his dwindling movement did not 
serve to help matters. By the summer of 1936, O'Duffy had had enough and he was 
ready to move on and try his luck in a new venture. The party was unable to survive 
without O'Duffy's enthusiasm and organizational skills, and faded away during 
O'Dufly's absence in Spain. 
O'Duffy decided to use the 1935 Annual Congressi of the League of Youth 
(O'Duffy Section) to launch his new party. In preparation, League branches and the 
National Executive, which had controlled the League since the split with Fine Gael, 
were encouraged to file motions for debate at the conference by the I" June 1935. 
O'Duffy's overwhelming influence on policy can be gauged from an analysis of the 
motions put to the Congress. Of the 65 motions, O'Duffy submitted 24, and a further 
II came from the National Executive, which O'Duffy effectively controlled. Of these 
35 motions, all but three were accepted. 2 The proposals that Congress rejected were 
' In Gaelic: ArdFheis. 
2 Notices of Motions to Congress, D/Jusg/296, NAL 
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concerned with the naming of the party and the renaming of the League of Youth. The 
National Executive proposed calling the party 'The National Front' and O'Duffy 
proposed 'The National Association. ' O'Duffy wanted the League of Youth to revert 
to its old name of the National Guard. Congress passed O'Duffy's motion to designate 
the rank-and-file as Volunteers, harking back to the military organization that had 
carried out the 1916 Easter Rising. Almost a third of the motions put to the Congress 
were concerned with minor organizational points, such as the style of the uniform, the 
marching song and the party flagg. 
The motions that O'Duffy put forward, and which Congress passed, were all 
concerned with fundamental policy issues, including 4 on labour policy, and 14 on 
agricultural policy. 3 O'Duffy had been prepared to accede to Congress on minor 
issues, but he clearly retained control over the movement's political direction. The 
outward show of democracy within the party masked the fact that it was, in common 
with fascist parties elsewhere, completely controlled by its leader, O'Duffy. After his 
experience with Fine Gael, he did not intend to share power with anyone. 
In contrast to O'Duffy and the Executive, the local branches showed a marked 
disinterest in policy-making, and seemed to be more concerned with minor issues, 
such as the party marching song (Westmeath Division suggested 'Wrap the Green 
Flag' or 'A Nation Once Again A), or the colour of the uniform tie (Killinick 
Company-Wexford Division). This split between the party hierarchy and rank-and - 
file, with the former following a more ideological path, reflects a similar split in 
motivation in the earlier Blueshirt organizations, as Cronin's research has shown. 6 
3 The Blueshirt, June 15,1935, 'Resolutions Passed By Congress. ' 
'Notices of Motion to Congress, D/Jus8/296, NAL 
3 Ibid. 
6 M. Cronin, The Blueshirts and Irish Politics pp. 126-133. 
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O'Duffy's control over the Congress agenda is quite evident. There were six 
Uff 
7 
motions of nomination for Director-General; all were for O'D Y. There were no 
other candidates. Before the Congress, in his appeal for funds for his new party, 
O'Dufry had produced a 12-point Summary of the proposed party's aims. Congress 
adopted this provisional document in its entirety. The Congress of the League of 
Youth8 took place on Saturday 8 th June 1935, in the Supper Room at the historic 
Mansion House. 9 The Blueshirt reported an attendance of 600 delegates, ' 0 and the 
Irish Independent 500,11 but the police report gave a more conservative figure of 
350.12 The delegates came from all parts of the Irish Free State. West Cork 
constituency alone sent 60 delegates. 13 A photograph in the Irish Independent shows 
the arrival of delegates in their uniforms, posing to give a fascist salute to the 
camera. 14 Notably in attendance was Patrick Belton T. D., who took part in the 
discussion on agricultural policy. Belton, in spite of this early interest, never officially 
joined the party. Over the next year, he would find himself increasingly at odds with 
O'Duffy. The mother and sister of the first Blueshirt martyr, Hugh Reilly of 
Bandon, 15 attended along with the father of Patrick Kenny of Tipperary, the second 
martyr to the cause. 16 The Congress observed two minutes silence in their memory, 
and that of Michael Lynch of Cork, a third martyr to the Blueshirt cause. 17 In 
7 The Blueshirt, IS June 193 5, 'The Leader. ' 
8 Gaelic: Oig Eireann. 
9 Built in 17 10, the Mansion House is the official residence of the Lord Mayor of Dublin. 
10 The Blueshirl, 15 June 1935, citing The Leader on the election of O'Duffy to head the NCP. 
11 Irish Independent, 16 June 1935. 
12 S/Serg. Michael Farrell., Garda Siochana Report on League of Youth Congress, 16 June 1935, 
D/Jus8/307, NAT. 
13 The Blueshirt, 15 June 1935, 'Editorial-A Great Congress. ' 
14 Irish Independent, 10 June 1935, photo of the Reception Committee on the front page. 
15 O'Reilly had been dragged from his home and brutally beaten by unknown assailants, dying two 
months later from his injuries. Manning, The Blueshirts p. 108. 
16 Patrick Kenny died in a right with Fianna Fail and IRA supporters on 30 June 1934. Manning, The 
Blueshirts, p. 136. 
17 Michael Lynch had been shot by police on 13 August 1934 during the sale of cattle seized after the 
non-payment of land annuities. Seven others had been injured by the police. See M. Manning, The 
Blueshirls p. 13 6. 
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traditional Republican tradition, O'Duffy put great store by the invocation of the 
memory of martyrs, the blood of martyrs being the necessary sacrifice for the birth of 
Irish freedom. 18 This pseudo-Christian cult of death, martyrs and sacrifice 19 was an 
element in Irish nationalism and in Irish fascism, as I will examine in chapter six. 
Congress rubber-stamped the election of a new Executive Committee that O'Duffy 
had proposed: Ex Captain Hughes, Dr Conway, Mr Gilleece, Gerald Sweetman, Tom 
Gunning, Ex-Comdt. D Hyde, Ex-Captain Giles, and Mr Hiney. 20 
General O'Duffy, as expected, dominated the proceedings at the Ard Fheis. On 
entering the room, theatrically preceded by standard-bearers, he received the Blueshirt 
salute, an exact imitation of that given to Mussolini by Italian Fascists. Dr Conway 
then spoke on the future policy of the organization and demanded a full and frank 
discussion before it was adopted by the party. 
"He pointed out that the only persons entitled to vote in accordance with the 
Blueshirt constitution were properly elected delegates and that any other people 
present were not entitled to speak or vote on the motion before Congress. As this 
would mean that at least two-thirds of the persons present would be unable to 
participate in the debate or vote on the motion, a good deal of confusion arose around 
Dr Conway's proposal and resulted in a certain amount of disorder. , 21 
O'Duffy responded by postponing the vote until after the election for Director- 
General. O'Duffy was quickly re-elected unanimously as Director-General of the 
Blueshirts and then as leader of the National Corporate Party (Cumann Corpruiteac 
Naisiunta). He then proceeded to monopolize the Congress, threatening to resign 
18 See the writings and poetry of Patrick Pearse. 
19 R. Griffin, Fascism ( Oxford, 1995), p. 220. 
20 Ard Fheis of League of Youth, JUSS/307, NIA, Special Branch Report 6 July 1935 by Denis 
O'Brien. 
21 Ibid. 
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unless Congress passed all his proposals. 22 The motions were passed in rapid 
succession. Congress realized that without O'Duffy there would be no movement and 
had no option but to submit to O'Duffy's. He was determined that there would be no 
democracy in his new party. It is also a further indication that personal loyalty to 
O'Duffy was the main motivation for many in the organization. 
O'Duffy brought the meeting to a perfunctory close by saying he wished the 
delegates to prepare for the evening's dance. The Garda report of the Congress 
describes the meeting, as "little more than a farce"23 and concluded that, "there would 
,, 24 be little to fear from this Movement . At the end of the conference, greetings were 
sent to Blueshirt prisoners detained in Arbour Hill and Mountjoy prisons, where they 
were being held for a range of offences connected with the land war, such as public 
order offences, sedition and damage to property. A motion followed, calling for the 
repeal of the Public Safety Act that was responsible for putting most of them behind 
bars. It had been the Cumann an nGaedheal government, enthusiastically backed by 
O'Duffy in his role as Chief of Police, that had introduced the Act in 1928 following 
the murder of minister Kevin O'Higgins 25 by the IRA. As Taoiseach, De Valera had 
briefly suspended the Act, but he had reintroduced it to help tackle the problem of 
increased lawlessness from the Blueshirts and the IRA. 
The Congress had put O'Duffy and his policies fin-nly in control. Ile had set the 
agenda for the Congress and his supporters had allowed him to control the 
proceedings. Boosted by this success in ensuring that he had full control over the 
National Executive and policy, he rashly predicted in his congress speech that his new 
party would be in power in the very near future. Even though he had only just 
22 S/Sergt. Michael Farrell, Garda Siochana Report of League of Youth Ard Fheis, 16 June 1935, D/Jus 
8/307, NAL 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25(y Higgins had been the Minister for Justice and External Affairs. 
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inaugurated his new party, O'Duffy immediately put it on an election footing by 
promising to contest the next election, though ultimately his party failed to do so. For 
O'Duffy the Congress was clearly a success. He had set up his new party and he had 
ensured that Congress had adopted his policies. His leadership was unquestioned. The 
problem was that the adulation of those around him had blinded O'Duffy to the fact of 
the marginalization of his movement and the irrelevance of his ideas to Ireland. He 
felt able to offer the electorate a radical policy altemative. It appeared from the 
enthusiasm of the delegates, and the high attendance, that he had the building blocks 
of a major new force in Irish politics. The next few months would see a drive on 
O'Duffy's part to consolidate his new party through branch organization, the creation 
of an election machine, and the promotion of his ideas through the party journal, 
public speeches and rallies. 
O'DUFFY'S KEYNOTE SPEECHAND THENCP POLICYPLATFORM 
In his keynote speech, the Ard Fheis address, O'Duffy began by reviewing the 
work of the movement since the split with Fine Gael the year before. Ile stated that 
policy differences were the reasons for his resignation, and concluded that "it had 
become absolutely clear to me that if we continued any longer within the merger the 
Blueshirt cause would be lost, " and therefore he had had no option but to resign. 26 He 
accused his former Fine Gael colleagues of seeking to use the Blueshirts: "to hoist 
, 527 them back to power again, and there was probably a great deal of truth in this 
statement. Ile explained the lack of publicity and low profile of the movement since 
thereby saying that he wanted the reorganization to go ahead quietly. In reality, he had 
been out of the country for much of the time trying to carve out a new role for 
26 The Nalion, 22 June 1935, 'The Year's Progress. ' 
27 Ibid. 
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himself. But he went on to justify his regular attendance at the Fascist conferences by 
stating: "I believe it is very necessary for a historic nation like ours to play its historic 
,. )28 part in the life of Europe. 
O'Duffy might have been a nationalist but he was not an isolationist. Men like 
Arthur Griffith, he argued, had adopted their ideas from abroad, and O'Duffy declared 
that the NCP owed much of its philosophy to men like Arthur Gri ith . 
29The ffi 
conferences that he had attended had indeed promoted corporatism, but he pledged 
that the corporatism of Ireland would be unlike that of any other nation. What bound 
corporatists from all countries together were "the principles of honour, self-sacrifice 
,, 30 and friendship between all classes. In conclusion, he declared that he had been 
proud to represent Ireland and that he had made useful contacts. 
O'Duffy moved on to launch his new organization. The centrepiece of NCP policy 
would be the advocacy of a corporate state that would equip the economy and nation 
for the modem age. The corporate system, adjusted to Irish requirements and staffed 
by nationalists who were patriots first and experts in their corporate/vocational field 
second, would control the economic and industrial life of the nation. An NCP 
government would quickly replace the outworn parliamentary system inherited from 
the British with a vocational government. 
Vocational, not party interests, would be represented in the new parliament and 
cooperation between people who represented their occupations would replace the 
conflict of party rivalries. This syndicalist form of economic organization would thus 
ensure that the government would represent the interests of all Irish citizens. The new 
system would secure national unity within the Irish Free State as a prelude to the 
28 Ibid. 
29 Arthur Griffith had looked to the Austro-1 lungarian solution of a dual monarchy as a possible option 
for Ireland, before the Easter Rising. See chapter six. 
30 The Nation, 2 nd June 1935, 'The year's Progress. ' 
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removal of the border with the North and the unification of the whole of Ireland. What 
he was advocating was an end to the class struggle through the corporatization. of 
society and government, of collaboration between worker and owner where the strike 
and lockout would be outdated. 
O'Dufly was quick to point out that the new system could only be achieved 
through the election of the NCP to government within the existing parliamentary 
system, but that once this mandate for change had been given by the electorate the 
corporate state would be inaugurated. Misjudging the political mood of the country, 
O'Duffy announced that there was already enough nationwide support to win one seat 
in every constituenCY31 and that a year would be long enough to secure success for the 
movement and its programme. As soon as the party had a majority in the Dail, the 
NCP would call a new election within a year, this time on an occupational or 
vocational register, replacing "'the present system of dictatorship by one party, one 
, 02 political clique. He declared that government by party was obsolete. It was a 
product of the nineteenth century that had had its day. It had failed because not only 
was it an anachronism, but because it always placed party politics before the national 
interest. 
There had been fierce opposition to the Blueshirts since their first appearance in 
1932 and O'Duffy expressed that he was still concerned about the threat to free 
speech, especially from communists. However, he stated that he refused to be 
intimidated by threats from the left, by which he meant the IRA and Trades Unions 
who had orchestrated demonstrations against the Blueshirts. O'Duffy did not rule out 
an aggressive response to this perceived intimidation, but he concluded that "in the 
" Ireland used the single transferable vote system for elections with multi-member constituencies. 32 The Nation, 22 June 1935, 'The Year's Progress'. 
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,, 33 interests of law and order it is best to leave such matters to the police. At this point 
in his speech, O'Duffy was at pains to show his commitment to the democratic 
process. It was a typical fascist ruse. He had been accused by Fianna Fail of aiming 
for a dictatorship because of his proposed March on Leinster House in 1933, but he 
declared that time had put the record straight on that issue. He promised: "We stand 
now, as we always stood, for majority rule, for one Government, one army, one police 
force- one authority.,, 34 However, in the corporate state that he was offering there 
would only be one class- that of Irishman, and one duty- service to Ireland. There 
would indeed be one authority and no opposition. 
O'Duffy made the Proclamation of Easter Week, 1916, the basis of the National 
Policy of the movement, the first of thirty-three resolutions passed by the meeting. 
O'Duffy accused Fianna Fail, Fine Gael, and the IRA of failing to follow through on 
the Republican. ideals of the 1916 Proclamation. O'Duffy reminded his audience that 
he had supported the Treaty but pointed out that he had always: 
"... regarded the Treaty as the thing Collins said it was: "Something which gives 
us freedom to achieve greater freedom. "" 35 
Now was the time to carry things further. The Treaty was not an end in itself but 
merely a stepping-stone to further independence. Ile went on: 
"When I joined the Volunteers, the Republic, as defined by the Proclamation of 
Easter Week, was my objective and the position has not changed. 906 
To achieve this, the people needed to return to national unity. That restoration of 
national unity, which he falsely believed had existed at the time of the independence 
struggle, would be the aim of the National Policy, thereby healing the wounds caused 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
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by the Irish Civil War. Closely linked to the issue of the republic was the Northern 
Ireland problem. For O'Duffy, the natural unity of Ireland as an island nation had 
been severed by the imposition, by Great Britain, of an unnatural border, causing the 
peoples of North and South to drift even further apart. He compared the irredentist 
problem to similar territorial problems elsewhere in Europe: 
"Partition is a denial of the existence of the Irish nation. The North is to us what 
Alsace was to France, what the Saar was to Germany, and our Nationals in the part 
, 07 cut off constitute one third of the total population. 
O'Duffy was brutally honest about his intentions and said that there would never be 
lasting peace with Britain while the border remained. He committed himself and his 
party to a republic outside the British Empire. Ile predicted that coercion would not 
be necessary, as the success of the corporate structure in regenerating the nation 
would win over the people in the North. By declaring a republic dejure for 32 
counties and defacto for 26, the struggle to end British domination would, he 
believed, enter its final chapter. In his speech, O'Duffy had promised to win power by 
democratic means but he then promised to use this mandate from the electorate to 
create a nationalist republic of thirty-two counties run on corporatist lines that would 
end bring an end to the divisiveness caused by democratic parliamentary government 
and British imperialism. He would use the democratic process to come to power, and 
then destroy democracy. 
The Unionist journal, Nolesftom Ireland, printed a partisan, yet surprisingly acute, 
analysis of the new party and its policies: 
"In'the midst of the visions of the Republic that was produced in 1916, the Republic 
that is praised and the Workers' Republic that is still in the lap of the gods, General 
37 Ibid. 
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O'Duffy, of "sling-the -lead" fame, has now launched a completely new brand of 
Republic. It is to be a corporate Republic dejure for all Ireland, to be administered as 
a Republic defacto for the twenty-six counties. The General believes that party 
government has failed-a conclusion few will question. The General has announced 
that his supporters are at least as strong as they were before the split in the ranks of 
the Blueshirts and that as a party they intend to fight the next general election. His 
intention is to out-manoeuvre De Valera and secure the allegiance of the IRA. It is 
obvious that were England to concede a Republic in the morning, the patriots would 
at once start quarrelling about the quality of the Republic, and throw the blame on 
, 08 England for letting them have the wrong one. 
The keynote speech by O'Duffy laying down party policy was followed by a lively 
debate on the peripheral issue of the uniform. A number of motions put to Congress 
offered alternatives to the existing colour, for example, a change from blue 
(symbolizing St Patrick) to green (the colour of Irish nationalism). In the end, 
Congress decided to keep the blue shirt but to change the colour of the tie from black 
to green, and to replace the beret with the 1916 Volunteer hat. However, the uniform 
was again to be an issue before the year was out. It had been Ernest Blythe who had 
3 40 originally suggested the colour blue in 1932.9 T. F. O'Higgins, who had been the 
leader of the A. C. A. when the shirt was adopted, had wanted the colour to be grey. 
Mike Cronin believes that the choice of colour was very important: 
38 Published by the Irish Loyalist Imperial Foundation. Extract from Notes From Ireland, no. 4 vol. 32, 
November 1935.0/351399/3, Public Records Office, Kew. 
39M. Manning, The Blueshirts p. 55. 
40 Ile was the second president of the A. C. A. and a Cumann na nGaedheal T. D. 
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"By choosing a colour linked so closely with Ireland's patron saint, Blythe was 
attempting to awaken the nationalist past and incorporate into the movement a degree 
of historical mythology., 41 
The National Policy and the corporatist policy dominated the discussions at the 
Congress, but agriculture was also a major item on the agenda. In line with existing 
Blueshirt policy, Congress called for no further collection of annuities and for: 
"... an independent Commission to enquire into the distribution of the cost of the 
economic war. 42 
The NCP believed that the government should offer compensation to farmers hit by 
the economic crisis. In a move to stem the flow of people from rural areas, the party 
proposed the expropriation, with compensation, and division of unproductive estates 
with an increase in tillage to create more employment on the land. Further support to 
small farmers would be offered through the de-rating of smallholdings; and the 
guarantee of security of tenure, a policy remarkably similar to that of Fianna Fail. 
It is clear that O'Duffy envisaged a strong role for government, with an increase in 
central planning, in order to put the nation on a firm economic footing. The party 
acknowledged that agriculture was the economic bedrock of the nation's economy 
and that it should continue to be so. The party also seemed concerned to root as many 
people on the land as possible, giving them a stake in the nation and extending 
property ownershi P. 43 Rather than accepting the traditional safety valve of emigration 
as the solution to her economic and social problems, the NCP wanted to keep the 
young on the land, and believed that this could be done through the state regulation of 
the economy and central planning. Fianna Fail geared its policies to similar ends 
41M. Cronin, M, The Blueshirls and Irish Politics p. 47. 
42 The Blueshirt, 15 June 1935. 
43 See chapter three for an in-depth analysis of NCP agricultural policy. 
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through the erection of tariffs and efforts that would change the focus of agriculture 
from pasture to tillage. Like Fianna Fail, the NCP wanted to root people in the land. 
Because of agriculture's key economic role the most important corporation would 
be that of agriculture, but the professions and labour were also to be organized by the 
party into corporations. At the head of this corporate pyramid would be the Director- 
General (Resolution 18). The placing of O'Duffy at the head of the corporate 
organization owed more to fascist than Catholic theories of corporatism. It would lead 
to an increase in the power of the state and give enormous power to the leader of that 
state. At a grass roots level, the collective bargaining that would replace confrontation 
would make the nation more productive, and ensure unity in the national interest 
rather than confrontation in a sectional interest. 
O'Duffy's party was presenting a unique package of policies to the Irish people that 
combined increased central planning, state control over much of the economy, and 
control over labour through official collective bargaining rather than ad hoc 
confrontations. However, the party was also offering a package of welfare provision 
that appeared to reflect its commitment to the principles of social justice outlined in 
the Papal encyclicals. It would also wean the worker away from any temptation to 
join socialist or communist parties in Ireland. The state would provide all those over 
65 with a living pension. An NCP government would create a Minister for Housing. 
Rents on municipal housing would be reduced. A Minister to coordinate activities in 
the GaellacV4 would help to place the Irish language on a firmer footing. The 
delegates recognized a need to provide social and leisure activities for the young, 
something that the Blueshirts had promoted as a recruitment tactic, and which was 
44 Those parts of Ireland where Irish was still spoken, particularly Waterford, Cork, Kerry, Galway, 
Mayo and Donegal. 
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one of their undoubted successeS. 45 O'Duffy aimed to inspire a new generation of 
fascists who would represent the national community and embody the future of the 
nation. 
This more activist role for the state was a radical move away from the cautious 
conservatism of the Cumann na nGaedheal and Fine Gael parties that O'Duffy had 
previously served. The NCP felt there was an urgent need for state involvement if 
Ireland was to face the challenges of a modem society and economy. The state would 
alleviate the hardships caused by centuries of British colonialism and a ruinous 
economic war; the state would have a clear role to play in economic development. 
The NCP was distancing itself from the cautious policies of Cumann na nGaedheal 
and Fine Gael. 
The nationalist ethos of the party pervaded the policy decisions made at the 
Congress, from specific resolutions relating to the preservation and promotion of the 
Irish language and Gaelic culture (Resolutions 25,26 and 27), to the constant 
evocation of the 'spirit of 1916' and the adoption of The Nalion as the party journal's 
title. 46 Its promotion of the interests of the farmer and rural communities reflected a 
desire to reaffirm the importance of the land to Irishmen. Any serious contender for 
political office at the time had to play the nationalist green card. O'Duffy was 
claiming that not only was his party the inheritor of the mantle of Irish republicanism 
but aimed to push the nationalist vision of men like Pearse to its logical conclusion. 
He argued that the only way that the nationalist dream of a Gaelic Republic could be 
achieved was through the creation of a corporate republic. Other attempts to do so, 
such as De Valera's, were doomed to failure. O'Duffy offered to create the political 
conditions and structures so that the republican dream could be achieved within the 
45 M. Cronin, The Blueshirls and Irish Politics, chapter 7. 
46 The Nation had been the title of the paper edited by Michael Davitt, I 91h century Irish patriot and 
founder of the Land League. 
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framework of modem twentieth century political and economic culture. However, 
O'Duffy was mistakenly drawing on one particular strand of Irish nationalism and 
assuming that it was enough to inspire a new generation of nationalists. 
THE ORGANIZ4 TION OF THE PARTYAND MEMBERSHIP 
Shortly after the 1935 Congress, O'Duffy wrote to the local Blueshirt branches. 
Like a true fascist, he required each party member to take a pledge of allegiance to the 
new organization and to himself as the leader of the party. Party members were to be 
bound by an oath of loyalty not only to a political programme, but also to the man 
who had set that agenda. O'Duffy administered the oath to members of the HQ staff, 
and then it was administered hierarchically from the top down to Divisional Directors, 
Company Captains, and then to the rank and file, including Young Comrades (as 
junior members were now known). The pledge was obligatory and could be taken 
individually or collectively. The military-style oath went as follows: 
"I do promise that I will serve my country to the best of my ability, that I will work 
under the direction of the National Executive and obey my superior officers, and that I 
will constantly endeavour by word and act to increase the strength and influence of 
the organization, and to maintain its integrity and promote its objects. I further 
promise that I will not become or remain a member of any secret society 
whatsoever. A7 
The NCP was unique amongst Irish political parties of all persuasions in obligating 
members to take such an oath. It had no counterpart in any other groups except those 
of a para-military nature, such as the IRA. The oath is indicative of the militaristic 
nature of the new party. It was a further demonstration of O'Duffy's hostility to party 
47 N. C. P. Headquarters Circular no. 4. D/JusS/296, NAL 
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politics. Once the NCP had created the corporate state, there would be no need for any 
political parties and the organization would act as a uniformed extra-parliamentary 
body. The party retained the structure and organization of the Blueshirts. The new 
party saw little need to waste too much energy on reorganizing the movement when 
its primary aim was to get rid of all political parties. 
The party issued its constitution on the day of the Congress. It restricted 
membership of the party to Irish citizens who accepted the party programme. At a 
later date, the proviso that only those who professed the Christian faith (not 
48 
specifically Roman Catholic) could be members was stated ,a criterion 
for 
membership that had been present in earlier Blueshirt constitutions. There was a 
strong equation between faith and nationality in Irish nationalism. During the 
independence struggle, the'British were equated with Protestantism, and indeed, in the 
North it was religion that continued to be the badge of nationality. The ban on 
membership of un-named secret societies was qualified by adding that members were 
required to put the interests of the NCP first, unless those interests were 
religioUS. 490ne argument for this broader specification would be that given the strong 
stance by the Blueshirts on the North this would be more inclusive of Protestantism. 
It could also be interpreted as an anti-Semitic gesture, and an expression of pro- 
Nazism. O'Duffy himself had remarked on the fact at Montreux, where he had stated 
that only Christians were admitted to his organization and that Ireland did not have a 
50 Jewish problem. 
The reference in the oath to secret organizations could have been a reference to other 
nationalist groups but was more likely a reference to Freemasonry. This is nowhere 
" NCT. Headquarters Circular no. 8 December, 1935, D/JusS/296 NAL 
49 Ibid. 
'o Irish Press, 29 June 1934. 
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clearly stated, however. An opposition to Freemasonry was common to many fascist 
parties throughout Europe, particularly in France, Italy, I lungary and Rournania. 
Whilst the Blueshirts had never been overtly anti-Semitic, there was certainly an 
under-current of anti-Semitism in Ireland at the time. This was especially evident in 
Catholic publications such as Kingship of Christ by Father Denis Fohey. Fohey's 
book, prefaced by John Charles McQuaid, the future Primate of Ireland, "depicted the 
Jew as being responsible for the corruption of western society and for the fomenting 
of world revolution. "51 In a later work, The Mystical Body of Christ in the Modern 
World, Fohey outlined the existence of a Jewish programme that aimed for the 
complete socialization of property, polygamy, and divorce. He cited the Protocols of 
the Learned Elders of Zion 52 in his publicationS. 53 Popular Catholic journals of the 
time, including The Irish Catholic, The Catholic Bulletin, The Irish Mind, and The 
Irish Rosary all carried anti-Semitic articles. 
At the time of the appearance of the NCP, an anti-Semitic j oumal appeared in 
Dublin and the party reacted immediately, arguing strongly that anti-Semitism was 
unacceptable: "There is no justification to our mind for singling out Jews for 
persecution just because they are Jews. , 54 The editorial, probably written by O'Duffy, 
and at least endorsed by him, went on to say: 
"Every Christian must feel shocked at the savage persecution of men for their 
religious beliefs which is taking place in Germany today ... there 
is a great danger to 
European peace in the Nazi policy. But there is an even greater danger to the human 
51 D. Keogh, Jews in Twentieth Century Ireland p. 92 ( Cork, 1998). 
52 A document created by the Tsar's secret police to foment anti-Semitism in Russia. It claimed to be 
the minutes of a secret meeting in Switzerland at which key Jewish leaders had plotted to take control 
of the World. 
5' D. Keogh, Jews in Twentieth Century Ireland p. 92. 
54 The Nation, 29 June 1935, 'Editorial. ' 
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race in the intolerant and tyrannical persecution of a religion which Hitler stands over 
,, 55 and encourages. 
However, on the day of the 1935 Congress, The Blueshirl had published an item 
written by K. C. C. (identity unknown) titled 'Ireland for the Irish. 06 The article said 
that while party politicians wrangle: 
"... Pharisees and aliens quietly take advantage to step in and gather the fruits of 
all our years of suffering and self-denial ... Is the day never to come when we shall do 
as St. Patrick and Brian Boru did and drive the deadly and virulent snakes and 
foreigners from our midst ... who are sucking away our blood and battering on the 
dissensions that are our curse? ', 57 
The article went on to urge De Valera to turn over businesses to Irishmen and for a 
future Blueshirt government "to send back all the foreign exploiters who have come 
,, 58 during the last 12 or 13 years back to the land or lands of their birth. It is a rabid 
and aggressive article, but its acceptance in the Blueshirtjournal indicates that 
O'Duffy gave tacit acceptance to anti-Semites within his movement. However, 
Ireland's small Jewish population meant there was little political mileage to be made 
from advocating anti-Semitism as party policy. 
A year later, The Nation 59 printed three articles with anti-Semitic comments 
equating the Jews with Bolshevism. One article quoted O'Duffy as saying: 
"Do you know who the leader of the League of Nations is? He is a Jew named 
60 Wallack Beer, who some time ago changed his name to Litvinov"[sic]. 
55 Ibid. 
56 The Blueshirt, 8 June 1935, 'Ireland for the Irish. ' 
37 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 The Nation, July 1936, ' From the News. ' 
60 Ibid. 
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Referring to current events, the news section of The Nation referred to a "wealthy 
,, 61 Jew and Freemason named Blum is now at the head of the Government of France. 
In another news item, this time on Palestine, the reader was informed: 
"The Arabs are being shot down as were the Irish Volunteers from 1916-2 1. The 
Jews are over-running the country and large cities like Tel-a viv [sic] populated 
exclusively by Jews, are quickly springing up (The Arabs have our complete 
sympathy). 9962 
By 1936, at the Ard Fheis, O'Duffy was referring to the spread of Jewish influence 
in the Free State: 
"I understand that in many of our industries Jews and other foreigners have been 
given a dominating influence and that in many cases, particularly in the smaller 
factories, Trade Union conditions are not observed. 110 
O'Duffy was trying to equate poor working conditions with Jewish management 
and ownership, a tactic which Mosley had used to mobilize the working class in the 
East End of London. 64 Mosley was able to do so because there was a heavy 
concentration of Jews in certain parts of London, and some provincial cities, such as 
Leeds. This was not the case in any city in Ireland. The 1936 Congress went on to 
pass the following motions: 
"4. That we view with some concern the number of foreigners employed in key 
positions in industries where Irishmen are qualified to fill the posts. " 
,, 65 "7(a). To oppose alien control and influence in National affairs... 
61 Ibid. 'From the News. ' 
62 Ibid. Palestine. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Mosley portrayed the Jews in the East End in two ways. Firstly, as exploitative businessmen who 
were paying low wages and aggravating the poor working conditions in the East End through lack of 
investment in their greed for profits. They were portrayed as potential competitors for scarce jobs who 
were prepared to accept lower wages, thus undercutting the rest of the workforce and lowering wages 
in general in the process. See R. Skidelsky, Oswald Mosley (London, 1981) pp. 388-389. 
65 The Nalion, July 1936. 
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The only large group of foreigners in Ireland were the British, who still had control 
over a large number of enterprises and a great deal of influence over the export 
market. It could also be a reference to the continued control over Northern Ireland's 
industry by the British or possibly a reference to the continued disproportionate 
influence of Ireland's Anglo-Irish Protestant minority. 
O'Duffy did not make anti-Semitism a key feature of his movement. If O'Duffy 
needed an enemy on which to blame all his country's woes he need look no further 
than the British. His intense Anglophobia caused him to blame the backward state of 
the Irish nation on centuries of colonialism and the continued neo-colonialism of the 
British which had prevented the rejuvenation of the Irish spirit which alone could 
inspire Ireland's greatness. This enemy was also the traditional enemy of the Irish 
nationalist movement. O'Duffy pledged his movement to rid Ireland of the vestiges of 
British rule, including the parliamentary system, in order to lay the groundwork for 
Ireland's re-emergence as a cultural beacon for Catholic Europe. 
O'Duffy justified the creation of his Irish Brigade, which went to Spain to fight for 
the Nationalists under Franco, by arguing that there was a racial affinity between the 
Irish and Spanish peoples. He claimed that they were both descended from 'Milesian' 
stock, a racial group that he claimed had originated several millennia ago in Egypt. 
Some of these Milesian warriors had migrated to Ireland from Spain before the birth 
of Christ. He concluded that "Spain and Ireland have been united through the 
centuries by the closest bonds of friendship, of faith, and of blood. 9,66 It tied the Irish 
to the continent, and specifically to Catholic nations. O'Duffy was never an 
isolationist and fully expected that a rejuvenated Ireland would have a key role to play 
in Europe as a leading Catholic nation. 
66 
. E. O'Duffy, Crusade in Spain (Brown and Nolan, 1933), p. 3. 
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The Director-General of the party was to be elected at the annual Congress. The 
party was to be controlled by the National Executive consisting of the Director- 
General, the Headquarters staff, Divisional Directors, and representatives of the 
vocational organizations for agriculture, labour etc. that the party intended to set up 
within the first year. 67 The basic organizational unit at local level, which was already 
in existence, was the company. These companies were now to function as party 
branches where the wearing of uniform was not compulsory. The process of changing 
the Blueshirts into a political party required little more than cosmetic changes. 
Fundamentally, the organization changed very little. 
There are a number of similarities between the party and other fascist parties, 
particularly Mosley's British Union of Fascists. Both organizations made a distinction 
between those who wore the uniform and those who did not, but there was no 
commitment to wear the uniform on the part of the membership. 68 There was the 
implication of an active and a passive membership and both parties distinguished 
between uniformed and non-uniformed members. This implies that it was expected 
that there would be a vanguard, active core of members, the rest being financial 
contributors and voting fodder. Neither party had stringent membership criteria for 
new recruits. As a result, there was a high turnover of membership in both 
organizations. Both parties had a specific pledge of loyalty to the party that 
distinguished them from other parties in their respective countries. Ideologically there 
were many similarities between the two movements, not least in their enthusiasm for 
corporatism. 
The party's organizational structure demonstrated this commitment to corporatism. 
The NCP proposed to create vocational organizations within the party, the first to be 
67 N. C. P. IIQ Circular no. 3; Constitution, 18 June 1935. D/Jus8/296. 
69 See B UF Constitution, 1936. 
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formed being agriculture. Two delegates from each company were to go to a 
Constituency Convention in order to appoint a Constituency Standing Committee for 
Agriculture, which was to have a Chairman, Vice-Chairman, a Secretary, a Treasurer, 
and other officers depending on the size of the constituency. This committee was to 
meet monthly and make policy recommendations to the National Council of 
Agriculture, the ex-officio Chairman of this body being the Director-General. The 
National Council was to meet quarterly, but the Chairman could also summon 
additional meetings if necessary. A similar organization to this was to be set up for 
labour and other vocational groups as soon as it was feasible to do so. 
Within two months of its existence, the party was encouraging local branches to 
arrange a Divisional Conference to implement the decisions of Congress and to 
promote the party ready for the next general election. To help promote the launch, 
O'DufFy announced that he was prepared to attend two conventions a week if given 
sufficient notice. One of the main purposes of these conventions was to set up 
Constituency Standing Committees for Agriculture. A meeting of the National 
Executive had recently reorganized the Divisions to correspond with the new 
constituency boundaries . 
69 The Executive, at its meeting on the 14 November 1935, 
decided that the Divisional boundaries were too large and their number was increased 
from thirty to thirty-seven. The selection of candidates to contest the election was to 
follow on from these Divisional Conventions. 
At the same time, the National Executive was beginning to express its concern over 
the influence of other groups on individual members, including the New Land 
League. The NLL had been formed in Cork in 1935 as a non-party organization 
calling for the redistribution of land to smallholders and subsistence farmers as well 
69 N. C. P. Bulletin no. 1, August 1935, DIJusSI296, NA I. 
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as landless labourers. The implication of this demand was that the government would 
be involved in the expropriation of land and its redistribution. The land would not be 
nationalized as, in line with their commitment to property ownership, it would be 
distributed to the landless, who would pay for it with a low-cost loan. Fine Gael 
quickly came to dominate the leaseholder movement. This caused O'Duffy's initial 
support to turn to outright opposition. 70 The Executive reinforced the stipulation that 
members of the NCP only take orders from party officers with the threat of expulsion 
for disobedience. 
O'Duffy set up a central branch of the party, to meet at Pearse Street headquarters, 
the purpose of which was to advise the Director-General on finance, elections, 
propaganda, publications, current affairs and new legislation. 71 O'Duffy had officially 
opened the headquarters on the 19th February 1935 and named it the St Patrick's 
Social Club 72 . The building, adjacent to Trinity College and since demolished, was 
shared with the Victor X-Ray Company Ltd. from 1935 until 1937.73 O'Duffy and the 
Divisional Directors were to recommend suitable members for the Central Branch. It 
meant a further strengthening of O'Duffy's control over the party machine. He stood 
at the apex of the pyramid organization of the party and controlled the policy-making 
National Executive. He would be the Chairman of the corporate organizations within 
the party and he was leader of the autonomous Blueshirt organization. 
In the same month, the first General Election Circular appeared. The party wanted 
every constituency to have a Polling Place Committee in place by the I" February 
1936. The Circular required Committee members to be "young, energetic and 
70 Speech at Bandon by O'Duffy, reported in The Nation February 1936. " Ibid. 
72 Director- General letter to District Directors, 13 February 1935, D/Jus8/296, NAL 
73 Thom's Directory of Ireland, (Dublin, 1936-39 editions) 
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loyal. 1974 The constituency was to appoint one person as Polling Place Director or 
'Keyman, ' whose purpose was to "direct and coordinate the work of the various sub- 
directors and to ensure the duties delegated to each is well done .,, 
75 Four Sub- 
Directors nominated by the Director were to assist him and were responsible for 
propaganda, organization, finance and transport. They were not required to be 
uniformed members, but preference was to go to those in uniform. 76 
O'Duffy and the National Executive had every intention, at this stage, of fighting 
the next General Election whenever it was announced and, as a result, O'Duffy 
wanted to set up his party's election machine as quickly as possible. It was expected 
that the machine would be up and running before the next Ard Ads in the surnmer of 
1936. Some constituencies were quicker to organize than others, depending on the 
manpower available and the enthusiasm of the local party. However, the vast majority 
of constituencies did not have the manpower to organize an electoral organization. 
West Cork, the main exception, was prepared by March 1936,77 even though a 
General Election was not expected for another year. In the West Cork constituency 78 
the Deputy-Director of the NCP, Colonel Coughlan reported that: 
"Our organization in West Cork is now a perfect machine, each district has its own 
farmers' and labourers' council to manage their own affairs. Every polling booth from 
Coachford to Castletownbere is manned. Every company captain, district director, and 
divisional director knows exactly what his duties are in case of an election, they know 
who are our supporters, who have cars and other transport to bring our supporters to 
,, 79 the booths - in short, we are ready for a general election at a moment's notice. 
74 N. C. P. General Election Circular no. 1, D/Jus8/296, NAI. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. 
77 The Nation, March 1936, 'Election Machine. ' 
78 The constituency was a Blueshirt stronghold. 79 The Nation, March 1936, 'Tribute to Released Prisoner. Leader in Cashel. ' 
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O'Duffy, speaking at Bandon, Co. Cork, described the organization in West Cork as 
the most perfect election machine in all Ireland. 80 West Cork, he said, was the model 
for party organization. The largest constituency in the Free State, it contained 184 
electoral divisions. It had always been a Blueshirt stronghold. The NCP split the 
constituency into four Divisions corresponding with the Council Electoral Areas. 
Each Division had its own Divisional staff under the direction of General 
Headquarters. Divisions were divided into three Districts and each District into eight 
or more Company areas, bringing the party down to a very local administrative area. 8 1 
However, the membership of the party was unstable, the turnover of officers high, and 
the membership numbers small. The paper organization for a mass party was in place 
but the membership numbers failed to materialize. 
Late in 1935, the National Executive made changes to membership, only 
acknowledging as members those whose names appeared on a National Roll kept at 
Pearse Street, and on the payment of an annual subscription of one shilling. 82 This low 
subscription implies that the party wanted to recruit a mass membership. This 
replaced the affiliation fee of two pounds for each Company. Unfortunately, this 
National Roll has been lost. Local branches were to maintain separate rolls for 
uniformed and non-uniformed members. Ordinary Members were those: 
"... who support the movement, and whose names appear on the National Roll, but 
who for any reason are unable to carry out the orders and duties pertaining to 
uniformed members, or who might be victimized should they appear in uniform. They 
43 
are not required to take the proscribed pledge. 
80 The Nation, April 1936, 'Election Machine. ' 
81 Ibid. 
92 Subscriptions were payable on the I st of January. 
93 NCP HQ Circular no. 8, December 1935 D/Jus81296 NAL 
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The National Corporate Party was never a numerically significant organization. It 
was created in June 1935 on the rump O'Duffy faction of the Blueshirts. At the time 
of the split with Fine Gael in August 1934, the Blueshirt movement had peaked with a 
84 membership of 47,923 .A rapid 
decline in membership of both the Fine Gael faction 
led by Ned Cronin and O'Duffy's smaller independent movement followed on from 
the split. Mike Cronin has shown in The Blueshirts and Irish Polilics that many of 
those who joined the Blueshirts were already members of Curnarm na nGaedheal/Fine 
Gael or were entirely new to politics. With the split, former Blueshirts soon drifted 
back into the mainstream of Irish politics and abandoned corporatist ideas. According 
to Fine Gael party documents, by September 1935, the membership of Cronin's 
Blueshirts was down to a paltry 4,050.85. The membership ledgers of the NCP are no 
longer available, and this makes accurate estimates of the size of O'Duffy's faction 
impossible to gauge. The NCP was never to contest an election and as a result, no 
statistics are available to calculate its broader, potential support. At the time of the 
split, United Ireland estimated that O'Duffy took no more than ten per cent of the 
movement with him, 86 which would have been around 4,800 members based on 
Blueshirt membership figures already quoted. United Ireland was the party paper of 
Fine Gael, however, and had a stake in playing down the strength of the O'Duffy 
faction. Many members, disillusioned with the split and the subsequent acrimonious 
wrangling between the factions, decided to leave rather than choose sides. 
Both Cronin and O'Duffy canvassed branch loyalties and there were votes of 
support taken for both leaders at branch and county level. O'Duffy's The Blueshirt 
listed the support given by the various branches to O'Duffy on a weekly basis, taking 
94 P246713 (B) Blythe Papers UCD, August 1934. This figure does not include the membership figure 
for Co. Longford. 
83 Membership ledger of Ned Cronin, September 1935, cited in Cronin, Mike, The Blueshirts and Irish 
Politics p. 204, note 22. 
86 United Ireland. 27 October 1934. 
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up much of the content of the journal in late 1934 (Appendix 3 gives an indication of 
the geographical concentration of those branches voting to stay loyal to O'Duffy). 
The national press also showed an interest in the dispute, for example the Irish Press 87 
reported O'Duffy's attendance at a conference in Wexford where 150 officers and 
district representatives voted unanimously to support O'Duffy as leader of the 
Blueshirts. At the same time, a weekly record of branches voting loyalty to either of 
the two factions in The Blueshirt revealed the serious divisiveness of the split. There 
were some very close votes; for example, 25-16 for O'Dufry, Glanworth Unit, Co. 
88 Uf 89 and East Limerick, Cork, Co Meath and Navan conference 25-20 for O'D fy 
where it was an even 23-23 split between the two potential leaders. 90 
Despite the fact that the membership records are no longer available, details of the 
names and residence of some members can be gleaned from party sources, such as 
journals, circulars, bulletins, the national press and police reports. The Department of 
Justice has files relating to the movement that give some personal details about 
members attending meetings, including the annual Congress. The Blueshirt and The 
Nation list the appointment of officers, attendance at functions and reports of locally 
organized events, as do party bulletins and circulars. The regional and national press 
provide some additional information but press reports on NCP activities declined 
rapidly after the initial interest in O'Duffy's new venture had died down. From these 
sources, it is possible to assess where the movement had its strongest support base. 
By the most conservative estimate, three hundred and fifty members attended the 
first Congress in June 1935, but only two hundred and fifty attended a year later, 
indicating a sharp decline in membership. Not all attendees were voting delegates, 
87 Irish Press, 21 November 1934, 'O'DufTy in Wexford. ' 
"" The Blueshirt, 24 November 1934, 
89 The Blueshirl 3 November 1934. 
90 The Blueshirt 10 November 1934. 
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however. The delegates were local officers representing the county divisions, 
companies, and the central branch. However, it does indicate that there was a larger 
membership base than the party has been given credit for. The names of party 
officials appointed by O'Duffy that are available indicate that the party did have an 
active membership prepared to take on the many thankless tasks associated with the 
day to day running of a political organization. The difficulty for the historian lies with 
the fact that the names that are available are those of party officers only, and it is 
therefore impossible to assess the size of individual local branches. Party newspapers 
were apt to exaggerate the size of the movement. The historian needs to be wary of 
the evidence. As an example, in early 1935, O'Duffy had organizational problems 
with the Cork City branch of the Blueshirts. As a result, he removed all existing 
officers and replaced them with new ones selected by himself 91 A Garda report of the 
Cork reorganization, commenting on the circular detailing the appointments 
concluded: 
"The names of the 16 men proposed for the appointment to the organizing staff as 
enunciated in paragraph 5 of Circular command little or no following, and it has been 
ascertained that the majority of them failed to accept their appointments to the 
Organizing staff.. Even when the officer personnel of the new Cork City Division is 
formed it is anticipated that the total membership will be very small. 9592 
The NCP was to have a high turnover of officer staff during its short life, as the 
membership details in the appendix reveal. This not only demonstrates the continued 
decline and fluidity in membership, but also the unwillingness of appointees to take 
on the posts assigned to them without prior consultation, a further example of 
O'Duffy's autocratic frame of mind, and dictatorial style of leadership. 
91 O'Duffy, East Cork City Division, circular issued 18 April 1935, D/Jusg/296, NAL 
92 Garda Report, Ard Cheannphort McCarthy, Cork City to the Commissioner, Garda Siochana, Dublin 
16 May 1935, D/Jus8/296, NAL 
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There are reports of local meetings that give the attendance in vague terms. At 
other times, the reports only name the officers in attendance while the number of 
rank-and-file members present is ignored. The Garda only rarely attended local 
meetings but when they did, they recorded the number present; for example, Ferns, 
93 
the 27th September 1936,12 in attendance 9 and Cashel, 18 members 
in 
attendance. 94Large numbers were attracted to social events such as dances such the 
one held on New Years Eve, 1935 in Dublin . 
95 Non-members and sympathisers 
attended these functions and annual events such as the Michael Collins 
commemoration ceremony at Beal na Blath and the ceremony to commemorate the 
martyrdom of Hugh O'Reilly. 96 In 1935, both factions of the Blueshirts held 
commemorative ceremonies at Beal na Blath on separate Sundays in August. The 
Cork Examiner described the Cronin event as "well-attended', 97 and reports that the 
following week around four thousand attended O'Duffy's tribute. 98 The party also 
held public meetings which attracted non-members. In a rural society with little 
organized entertainment any event, such as a party rally or speech, was a welcome 
distraction. 
By plotting the names and location of named members on a map of Ireland (see 
Appendix, mapl), it is possible to ascertain the geographical distribution of the party 
membership. A similar exercise with the recorded location of meetings produces a 
similar geographical distribution to the membership figures (see Appendix, map 2). 
The greatest concentrations of members were in the province of Munster (particularly 
93 Ard Cheannphort Lynch to Commissioner, Garda Siochana, Dublin 2 October 1936, D/Jus8/296, 
NAL 
94 Ard Cheannphort, Thurles to Commissioner Garda Siochana, Dublin, 22 June 1936, D/Jus8/296, 
NAI. 
95 The Nation, February 1936, 'Dublin Entertainment'. 
96 The Nation, February 1936 reported that on January 1936 the Hugh O'Reilly commemoration "was 
attended by upwards of 1,500 people. A procession of over 1000 members of the National Corporate 
Party ... marched for Inishannon Bridge. " 97 Cork Examiner 12 th August 1935, 'Beal na Blath. ' 
98 Cork Examiner, I 91h August 1935, 'Beal na Blath Commemoration. ' 
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Cork and Tipperary), Dublin (understandably as the capital and largest population 
centre), and the northeast of the Free State bordering Northern Ireland. The large 
number of members in Monaghan who stayed loyal to O'Duffy is almost certainly 
due to the fact that O'Duffy was a Monaghan man. Neighbouring Cavan, to which 
Monaghan had close links, was also a NCP stronghold, and a border area to boot. Irish 
politics puts great store on the support for local men for political office, inspiring a 
great sense of loyalty to individuals. The party was particularly weak in Leinster, the 
province of Connaught, and Donegal (see Appendix on Relative Strength of the NCP 
By County). Whilst the party was to claim that its membership was nation-wide the 
evidence reveals that the spread of the organization was patchy and concentrated in a 
few small core areas. 
A comparison with the work done by Fearghal McGarry and Mike Cronin on the 
membership of the earlier Blueshirts shows the similarity in distribution to NCP 
membership. McGarry was able to plot the geographical strength of the Blueshirt 
movement before the split. In August 1934, the greatest concentration of Blueshirts 
was to be found in Meath, Carlow, Kilkenny, Limerick and Cork, with significant 
numbers in Tipperary, Sligo and Dublin. 99 Those areas most affected by the Economic 
War produced the largest number of Blueshirts. There is also a correlation with 
electoral support for Cumann na nGaedheal and its successor, Fine Gael. 100 
Mike Cronin concludes from his own research that, "the majority of constant high 
level Blueshirt support did rest in areas where the average farm size was greatest, "101 
but that most Blueshirts, in spite of being labelled 'ranchers' by their left-wing 
opponents in the columns of An Phoblacht, did not own large farms (those over 60 
99 F. McGarry, Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War p. 33. Map showing the distribution of 
Blueshirts by county, August 1934. 
100 Ibid. 
101 M. Cronin, The Blueshirts and Irish Politics, p. 117. 
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acres). However the sample size he uses for his survey is small, only 15, and there is a 
considerable margin of error in using such as small sample. The distribution of 
Blueshirts, as plotted by McGarry, ' 02 is similar to that of the NCP, and this is 
especially noticeable in Cork and Tipperary. This is supported by Cronin who claims 
that the Blueshirts were a rural movement that attracted members from a wide range 
of rural occupations. "93 In the week that the NCP was formed, The Blueshirt printed 
an article which claimed that there were 586 Blueshirts in 14 company areas in 
Connemara, County Galway. 104 Two reasons were given for publishing this 
constituency strength: 
"First, it is the best reply to those who allege that the Blueshirts are a ranchers' or 
big farmers' movement. Secondly, Connemara is an area which was never pampered 
or spoon-fed by Headquarters, even during the existence of Fine Gael. 
"We are proud to say that in the poorest districts in Ireland and in the Gaeltacht 
ours is the strongest national movement. "' 05 
The article was trying to argue that, even in an area like Connemara, which was 
overwhelmingly associated with tillage and subsistence farming, the Blueshirt 
movement could count on widespread support. Connemara was part of Galway 
county, which in August 1935 only had a total of 2,457 members. 106 O'Duffy was 
keen to distance himself from being labelled as too closely connected with larger 
farmers, thus broadening his base and distancing himself from the conservatism of 
Fine Gael, and its predecessors. However, there is considerable doubt that his 
statistics were anywhere near accurate. 
102 F. McGarry, Irish Politics and the Spanish civil War, p. 33. 
103 Ibid. p. 126. 
104 The Blueshirt, 8 June 1935, 'Connemara. ' 
105 Ibid. 
106M. Cronin, The Blueshirts andIrish Politics, Table 5.2, p. 115. Blueshirt Membership Figures by 
County. 
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Following the split, branches voted their loyalty to Cronin or O'Duffy as leader of 
the movement. An analysis of the distribution of these branch votes (see Appendix- 
map 3) seems to indicate that O'Duffy's support within the movement remained 
geographically the same as that of the Blueshirts. No particular area voted en masse 
for one leader over another. 
An analysis of Blueshirt membership figures reveals that in August 1934,26% of 
members (12,385) were women, and that the vast majority of these were unmarried. 107 
There has been no study made of the role of women in the Blueshirt movement. 
According to his survey of surviving members, Cronin found that most of the women 
joined the movement when a relative, usually a father or brother, did so. 108 They were 
nicknamed 'Blueblouses, ' and had their own separate women's divisions. 
Women continued to be involved with O'Duffy's rump faction and the NCP. Later 
they were given their own version of the new green uniform, a green blouse and black 
skirt. 109 The Mation provides evidence for the existence of NCP women's divisions 
in only three counties-Dublin (Dublin Townships, Dublin South, Dublin Northwest 
and Dublin Northeast), County Cork (Bandon, Templemartin, Ferns and Inishannon) 
and Limerick, though it is possible that women's organizations existed in other 
counties. In my sample of 337 NCP members, only 24, slightly over 7%, can be 
positively identified as female (a similar figure to the female membership of Hitler's 
NSDAP110). This demonstrates a considerable decline in female membership since 
the split. There is little information about the activities of these women's units but 
they were involved in arrangements for social functions such as dances, picnics and 
107 League of Youth membership figures, P24671 (B) Blythe Papers, August 1934, U. C. D 
'0' M. Cronin, The Blueshirts and Irish Politics, p. 126. 
109 HQ circular No. 12, DIJus 8/296, NA1. 
110 The NSDAP had a female membership that fluctuated between 6 and 8% cited in Renton, D., This 
Rough Game. Fascism andAnti-Fascism (Stroud, Glos., 2001), p. 39. 
82 
83 
providing refreshments at branch meetings. " 'Given the overwhelming bias of fascism 
towards the masculine, and O'Duffy's long history of misogyny in his speeches, this 
is not surprising 
The 193 6,4rd Fheis addressed the issue of women in the movement, and the need to 
promote female recruitment. A motion was referred to the National Executive for 
consideration: 
"T That women and girls be encouraged to join the movement, and that a women's 
section be organized. "' 12 
However, by this point, the active life of the party was almost over and the National 
Executive never discussed the issue. 
Historians such as Cronin, Manning and McGarry, have portrayed the movement as 
stillborn and inactive but the party j oumal and press reports reveal a movement that 
was active in debating policies, holding lectures and public meetings, particularly on 
the corporate question and agricultural policy. Members were also involved in selling 
the party newspaper and organizing an electoral machine. Some branches provided 
more activities such as first aid and physical culture in Dublin South constituency 
branch, and a band at Carrickshock, Co. Kilkenny. 
A glance at O'Duffy's itinerary for the year 113 indicates the active role he played in 
rallying his movement. He was involved in organizing the branches, setting up the 
corporate organizations within the party, rallying the faithful at party conferences and 
speaking on the corporate issue. He also produced a lot of the material published in 
the party journal which was a constant drain on his time. He was busy with his 
involvement with the international fascist movement as a member of CAUR. He 
111 The Dublin South (Ladies) Branch also offered a number of classes, including Irish language and 
keep-fit. 
112 The Natlor4 August 1936, 'Resolutions Passed By Congress. ' 
113 See Appendix-O'Duffy's Itinerary 1935-6. 
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travelled the country but was also heavily involved in his work at Central 
Headquarters in Dublin. The job entailed a lot of travelling, but he was hampered in 
this by the party's lack of finance, and often by bad weather. 
The National Executive felt sufficiently encouraged by membership figures, 
attendance at public meetings and rallies to predict that at the next election the party 
would be able to "secure one seat in each of 20 constituencies, two seats in one 
constituency, and no seat in 13 constituencies. " 114 This was optimistic since the party 
had recently, but temporarily as it later turned out, ceased publication of its party 
newspaper, The Nation, due to the lack of new subscribers and advertisers. The 
members' subscriptions were not suff icient to keep the paper financially afloat and the 
party did not have enough ftinds to subsidize its continued publication. 
A note from the editor in The Nation in July 1936, attached to an article on 
emigration, pointed out that over the last twelve months, half of the officers of the 
NCP had to be replaced due to emigration from Ireland to England and Scotland. ' 15 
This would appear to indicatethat the party tended to recruit from those groups likely 
to face unemployment and/or emigration. However, it could have been an excuse for 
the rapid turnover of officer staff caused by resignations from the party or a failure to 
take up appointments in the first place (as they had failed to do in Cork in early 1935). 
The majority of the leading figures in the Blueshirt movement, men such as Blythe, 
Tierney, Hogan and O'Higgins, remained loyal to Fine Gael and its faction of the 
League of Youth under Ned Cronin. Few were to follow O'Duffy into a potential 
political wilderness. The few who did so were inspired by O'Duffy's radical, 
increasingly fascist, rhetoric or by personal loyalty to the man. 
114 N. C. P. Bulletin no. 5, December 1935, D/Jus8/296, NAL 
115 The Nation, July, 1936, 'The 57,000 or a Nation's Strength. ' 
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Thomas Gunning was born in rural Roscommon to an R. I. C. ' 16 man turned farmer. 
Gunning spent time in seminaries in Ireland and at Freiburg in Germany during the 
early thirties, witnessing the rise of Hitler and the Nazis, before deciding against a life 
in the priesthood. Ile returned to Ireland and turned his hand to journalism, editing the 
Catholic Standard. He quickly involved himself in the Blueshirt movement once it 
began to accept members who had not been in the an-ned forces. He travelled around 
the country making speeches to district and county gatherings. 117 In 1933, he became 
O'Dufly's personal secretary, a post he held until 1936. He was an admirer of 
O'Duffy and his extreme ideas, in particular backing his belligerent stance on the 
North. In 1934, he was described by Gomez Homen 118 as "an expert fascist, well 
versed in the doctrines and practices of corporatism, "' 09 At the time of the split from 
Fine Gael, it was Gunning who prompted O'Duffy to carry on as leader of the 
Blueshirts, causing further division. An angry Ned Cronin accused Gunning of 
plotting to murder O'Duffy earlier in the year, 119 an accusation that he did not deny. 120 
There had been some animosity between the two men. Whilst Cronin had been in jai I 
in 1934, Gunning had taken on his position at League HQ, but on his release, Gunning 
lost his position. 121 In the light of this animosity, and lack of evidence, the truth of the 
accusation is difficult to substantiate. 
Gunning followed O'Duffy out of Fine Gael and became General -Secretary of the 
NCP and editor of the party paper at a wage, paid from members' subscriptions, of V 
a week. 122 Ile was the only paid party functionary. Financial difficulties led to the 
116 Royal Irish Constabulary. 
I 17M. Cronin, The Blueshirts and Irish Politics, p. 45. 
"8 Gomez Ilomen, an Italian Fascist, visited Ireland in June and July of 1934. Cited in D. Keogh, 
Ireland and Europe 1919-48, p. 47. 
119J. R. Regan, The Irish Counter -Revolution, 1921-36 (Dublin, 1999), p. 368. 120 Dillon to MacDermot, 25 September 1934, MacDennot Papers 1065/2/4, NAL 
12 ' Regan, J. R. The Irish Counler-Revolution 1921-36, p. 368. 
122 Letter from O'Duffy to Divisional Directors, 7 August 1935, D/JusV296, NAL 
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termination of his paid employment only two months after the NCP was set up. 123 As 
Gunning was unable to continue in the post in an unpaid capacity, he resigned. He 
continued his involvement with the party as a member of the National Executive and 
later joined the Irish Brigade in Spain where he became O'Duffy's aide de camp and 
held the honorary rank of Captain. He was responsible for the financial side of the 
Brigade but was "regarded as both profligate and irresponsible in his use of Brigade 
funds. "124 Later in the Spanish campaign, he split with O'Duffy. He did not return to 
Ireland but remained in Burgos as an advisor to the Nationalists. 125 He moved to 
Gen-nany where he worked for Goebbels' Ministry of Propaganda, helping to write 
William Joyce's 126 broadcasts. 127 He died of tuberculosis in Breslau in June 1940.1 28 
Colonel Patrick Joseph Coughlan of Balineen, Co. Cork was O'Duffy's second in 
command. He had fought in the independence struggle and had been a member of the 
National Army on the pro-Treaty side in the Irish Civil War. He joined the A. C. A. 
soon after its fori-nation and quickly became a key figure in Cork. He became Director 
of Organization for Fine Gael and County Director of the League of Youth. ' 29 He was, 
a nationalist and an extremist. 130 He joined O'Duffy after the split and was appointed 
Deputy Director of the League of Youth, and later, the NCP. Ile wrote The Truth, the 
Story ofthe Blueshirts, describing the events that led to O'Duffy's resignation from 
Fine Gael. It also contained details of Blueshirt policies, and was evidence of 
Coughlan's extremism. During the short life of the party, his West Cork constituency 
123 ]bid. 
124 R. A. Stradling,, The Irish and the Spanish Civil War (Manchester 1999), p. 23. 
125 F. McGarry, Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War, p. 38. 
126 William Joyce, Lord llaw-Haw, broadcast for the Nazis during the war. A former member of the 
BUF, he was executed for treason after the war. 
128 F. McGarry, F. General O'Dujfy and the Irish Brigade, p. 123. 
128 Ibid. 
129 P. J. Cough Ian, The Truth- The Story ofthe Blueshirts, p. 3. 
130 F. McGarry, Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War, pp. 21-22. 
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was held up as the model for organizational efficiency by O'Duffy. 131 Ile often 
accompanied O'Duffy on his tours and attended was a member of the National 
Executive. Ile wrote an account of O'Duffy's speaking tour of West Cork, which was 
printed and sold through the party journal. Coughlan was involved in the recruitment 
of volunteers for the Irish Brigade, but did not go to Spain. 132 
Captain Liam D. Walsh replaced Tom Gunning as the General Secretary of the 
NCP, and became O'Duffy's private secretary once the party was disbanded. He had 
been a G2 (Irish Military Intelligence) officer in the 1930s. 133 He later became a 
police agent. 134 A long-time admirer of O'Duffy, he later wrote an unpublished, 
sycophantic account of the General's career, titled General O'Duffy-His Life and 
Battle . 
135 When O'Duffy was in Spain, he claimed to have left Walsh in charge of 
funds only to find on his return that E2300 had vanished. O'Duffy had to meet debts 
incurred by Walsh "but nevertheless did not break friends with him and he succeeded 
in getting him a position at the Italian legation. "136 Walsh was very active in recruiting 
for the Brigade and in efforts to keep O'Duffy and his Brigade in the newspapers. He 
continued his association with O'Duffy, and was later involved in the creation of the 
pro-Nazi People's National Party, a clear indication of his extremist views. 137 1 le was 
in contact with prominent members of the Fichte Bund, a quasi-official German 
propaganda organization. 138 Ile wrote a series of propaganda articles which he sent to 
Germany, and was co-founder of the Irish Friends of Gennany. Ile was interned in the 
13 1 The Nation, March 1936, 'Election Machine. ' 
132 F. McGarry, General O'Du5, the N. C. P and the Irish Brigade, p. 121. 
133 D. O'Drisceol, Censorship in Ireland 1939-45, (Cork, 1996), p. 76. 
134 Extract from Weekly Miscellaneous Reports, G2 Military Intelligence, We 3 rd September 1940., 
G2/X/0253 Irish Friends of Germany, Military Archives, Dublin. 131 MS. N. A. L 
136 Extract from Weekly Misc. Reports, G2 Military Intelligence, We P September 1940, G2/X/0253 
Irish Friends of Germany, Military Archives, Dublin. 
137 R. Fisk, In Time of War (Andre Deutsch, 1983), pp. 374-5. 
138D. O'Drisceol, Censorship in Ireland, 193 9-45, p. 76. 
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Curragh later in the war for subversive activities. 139 Ile remained friendly with 
O'Duffy, until the latter's death. O'Duffy remembered him with a bequest in his will. 
Little inforination is available about other key figures in the party. Dr. J. E. Conway, 
B. L. was Divisional Treasurer of the Dublin Division and sat on the National 
Executive. He was responsible for organizing a dinner in O'Duffy's honour. Louis 
O'Connell, a solicitor from Listowel, County Kerry, was the representative from 
Munster on the Standing Committee formed by O'Duffy. He was responsible for 
promoting the Social Credit ideas of Major C. H. Douglas in The Nation. 
O'Duffy failed to attract any mainstream politicians away from the Fine Gael. He 
had failed to lead that party to victory in the local elections, a demonstration of his 
inability to inspire the Irish electorate. The result was that few were wiling to follow 
him into another venture, but were prepared to trust to the politicians such as 
Cosgrave who had led the party to victory in the past. The party members, and 
Blueshirts, had heard his extremist views and were unwilling to endorse them by 
joining his new party. O'Duffy, the green Duce, had failed to win over a substantial 
number of his erstwhile followers, but it did not deter O'Duffy who felt that the 
shirted tradition should continue, and that an electoral victory would soon be won. 
INTERNAL PARTY ISSUES 
The NCP, like many small organizations, became obsessed with minor internal and 
doctrinal wrangles and with the minutiae of organization, form, and regalia. It only 
came to life over two main contemporary issues, the economic war and the 
Abyssinian crisis, preferring instead to discuss the details of corporatism and social 
credit, and in doing so alienating even more members. 
139 Ibid. p. 76. 
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The National Corporate Party decided to carry on the shirted tradition of the 
Blueshirts, with minor changes, in spite of the impending ban on the wearing of 
uniforms. The issue was discussed at the party's inaugural Ard Fheis. The party 
discarded the black beret and members were required, from early 1936 onwards, to go 
bareheaded or to wear the 1916 Volunteer hat. 140 The National Executive changed the 
colour of the tie from black to dark green. 14 1 At the same time, a new flag was 
adopted, a red St. Patrick's cross on a blue background with the initials of the party 
and a shamrock in green in the quarters of the cross. 142 It is of interest to note that the 
original uniform was very similar, in style and colour, to that wom by the British 
Fascisti who were active in Dublin in the thirties. 143 The party was obsessed with the 
liturgical trappings of the movement, a continental influence which O'Duffy tried to 
absorb into the Irish political tradition by stressing the connection with earlier 
uniformed movements such as the Volunteers. 144 
The National Executive met on 10 November 1935 to discuss changing the colour 
of the uniform. The party seemed to think that the issue was an important one. The 
adoption of a green uniform, the Volunteer hat, and the break with the blue shirt 
indicate a change of tack. The party was distancing itself from its links with Fine 
Gael, and reverting back to the ideas and symbolism of the 1916 Rising in order to 
challenge Fianna Fail for the mantle of republicanism. Delegates had raised the 
uniform issue at the 1935 Ard Fheis, but the overwhelming majority of members had 
come out in favour of retaining the colour blue. Captain Tom Hyde 145 spoke at the 
140 A soft, large-brimmed hat wom by some Volunteers in 1916. 
141 Headquarters Circular no. 5, D/Jusg/296, NAL 142 Ibid. 
143 R. Thurlow, Fascism in Britain, A histoty 1918-85 (Oxford, 1987), p. 34. 
144 For an analysis of fascism as a 'secular religion' see E. Gentile, The Sacralization ofPolitics in 
Fascist Italy (Boston, 1996). 
14' A long-standing member of the Blueshirts from Kerry. fie laterjoined the Irish Brigade and fought 
in Spain, where he died fighting in support of Franco. 
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Congress, arguing that green was the national colour wom by patriots throughout 
history, but he failed to sway delegates. 
In spite of the decision by Congress, the National Executive promoted a change of 
colour, but stated that it did not have the authority to do so. It was some time before 
the next Congress and they deemed the need for a decision as urgent. The Executive 
decided to canvass opinion by allowing companies and divisions to vote on the 
matter. The Executive intended to make a decision at the end of the year based on 
these ballots. 146 The issue of changing the uniform's colour was one of the few 
motions that had been put by the Executive that Congress had failed to carry. The 
decision to proceed with the change, based on a ballot that could easily have been 
tampered with, is a clear indication that the decisions of Congress were meaningless 
unless endorsed by O'Duffy and his Executive. 
The reason that O'Duffy gave for the change was that: 
"Instances were given where the action of those, who deserted from the movement 
at the time we left Fine Gael, were opposed to our ideals, and that in many cases the 
public were confused, and in some cases even the Press associated such conduct to 
our organization. It was considered that in the event of a General Election such 
confusion would still be more embarrassing. It was urged that the full benefits of our 
National Policy could not be reaped until the Green Shirt was adopted. " 147 
In marked contrast to the vote at Congress, the returns counted on 31 December 
1935 showed that an "overwhelming majority of the companies and branches " 
favoured the change to a green shirt. 148 There is no accounting for the complete 
turnaround in opinion. O'Duffy chose the particular shade of green and the shirts were 
made available for purchase from May 1936 at a cost of six shillings. Uniformed 
146 1 leadquarters Circular, no. 9, December 193 5, D/Jus8/296, NAL 
147 Ibid. 
148 Headquarters Circular no. 14, May 1936P-UusS/296, NAI. 
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party members were to wear the green shirt with a tie of a darker shade of green. 
O'Duffy wrote: 
"All over the world green is, and ever shall be recognized as the symbol of the 
Emerald Isle. Make no mistake about it, this country shall always be known as Green 
Erin. " 149 
The change to green relates to O'Duffy's return to traditional Republican 
symbolism but, more pragmatically, it was a belated recognition of the fact that most 
Blueshirts had not followed him out of Fine Gael. Clashes between the two factions 
from late 1934 onwards were causing confusion. Interestingly, the party adopted the 
green shirt at the same time as they began to debate the Social Credit ideas of Major 
Douglas (see chapter 3). The members of the British Social Credit party wore a green 
shirt, though they were actively opposed to fascism. ' 50 
De Valera's proposal to ban the wearing of uniforms was still in legal limbo when 
this change took place. In 1934, the Wearing of Uniforms Bill had passed all its stages 
in the Dail but there was strong opposition in the Senate. The Senate voted against 
giving the bill a second reading. This provoked De Valera into proposing a bill the 
next day to abolish the Senate. Inevitably, the Senate rejected the bill but it would 
come into force anyhow after an 18-month moratorium, along with the Wearing of 
Unifonns Bill. 151 O'Duffy threw out a challenge to De Valera: 
"We are determined to wear our green shirts despite any ban and despite any threat 
of persecution or victimization. Please God the green will survive all parties. " 152 
From now on, the NCP members were known as Greenshirts. O'Duffy's new party 
continued the shirted tradition begun with the Blueshirts. He felt that there was a need 
149 Ibid. 
"0 They often appeared at anti-Mosley demonstrations in uniform. "' The Senate could only delay legislation. Manning, The Blueshirls, p. 126 152 f leadquarters Circular, no. 14, May 1936, D/JusS/296, NAL 
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for a disciplined uniformed organization, alongside the party organization. The 
Greenshirts were necessary to continue to provide the symbolic pageantry that was the 
distinguishing mark of most fascist movements 
At its inaugural conference, the NCP agreed to change the name of the party 
journal from The Blueshirt to The Nation. This change of name was in line with 
O'Duffy's stress on defining the party within the nationalist framework but it also had 
a fascist angle in equating the party with the nation. Thomas Davis, the poet and 
nationalist, had launched a newspaper in the nineteenth century, which he named The 
Nation. A number of otherjournals since had borne the name, that of the NCP being 
the latest. It implied a continuity, and extension, of the nationalist tradition. 
The price of the paper was reduced to half that of The Blueshirt 153 in an attempt to 
bring in subscriptions. Propaganda and publicity were crucial to the success of the 
new party, and an increase in the circulation of the paper would be a step towards 
increasing the membership and winning people over to the party's radical agenda. 
Party members were encouraged to approach their local newsagents and suggest that 
they stock the party newspaper. Individual members were to encourage their 
newsagent by guaranteeing the sale of a certain number of copies. The party asked 
members to canvas potential advertisers who were encouraged to place 
advertisements at 2/6d per insertion. In return, the advertiser would be assured of 
Blueshirt support for their business. 154 As well as sales through newsagents, Young 
Comrades were to sell the paper at church gates after Mass on Sundays. The party 
sent potential new recruits copies of the paper free of charge for a trial period. 
Advertising revenue was crucial as the party hoped that the newspaper would be able 
153 1 leadquarters Circular no. 1, August 1935, D/Jus8/296, NAL 
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to rely exclusively on this source of revenue for its continued existence after the initial 
launch. Unfortunately, this source of income failed to materialize. 
The party initially expected that much of the content of the newspaper would come 
from the individual members, local branches and reports of meetings, conferences and 
reprinted speeches. Members were encouraged to write on a regular basis and 
eventually the Executive hoped to set up a panel of writers. 155 In the end, O'Duffy did 
much of the writing, or his lectures and speeches were printed verbatim. Most issues 
of the paper contained articles written in Irish, usually on the subject of Gaelic 
culture. This Gaelic language tokenism was common in many papers of the time. 
The publication of the paper proved a heavy drain on the slender resources of the 
fledgling party. Regular advertisements were few and it had to rely "entirely for its 
funds on the voluntary subscriptions of the members, none of whom can afford to 
give large sums. "' 56 Financial necessity led to the suspension of publication, with the 
hope that publication would be resumed "as the strength and influence of the 
movement developed. "' 57 Files containing all 28 issues of its predecessor, The 
Blueshirt, plus all issues of The Nation, were available free of charge to all members, 
an indication of the large stock accumulated at headquarters which they now sought to 
shift. The NCP substituted the paper with a bulletin distributed on the first of every 
month. It was to be sent to every company, division and district, to all local 
newspaper editors, and to "prominent people interested in the Corporate movement. 
In this way, it [was] hoped to secure for the Organization a wide measure of 
propaganda. "' 58 The National Executive asked local officers to send details of 
meetings to the local press as another way of promoting and building the organization, 
155 Ibid. 
156 1 leadquarters Bulletin, no. 1. August 1935, D/JusV296, NAL 
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and some newspapers, for example the Cork Examiner, regularly printed details of 
NCP local branch meetings. O'Duffy reminded the members: 
"Knowledge is power, and a report in the local press will be a great source of 
strength to our movement. " 159 
At the December 1935 meeting of the National Executive, O'Duffy proposed the re- 
launch of the newspaper, starting the following month "providing sufficient sales and 
advertisements were forthcoming. , 160 Once again members were encouraged to take 
out a subscription, and O'Duffy, ever the optimist, predicted that before long "our 
paper [will have] the largest circulation of any weekly paper in Ireland. " 16 'The 
newspaper was to have only six pages and cost 2d, and members were urged to 
prepare for the re-launch by again seeking subscribers and newsagents who were 
willing to stock copies. 
The newspaper did not in fact re-appear until February 1936, but it was much more 
substantial than earlier envisaged, with sixteen A4-sized pages. This was increased to 
twenty pages with the next and subsequent editions. However, the paper failed to 
attract any advertisers, even NCP members with businesses to promote. This could 
indicate that the party attracted few businessmen in the first place or that those who 
did join the party were aware of the limited circulation of the paper and did not feel it 
was financially worth their while to advertise. The movement persistently failed to 
find wealthy backers. Supporters of the party were unwilling to put politics before 
economics when it came to advertising. The only items advertised were those 
connected with the party such as uniforms, calendars and pamphlets. Priced at 3d, the 
paper was available form an address in Middle Abbey Street, Dublin and from March 
from the Pearse Street Headquarters. The substantial forinat of thejournal, the lack of 
159 Headquarters Bulletin no. 1, August 1935, D/Jusg/296, NAL 
'60 Headquarters Bulletin no. 5, December 1935, D/Jus8/296, NAL 
161 Headquarters Circular no. 7a, December 1935, D/JusS/296, NAL 
94. 
95 
advertisements, and the declining membership of the party make one question the 
source of funding for the paper when for months the party had been reduced to 
circulating badly copied bulletins and circulars. There are no records, however, of the 
print run of thejournal to establish how many of each issue were printed. The party 
had changed its arrangements for membership funding. The revenues obtained in 
January and February, when annual subscriptions were due, could have been used to 
finance a re-launch of the paper. 
There is always the possibility, in the light of O'Duffy's continued relationship 
with Mussolini and his championing of the war in Abyssinia, that overseas funding 
was made available to the Greenshirts. Mussolini certainly made financial 
contributions to other fascist groups in Europe. Between August 1933 and January 
1934, the Italian government deposited E40,000 in various currencies in a number of 
BUF accounts, as letters between Dino Grandi and Mussolini attest. 162 Considering 
Count Grandi's enthusiasm for Irish fascism and his trips to Dublin, 163 the possibility 
of contributions by the Italians to support the NCP are not beyond the realms of 
possibility. There is, however, no direct evidence from Garda files open to the public. 
However, during the Spanish Civil War, Liam Walsh sought the help of the Italian 
consul in supporting O'Duffy, who had used up his personal fortune in financing the 
Irish Brigade. A letter from Lodi Fe to Count Ciano secured; E350 for O'Duffy, which 
O'Duffy was to use to cover his personal expenses in Spain. 164 
As it was, the journal continued to be produced throughout the active life of the 
party, until August 1936. The paper was a mixture of local branch news, discussion of 
the party programme, and commentary on current affairs from a party perspective. 
162 As cited in N. Mosley, Beyond the Pale (London, 1983), pp. 174-5. 
163 Including his attendance at the 1936 NCP Ard Fheis. 
164Lodi Fe to Ciano, 29 January 1937, cited in R. Stradling, The Irish and the Spanish Civil War 
(Manchester, 1999), pp. ) 12-113. 
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Members submitted articles and wrote letters but the content tended to be dull and 
repetitive, and the style, turgid. 
The newspaper contributed to the liturgical element of the party by its re-printing of 
traditionalist nationalist songs. The Blueshirt movement, like many uniformed 
organizations realized the value of songs in rousing passions and uniting a mass of 
individuals into a coherent whole. Ian Stuart, 165 himself a figure on the post-WW 11 
extreme right, said: "A pamphlet is read only once, but a song is learned by heart and 
repeated a thousand times. "166 In the early years of the Blueshirts W. B. Yeats briefly 
involved himself with the movement and wrote marching songs to the tune of well- 
known songs. 167 The NCP featured revolutionary and nationalist songs in every issue 
of its paper, under the heading 'Songs of Our Nation. ' They reflect the nationalism of 
the party. The songs are about an Ireland on its knees under British rule, the glory of 
the tricolour, violence, sacrifice and martyrdom. In 'The Uiree Coloured Ribbon' 168 
are the lines: 
was true to my land love; I fought for her glory, And gave up my life for to 
make Ireland free. "169 
'The Jackets Green' speaks of the death knell of British rule in Ireland: 
"Yet grief shall come to our heartless foes, And their throne in the dust be seen, So 
Irish maids love none but those Who wear thejackets green. "170 
O'Duffy, influenced by the songs and poems of the Irish Gaelic cultural renaissance 
of the turn of the century, recognized the value of such songs in inculcating the 
165 Ian Stuart was-involved in the neo-Nazi skinhcad movement, specifically producing and performing 
songs such as 'Mother Europe's Sons' with his rock group, Skrewdriver. 
166 Ian Stuart, cited in R. Griffin, Fascism (Oxford, 1995), p. 363. 
167 M. Cronin The Blueshirts and Irish Politics, p. 102. 168 The Nation, April, 1936. 'Songs of Our Nation, ' 
169 Ibid. 
170 The Nation, March 1936. 'The Jackets Green', 'Songs of Our Nation. ' 
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nationalist spirit and tried to equate his movement in the public eye with the ongoing 
nationalist tradition. 
The split from Fine Gael and the wrangle during the following few months with 
Ned Cronin's faction, led to a rapid decline in the membership of both organizations, 
and a concomitant loss in funds. However, there were sufficient funds for O'Duffy to 
keep his rump faction going and to publish a newspaper. In January 1936, there was a 
change to individual funding which could indicate that the party could raise more 
money this way than by charging per company. It is more likely that the money per 
company was not forthcoming and drastic action was taken to secure income. Fund- 
raising events such as the traditional Irish standby of Sweepstakes on horseracing 
events such as the Grand National, newspaper sales, and individual donations 
provided additional funding. In December 1934, O'Duffy had launched an appeal for 
f 10,000 to start the new party, 17 1 but it is very unlikely that he raised anywhere near 
that amount. O'Duffy's efforts to get his party up and running were seriously 
hampered by the lack of funds. 
Before the party was officially launched in June 1935, O'Duffy asked Divisional 
Directors of the League of Youth to forward to party headquarters the names and 
addresses of potential subscribers of one pound or more 172 but the "response to this 
was poor. " 173 Ile made the same appeal just after the Congress. This time, less 
optimistically, he asked for the name of subscribers who could pledge ten shillings or 
more. In August 1935, the party announced that a house-to-house collection would 
take place over three Sundays in September, which would require the involvement of 
all members. Collectors were to accept money from all, "... without distinction of 
171 Letter from O'Duffy 4 December 1934, DIJus3286, NAT. 
172 Headquarters Circular no. 2 Finance 18 June 1935, D/Jus8/296, NAT. 
173 Ibid. 
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class, creed or political belief " 174 The party intended to use the collection of funds as 
an opportunity to get people interested in the party programme. In addition, collectors 
were to solicit regular subscriptions proportionate to the value of a man's property. 
For example, a fanner with property valued at EIO would be asked to subscribe 2/6d, 
20 acres- 51- and 40 acres- 10/-. Tile money was desperately needed with an election 
on the horizon. The same month, The Nation failed to appear and Thomas Gunning 
lost his job as editor and General-Secretary of the party at a weekly wage of V. The 
Executive notified the Divisional Directors of this and they were reminded that 
Gunning had been the only paid party official. They were asked to remember that the 
motto of the movement was "Voluntary Public Service. "' 75 
O'Duffy's new party was never placed on a secure financial footing, and this not 
only affected the organizational capabilities of the movement, due to the lack of 
permanent paid staff, but also restricted the amount of publicity and propaganda that 
could be produced and distributed. This was especially important at a time when the 
national press were showing less and less interest in O'Duffy's movement. There had 
been some initial interest in the press on the launch of the party based on O'Duffy's 
high public profile in the past and the prominence of shirted movements throughout 
Europe. O'Duffy's low key approach and the failure of the party to secure prominent 
members or a large following meant it was rarely to appear in the news. O'Duffy did 
not commit himself or his party to any ncws-grabbing activities which in turn ensured 
that the party appeared inconsequential to the newspaper-reading public. O'Duffy 
failed to find any wealthy backers for the party. The dwindling membership and 
concomitant decline in funding meant that even if he had the enthusiasm and the 
I 
174 Headquarters bulletin no. 1, August 1935, D/Jus8/296, NAL 
175 O'Duffy, letter to Divisional Directors, 7 August, 1935, D/JusS/296, NAL 
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organizational skills, his party did not have the resources or the manpower to fight an 
effective campaign, something of which O'Duffy must have been increasingly aware. 
NCP CA MPA IGNS 
It was the economic war with Great Britain following the withholding of the 
payment of land annuities by the Fianna Fail government of Eamon De Valera that 
had pushed many frustrated farmers, and their families, specifically those dependent 
for their income on the export market, into the ranks of the Blueshirts in the early 
nineteen-thirties. The resulting tariff war caused a significant drop in agricultural 
exports. Export values dropped from L36 million in 1931 to only E19 million in 
1933.176 The Blueshirts were quick to make the most of the farmers' anger with De 
Valera to recruit members. The dispute not only affected farmers but the entire rural 
economy of certain areas. The farmers, particularly those -involved in the dairy 
industry, found themselves unable to pay their rates as a result of their loss of income, 
a policy which resulted in increased violence between the Blueshirts and government 
agencies. The Blueshirt Congress of 1934 had passed resolutions, against Fine Gael 
policy, calling on farmers not to pay the rates, precipitating O'Duffy's resignation as 
President of Fine Gael. 
Whilst the violence associated with opposition to the economic war peaked in 
September and October 1934, it very quickly subsided after that, partly because the 
Blueshirt split had seriously hampered the movement. However, it was also due to the 
lack of support for the grievances of the larger farmers from the Fine Gael Executive, 
and from the general population who were benefiting from cheaper food. In January 
1935 came the Coal-Corn Pact between Britain and the Free State, which increased 
176 M. Manning, The Blueshirts, p. 109. 
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the export of cattle to 150,000. It was the first step towards resolving the dispute. 
Further efforts were made at resolving the economic war with a number of trade 
agreements between the Free State and Britain. The result was an increase in quotas 
of Irish cattle and bacon going to Britain and a reduction in duties on both sides. 177 On 
February 17 th 1936, further tariffs were removed with the signing of a new Irish Trade 
Pact between the two nations. 178 The beginning of the end of the econdmic war and 
the easing of the problems of tenant farmers with the Land Purchases (Guarantee 
Fund) Bill were serious blows to the movement. The Blueshirts had won the support 
of farmers when they were seen to be fighting for their rights against a seemingly 
hostile government. With one less issue to fight for it made the party appear even less 
relevant and of course, - it ate away at its membership base. 
O'Duffy was keen to make the tariff war a national issue not a party political one. 
He criticized Cumann na nGaedheal for the financial settlement it had made with the 
British in 1923 and for the poor leadership shown by Fianna Fail in the economic 
war 179 in which he claimed that farmers were used as "pawns in the political 
game. "180 The NCP pointed out that as a new party it was not responsible for the 1923 
settlement or the economic war. The farmers were divided on an issue on which they 
should be united. Under the corporate system, the issue would be one over which the 
farmers, not party politicians, would have control. 
Agrarian radicalism had been one of the distinguishing marks of the Blueshirt 
movement, something O'Duffy hoped would continue with the NCP. For example, 
members were encouraged to stencil slogans on walls opposing the economic war. At 
the 1935 Ard Fheis the following was made official party policy: 
177 T. Gray, Ireland This Century (London, 1994), p. 130. 
171 Ibid. 
179 Speech made by O'DufTy at Macroom 13 January 1936 reported in The Nation, February 1936. 
"0 Ibid. 
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"I 3. That Congress approves of making the economic war a national issue, 
removing it from the sphere of party politics and removing all possibility of English 
politicians playing one group of Irishmen against another. If a settlement cannot be 
reached, al sections of the community to bear their just share of the cost. 
"I 4. That the following be items of our agricultural policy: - 
A. No further collection of annuities in any circumstances. 
B. Setting up of an independent Commission to inquire into the distribution of the 
cost of the economic war. 
C. Compensation for losses sustained by the farming community over and above 
those sustained by other sections of the country. "' 81 
The resolutions were almost identical to those passed a year earlier at the League of 
Youth Congress of 1934, but times had changed. The policies reveal that the party 
was still representing a sectional interest, the larger farmers and grazers, and that 
these policies were becoming less and less relevant to the political agenda. 
In 1935, the NCP began to focus on "an even greater injustice", the problem of land 
leases and the party offered its support to the Leaseholders Movement. 182 The aim of 
the Leaseholders Movement was to: 
"... urge the government to introduce legislation immediately enabling struggling 
leaseholders to buy out their businesses and residences and thus avoid any further 
exploitation by ground landlords. "183 
The National Executive decided that, "support for the leaseholders movement 
should be included in the policy of the National Corporate Party. "' 84 
is, The Blueshirt, 15 June 1936. 
182 Correspondence issued by N. C. P., D/Jus8/296, NAL 
193 Ibid. 
194 Headquarters Bulletin no. 5, December 1935, D/Jusg/296. NAL 
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The party was clearly trying to seize on another land issue, the sort of problem that 
had inspired nationalists throughout Irish history. The party regarded the leaseholder 
system as a hangover from colonial days, when absentee landlords based in England 
took the rents out of the country. This was still happening to a minor extent, but the 
more important concern was that money was leaving the rural areas and going to the 
towns. As it was, it left the tenant at the mercy of the landlord who could charge what 
rent he wanted once the lease was up for renewal. O'Duffy argued that a tax on land 
values was no solution and that ground rents should be abolished absolutely. The 
party broadened the issue by including rents on urban properties 185 and Captain P. 
Hughes, a Dublin staff officer and member of the National Executive outlined a set of 
proposals, which were printed in The Nation for discussion: 
"I. A Landlord and Tenant Act providing for the setting up of courts to enquire 
into and fix rents in cities ad towns as has been done in the case of agricultural 
holdings. 
2. That when rents are fixed by such Courts, leaseholders should be enabled by 
law to acquire the freehold interest in their premises or houses at ten years' 
purchase. 
3. That ground rents be taxed or rated at 16/9d in the f and that rates on hose 
property be reduced to something I ike 10/- in the f on poor law valuation. 
4. That all land required for building purposes in the neighbourhood of cities 
and towns be acquired compulsorily at something near its agricultural value 
and that it be sold at the same price with any house erected thereon as freehold 
property and not leased as at present. 
"' The Nation, March 1936, 'Irish Leaseholders and Ground Rents. ' 
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5. Any land which is acquired compulsorily should be taxed on its enhanced 
value for building purposes and not on its agricultural value as it is at present 
taxed. " 186 
The adoption of the problems of the leaseholders was a desperate bid to appeal to 
another section of the populace on an issue with which it felt it had some experience 
and empathy. It was an issue that failed, however, to inspire a surge in applications for 
membership of the floundering party. 
Both Maurice Manning 187 and Fearghal McGarry 188 agree that the invasion of 
Abyssinia by the Italians on P October 1935, and the subsequent sanctions debate, 
was one of the few issues to prompt the NCP into activity during the party's short life, 
until the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. The party, unsurprisingly, came down 
firmly on the side of Mussolini and castigated the League of Nations for 
implementing a policy of sanctions against Italy. O'Duffy was particularly angry at 
the all-party united stance on support for sanctions. In response, O'Duffy came out in 
wholehearted support for the Italians. Mussolini personally wrote to O'Duffy 
" ... expressing on the one hand his surprise at the official attitude of the Saorstat 
towards his country, and on the other his profound appreciation of the brave stand 
taken by the National Corporate Party of Ireland on behalf of the Italian people. ", 89 
Over the next few months, O'Duffy used the example of Italy, and the way it 
effectively coped with sanctions, to promote corporatism. For O'Duffy, the 
imposition of sanctions had served to galvanize the Italian working class behind the 
government, allowing the latter to "control the market in the collective interest, "190 by 
which he meant increased government control of the economy in the national interest. 
186 Ibid. 
187 M. Manning, The Blueshirts p. 200. 188 F. McGarry, Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War, p. 23. 189 The Nation, April 1936, ' Italy and Ireland. ' 190 The Nation, March 1936, 'Workers and Sanctions. ' 
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November 1935.199 However, the party bulletin following the meeting did not 
mention it as an item that had come up for discussion. 
The Nation was very keen to publicize information about Abyssinian society that 
showed it in an unfavourable light, as a way of justifying the Italian invasion and 
occupation. In April 1936, the paper reported that there were two million slaves in the 
country and that the Coptic clergy were the largest slaveholders. In May 1936, it 
printed what it claimed to be a passage from the Abyssinian mobilization order: 
"Married men may take their wives to carry food, cook, etc. and those without wives 
will take any women without husbandS.,, 200 O'Duffy was making an appeal to 
Irishmen to give their moral support to the liberating Roman Catholic Italians. 
Articles in The Nation argued that the Italians were invading Abyssinia in order to 
replace tribal barbarism with civilization. It was a clarion call to defeat the heathen 
that would be heard again as the Spanish Civil War got under way. 
At its congress in 1936, the NCP passed resolutions supporting O'Duffy's stand in 
opposing the sanctions imposed on Italy and ratified by the Dail. The Congress, 
furthermore, extended its greetings to the Duce, praising him for his "wonderful work 
for Italy's regeneration, his work for Christianity, and his powerful influence for 
European peace. "201 The Congress made it official party policy that should they 
achieve power then they would take Ireland out of the League of Nations. The party 
saw membership of the League as detrimental to the national interest and a waste of 
117,000 of the state's money. 202 
199 O'Dufry, letter to John F. McCarthy, 29 October 1935, in response to latter's request for information 
about fighting for the Italians, D/Jusg/296 NAL 
200 The Nation, May 1936, 'From the Abyssinian Mobilization Order. ' 
201 The Nation, August 1936, 'Telegram to the Duce'. 
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THE DEMISE OF THE PARTY 
On 18 th jUly 1936, the first day of the Spanish Civil War, the National Corporate 
Party held its Congress at Rathmines Town Hall, Dublin. Those entitled to attend 
included all members of the National Executive, Divisional, District and Company 
officers, and two delegates from each company or unit, elected by the rank and file, as 
well as the officers of the Farmers and Labour Councils of the party. In the previous 
month, O'Duffy had made a tour of County Cork in order to whip up enthusiasm for 
the forthcoming Ard Fheis. In his keynote speech at the Congress, O'Duffy claimed 
that he had attended 97 meetings and conferences since the last Congress, an average 
of two per week. 203 
O'Duffy had placed a great deal of stress on the importance of the Congress in re- 
launching the movement in time for the election: 
"I believe that the National Corporate Party Congress this year will mark a turning 
point not only in our movement but in the whole future of this country. If it is an 
outstanding success, as please God it will be, nothing can stop our progress, and our 
policy will be triumphant even sooner than we had anticipated ... When our members 
consider that the whole future of our Organization depends on our success on the 18, h 
July 1936,1 have no doubt that there will be a generous response to my call. "204 
The Irish Special Branch attended the Congress but they were satisfied that "nothing 
,, 205 
of a revolutionary nature was proposed or discussed at the Convention. Buses, 
according to the same report, conveyed contingents of Greenshirts from the south of 
203 Cork Examiner, 20 July 1936. 
204 Headquarters Circular no. 13, June 1936, D/Jusg/296, NAL 
205 Special Branch Report from Michael J. Mansfield to Commissioner 'C. S. ', 20 June 1936, 
D/Jus8/296, NAL 
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the state, including Cork, Dungarvon, Waterford and Tipperary, and around 250 
206 delegates in all attended , significantly 
down on the previous year. The party, 
however, claimed an attendance of 650.207 During the day Colonel Coughlan 
specifically offered a welcome to a contingent of a hundred delegates from West 
Cork, which he referred to as "the cradle of the movement, , 208 61 from Cork City, and 
40 from County Cavan. 209 If his figures were correct, then it would show that a large 
percentage, 80%, or 201 of the 250 delegates (as totalled in the Garda report), were 
from two counties, Cavan and Cork. 
The Congress attracted little attention from the press, in spite of the massed 
appearance of the Greenshirts in uniform, though the Irish Times gave the Congress 
front-page coverage, including a photograph of the reception committee. 2 "9 The paper 
reported that O'Duffy arrived over an hour into the Congress, preceded into the 
Assembly Room by a guard of honour, colour party, and an escort with Commandant 
O'Sullivan in charge. In the opening ceremony, a fascist salute to O'Duffy was 
followed by the sounding of the Last Post, two minutes silence in honour of dead 
comrades, reveille, a rallying song and the national anthem. 211 O'Duffy then 
proceeded to speak for an hour and twenty minutes. His speech did not cover any new 
ground. He continued to hammer away at the issues that had caused him to resign 
from Fine Gael, which was hardly new material for the delegates. He then went on to 
speak about taxation, the need for the farmers to redress their grievances and for the 
creation of a National Council of Agriculture. Ile took the opportunity to remind 
people of the party's commitment to democracy: "We stand for law and order, for the 
'06 Ibid. 
207 The Nation, August 1936, 'Our Great Congress- Opening Ceremony. ' 
2011 Ibid. 
209 Ibid. 
210 The Irish Times, 20 July 1936, photo of the Reception Committee on the front page. 211 The Nation, August 1936, 'Our Great Congress-Opening Ceremony. ' 
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absolute supremacy of parliament-one Government, one Army and one police 
,, 212 force. He failed to add that it would also be a one party state. fle went on to attack 
Britain, invoking the traditional nationalist adage that England's danger is Ireland's 
opportunity: 
"If we were in office we would say to Britain that we want back our lost province- 
our Alsace Lorraine. If Britain prefers to stand by a small and pampered 
minority ... she cannot expect our friendship and our support. 
A hostile Ireland, a 
sullen Ireland, would be fatal to Britain in time of war. Our goodwill is essential and 
Britain will o far to secure it. We want nothing more, and nothing less, than our own, 9 
and every sod of this land is ours. In making this claim I believe we have the support 
of all creeds and classes at home and the respect of the world ahead. "213 
The 'pampered minority' to which he referred were the Ulster Unionists. He went 
on to claim that if the corporate state had been set up in 1922, then partition would 
never have occurred. He remarked that an organization had been set up in the North 
pledged to the promotion of the corporatist system and which was also opposed to the 
Unionist Government. They were hostile to communism and saw the border as 
responsible for the lack of progress in Irish relations. Now O'Duffy was prepared to 
take advantage of the prospect of war, and Britain's need for a supportive Ireland, to 
press Ireland's irredentist claim to Ulster. 
Following the Director-General's speech, Dr. P. Cagney took the Chair and the 
unanimous re-election of O'Duffy as party leader took place. The nomination was 
proposed by Colonel Coughlan of Cork, O'Duffy's second in command. There were 
no other nominations. The Director-General appointed the following as his 
Headquarters Staff- 
212 Irish Times, 19 July 1936, 'Corporate Party Candidates. ' 
213 ]bid. 
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Deputy Director General-Colonel P. J. Coughlan of Cork. 
Assistant Director-General-Cmdt. Diarmuid O'Sullivan of Dublin. 
General Secretary-Captain Liam Walsh of Dublin. 
Trustees-Dr. V. S. Delaney of Longford, Dr. P. Cagney of Cork, John Dowdall of 
R: oscommon and P. J. Lonergan of Monaghan. 
Standing Committee- Ulster-Comdt T. Donnelly of Monaghan and Sean P. Martin of 
Cavan. Munster-Captain Tom Hyde of Cork and Mr L O'Connell of Kerry. Conaught- 
Col. P Farrelly of Leitrim and P. J. Gallagher of Sligo. Leinster-Pierce MacGorisk of 
Kildare and James Daly of Meath. Dublin City-Captain M. Sweetman. 
Staff Officers-Don Reeves of Dublin, Sean B. Murphy of Cork, Colonel T. Carew of 
Tipperary, Captain P. Hughes of Dublin and Dr. J. Hennessy of Tipperary. 214 
These appointments reveal a number of points about the party leadership. O'Duffy 
was keen to make sure that the movement, in spite of its real strength in only certain a 
few counties, be perceived as a national movement by the electorate. Headquarters 
staff were appointed from all four provinces, with surprisingly few from the NCP 
heartland of County Cork. The staff, who would have formed the National Executive, 
were an unwieldy 22 in number, including O'Duffy, but due to the distances travelled, 
especially in winter, attendance would favour those Executive members living closer 
to the capital. Of these 22 members, UO proudly displayed military titles and, no 
doubt, other members of the Executive were ex-army men. This continued 
preponderance of ex-army men is a reflection of the make-up of the membership, the 
origins of the Blueshirts/Greenshirts in the Army Comrades Association, and the male 
bias of the movement. Noticeably, there were no female members of the central staff, 
not even a token example to represent the Women's Divisions. 
214 The Aration, August 1936, 'Our Great Congress. ' 
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The Congress then proceeded to welcome Major Hume Sleigh, the leader of the 
Corporative movement in Scotland, and Mr T. Kennedy, the founder of the Social 
Credit movement in Ireland, both of whom addressed the meeting. A special welcome 
was then extended to delegates from Northern Ireland. Amongst the observers - 
attending the Congress were Maurice Lodi Fe, the founder and organizer, and Count 
Eduardo Tomacelli the secretary, of the Italian community Fascisli in Dublin. 21 5 The 
Congress then went into committee, to which the press were not admitted. 
The press were given the wording of a telegram sent, and signed by O'Duffy, to 
Mussolini: 
"The National Corporate Party of Ireland in congress assembled greets Signor 
Mussolini. The Fascist Government has shaken the prestige of the old world which 
oppressed us, and we hope that Italy's action, already developed through her recent 
continental consolidations, will be understood in all its importance by the Irish people, 
not only as regards true and real peace in Europe, but also because it will help in the 
,, 216 accomplishment of Irish national aims. 
The main resolutions passed by the delegates were as follows: 
-to substitute a national scheme of public works for the dole (The party resolution did 
not go into any detail) 
-concern was expressed at the number of foreigners engaged in key positions in Irish 
industries when Irishmen were equally qualified to fill the posts. 
-membership of the League of Nations was harmful to the Irish nation, the E17,000 
given to its upkeep was a waste of money, and the Free State should resign its 
membership. 
215 The Nation, August 1936, 'Our Great Congress. ' 
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-a munitions factory should be set up for the defence of the count 
-that university representation, with their own T. D. s in the Dail, be restored. 
-that the economic war should be removed from the sphere of party politics and be 
made a national issue. 
-cessation of the collection of land annuities. 
-the division of unproductive ranches and estates and the redistribution of land. 
-increased tillage. 
-the Director-General to arrange a our of the United States to raise funds for the 
organization. 218 
Other resolutions passed during the six-hour conference were referred to the 
National Executive for consideration. 219 The party was marking time, with no major 
new policy initiatives. It did however, have a clear and defined programme to present 
to the electorate that was markedly different to that of the main parties but which 
adhered to the cornmon thread of nationalism and links to the land that motivated all 
Irish political groups. The policy platform would result in major constitutional change 
and increased state involvement in the economy. That it failed to contest an election 
to gauge support for its policies was due to the emergence of an issue which had more 
appeal to O'Duffy the soldier than domestic policies-the Spanish Civil War. 
The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War gave the NCP a much-needed fillip. The 
Greenshirts, and the Blueshirts, had always portrayed themselves as staunch anti- 
communists. The Spanish Civil War attracted a huge amount of attention in Ireland, 
partly due to biased press reports. The war was wrongly seen as a religious crusade by 
the Catholic right and by the left as a monumental struggle between fascism and 
217 The Irish Free State did not possess a munitions factory but relied on imports for all of its military 
needs. 
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democracy. The press regularly reported the atrocities committed by Spanish 
Republicans against members of the Church, often in lurid and salacious detail. The 
press whipped the public into a frenzy of indignation, and the Catholic Church used 
the opportunity to raise money for the Nationalist cause. 
O'Duffy felt called upon to suggest, via letters to the press, the creation of an Irish 
Brigade to fight on the Nationalist side. Thousands responded to his call and he 
contacted the Nationalists to set out his proposal, travelling to Spain on 21 September 
1936 where he met with Count de Arellano and Juan de la Cierva, who were to 
organize transportation for the Irish volunteers. 220 De Valera wanted the war to 
remain a Spanish domestic issue and made participation a punishable offence in line 
with the Non-Intervention Agreement. De Valera must also have been concerned that 
O'Duffy was now back in the national spotlight with the press and the Church on his 
side, and with the prospect of an armed force at his disposal. The imposition by the 
government of the Non-Intervention Agreement would ensure that there was little 
chance of O'Duffy finding himself at any one time, and any one place, with a large 
armed force fired up with Catholic zeal and anti-communist rhetoric that he might use 
to further his domestic agenda. 
O'Duffy's former ally, Patrick Belton, began to organize the Irish Christian Front to 
raise money for aid and supplies for the Nationalists in Spain, but O'Duffy favoured a 
more direct, military approach. In August 1936, he set about recruiting the Irish 
Brigade to fight on the Nationalist side. He hurled himself into his new venture with 
great enthusiasm, spurred on by the adulatory publicity he began to receive and the 
prospect of appearing once again as a player on the international stage. For O'Duffy, 
his recruitment of an Irish Brigade was a response to the historic links between the 
220 PRO FO W12S47/9549/41, as cited in McGany, Irish Politics andthe Spanish Civil lVar, p. 26-7. 
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two nations, their common Catholic faith, and opposition to the perceived communist 
threat . 
22 'McGarry agues that O'Duffy was as much inspired by his commitment to 
international fascism as by his Christian fervour, 222 recognising Franco as an 
ideological ally. 
O'Duffy decided to suspend the political activities of the NCP so as "to maintain the 
,, 223 non-political character of the brigade , yet 
he also claimed that the party was being 
suspended due to the "volume of work connected with the Crusade against 
CommuniSM.,, 224 He used the annual Michael Collins Commemoration ceremony at 
Beal na Blath to announce: "We are going to Spain; we are going to bring an Irish 
1,225 Brigade... The event, held under the auspices of the NCP, attracted a "fairly 
large"226 audience, many of whom wore uniform. O'Duffy also used the occasion to 
praise Mussolini and Hitler for opposing communism in their respective countries. 
The NCP was already recruiting for the Brigade. The Cashel branch, for example, 
opened a recruiting office on 15 August 1936, two weeks before the Beal na Blath 
speech. This must have come about as a local initiative as O'Duffy was away on a 
pre-arranged holiday in Holland for ten days until the 19 August. 227 The NCP would 
act as a recruiting agent for the Irish Brigade throughout the next year, operating from 
their Pearse Street Headquarters, but also utilizing local branches as wel 1.228 Liam 
Walsh was particularly active in this, for example organizing a second recruitment 
drive in January 1937.229 O'Duffy threw himself into organizing transportation, 
22 1 E. O'Duffy, Crusade In Spain, pp. 10- It, p. 153. 
222 F. McGarry, O'Duffy, the National Corporate Party and the Irish Brigade, p. 126. 
223 E. O'Duffy, Crusade In Spain, p. 60 
224 Irish Independent, 13 September 1936. 
223 Cork Examiner, 31 August 1936, 'O'Duffy at Beal na Blath. ' 
226 ibid. 
227 Cork Examiner, 20 August 1936, 'General O'Dufry Returns to Dublin. ' 
228 Rý Stradl ing, The Irish and the Spanish Civil War, p. 23. 229 Ibid. p. 84. 
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funding, and passports but he was beset by the problems posed by the need for 
secrecy and the hostility of De Valera's government towards any form of intervention. 
O'Duffy purchased a thousand green shirts for his brigade, and as a result they went 
into battle wearing the uniform of the NCP In an analysis of the political affiliation of 
volunteers for the Irish Brigade, Fearghal McGarry found that out of a sample of 61 
soldiers, 27 were members of the NCP and another 22 were Blueshirts. 230 Blueshirts 
and Greenshirts also organized recruitment for the Brigade. The Brigade attracted 
recruits from Cronin's organization, as well as supporters of O'Duffy. O'Duffy wrote 
to the Irish Independen ? 31 to point out that his Brigade was non-partisan: 
"We did not come here to further the interests of any political party, be it Fianna 
Fail, Fine Gael, Labour or the National Corporate Party. " 
In the light of McGarry's research, this statement by O'Duffy is clearly untrue. 
The Spanish adventure gave O'Duffy, who had found himself marginalized by 
domestic politics, the opportunity to lead an organization on the international front. 
However, the failure of the Irish Brigade is well documented. 232 The volunteers went 
to Spain in small groups, but the largest contingent of 700 men were left stranded on 
the quayside by a ship that failed to arrive and they had to disperse and return home. 
Out of 6,000 applicants, only 700 arrived in Spain, where they found they were ill- 
equipped for the task ahead. 233 By February 1937, after only a month of training, the 
Brigade was fired upon by a Nationalist Bandera from the Canary Islands who had not 
recognized the green uniform of the Irish Brigade. As a result, two Irishmen died, 
killed by soldiers on their own side. It was an inauspicious start. Poor diet, inadequate 
clothing, and a lack of training created major problems during the next few months 
230 F. McGarry, Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War, p. 34. 
231 Irish Independent, 25 March 1937. 
232 F. McGarry, Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War. 
233 E. O'Duffy, Crusade in Spain, p. 153. 
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and morale plummeted. O'Duffy created difficulties by his behaviour, with his "long 
,, 234 absences from the front, heavy drinking and ostentatious lifestyle. He seemed to 
spend much of his time sight-seeing and socializing. Lacking funds after the decline 
of the Irish Christian Front, the Brigade's main source of finance, Lodi Fe procured 
funding of E350 from Rome, 235 the only verified instance of Mussolini supporting 
O'Duffy financially. When their six-month stint of duty was up, only nine men opted 
to stay on for a further period of duty. 236 The rest of the men returned on the ship 
'Mozambique' which arrived back in Dublin on 21 June 1937.237 The country was in 
the middle of an election campaign and the Brigade's return received poor press 
coverage. As he disembarked, a bad-tempered O'Duffy declared to the few waiting 
press that he had no intention of standing in any constituencies in the general 
election. 238 The Irish Independent reported that the Irish Brigade as such would play 
no part in the election, but O'Duffy remarked that it was: 
" ... possible that in a few constituencies Independent candidates might seek 
election who would advocate the principles and ideals of the Brigade, who wanted to 
lead the campaign against communism, and who would urge the acceptance of the 
form of Government advocated in the Papal Encyclicals, and the recognition of the 
,, 239 Government of General Franco. 
An analysis of the results for the General Election of June 1937 reveals that no-one 
appears to have followed O'Duffy's suggestion. 
234 F. McGarry, O'Duffy, The National Corporate Party, and the Irish Brigade, p. 13 8. 
235 See file on Voluntari Irlandese l2er la Spagna in Serie Politici]931-35, Irlanda Busta X. 3 193. 
ASAME. Roma, as cited in D. Keogh, Ireland and Europe 1919-1948 (Gill and Macmillan: Dublin, 
1988), p. 91. 
236 E. O'Duffy, Crusade in Spain, pp. 236-9. 
237 In spite of the fact that many more fought for the Nationalists than the Republicans in Spain, there 
are no memorials to the men or their mission. In contrast the members of the Connolly Column who 
fought on the Republican side have received much praise and commemoration since, including a 
memorial in Dublin unveiled in 1991 outside of liberty Hall. 2311 Irish Independent, 22 June 1936. 
139 )bid. 
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The Mayor of Dublin held a reception for O'Duffy, 240and he later received the 
Freedom of the City of Kilkenny. 241 However, the Brigade was not lauded as a 
success and was to be remembered by later generations more for its role in supporting 
fascism than in fighting for the Catholic faith. 
O'Duffy did not revive the NCP. The Spanish adventure had left him disillusioned, 
and the response on his return was muted to say the least. There had been no attempt 
to keep the party going and field candidates in the upcoming general election, an 
illustration of how much the party depended on the stamina, enthusiasm and personal 
charisma of O'Duffy, but also how weak the organizational structure actually was. He 
did not have the enthusiasm to try to revive the party. His arrival in the middle of an 
election campaign meant it was too late for him to raise an electoral machine and 
candidates in time, and it could be years before he had another opportunity to stand in 
a general election. He retired, temporarily, from the political scene and did not even 
appear at Beal na Blath in 1937, attending instead a Requiem Mass at St. Joseph's 
Church, Dublin in memory of Collins and Griffith. He went to Glasnevin Cemetery 
afterwards to lay wreaths at their graves. 242 The Beal na Blath ceremony of 1937 was 
attended by uniformed Blueshirts and Greenshirts. However, this was to be the last 
occasion that they were to do so, but, like O'Duffy, many of those involved in the 
shirted movements of the thirties were to reappear as members of small right-wing 
groups that huddled on the Irish political fringe during the war years. 
2'0 The reception was attended by the Lord Mayor, Paddy Belton and Monsignor Walters of the CYMS. 241 Irish Press, 30 September 193 7. The person who had proposed the Freedom was P. Hayden, a 
supporter of O'Duffy. The Corporation was evenly divided on the issue, until two Labour Party 
members joined with Hayden to swing the vote. The ceremony went off peacefully but little public 
interest was shown. 
242COrk FX. allliner, 30 August 1937, 'Requiem Mass for Michael Collins. ' 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE POLICIES AND IDEOLOGY OF THE NCP 
INTRODUCTION 
The National Corporate Party did not emerge in a political or ideological vacuum. 
The party, and its policies, were the final manifestation of a programme that General 
O'Duffy had been developing throughout his short career in politics. There was a 
marked degree of continuity between the policies of the NCP and the Blueshirt 
organizations that had preceded its formation in 1935. The core idea embodied in the 
political philosophy of O'Duffy was his opposition to parliamentary democracy and 
its replacement with a strong corporate republic that would implement the nationalist 
ideals of the independence struggle. However, O'Duffy was to find that his political 
programme held little appeal to an electorate who wanted political stability, and who 
were content with the parliamentary system adapted from the British model. In 1934, 
O'Duffy had been the president of the Ireland's second largest political party, Fine 
Gael, but he became frustrated that the party was not wholeheartedly promoting his 
ideas. A year later, General O'Duffy found himself accountable to no-one but his 
dwindling following, a core of extremists who were as much out of touch with the 
realities of Irish politics as their leader. 
As the leader of his own party, O'Duffy ensured that he was both in full command 
and that the party adopted his ideas wholesale. O'Duffy was not a politician; he had 
spent twelve years in public service but despised politics. Neither was O'Duffy an 
intellectual. fie relied on others to provide him with the ideas and policies that his 
organizations then adopted. These ideas gave his movement a theoretical framework, 
which was not, however, always consistent. Ile took on board and adapted the ideas 
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of men like Hogan, Blythe and Tierney, ' Irish advocates of corporatism, but he also 
relied on ideas gleaned from his many trips abroad (particularly to Mussolini's Italy). 
Like many fascists, O'Duffy formed his ideas from secondary sources. 
As a nationalist, he was concerned that his party should appear to be a logical 
continuation of the traditions of Irish nationalism and republicanism. To this end, he 
was at great pains to stress that, whilst he might look abroad to fascist movements for 
political inspiration, Irish circumstances would colour any political movement or 
system based on foreign models. It found expression in the 'National Policy' of the 
party and O'Duffy's commitment to building a united corporate republic that would 
finally break the ties with Britain and would replace the liberal parliamentary 
democracy of the Irish Free State with a vocational political system. 
O'Duffy presented a programme advocating the structures and trappings of fascism 
within the context of Irish nationalism. lie presented this political blend as the 
solution to the divisions that had hampered Irish politics since the Civil War. This 
division, O'Duffy declared, had prevented Ireland's development into the dynamic 
post-independence republic envisaged by the likes of Griffith, Connoll Y2 and Pearse. 
O'Duffy aimed to put Ireland's development back on track, claiming that: 
"The policy of the Blueshirts is to bring about a complete change in the system of 
Government- a revolutionary change, if you like, but it will not be a bloody 
,, 3 revolution... 
The ideas that he had espoused as leader of Fine Gael had developed; they were 
increasingly militant and there was a greater degree of honesty in his speeches and 
' See chapter 4. 
2 Connolly, James (1968-1916) had been a leading socialist and trade union leader at the turn of the 
century, helping to form the Irish Labour Party. Ile commanded the Irish Citizens Army which took 
fart in the 1916 Easter Rising. 
Lecture on the Corporate System delivered by O'Duffy at Dublin Headquarters on 19 February 1935, 
D/Jus8f296, NAL 
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writings acknowledging his debt to fascism. Party journals and bulletins continued to 
stress the practical side of the party's policies, but apart from the continued opposition 
to the economic war, there was little to appeal to voters who were more concerned 
with bread and butter issues than with the radical constitutional and political ideas 
spouted by O'Duffy. Lacking a wide membership, and unable to inspire an 
unresponsive electorate with its ideological radicalism, O'Duffy's party never became 
a serious player in Irish politics. 
PREPA RA TIONS 
In the period following the split from Fine Gael, O'Duffy had to do two things. 
First, he had to consolidate his hold over as much of the Blueshirt movement as 
possible. Second, he had to give his movement a defining identity to distinguish it 
from Fine Gael and Cronin's Blueshirt faction. The most important event of this 
transitional period for O'Duffy was the Mansion House meeting held on thel6, h 
November 1934. This gathering of key League of Youth officers gave O'Duffy the 
opportunity to rally his followers in support of his core beliefs. It is worthwhile to 
quote the keynote speech of O'Duff-y's in some detail as it incorporates many of those 
elements later presented in the NCP party platform. The agenda is a fascist one that 
would have given the Blueshirts a key role to play in O'Duffy's New Order in Ireland. 
O'Duffy, in the lecture he gave to the assembled Blueshirts, said: 
"In my last lecture I stressed the point that the best leadership was 
servic e... Service is the essence of leadership; leadership is service. Let this sink in, 
and dwell upon it well, for in the new Irish state which we envisage you will each and 
every one of you be called upon to play the part of leaders. That is the function of the 
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Blueshirts - to lead the Nation out of its present difficulties, and to set up the only 
Christian system of Government which will work successfully in the modem world... 
"I believe that our Country's chief hope of national salvation lies in the increasing 
strength, manly resolve and maturing discipline of our movement. The young 
Blueshirt is the expression of the new Ireland. lie must temper his enthusiasm with 
discipline; he must strengthen his body and his spirit; he must spurn danger and love 
daring; he must serve the Blueshirt cause with loyalty and carry out his duties 
cheerfully and with pleasure. In all ranks, we must have affectionate comradeship. 
This will not weaken discipline- on the contrary it will create a spirit of obedience 
which will lack rigidity... Our discipline is self-respect, combined with orderly, 
unselfish behaviour and a sense of responsibility to self and others. Believe and obey. 
Officers should inculcate sentiments of honour and duty in the rank and file... 
"For the Blueshirts themselves the setting up of an Irish Corporative State will not 
mark the final achievement; it will indeed be no more than the beginning of our work. 
No public service which we can render now will be so great or so abiding as the 
service which we then undertake. 
"We must lead the people always; nationally, socially and economically. We must 
clear up the economic mess and right the glaring social injustices of today by the 
corporative organization of Irish life; but before everything, we must give a national 
lead to out people. At present Irish nationality is a wilderness in which a dozen 
different prophets are howling so loudly and abusing each other so raucously that the 
listener is bewildered and wonders what perfon-nance is going on. 
"Now what Ireland needs, and what I think only we can give it, is a sane and sincere 
national lead away from that wilderness. The first essential is national unity. We can 
only have that when the Corporative system is accepted. We shall put our national 
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programme to the people, and it is a National programme which even the most 
advanced Nationalist can find nothing to disturb him. We hold the Irish people to be 
both wise and good... We will consult them always before taking any vital step, and if 
they say 'Go out of the Commonwealth' we will go gladly, convinced that it is the 
right thing to do because it is their will, and we will be proud to serve in the front 
ranks of the Nation... 
"But our main work will always be to inspire our people with a consciousness of 
the great destiny of Ireland as a Christian State, and to promote in the coming 
generations the spirit which sent and is still sending Irish Missionaries to the very 
ends of the earth. 
"When the chaos of the dark ages broke over Europe, Irishmen saved Christianity 
even in Italy itself; and we should never forget that our proudest traditions are cultural 
and Christian. Chaos seems again to be about to spread all over the world; let us 
resolve that once again Ireland, the last outpost of Europe, will be ready to relive her 
historic past and stem the tide of Communism and materialism. By discipline and 
service we must perfect ourselves, and our Nation, so that should the call to battle 
come, Ireland will be ready to play a noble part... 
"The most promising feature of our movement is the manner in which it has 
captured the imagination of the youth. It is on the youth we rely, and we must solicit 
and welcome their support. We must wean them from all political parties. We must 
show them the futility of party strife, the waste of time and energy involved, resulting 
only in putting brother against brother. We must educate them towards the acceptance 
of the Corporative Idea. '-A 
4 Speech to the League of Youth by O'Duffy, Mansion House, Dublin, 16 November 1934, as quoted 
in R. Griffin, Fascism ((Oxford, 1995), pp. 193-184. 
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This speech set out O'Duffy's platform, and represented the ideas to which he had 
been increasingly attracted over the last three years. I lis appeal to youth, his 
opposition to communism and materialism, and the need to create a strong corporate 
Ireland set him apart from the other parties, particularly in the extremist language that 
he now felt free to use. The Blueshirts would create a strong and united republic that 
would allow Ireland to play a new, dynamic role in Europe, which fascism would 
rescue from an encroaching dark age. The speech is significant as it was a rare 
occasion when he stressed that his movement aimed to put Christian values at the 
forefront of the political agenda. He portrayed his party as a Christian vocational 
movement, a political angle that was rarely promoted. It was a further example of 
fascism's flexibility and willingness to use whatever told it needed to achieve power; 
in Catholic Ireland an appeal to religious values and culture was always pertinent. 
After his resignation from the presidency of Fine Gael, O'Duffy realized that in 
spite of his declared hostility to party politics, the only way to achieve his policy aims 
was to form an organization to fight and win an election. In December 1934, he 
distributed a letter to members of the League of Youth appealing for funds to set up a 
new political party. Ile accompanied the letter with a summary of the policies of the 
new party. O'Duffy was setting the agenda for the new party. The Summary of the 
Policy qf1he New Movemen? was avowedly nationalistic but contained little in the 
way of practical policies. Surprisingly, it paid little attention to the corporatist ideas 
that would dominate the NCP's political agenda, and the earlier focus on Christian 
vocationalism had vanished entirely. At this stage, he was anxious to win over as 
many supporters as possible with a display of his party's nationalist credentials. It was 
the document's intense nationalism, with its specific appeal to youth and its message 
5 Summary of the Policy of the New Movement, December 1934, D/JusS/286, NAL 
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that there was a need to "bring the State into harmony with the more personal 
elements of the National Will'sý6 that gives an indication of the fascist direction in 
which O'Duffy was moving. 
The first article of the policy summary dealt with the issue that had alienated him 
from so many of his Fine Gael colleagues- the need for the immediate reunification of 
Ireland. The tone of the article is remarkably conciliatory, however, considering his 
controversial comments only five months previously when he appeared to advocate 
the invasion of the North by Free State forces (see Chapter One), though O'Duffy was 
consistent. In 1922, he had made his "Give Them Lead" speech where he proposed 
that the North should be seized by force by the Free State. In contrast, the stress in the 
policy outline was on reunification through reconciliation. This was to come about 
through a combined vote of all Irish people, both sides of the border. In the meantime, 
a public spirit was to be fostered on both sides of the border that would make the 
successful conclusion of this vote possible. The creation, by O'Duffy, of 'The 32 
Club' was a step towards fostering this climate of reconciliation. Article one set out 
his nationalist, or green, 7 credentials and Article 3, which called for "the preservation 
of our National Rights and the observation of our international credentials, " further 
emphasized the nationalist cause that O'Duffy took to be one of the cornerstones of 
his new programme. It was an affirmation of the principles that motivated the 
nationalists in the 1916 Rising, which declared that the future of Ireland could only be 
decided by "the people ... consistent with national honour and dignity. "S O'Duffy was 
opposed to the dominion status of the Free State which meant that Ireland was tied to 
the British Empire and denied her complete freedom. The reference to "National 
6 Letter korn O'Duffy appealing for funds, D/Jus8/286, NAI. 7 Green represented staunch nationalism in Ireland. " Summary of the Policy of the New Movement, article 6, D/Jusg/286, NAL 
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Rights" also hinted at Britain's military presence on Irish soil in the North, but also 
the continued use, by the Royal Navy, of Irish ports as defined in the 1922 Treaty. 
The policy document stated that the new party would oppose communism and 
uphold Christian principles in a patriotic state spearheaded by the "Youth of action in 
a movement of constructive national action. "9 The new state would be based on 
cooperation, not conflict. Fuelled by patriotism, voluntary public service for the 
common weal would replace the class conflicts and divisions which were, O'Duffy 
argued, sustained by the influence of communists. The Blueshirts had been fon-ned 
partly in response to a perceived communist threat in 1932 ('The Red Scare'), and it is 
clear that O'Duffy was still using the argument that this danger still existed. He was 
still concerned with the threat to freedom of speech, "9particularly from Fianna Fail 
legislation such as the banning of uniforms and the imprisonment of men for sedition. 
It is clear from the Summary that it would be the youth of Ireland, mobilized as 
Blueshirts, who would be at the forefront of the struggle to maintain the right of free 
speech. It has been argued, by men such as T. F. O'Higgins, that the Blueshirts were a 
free-speech movement who saw the IRA and Fianna Fail as hostile to freedom of 
opinion. ' 1 O'Duffy was concerned that the success of his ideas might be hampered, or 
destroyed, because of the continued opposition of Fianna Fail who were attacking the 
movement through legislation such as the Wearing of Uniforms Bill (1934). 
Policy articles 2,5,6 and 7 concentrated on economic issues; the abolition of 
annuities and a negotiated end to the economic war with Great Britain, public works 
that were intended to tackle unemployment, and the reorganization of industry on 
corporate lines to put an end to industrial disputes. This is the only mention (Article 6) 
9 Ibid, Article 9. 
10 Ibid, Article 10. 
11 Patriots to a Man: the Blueshirts and their Time, RTE broadcast, II January 200 1, quoting T. F. 
O'Higgins. 
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of corporatism and refers only to the corporatization of industry, not of the state 
apparatus. The practical elements in the policy summary seem out of place in the 
plethora of nationalist rhetoric that dominates the document, and they hardly 
constitute a complete programme of economic reform or development. However, like 
many fascist programmes, it would allow O'Duffy to be flexible in marshalling any 
means or issues he felt would help in gaining power. 
The document is far more concerned with the issue of national unity, whether 
between North and South or between employer and employee, than with practical 
solutions to the economic crisis that Ireland was facing as a result of the economic 
war. In 1934-5, economics was at the top of the political agenda in Ireland. O'Duffy's 
failure to present a detailed economic programme marginalized his movement simply 
because he failed to address the issues that were seen as important by the electorate. 
The few practical policies that were proposed, such as public works, were drowned in 
a flood of overblown nationalist rhetoric, pleas to duty, and the need to awaken a new 
spirit that would provide the panacea for Ireland's problems. It was a vague 
nationalist rallying cry rather than a detailed policy document. 
The reality was that O'Duffy wrote the document to accompany his request for 
funds and it needed to have broad appeal. This could account for the lack of attention 
given to corporatism, a policy that would be so important to the party in the following 
year. Even the customary demands for an end to parliamentarianism that people had 
come to expect of O'Duffy were missing. The stress was on community and the 
nation, rather than the individual. Duty, rather than democracy, was the key element 
in the relationship of citizen to the nation. Much of the language is surprisingly 
temperate, focusing on the need for voluntary acceptance of his ideas within the 
current constitutional framework. At this rather vulnerable stage in his political 
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career, O'Duffy could not afford to be too radical, nor his programme too esoteric, as 
he was still trying to win over more Blueshirts from Cronin's camp. Whilst a fascist 
element can be perceived in this document, for example in the appeal to youth to 
resurrect Ireland, the bulk of the articles were broad enough in their appeal to win 
over those Blueshirts who might be more concerned with the economic war. Once he 
realized that he had failed to do so, he was at liberty to pursue a course that was more 
in keeping with the fascism that he was imbibing through his attendance at 
international fascist gatherings than with traditional Irish nationalism. 
ANTI-COMMUNISM 
O'Duffy had always been vehemently opposed to communism and during his time 
as Commissioner of Police he had used his position to monitor communist activities 
in Ireland closely. 'The Red Scare' of 1931-2 was fomented by the Cumann na 
nGaedheal government in the run-up to the 1932 General Election., 2 The prospect of a 
Fianna Fail victory prompted the government to use scare tactics. They hoped to 
convince voters that a victory for dc Valera would lead to the IRA and its left-wing 
agenda finding a home in government in alliance with Fianna Fail. This fear of 
communism, fuelled by the extremism of the Blueshirt response and the instability 
caused by the economic war, persisted throughout the Thirties, in spite of the lack of 
evidence for any increase in communist activity. 
For O'Duffy, the communist scare was a useful rallying cry to win support for the 
National Guard, to justify the need for the adoption of corporatism as a bulwark 
against the threat from the left, and in order to claim that the movement was there to 
preserve Ireland's Catholic culture from atheistic communism. Cumann na nGaedheal 
12 J. Regan, The Irish Counter Revolution (Gill and Macmillan: Dublin, 1999) p. 280. 
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fought the 1932 election largely on its own conservative record after a decade in 
government, but spiced up its campaign with attempts to link Fianna Fail with the left. 
O'Duffy, as Commissioner of Police, produced a memorandum for the Taoiseach in 
late 1932 13 whose purpose was to expose the spread of communism in the Free State, 
but which, in fact, failed to produce any real evidence to support this claim. 
Communism had failed to take root on any significant scale. The memo examined the 
presence of communists in Ireland on a county-by-county basis and demonstrated that 
the communist presence was negligible in both size and significance. In total, the 
memo listed 280 persons, only 80 of whom, according to O'Duffy, could be definitely 
identified as communist activists or sympathizers. 15 The memo catalogued local 
communist activities, but these often turned out to be meetings of the unemployed or 
demonstrations with no discernable communist element. A Fianna Fail government 
report from 1936, in analysing the presence of communists in Ireland, concluded: 
"There are no reliable figures available to compare the number of communists in 
1931 and 1936. The police believe that at the present time there are not more than 250 
openly avowed supporters of the Communist Party of Ireland in Dublin and a mere 
handful outside Dublin. "16 
The communist threat did not exist. It was a fabrication. O'Duffy knew that there 
was no large-scale communist presence in Ireland. The Red Scare was used by 
Cumann na nGaedheat to mobilize a devout Catholic population into believing that 
their faith could be under threat should Fianna Fail win power. Fianna Fail's victory 
in the election demonstrates that the population were not taken in by these slurs. An 
inflated fear of communism fuelled the rise of the Blueshirts and remained a feature 
13 Memo on Communism and Kindred Organizations by General O'Duffy, 24 November 1932, Dept of 
Taoiseach Private Office Files, 97/9/73, NAT. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Communism, 23 June 1936, Dept. of Taoiseach Private Office Files, 97/9/73, NAT. 
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of Blueshirt policy throughout the existence of the movement. Speaking at the CAUR 
conference in Montreux, O'Duffy boasted: "We have prevented communism and her 
allies from terrorizing the civilian population. " 17 
The Army Comrades Association had taken no part in the 1932 election but under 
Dr. T. F. O'Higgins, T. D., this non-political stance changed. The movement declared its 
opposition to communism and criticized the efforts of the left to Prevent free speech 
through their heckling and physical violence at the Cumann na nGaedheal hustings. 
This brought a sharp response from De Valera who said that there was no threat to 
free speech from communists and therefore no need for the Blueshirts. 18 
Mike Cronin has analysed the motivation for members joining the Blueshirts and 
has discovered that communism was not the principle motivation forjoining. His 
research, based on interviews with surviving Blueshirts, reveals that: 
"... members positively scorned the idea that they feared communism. They saw the 
communist threat as an attempt by the Blueshirt hierarchy and the Church to drum up 
support. "19 
This is further evidence of the dichotomy between the motivations of the leadership 
and the rank-and-file. The leadership had failed to understand the aims and aspirations 
of its followers. Such a strategic mistake had far reaching consequences for the 
potential for mass mobilization, a mistake that O'Duffy was to repeat in setting out 
his programme for the National Corporate Party. 
Moderate socialists in Ireland and trade unionists viewed the rise of a shirted 
movement, in the light of events in other parts of Europe, with alarm. The result was 
that the two groups fanned the flames of each other's fears. The fact that communism 
had failed to take root was put down, by O'Duffy, to the presence of the Blueshirts. 
17 The Blueshirt, 22 December 1934, 'Leader at Montreux. ' 
18 M. Manning, The Blueshirts, p. 30. '9 M. Cronin, The Blueshirts and Irish Politics, p. 134. 
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The IRA was linked with communism by the Blueshirts, in spite of the fact that the 
creation by members of the IRA of Saor Eire, a left wing political party committed to 
abstentionism, had removed many of those on the left from the IRA. The loose use of 
the term 'communist', the frequent admonitions against communism and socialism 
from the pulpit, the discussion of Catholic social thought, and the European-wide fear 
of communism certainly kept the 'Red Scare' going in Ireland throughout the Thirties. 
O'Duffy justified his aggressive anti-communism based on these fears. It was an 
opportunistic response by O'Duffy to populist fears of 'godless communism. ' But, in 
contrast to other countries such as Germarýy and France, O'Duffy had no real 
substantial communist force to oppose, making his movement's focus on opposing 
communism a political non-starter, particularly as Fianna Fail's period in power gave 
proof to the lie of Cumann na nGaedheal's 'Red Scare. ' 
O'Duffy's hostility towards communism did not abate on leaving Fine Gael. The 
Blueshirts argued that communism was atheistic and therefore opposed to 
Catholicism. Furthermore, communism did not respect the rights of the individual, not 
least the right to property. The NCP presented corporatism as the Catholic alternative. 
In the face of the communist threat, O'Duffy argued that there was an urgent need to 
reform capitalism in order to prevent the drift of dissatisfied workers into the arms of 
socialism. O'Duffy, sounding disarmingly like a classic liberal, stated: 
"Communism is the negation of the right of property just as it is the negation of the 
,, 20 liberty of the individual. 
Labour in the Corporative State, a lecture given by O'Duffy, gives the Blueshirt 
perspective on communism. In denying man his basic rights, the communist state 
needed to be controlling and so totalitarianism was inevitable. However, O'Duffy was 
20 Labour in the Corporate State, lecture by O'Duffy, D/JusS/296, NAI. 
130 
131 
not averse to dictatorship, in principle. O'Duffy had a clear conception of what he 
believed a communist state would entail: 
"Every man has his rights and the communist deprives him of all his fundamental 
rights, making the State a monstrous idol and all men its slaves. The individual is 
allowed to use things but not own them-the State owns everything.,, 21 
Communism, he argued, would lead to an all-encompassing totalitarian state: 
"The Socialist way, the Communist way, is by means of Government control, by 
the employment of more and more officials, by winding miles of red tape round 
everybody and everything so that initiative is destroyed and individual freedom is 
ultimately IoSt., ý22 
O'Duffy argued that whereas all men had certain basic rights to property and to 
freedom, social inequality and hierarchy were part of natural law. Ile declared that 
"the fundamental error of Socialism and Communism is that the social inequality of 
,, 23 men is not recognized, in theory at any rate. 
The party used the example of the Catholic Church as the perfect representation of a 
hierarchical structure, and the party structure reflected this commitment to hierarchy: 
"Our movement has taken its present shape because is based on the fundamental 
Christian principle of Hierarchy as opposed to Socialistic or Communistic 
,, 24 principles. 
Hitler and Mussolini also had great admiration for the Catholic Church as an 
organization, whilst rejecting its claim to leadership and authority based on scripture 
and history. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 O'Duffy speech at Montreux, quoted in The Blueshirt, 22 December 1934. 
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O'Duffy was opposed to the class-based society of socialism, whilst appealing to 
the electorate on a platform that corporatism would introduce an element of social 
justice into the economic system. His platform of social justice was a ploy to win over 
workers to his belief in a united nation that had no time for class-based politics that 
only served to promote division and unrest. 
A crisis was useful for the corporatists, whether real or not, and the Blueshirts 
claimed that they had created an organization to deal with the communist threat. A 
real fear of communism had been created in 1931-2 in the face of the resurgence of 
the IRA but De Valera's period in office and his eventual clamping down on the IRA 
meant that by the time of the creation of the NCP the fear of communism was no 
longer on the mainstream political agenda. However much O'Duffy wanted to keep 
the issue of communism alive as a motivating issue, in reality it was a dead letter. The 
NCP continued to decry the communist menace amongst its membership by articles in 
The Nation such as, 'The Aim of Soviet Russia 25 and 'Time Marches On, 26 both of 
which equated communism with atheism. For O'Duffy, opposition to communism 
was essentially ideological, as his speech at Montreux indicates, but he also saw the 
tactical advantage in keeping the 'Red Scare' on the political agenda. 
The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War and the atrocities committed against the 
Catholic Church by communists and anarchists which were reported by the Irish 
press, revived the fortunes of the NCP, however briefly, by providing real 'proof' of 
the dangers of communism. O'Duffy's movement had always portrayed itself as the 
party that was most vociferously opposed to communism. In Spain, O'Duffy had 
evidence that the spectre of communism was real. O'Duffy now appeared a prophet 
who had been crying out in the political wilderness but whose time had now come. 
25 The Nation, February 1936, 'The Aim of Soviet Russia. ' 26 The Nation, April 1936, ' Time Marches On. ' 
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Anti-communism was once again back on the political agenda, and O'Duffy was 
able to capitalize on this. O'Duffy launched a new organization to raise an Irish 
Brigade to fight Bolshevism in Spain on a platform called 'The Irish Crusade Against 
Communism, ' its title effectively linking religion and politics. 27 O'Duffy portrayed 
his new efforts as a Christian crusade against godless communism. But whilst his 
Catholicism and hostility to communism were the chief motivating factors for his 
support of Franco, they were not the only ones. Fearghal McGarry sees his 
involvement in Spain as the logical outcome of his participation in the international 
fascist scene. O'Duffy saw Franco as an ideological ally. 28 The Spanish Civil War 
provided the ideal opportunity to show his commitment to Catholicism and his active 
opposition to communism, but also to re-launch the NCP, which had been in decline 
since its creation a year before. Perhaps O'Duffy wanted to use the occasion to 
promote a form of fascism more in line with the clerico- fascism which was 
developing in some parts of Europe, such as Dolfuss's Austria, to re-launch his 
movement by stressing its allegiance to the Catholic faith. However, O'Duffy's 
involvement in Spain, and his absence from the domestic political scene, effectively 
sealed the fate of the NCP. The party lacked men of sufficient political calibre to keep 
it going or even to capitalize on O'Duffy's exploits in Spain. O'Duffy had taken many 
of the core activists with him to Spain. The few members who remained in Ireland 
found themselves isolated and unable to function as a viable political force without 
the central direction given to the movement by O'Duffy. There was effectively no 
party left for O'Duffy to revive on his return. 
27 F. McGarry, Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War, p. 25. 28 ]bid. pp. 25-26. 
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THE CORPORATISM OF THE NATIONAL CORPORATE PARTY 
O'Duffy used the Blueshirt Congress of 1935 to launch his new party and to 
present the Blueshirts with a new platform of policies that he wanted them to rubber- 
stamp. The basis of the party platform was nationalism, vitalism, and the corporatist 
ideas that gave the party its name. O'Duffy tried to portray his party as non-political, 
by which he meant non-partisan. The aim of the new party was to do away with the 
divisiveness of party politics and to replace it with a system where political parties 
would be redundant. This non-partisan approach he called 'the Blueshirt ideal', that 
is, something which was "above party. "29Similarly, Mussolini always preferred the 
term 'movement' to 'party' even after 1919. The new movement was to stand for the 
nation, rather than for any one political faction. O'Duffy had always claimed that he 
had initially joined the Blueshirts in a non-political capacity. 
O'Duffy saw the Blueshirts as an organization that was: 
"... directed to bringing the existing parliamentary system into closer harmony with 
political needs and the traditional outlook of the people, towards evoking patriotic 
enthusiasm and zeal for a self-disciplined voluntary public service while allowing a 
direct appeal to the electorate on our own policy should circumstances require it.,, 30 
O'Duffy now felt ready to make this appeal to the electorate with a programme built 
on ideas that the Blueshirts had been developing over the last three years. Even before 
the launch of the NCP, he had been aware that the only way that there was any chance 
of seeing corporatism adopted was through participation in the electoral process, but 
he continued to announce his reluctance to do so. In his appeal for funds to launch the 
party, he had stated that in order "to achieve this policy we find it necessary to contest 
29 The Nation, 22 June 1935, 'O'DufTy Reviews the Last Year. ' 
30 Eoin O'Duffy, Mansion House speech delivered Dublin 6 November 1934, reported in Garda 
Siochana Report 6 November 1934 submitted by D. J. McGlain, Inspector, D/Jusgr296, NAL 
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elections and undertake the functions of a political party. ,31 Ile scorned the current 
state of Irish politics as an un-natural process in which rival groups, whose main point 
of dispute seemed a constitutional one deriving from differences over the Treaty with 
Britain, tore the nation apart. Ile genuinely saw his movement as standing outside this 
political arena, reasoning that the Blueshirts were not interested in post-Treaty 
politics. The NCP claimed that it was to be an anti-party organization that somehow 
transcended the mire of post-Treaty politics. Its programme would state that the only 
solution to the divisive rivalry caused by post-Treaty politics was to get rid of the 
parliamentary system which had allowed this problem to arise in the first place. 
He made a specific appeal to youth, who he believed had not been tainted by direct 
involvement in the Irish Civil War and its aftermath. Ireland's youth, instead of 
harking back to the disputes of the post-Treaty years, was more forward-looking and 
more likely to embody what O'Duffy called "the National Will.,, 32 O'Duffy's 
generation had failed to carry through on the promises of the 1916 Rising. A new 
generation, educated through membership of the Blueshirts in the principles of the 
independence struggle, would forge a vanguard that would carry the rest of the 
population on a wave of nationalism to achieve a united Irish republic. The youth of 
Ireland, enrolled as Blueshirts, would have a decisive role to play in the 
reorganization of Irish political life and the creation of a corporate republic, playing 
the vanguard role in the promotion of the ideals of the new fascist republic. It would 
be their duty to spread this message to the rest of the population. 
The key document outlining the ideas of O'Duffy as regards the position of youth 
was written early in 1935, before the NCP was launched, and titled The Function of 
31 Eoin O'Dufry, Letter appealing for funds accompanying Summary of Policy, 4 December 1934, 
D/Jus8/286, NAL 
32 Ibid. 
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the Blueshirts in a Corporative State. 33 The document stated that the corporate state 
would give the Blueshirts the key role to play in the new republic. They would lead 
by their example of voluntary and disciplined, public service. O'Duffy's idea of 
discipline was: 
"... that quality which makes a person responsive to orders; to subordinate his own 
ideas and opinions to those of his superiors, to fit himself into that part of the 
organization allotted to hirn.,, 34 
It was to be discipline based on love for the nation in which all ranks would work 
together and the higher the rank, the greater the responsibility. He cited the supportive 
camaraderie of the 1916 Volunteers as the collaborative example to which all 
Blueshirts were to aspire. The Irish Civil War had come about, O'Duffy believed, 
with the breakdown of this camaraderie and its replacement with factional self- 
interest. The partisan approach of politicians had betrayed the republican dream. The 
adoption of the British parliamentary system, O'Duffy claimed, had created the 
conditions that gave rise to factionalism. The Blueshirts intended to solve the problem 
by themselves providing the example of an organization working for the public good 
where relationships were to be based on mutual respect. 
The new state structure in which the Blueshirts would play such a crucial role was 
not an end in itself, however: 
"For the Blueshirts themselves, the setting up of an Irish Corporative State will not 
mark the final achievement; it will indeed be no more than the beginning of our work. 
No public service which we can render now will be so great or so abiding as the 
,, 35 service that we must then undertake. 
33 Documents issued by League of Youth (O'Duffy Section), D/Jusg/296, NAL 
34 ]bid. 
35 Ibid. 
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The corporate state would create the national unity that was a prerequisite for the 
Blueshirts to be able to promote national identity and inculcate a new citizenship that 
would be distinctly Irish. However, throughout his speeches and publications there is 
little substance to the form this Irish identity would take. 
The Blueshirts would have a para-military function in the new republic. The extent 
of the Blueshirt influence would be such as to give the movement a significant 
controlling and policing role as we can see from the list of duties envisaged by 
O'D u ffy: 
"Cooperation and coordination of all public services. 
Cooperation with the police in maintaining law and order. 
Guidance and control of youth movements. 
Instruction in citizenship. 
Protection of State and Public property- forests, fisheries, railways etc. 
Duties on trams, Buses, Trains, and on public highways. 
Duties in Ports, Docks, Post Offices, Banks etc. 
The organization of all forms of sport and recreation for the physical and mental 
well-being of the people. 
Generally Service to the Nation. 06 
The Blueshirts would have a key role to play in the transition period leading to the 
creation of a corporate republic. As the above list clearly indicates, their role would be 
to combat strikes and lockouts, which might threaten law and order within the new 
state structure. In the event of a strike, the Blueshirts would be in a position to ensure 
that the disruption was kept to a minimum. The Blueshirts would be the muscle 
behind the corporate state, a political police force guaranteeing its continued 
36 Ibid. 
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functioning in the face of disruptive opposition. "Service to the Nation" meant service 
to the corporate idea and, in this light, the Blueshirts saw themselves as serving as a 
uniformed state auxiliary. O'Duffy had the precedent of the newly established Irish 
Free State co-opting the pro-Treaty faction of the IRA to form the national anny in 
1922, but his organization would have effectively created a totalitarian police state. 
The key feature of the position of the Blueshirts in the new state would be their role 
as the nation's vanguard, embodying the spirit of national regeneration. This 
propagandist function would ensure that the myth of the revolution and the new state 
would be kept alive: 
"I believe that our country's chief hope of national salvation lies in the increasing 
strength, manly resolve and maturing discipline of our movement... Now what 
Ireland needs, and what I think only we can give it, is a sane and sincere national lead, 
away from that wilderness [of party strife] ... [The Blueshirts] will serve to promote 
the greatness of Ireland; they will endeavour to bring our country back to her crucial 
place as one of the foremost Nations in Christendom. They will wipe out the signs of 
the conquest ... Our main work will always be to inspire our people with a 
consciousness with the great destiny of Ireland as a Christian state ... Chaos seems 
again to be about to be spread all over the world; let us resolve that once again 
Ireland, the last outpost of Europe, will be ready to do her historic part and stem the 
, 07 tide of Communism... 
This is a rare occasion when O'Duffy's policies seemed explicitly clerico-fascist in 
purpose. 
Throughout his political career, O'Duffy faced frequent criticism for allegedly 
importing foreign political ideas into Ireland, but he countered this accusation by 
37 The Function ofthe Blueshirls in a Corporate State, lecture by O'Duffy, D/JusSP296, NAL 
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claiming that the Irish "were steeped in English political tradition and in English 
constitutional theorieS,,, 38 and that they had "inherited a parliamentary system ... 
from 
the despised Saxon ,, 39 Oliver Cromwell . 
40 The Gaelicization of Ireland would 
require the replacement of these English institutions and political culture. Whilst 
acknowledging his debt to continental models and thinkers, O'Duffy was at pains to 
stress that his ideas would be specifically adapted to Irish needs and circumstances: 
"We are not going to take any scheme ready-made from abroad, but it is not a 
national crime to study schemes which have proved successful in other countries. "A' 
In this case, he was referring to Mussolini's Italy as O'Duffy gave the rest of the 
lecture over to detailing the successes of Mussolini's fascist state. Essentially, 
Mussolini's myth of Romanita and O'Duffy's myth of a Gaelic Ireland served the 
same purpose in uniting the population behind a myth and goal. 
O'Duffy knew the importance of Catholicism to Irish national identity and politics 
and frequently referred to the similarities between Catholic social thought and NCP 
corporatism. In numerous speeches, he backed up his claims and arguments by 
referring back to the Papal encyclicals which had outlined Catholic social theory. 42 In 
his lecture on Labour in the Corporate State, he stated that the corporate state would 
provide for a mix of state-owned and private property, but that modest private 
ownership, its secure possession, and inheritance rights were the foundation of a 
secure Christian state. The new corporate republic would not be an egalitarian one, 
but one based on a few elementary Christian principles: 
38 Eoin O'Duffy, lecture delivered 9 February 1935, D/Jus8/296, NAL 
39 Ibid. 
40 Eoin O'Duffy, lecture, 'Labour in the Corporative State. ' D/Jus8/296, NAL 
41 Ibid. 
42 Leo XIII, De Rerum Novarum (1891) and Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno (193 1) 
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"The greatest principle is that of order, which we call Hierarchy when it is applied 
to society, human or divine. In society some men are more equal than others, although 
as human beings they may all be equal. i-A3 
The ordered, hierarchical nature of the corporate state would follow the "example 
of the most perfectly ordered society on the earth- the Catholic Church. 9-A4 In 
opposing communism and socialism, Ireland would be carrying on its historical 
tradition of leading Christendom, promoting Catholic principles, and fighting 
paganism in every sphere of national activity. The Blueshirts would be in the 
vanguard of the Christian corporate republic, promoting the spiritual, as well as the 
material, destiny of the nation. There is a startling similarity to the later 
pronouncements of General Franco. At a meeting in Hugginstown, Co. Kilkenny in 
July 1935, O'Duffy referred to papers read by Reverend Arthur Ryan of Belfast at the 
conference of the Irish Catholic Truth Society relating to private property. O'Duffy 
was pleased to announce that the policies of the NCP were in full accord with the 
views expressed in these lectures and with statements issued by Cardinal MacRory 
and the members of the hierarchy on the subjeCt. 45 
O'Duffy argued that the parliamentary system was an anachronism that was totally 
unsuited to the demands of the twentieth century: 
"Parliament is a human institution and that like all human institutions it has its 
spring, its time of growth, but that it has its autumn, its time of decay, and its winter, 
its time of departure, is at hand. 146 
The corporate idea was central to the platform the NCP was offering to the 
electorate. However, the case for the replacement of the existing system had to be 
43 Eoin O'Duffy, lecture 'Labour in the Corporative State, ' D/Jus8/296, NAI. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Cork Weekly Examiner, 6 July 1935, 'Blueshirt Policy. ' 
46 Eoin O'Dufly, lecture 15 February 1935, D/JusSP-96, NAL 
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argued first. The party also faced the problem that the adoption of corporatism 
elsewhere, for example in Italy, was linked to dictatorship. The NCP argued that a 
dictatorship already existed, the dictatorship of De Valera and Fianna Fail, which 
represented only a fraction of the population. The parliamentary system ensured the 
Tepresentation of only a small minOTity of eleCtOTS who, once voted into POWeT, had 
carte blanche to lord it over the rest of the Irish population. In contrast, the corporate 
state, because it involved all citizens and did not tolerate party factionalism, would be 
inherently more democratic as it would represent the entire nation. The elected 
representatives would represent every member of each vocational group. Whilst 
publicly O'Duffy claimed that a corporate state would not be a dictatorship, the 
structure advocated by the party in policy documents indicate that the hierarchical 
state with its pyramid structure led by a powerful executive would inevitably lead to a 
concentration of power. Ireland, said O'Duffy, appeared to be a democratic state, but 
in reality the trend of government was towards increasing the power of the Cabinet 
and Taoiseach: 
"In those countries which have not yet adopted the Corporate policy, like England 
and Ireland, the party system of Government is leading to a dictatorship of the 
Cabinet, and those elected to Parliament have little or no say in national or economic 
, 47 affairs or in control of public expenditure. 
O'Duffy declared that it was the party whip that kept those with a vested interest in 
control and in power. The result was that the will of the Executive was foisted upon 
the rest of the Dail, including the government's own party members: 
"Every day the Government is saved whether in the right or wrong by the machined 
party vote- whether T. D. s agree with the party bosses or not they must swallow their 
47 O'Duffy lecture delivered 19 December 1935, D/JusS/296, NAL 
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principles, submit to the party whip and walk like cows coming home one after 
another behind their leader into the Division lobby, otherwise they are promptly 
expelled from the party like Messrs. Belton, Morrisey and Anthony. A8 
O'Dufýv claimed that his party was exposing the sham whereby parliament posed as 
a democratic body, but was in reality a dictatorship of a party faction. The dictatorship 
of one faction was inevitably divisive, as one party could not represent the whole 
nation. Party government could never be truly democratic, whereas a corporate state 
representing all the workers in the nation, could: 
"Under the present system, Governments are forced to put the interests of their 
Party before the interests of the Nation, and every issue ensuing is coloured and 
misrepresented in the interests of party PolitiCS. i49 
Liberal democracy created its own corruption: 
"Legislation is enacted to prop up the party in power and to cripple the. 
opposition ... and the main object of the opposition is to turn out the Government and 
to slight their efforts. The wants of small influential sections are disregarded in the 
interests of bigger sections which can influence more VoteS.,, 50 
Having accused the existing system of being a dictatorship hiding behind a 
democratic fagade, O'Duffy played down the authoritarian aspect of corporatism. 
Speaking at a Blueshirt conference in Millstreet, Co. Cork before the formation of the 
NCP, O'Duffy emphasized that "our object is to establish a Dail on democratic lines, 
elected by adult suffrage, as at present .,, 
5 'As a party committed to coming to power by 
constitutional means, the NCP aimed to use the electoral process to secure a mandate: 
4" The Blueshirt, 15 June 1935. 'Blueshirt Corporate Policy. ' 
49 O'Duffy lecture, 15 December 1935, D/JusS/296, NAL 
50 Ibid. 
51 Irish Times, 13 January 193 5, 'A Democratic Dail. ' 
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"We want no powers beyond what the people freely give us in the ballot box when 
we appeal to the electorate on our policy. The Corporate State will be set up when the 
,, 52 Irish people by a free vote in a free election ... so decide. 
What the Blueshirts were actually stating was that while the path to corporatism in 
Ireland would not come via a coup or dictatorship, once the corporate republic was 
inaugurated there would be no constitutional means to reverse the mandate. The 
corporate state, once established, would remain, and parliamentary democracy would 
be a thing of the past. 
The Blueshirts were faced with the dilemma that they were opposed to party politics 
but were condemned to enter the political fray as the only way to get their corporate 
and national policies adopted. The NCP was apologetic about having to assume this 
role: 
"The National Corporate Party does not aspire to a dictatorship. It does not even 
aspire to lead the nation as an end in itself .. it points out the only way to social justice 
and national happiness, confident that the good sense of the Irish people will triumph 
before long and that the establishment of the Irish Corporative State will mark the end 
of the miserable party system which we have endured under Cumann na nGaedheal 
and Fianna Fail. "53 
O'Duffy's definition of dictatorship and totalitarianism was linked to his opposition 
to the party system. He was opposed to dictatorship by any party that represented a 
faction of the nation. A party representing the whole nation (such as, in O'Duffy's 
opinion, the NCP) could not be dictatorial in his view. The corporate system would 
ensure that all Irishmen would have a voice and no one faction would be able to 
52 The Blueshirt, I June 1935, 'Blueshirt Corporate Policy, ' 
53 The Nation, 22 June 1935. 'Editorial. ' 
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oppress or dominate another. There would be no truly democratic elections, as the 
system would not allow parties to fight on different platforms. 
O'Duffy was more than willing to accept dictatorship, provided certain conditions 
were met: 
"The only dictator we will recognize will be the Irish people, and their need, not the 
need of any class or party, will be our first consideration. , 54 
Dictatorship by any one class or faction would be replaced by dictatorship of the 
Irish people, presumably with the NCP, and their uniformed auxiliaries, representing 
the 'National Will'. Speaking frankly, O'Duffy said that providing it was in the 
interests of the Irish people as a nation, he had no problems with dictatorship: 
"I would much prefer to see Mr De Valera installed as a fully fledged dictator, 
with all the responsibility attached thereto, than a dictatorship of a group of political 
clubs and a sham Parliament playing with constitutionalism and democracy. "55 
O'Duffy's conception of the corporative state was one that owed a great deal to his 
understanding and observation of the structure of Mussolini's fascist Italy and 
considerable space was give in Blueshirt/Greenshirt publications to describing its 
organization and successes. O'Duffy's corporatism, nationalist as well as fascist in its 
inspiration, tied his corporatist policy firinly to the party's National Policy. The first 
item in the National Policy, for example, stated that it was the intention of the NCP: 
"... to secure a mandate from the people to alter the present party system of 
government which is dividing and disrupting our people in the interests of party 
factions, and to substitute thereafter a system whereby every interest in the country 
will be represented by its nominees in a vocational Government pledged to a 
54 Garda Report Metropolitan Division submitted by J. McGlain, Inspr. quoting General O'DuIT), I/C 
6.11.34, D/Jus8/296, NAI/ 
55 The Blueshirt, 15 June 1935, 'Blueshirt Corporative Policy. ' 
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fulfilment of the principles of the 1916 Proclamation and the establishment of a 
,, 56 regime of social justice for every class and section in an all-Ireland Corporate state. 
Once elected to power, "a Republic dejure for 32 counties and defaclo for 26 ýi" 
would be declared by the NCP government. O'Duffy perceived his Gaelic corporate 
republic as the logical fulfilment of the desire of the leaders of the 1916 Rising for a 
united Irish nation where people put the national interest before personal interests. 
The idea was also extended to O'Duffy's attitude towards unregulated capitalism, 
which had also come under attack in the Papal encyclicals. Developing the ideas of 
Leo XIII's De Rerum Novarum 58 and Pius XI's QUadragesimo Anno, 59 O'Duffy 
argued that a "revolutionary reform of the existing capitalist system was long 
overdue, "60 the stress here being on reform. Capitalism, argued O'Duffy, whilst 
providing many benefits to modem society, had left a large number in poverty. 
Capitalism that behaved in this uncaring way was an abuse of the right to private 
property. The Blueshirts hoped to: "... reform the abuses of private property, not to do 
away with it; to clip the wings of greedy capitalism and give the working man the 
chance to become a proprietor himself.,, 61 
The unrestrained capitalist, working exclusively for himself and his own self- 
interest, did not seek to serve his fellow man but to control him and this resulted in the 
capitalist opposing widespread property ownership as this would serve to encourage 
the independence of the worker. Corporatism would change all this by giving the 
worker not only a share in the management of industry but also in the management of 
the country and its economy. This would prevent the workers from drifting into the 
56 National Policy of the NCP, D/Jusg/296, NAL 
57 Irish Independent, 10 June 1935, quoting O'Duffy. 
58 D. O'Brien, D. and T. A. Shannon, (Eds), Catholic Social Thought-The Documentary Heritage (Orbis 
Books, Maryvale, 1995). 
59 Ibid. 
60 Labour in the Corporate State, lecture by O'Duffy, D/Jus8/296, NAL 
61 Ibid. 
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arms of socialism or communism by giving them the rights and fair wage that was 
their due, but also giving them a stake in the capitalist system. 
The corporatist ideas of the NCP were presented in a number of lectures and journal 
articles that were aimed at the rank-and-file party member, who was encouraged to 
study and then promote these ideas. The proposals were expressed in a very 
accessible, un-intellectual manner that made them easy to digest. Considering that the 
party, naively, expected to be in power in the very near future(within a year of taking 
office) there was a distinct lack of the detailed paperwork that would have been 
needed to set in place the corporate state that the party envisaged. For example, there 
were no clearly set out documents covering the new, and potentially complex, voting 
procedures. 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORA TE STA TE 
The National Corporate Party presented itself as a political organization whose aim 
was to get rid of the existing system of government through the democratic process, 
and replace it with a new political structure. The NCP, on achieving an electoral 
mandate to overturn the system, pledged to do so within a year of taking office. A 
new election, on a vocational register, would take place. 62 The creation of a corporate 
state would coincide with the declaration of a dejure republic for the 32 counties with 
a President elected by the people as a whole. Under the new system, social and 
economic factors would determine the choice of representatives in the legislature. The 
Blueshirts declared that economic expertise would replace political patronage and 
62 Eoin O'Duffy, 1935 Congress speech reported in Irish Independent, 10 June 1935. 
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place-seeking as the motive force in government. 64 The corporate structure envisaged 
by the party would seek to guide the economic life of the nation by: 
"... interposing between the State and the individual, occupational or vocational 
self-governing corporations functioning under the guidance of a National Economic 
Council. "65 
The NCP worked out a procedure for the implementation of its corporate 
programme to ensure that the transition was smooth, and the end results effective. The 
Nation, in its February 1936 edition, outlined this process, with the agricultural 
corporation given as the example: 
Step one. 
Adult suffrage. Every person on the electoral roll would be sent a new form on which 
to indicate their occupation and these would be collected by the police. For example, 
every farmer, agricultural worker, their wives and sons and daughters over 21, and 
"every person living by the land, including shopkeepers and artisans, in the small 
villages and towns, would be included in the agricultural register. 46 
Step 2. 
A General Election. This would take place within a year of the NCP taking office. 
All those on the agricultural register, for example, in each electoral division, would be 
allowed to attend a meeting announced by the Returning Officer. The business of the 
meeting would be to appoint delegates to represent the division at a constituency 
agricultural convention to select candidates for the Dail. In the selection of delegates 
the system of proportional representation would be adopted "so that all those. classes 
64 The Blueshirt, 15 June 1935. 'Blueshirt Corporative Policy. ' 
65 Eoin O'Duffy lecture, 19 February 1935, D/Jus8/296, NAL 
66 The Nation, February 1936, 'Democratic System of Government. ' 
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,, 67 engaged in agriculture will receive just representation. Each district would do the 
same. 
Step3. 
On a day fixed by the Returning officer, all delegates would meet to select their 
candidates for the General Election. In order to be nominated, the candidate's name 
had to appear on the register for that particular vocation. All persons on the register 
would be entitled to vote. However, it was hoped that as a rule agreement would be 
reached between the delegates so that an election would be unnecessary. An election 
would only occur if agreement could not be reached. 
Step 4. 
Each constituency would act similarly and the elected members, who would still be 
referred to as T. D. s., would meet in Dublin as the National Council for that particular 
corporation, for example agriculture. They would then proceed to elect a chairman 
who would become the Minister for that vocation. The Council of T. D. s would have 
the power to appoint experts, but of course, only the elected T. D. s would be allowed 
to sit in the vocational Dail. Every constituency would have one member on the 
Council. Relevant legislation would be considered by the Council which it most 
concerned and the Minister for that vocation would bring the Bill to the Dail. The 
Dail would be allowed to reject the bill on only two counts: finance, or if the bill was 
deemed to be detrimental to the interests of another corporation. 
There would be a coordinating National Council for Corporations to oversee all 
interests and advise the Minister for Finance as to the allocation of funds to the 
67 Ibid. 
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various councils in proportion to their importance to the nation. A Minister would 
only hold office as long as he had the confidence of his own corporation. 68 
The population as a whole would directly elect the President of this new corporate 
republic. His task would be to appoint those ministers not representing a particular 
vocation, such as finance, external affairs, defence and justice, subject to Dail 
approval. His exact role, the extent of his powers, and his function as Head of State 
were left vague. However, his powers of appointment would give him a great deal of 
control over the government, especially in the key areas of finance and foreign affairs, 
even more so if the task of appointment to the coordinating National Council of 
Corporations was also part of his brief. 
LABOUR IN THE CORPORATE STATE 
The NCP held the view that capitalism was the system that was most suited to the 
demands of a twentieth-century economy. However, the party leadership accepted that 
the position of the worker was weak due to the uncontrolled excesses of the capitalist 
system, which allowed for the exploitation of the workers. This in turn made the 
workers more susceptible to communist propaganda. The only solution to an 
increasingly desperate economic problem was to initiate a "revolutionary reform of 
the existing capitalist systerrC' in order to provide for the prosperity and progress of 
69 
the nation. If capitalism had provided many benefits, it had also left a significant 
section of the population in need, with many living in urban and rural slums on 
starvation wages. The abuses of capitalism needed to be tackled, whilst continuing to 
recognize the right to private property as sacrosanct. The NCP presented a full 
68 The Nation, March 1936, 'Fallacy of Party Government. ' 
69 Eoin O'Duffy, lecture, Labour in the Corporative State, DJus8/296, NAL 
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package of social reforms to tackle unemployment, poverty, both rural and urban, and 
low wages. In common with fascist parties throughout Europe, the NCP saw the 
necessity of appealing to the workers to win them over from socialism. 
The rights of man, including the right to property, were not to impinge on the rights 
of others: 
"... so consequently the individual must be considered less important than the 
Society to which he belongs, as the part is less important than the whole. ýM 
Capitalism, as it was constituied at the time, always put the individual, not the 
community first. The NCP tried to walk a fine line between acceptable state 
interference and the right to private property. The State was not to act in a totalitarian 
way as "the state has its own functions but it may not usurp what does not belong to 
it. 9,71 It may "not interfere with the rights of the individual or individual interests. It 
may interfere only by way of supervision in the National IntereSt.,, 72 The state may 
intervene to set down limits within which mankind's right to property may be 
exercised but this was not seen as an attack on the institution of private property itself. 
The NCP argued that one of the main duties of the state was to guarantee that 
enough was produced to ensure that the population was supplied with their basic 
needs. By giving the farmer full rights to the soil, that is ownership instead of renting, 
the party was sure that higher productivity would ensue because private ownership 
was seen as a great incentive to production. However, even here there could be a case, 
where full use was not made of the land, for state interference, that is "in cases where 
the farmer fails to promote the temporal prosperity of the community.,, 73 The party's 
policy was one way of tackling the urgent problem of rural poverty, in part caused by 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
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poor management of land and the need to redistribute under-used or badly-managed 
land holdings, but it also was surprisingly similar to Fianna Fail's economic policy. 
If modifications, rather than a complete overhaul of the system, were deemed 
necessary, then statesmen were needed to discover what modifications were needed to 
re-arrange the national economy so that production could be disciplined. O'Duffy saw 
the corporate system as the solution to the problem as it aimed to clip the wings of 
what he perceived to be the greedy aspect of capitalism, whilst giving the workman a 
chance to become a proprietor himself. O'Duffy believed that a careful examination 
of those systems in operation abroad would lead to the adaptation of one of those 
systems to Irish conditions. O'Duffy clearly saw the Italian model as the one to 
emulate. Ile praised it frequently in speeches and would often hold up the successes 
of the Italian system as evidence of its effectiveness. 
O'Duffy's arguments for. property rights, large scale private ownership, control of 
some aspects of production in the national interest and the idea of thejust wage were 
all taken from the philosophy of Catholic social thought whilst the institutional 
remedy that he suggested was based on the Italian model. Pre-capitalist society, to 
which many Catholic social theorists harkened back, was based on small workshops 
with independent proprietors, but O'Duffy was well aware that this was impractical in 
the modem age of mass production. Whilst the mass scale of industry could not be 
changed, the corporatists at least wanted the workers to have basic rights and the 
ultimate aim, in theory, was to raise the status of the worker equal to that of the 
employer. The physical value of the worker was deemed to be equal to the financial 
74 investment of the capitalist and the issue of profit-sharing for workers was raised . 
74 Second lecture by O'Duffy on Labour in the Corporative State, D/Jus8/296, NAI. 
151 
152 
In the corporate state, all workers would be members of a trade union or 
corporation, but the role of these organizations would be fundamentally changed, as 
basic workers' rights would already be guaranteed under the new system: 
"They are returning to their mediaeval function-associations of men engaged in a 
particular form of honest toil, proud of themselves and working for the temporal, 
,, 75 cultural and spiritual welfare of their members. 
In catering for the spiritual and cultural welfare of their members, the unions would 
be reduced to being harmless adjuncts of the state. The corporate system would 
promote goodwill, not hostility, between capital and labour and give workers the 
opportunity to help decide conditions of work and labour. They would function more 
like mediaeval guilds than modem unions. The traditional functions of trade unions 
would be delegated to state-run organizations where employee and employer would 
sit as equals. As an example, The Nation described the functioning of the National 
Council of Printing in Italy, which had legislative powers to fix wages, hours and 
conditions of service, something he expected to introduce into Ireland. The National 
Council of Printing had representatives from all branches of the industry so that 
"labour and capital in every branch of the trade gets a fair and equal say in everything 
06 affecting that trade. In the corporate state, the workers in industry would have the 
same extensive rights to sick pay, pensions, holidays and social insurance benefits that 
civil servants already enjoyed in the Irish Free State. 
Disputes might still arise, but these were to be dealt with through the Labour Courts 
with the result that, as in Italy, "such consideration is given to all legitimate claims of 
07 both workers and employers that strikes and lockouts are equally unnecessary. This 
easy and quick solution of industrial disputes was based on a very optimistic view of 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. 
77 ]bid. 
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the new relations between employer and employee but cooperation for the national 
good was regarded as the defining mark of the new state: 
"Justice and goodwill are the foundation of the corporative state. The national 
interest is above the individual interest and should not be left to any sectional 
,, 78 interference. 
The policy adopted by the NCP at its inaugural congress made provision for the 
reconstruction of industrial relations based on cooperation rather than on factionalism 
and conflict. Industrial disputes were to be settled by statutory corporations under a 
chairman who was expected to arbitrate disputes impartially, but always in the 
national interest. The corporate state would allow trade unions, but would transform 
them into organs of public authority working for the betterment of the national 
economy rather than representatives of sectional, particularistic interests. In exchange, 
a programme promising improved working conditions and new. rights for the worker 
was on offer (ranging from a minimum wage topped up with a share of the company's 
profits, higher pay for night work, severance pay, unemployment insurance, and 
retr aining for the unemployed). On paper, it was an impressive range of measures that 
would have guaranteed the worker a living wage and provision in time of need, but 
which would have left the unions with few of their usual functions. The unions would 
be reduced to being a part of the corporate machinery in a state where the power, 
independence, and militancy of the workers would be effectively destroyed. 
O'Duffy's new party had created a set of corporatist policies that were far more 
developed than those of Italian fascism, but which he had little hope of carrying 
through. His policies also reflect the modernizing element of fascism. 
Ibid. 
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NA TIONA L POLICY 
Eoin O'Duffy was one of the prot6g6s of Michael Collins, who had signed the 
Treaty which had created the Irish Free State. Collins saw the Treaty, not as an end in 
itself, but rather as a step on the road to full self-determination for Ireland, leading 
finally to the republic that had been declared in Dublin in 1916 . 
79 The National Policy 
of the NCP committed the party to the principles of the 1916 Proclamation of the 
Republic, declaring that the Free State was now in a position to move further down 
the road towards the republic. Always a committed nationalist, O'Duffy pledged the 
party to working for a full republic of thirty-two countieS. 80 The republic that he 
desired was that envisaged by the leaders of the 1916 Rising, and of the Irish 
Republican Brotherhood to which he had belonged. O'Duffy's continuous references 
to 1916 make this clear. He tied Irish regeneration to the revival of the republicanism 
of the 1916 rebels, and it became central to O'Duffy's programme. 
O'Duffy held the idea that a national reawakening would lead to a transformation of 
Irish society and a renewal of Irish culture, but he believed that this would only be 
possible within the modem framework of a corporate organization of society. As a 
result, he had a very distinctive national programme that set him apart from other 
nationalists in the thirties. Liam Walshal summed up O'Duffy's national agenda in his 
unpublished biography of O'Duffy: 
"General O'Duffy did not study and advocate corporatism because it was a new- 
fangled, continental idea that generally mirrored fascism. Ile studied and advocated it 
because his mind turned back to the old Gaelic Ireland with its perfect system of laws 
which Irishmen respected and full observed, and which were not, as today, a mere 
technical contrivance argued by men in which people have little, if any, confidence. 
79 The Republican Proclamation became the fundamental document for republican hard-liners. 
go Thirty two counties as opposed to the twenty six which comprised the IFS. 
a' Walsh was O'Duffy's private secretary. 
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He studied and advocated it because he believed that the Old Gaelic State was a 
remarkable achievement and that it would be impossible, even in the light of modem 
advancement, to find so complete a State Craft, or one so wise and so soundly based 
,, 82 on the will of the people. 
In his speech at the 1935 Ard Fheis, O'Duffy announced that once in power his 
government would "establish a Republic dejure for 32 counties and defacto for 
26.9,83 In the same speech, he used strong language to register this commitment, the 
same kind of language that had alienated his erstwhile colleagues on the traditional 
conservative wing of Fine Gael: 
"If we are sincere in striving for independence then we must be prepared to use 
every means at our disposal to achieve it and we must be free to take advantage of 
,, 84 each and every opportunity which offers. 
O'Duffy always made it clear that he supported the Treaty as a necessary evil and 
that he had never wavered in his commitment to the ideals of the 1916 Proclamation 
of the Republic. He described the Treaty as "an oasis on our journey to freedom 
where we could get a little refreshment to enable us to complete our journey. , 85 
Whilst O'Duffy had voted in favour of the Treaty, he did so believing that it was not a 
final settlement. 86 He made this quite clear in his 1935 Ard Fheis speech: 
"By 1918 the issue of the Republic was put before the Irish people at a general 
election. They decided overwhelmingly for a Republic, and ratified the declaration of 
1916. Until that decision is reversed, it must be assumed that the Republic is the 
symbol of our independence. 
82 L. Walsh, General Eoin O'Dujfy-His Life and Battle, Unpublished Manuscript, National Library of 
Ireland, Dublin, pp. 195-6. 
" The Irish Independent, 10 June 1935, 'General O'Dufly's Party Decisions. ' 
84 The Blueshirt, 15 June 1935, '1916 Declaration Basis of Policy. ' 5 Ibid. 
6 Bulletin no. 5, December 1935, D/Jus8/296, NAL 
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"It is clear that the national objective of youth today is the Republic, and it would 
be in our country's best interests for all to recognize the fact now. An all-Ireland Free 
State will only attract a minority. The epithet 'Free State' is now regarded as an insult 
by our youth. Our army demands to be known as the 'National' rather than the 'Free 
State' Army, and our Cabinet ministers would not wish to be referred to as 'His 
,, 87 Majesty's Ministers' for that portion of the Empire called the Free State. 
In adopting an uncompromising republican position, O'Duffy was emphasizing his 
party's nationalist credentials, a sine qua non for any serious Irish political party in 
the thirties. Where he differed from other parties was his belief that a republic of 
thirty-two counties could only come about once a corporate Ireland was created . 
88 It 
was this corporate framework that he hoped would encourage the Northern Unionists 
to re-unite with the south of the country. O'Duffy believed that had corporatism been 
89 
on offer in 1922 then partition would never have taken place. O'Duffy declared that 
it was necessary for him to be brutally honest about what his intentions were once his 
party was in power. However, the strong language of his speeches, whilst music to the 
ears of Irish nationalists was hardly likely to win over the Unionists of Northern 
Ireland, especially with his continued references to Papal mandates for his policies 
and his emphasis on Catholic culture and the Gaelicization of national life. However, 
the Northern Unionists were hardly his natural constituents. 
In the intervening period between his resignation from Fine Gael and the formation 
of the NCP, O'Duffy appeared to have moderated his stance on the Northern issue. 
This was possibly because of his desire to win over the Ulster Fascists. It casts into 
doubt how genuine his commitment to republicanism was; for instance, he had been 
willing to include a commitment to monarchy in the programme of the 32 Club. 
87 The Blueshirl, 15 1 une 193 5, '1916 Declaration Basis of Policy. ' ' Irish Times, 19 July 1936, 'Corporate Party Candidates. ' 
9 Ibid. 
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In the appeal for funds in late 1934, O'Duffy had said that his movement would 
encourage: 
"... the promotion of the reunion of Ireland by peaceful means in an independent 
state, its attitude towards the British Commonwealth to be decided by the Irish people 
themselves by a free vote and consistent with the national honour and dignity; and the 
fostering North and South of the border of a public opinion which will make the unity 
of Ireland inevitable in our time. "90 
O'Duffy believed that the only way forward was to be brutally honest about the 
intention of the NCP should they be elected to government in the near future: 
"I think we should be honest with the North and tell them straight that our aim is a 
Republic for all Ireland. A Free State for all Ireland will not satisfy the aspiration of 
the Irish people, and if it were established tomorrow, the struggle for complete 
independence would continue. There will never be peace and agreement in the South 
except on the basis of a Republic, and if we want it for the South, then we want it for 
all Ireland. The North should not be deceived by this talk of a united Ireland within 
the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth can never be regarded as a basis for Irish 
unity. "91 
O'Duffy tried to portray the Stormont administration of Northern Ireland as a 
tyrannical regime, an artificial creation imposed on the Irish people by the British. 
In spite of his accusations of dictatorship levelled against the Free State Government 
(chiefly for its introduction of the bill banning the wearing of uniforins but also its 
return to the Public Order Act to control its political opponents), he contrasted the 
freedom enjoyed in the South with the oppression of Catholics in the North: 
90 Summary of the Policy of the New Movement, December 1934, D/Jus8/286, NAL 
9' The Blueshirl, IS June 1935, '1916 Proclamation Basis of Policy. ' 
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"Today largely through their sacrifice we here in the South enjoy a wide measure of 
2 freedom, while they are ground down beneath the heel of a ruthless tyranny9 ... 
Our 
Northern fellow-countrymen may expect from us equal justice and fair dealing that 
93 9594 we have given their co-religionists in the South . 
O'Duffy regarded the border between North and South as a denial of the existence 
of the Irish nation. He believed that its existence seriously hampered the development 
of cordial relations with Britain: 
"Let there be no mistake about it, the responsibility for partition rests on the 
shoulders of English party politicians. It was imposed by Britain, and is being 
maintained by British financial support. Without this the Six County Goverm-nent 
,, 95 would be bankrupt in six months. 
O'Duffy believed firmly that relations with Britain could never be normalized until 
partition was ended. For O'Duffy, all opportunities to end partition should be gasped 
and the traditional nationalist battle cry still held true: "England's difficulty is 
Ireland's opportunity. ', 98 He had always been prepared to take extreme measures to 
unify the state when it suited him: 
"At the time [of the creation of the National Guard] it was reported that England 
was fortifying her outposts in the Six Counties and I said, "If this means war I shall 
probably be in it... "99 
For O'Duffy, Ireland could never accept Britain's role in upholding a brutal 
Protestant tyranny in the North by military force: 
92 Ile was referring to the oppression of Catholics in Northern Ireland by the Stonnont Government and 
the R. U. C. 
9' tie was referring to the Protestants. 
94 The Blueshirl, I May 1935, 'Blueshirts in the Corporative State. ' 
95 The Blueshirt, 15 June 1935. 'Eoin O'Duffy Ard Fheis speech. ' 
98 The Irish Times, 19 July 1936, 'Corporate Party Candidates. ' 
99 The Blueshirt, 15 June 1935, '1916 Proclamation Basis of Policy! 
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"Let there be no mistake about it, the responsibility for partition rests on the 
shoulders of English party politicians. It was imposed by Britain, and is being 
maintained by British financial support... " 100 
As Hitler's demands in Europe became more ambitious the likelihood of a European 
war became a very real prospect. If war did come, then Britain needed a friendly 
Ireland at its back. O'Duffy believed that the only way that this could be made 
possible was if the six Northern counties joined the Free State. Failure to do so would 
push Ireland into the arms of Britain's enemies. O'Duffy's pro-German stance during 
World War Two is evidence that his extremism was to be taken seriously. It is 
evidence of the eclecticism of the methods he was prepared to use to achieve unity. 
Any Irish party hoping to have electoral appeal had to play the nationalist green 
card. For O'Duffy, nothing less than complete withdrawal of the British from the 
North was acceptable. This would be followed immediately by the declaration of an 
Irish republic with the capital in Dublin. In making the 1916 Declaration of a 
Republic the basis of his party's National Policy, O'Duffy wanted to return to the pre- 
Civil War unity of Sinn Fein. 1010'Duffy believed that the Treaty had been a 
transitional document, necessary in the context of the early twenties, but no longer 
relevant. What had angered O'Duffy during his time as President of Fine Gael was 
that the party had shown no interest in moving the Irish state further along the path to 
a republic, even though the time seemed opportune to do so. Nor did the Fianna Fail 
government show any interest either in putting pressure on the British to withdraw 
from the North or to declare a republic themselves, in spite of their claim to be the 
republican party in the Dail. In some ways, it placed the NCP closer to the IRA by 
way of its aggressive nationalism and irredentist posturing. This affinity with the IRA 
100 Ibid. 
101 See Chapter Six. 
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was a fact that O'Duffy was willing to acknowledge, especially as the leftist element 
had splintered off to forrn the short-lived political party, Saor Eire. 102 
O'Duffy saw the national problem, as well as the economic one, as being 
responsible for Ireland's lack of development since independence. De Valera, 
according to O'Duffy, refused to push the issue of reunification with the North. De 
Valera firmlY believed that national reunification would be a natural development 
following on from his successful economic policies. Economic success in the Free 
State would attract Ulstermen back into the Irish fold. O'Duffy also castigated Fine 
Gael for its apathy and contentment with the status quo; that they were happy to 
remain part of the Commonwealth as 'West Britain. ' In O'Dufly's estimation, it 
would ultimately lead to the demise of Fine Gael and the contest for the votes of the 
Irish electorate would be between his NCP and Fianna Fail, a contest that O'Duffy 
expected to win, because he believed that he held the republican higher ground. 
With the formation of Cumann Poblachta na hEireann in March 1936, O'Duffy 
found himself faced with a new party with whose national policy he was broadly in 
agreement. The new party had declared: 
"The Irish people will be invincible, as they were from 1918 to 1921, when they 
regain confidence and realize their strength, when they spum compromise, 
expediency, and opportunism and stand unflinchingly for the Republic. " 103 
The party, formed by members of the IRA, pledged themselves to fighting election 
both North and South of the border, though they were also committed to a policy of 
abstention from either parliament should they be elected. 104 Its formation was largely 
102 Saor Eire was banned in 193 1. 
103 Cumann Poblachta na hEireann, Manifesto, Constitution andRules, Coyle O'Donnell Papers 
Archives Dept, UCD P61/10(l), 4. 
'04 T. P. Coogan, The IRA (Fontana Paperbacks, 1980), p. It 5. 
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the work of Sean MacBride, 105 but few had a good word to say about the new party 
and enthusiasm was markedly absent. O'Duffy was banned from entering Northern 
Ireland (one of the objectives of the Blueshirts had been the abolition of the border 
and this was the reason given for the banning of the National Guard in the North 
under the Civil Authorities (Special Powers Act) on 22 nd jUly 1933. The ban extended 
to members of the organization including O'Duffy, entering the North. (See chapter 
one)) and so he gave his electoral blessing to Cumann Poblachta na hEireann's 
proposal to stand there. Like his own party, its national policy was based on the 1916 
Proclamation. Both parties proclaimed a policy of "social justice based on Christian 
principles. " 106 However, the new party had not adopted corporatism as part of its 
electoral platfonn. Whilst O'Duffy was prepared to endorse the party in the North, he 
believed that only a corporatist state could effectively end partition. If the new party's 
policy objectives are examined, it is clear that there was a lot of common ground 
between the two parties, particularly republicanism, Anglophobia, Christian social 
ideas, and the restoration of the Gaelic language and Irish culture in a Gaelic state. 107 
However, apart from O'Duffy's endorsement of the party for elections in the North, 
there appears to have been no cooperation between the two parties, mainly due to the 
enmity between the members of the parties left over from the IRA-Blueshirt conflict 
earlier in the decade. The party had a short life as it was quickly banned in the North 
as an unlawful organization. 
As the President of Fine Gael, O'Duffy had found himself at odds with other key 
party members on the Ulster question. Freed from the constraints of his party office, 
O'Duffy aired his views openly. As an Ulsterman himself, from County Monaghan, 
105 Sean MacBride (1904-88) had been in the IRA. since the War of Independence, and became its 
chief of staff in 1936, but left a year later after the enactment of the 1937 constitution which he felt met 
Republican demands (Oxford Companion to Irish History, p. 333). 
106 Ibid. 
107 Richard English, Radicals and the Republic (Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 23 S. 
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he felt strongly about the issue of the border and the division of Ireland. Ile had been 
actively involved in the North during the War of Independence. In 1922, he had set up 
the Northern Military Council in order to protect the Catholic minority from 
Protestant violence and to try to prevent the Unionists of Stormont from consolidating 
their statelet. 108Since then, his intemperate speeches advocating the use of armed 
force in the North had increasingly alienated him from the political mainstream, but as 
head of his own party he was free to vocalize his bellicose attitude towards the British 
and Northern Unionists. 
O'Duffy would frequently claim that he had inherited the political mantle of his 
mentor, Michael Collins. He firmly placed his party and himself firmly in the tradition 
of Irish nationalists such as Emmett, ' 09Grifffith and Pearse. The NCP held an annual 
commemorative service at the grave of Hugh O'Reilly, the first Blueshirt martyr. 
O'Reilly had been a Blueshirt from Bandon, Co. Cork. ' 10 He had been dragged from 
his bed one night by unknown assailants and brutally beaten, dying from his injuries 
two months later on 30th December 1930. O'Duffy used the commemoration as an 
opportunity to rouse the party faithful and to stress the links and continuity with the 
party's Blueshirt past. Hugh O'Reilly had not died in vain, said O'Duffy, if the 
movement "remained steadfast during the year to come by the ideals for which he 
gave his young life. "' 1 'The ceremony, which was to be held in early January each 
year, began the Blueshirt/Greenshirt liturgical year. It was an opportunity to look 
ahead to the coming months, and to listen to O'Duffy reminding his followers of the 
sacrifices already made for the republican ideal, with the hope that more personal 
sacrifices and victories would follow. 
108 Coogan, TA, Michael Collins (London, 1990), pp. 343-344. 
109 Robert Emmet was one of the new leaders of Irish nationalism to emerge after the failed 
insurrection of 1798. fie led an insurrection in 1803 in Dublin, was captured, and hanged. 
I 10 M. Cronin, The Blueshirts and Irish Politics, p. 56 
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The party always referred to the Blueshirt dead as martyrs, and their families were 
wheeled out for the occasion. O'Duffy firmly believed that the republic could only 
come about through further blood sacrifice, in the tradition of Irish nationalists 
throughout the struggle for full independence. He saw his movement as the final 
expression of the nationalist surge towards a Gaelic republic. The O'Reilly 
commemoration provided the Director-General, acting as high-priest of Gaelic 
nationalism and republicanism, with the opportunity to urge his listeners to follow the 
example set by men like O'Reilly to ensure the eventual realization of a republic. The 
Greenshirts would provide the next, and final, generation of martyrs. The function of 
the rally is clear from the graveside oration O'Duffy gave on 12 January 1936: 
"Hugh O'Reilly ... gave his life's blood in the cause of his country ... It is fitting that 
each New Year should be the Hugh O'Reilly anniversary, when we can renew our 
vows to be steadfast during the year to come by the ideals for which he gave his 
young life, to strengthen ourselves by the example he set, to emulate his noble 
qualities, and to resolve to carry on the work until our task is accomplished- a united 
and independent Corporate state established on Christian principles and free from 
Antrim to Cork ... Let your motto be "faith and country, " and the cause for which the 
blood of Hugh O'Reilly reddened Cork soil, will, please God, be triumphant. "' 12 
In a country where the historical failure of Irish nationalists to achieve 
independence had left a trail of blood and executions well into the twentieth century, 
O'Duffy finnly believed that the republic could not be achieved without further 
sacrifice: 
112 TheNation, March 1936, 'Tribute to Released Prisoner. ' 
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"No movement in this country ever succeeded without sacrifices and our members 
were called upon to make sacrifices-some the supreme sacrifice. " 113 
The resurrection and renewal of Ireland could only come about through the spilling 
of blood. What this entailed in the field of politics in 1936 is hard to imagine, unless it 
meant a military seizure of power. The war in Spain would later provide the 
opportunity for his followers to show their commitment to O'Duffy's ideals, even to 
the extent of losing their lives. 
O'Duffy had first risen to prominence as a member of the Supreme Council of the 
IRB and as a member of the IRA. He lost no opportunity to praise those who had died 
for Ireland in the struggle for independence. The other main event in the NCP 
calendar, therefore, was the annual pilgrimage to Beal na Blath, the scene of the 
assassination of Michael Collins. He used the occasion to remind the party members 
of their martyred colleagues, Hugh O'Reilly of Inishannon and Paddy Kenny of 
TiPPerary. The Michael Collins commemoration ceremony gave O'Duffy the 
opportunity to recall Michael Collins' sacrifice as a heroic martyr and to link him with 
the NCP. A long line of nationalists reached back through Irish history, each one 
passing on the torch of rebellion and freedom to the next leader, always aiming at the 
ultimate goal of a free Gaelic republic. O'Duffy believed that Michael Collins had 
passed this torch on to him to run the last leg of thejourney. 
This invocation of the nationalist past was not confined to the Hugh O'Reilly and 
Michael Collins commemoration ceremonies, but was to be part of the education of 
young Greenshirts. A party member writing in The Nation, identifying him/herself 
only as C. B. D. (West Cork), recommended the following: 
113 Ibid. 
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"What more interesting subject for discussion at the meeting places of our youth 
than a chapter from the glorious, soul-stirring story of Ireland- crushed to earth, 
carcass and ashes in one generation, yet again in arms battling for liberty in the next; 
her people swept by famine and fever in one generation, again ready to draw the 
sword in the long struggle for freedom in the next. " 114 
In an editorial in The Blueshirt the following appeared: 
"Since 1924 our people have been divided into two hostile parties ... the Civil war 
mentality must be eradicated. The man who can only think of the gun as a means of 
solving internal differences must be hauled out of Irish public life. 
"The first item of Blueshirt policy declares for the complete and unfettered freedom 
of all Ireland. To obtain this even a gun, if all else fails, may be justly used. The 
second item of our policy is the eradication of internal bitterness and strife ... We must 
forget all bitterness, cut out all hate, and strive to get the national front as solid once 
again as it was in 1918-2 1. 
"We must renounce all party ties that owe their origin in the Civil War. We must 
turn to a party which does not deal in hatred and recrimination. All Irishmen must be 
free to do their duty, unhampered by the past. And there is only one way in which 
these can be solved and that is by the abandonment of the present spiteful and futile 
party system, and the unification of all national forces in a corporate state. "' 15 
A leading light in the Gaelic Athletic Association (which promoted the playing of 
native Irish sports rather than British games), O'Duffy tied his movement to the 
promotion of Irish language and culture. He believed that only thus could the Irish 
nation be made a reality, distinguished by its unique Gaelic identity: 
114 The Nation, February 1936, ' An Irish-Ireland Corporate State. ' 
115 The Blueshirt, 6 July 1935, 'Hatred in Irish Politics. " 
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"No language, no nation; and all Irish leaders and patriots, with the exception of 
O'Connell, have realized the importance of keeping alive the mother tongue if 
nationality is to survive. " 116 
As usual, O'Duffy used Irish patriots and Irish history to demonstrate his party's 
commitment to the Irish nationalist cause. On the formation of the National Guard, he 
had stated that one of his main aims for the movement was the preservation and 
promotion of Irish language and culture. He proposed the creation of an organization 
run by the state, on the lines of Hitler's KdF or Mussolini's Dopolavoro 
organizations, to promote Irish culture and sports. ' 17 
He opposed the decision by De Valera's government not to raise the school leaving 
age, on the grounds that an additional year in school would be invaluable in the 
promotion of the Irish language. Under British rule, the Gaelic League, 18 had been at 
the forefront of the Irish language revival, but now the NCP claimed that it was the 
responsibility of government to promote the language via the educational system. 119 
O'Duffy was appalled at the lack of effort on the part of goverm-nent since 
independence to restore to Ireland her 'soul, ' by which he meant her "nationality, 
religion, language and culture. "120 Writing in The Nation, O'Duffy reminded his 
readers that Pearse and the rebels of 1916 had not sacrificed their lives to make 
Ireland a "second edition of England. " 121 O'Duffy wanted to: 
"... ensure that our culture and our civilization, as well as our social and economic 
system are Irish to the core. " 122 
116 The Nation, April 1936, ' Ignorance is Bliss. ' 
117 The Nation, February 1936, 'An Irish-Ireland Corporate State. ' 
1 'a The Gaelic League founded in 1893 by Eoin MacNeill and others. It sought to revive Irish as a 
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language. League members were prominent in the 1916 rising. 
9 19 The Nation, April 1936, 'Ignorance is Bliss. ' 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid. 
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A nationalist, corporate state would break the cultural and economic hegemony of 
the British, which O'Duffy believed the parties had failed to tackle since 
independence. A free, united Ireland under a corporate system would prioritise the 
promotion of Irish language and culture. What O'Duffy ignored was the fact that a 
united Ireland would be very different from the Free State he had served since 1922. 
A united Ireland would contain a large minority whose language, culture and religion 
were not his own but those of the British he despised. The reality was that a united 
Ireland could not be a Gaelic Ireland. Unlike the IFS, a thirty-six county Irish 
Republic would contain a significant non-Catholic minority who would continue to 
look to Britain for its cultural and linguistic roots. 
SOCIAL CREDITAND THE NCP 
New to the policies of the Blueshirt movement, in its manifestation as the NCP, was 
the discussion in the party j ournal and at Congress, of the monetary reform ideas of 
Major C. H. Douglas known as Social Credit. Douglas, a Scottish engineer and anny 
officer bom in 1879, developed his theory whilst working in the British aircraft 
industry during and after the Great War. He stated that the aircraft industry was in 
difficulties due to the fact that the industry was generating prices at a faster rate than 
incomes. Douglas believed that the crisis of capitalism was due to the lack of 
purchasing power in the population at large. This resulted in the boom and bust 
swings of contemporary capitalism. Douglas believed that this could be remedied 
through stimulating the circulation of the money supply by the payment of a national 
dividend to each adult, and by the strict control of the money supply by central 
government through a National Credit Office. The state, rather than the banks would 
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therefore have complete control of finance, and capitalism in the process would be 
saved from socialism and communism. 
The NCP never adopted Social Credit as official policy, but discussion of the idea 
was given a great many column inches in The Nation and O'DufFy gave it his clear 
support. He wrote that the Social Credit movement had "aims and objects [which] 
have much in common with the financial policy of the National Corporate Party.,, 123 
Speaking on the subject of Social Credit at a meeting in Listowel on 20 October 1935, 
O'Dufry admitted that he was not an expert on financial reform but he believed that it 
was a solution to the problem of under-consumption and that he hoped to discuss it 
with the Party Executive at a later date. 124 
A series of monthly articles appeared discussing all aspects of the subject, including 
its adoption abroad by parties and governments. Louis O'Connell, a Listowel solicitor 
and Divisional Director of the NCP wrote the articles. Mr R. Whaley, the Assistant 
Divisional Director of South Tipperary composed articles with a more critical stance. 
By May 1936, the party j ournal was devoting three whole pages of the paper to the 
issue of financial refonn. 
Mr T. Kennedy, the founder of the Social Credit movement in Ireland, addressed the 
1936 NCP Ard Fheis and received a loud ovation in response. He said that through the 
banks, the English [sic] government still controlled the national life of Ireland. The 
conference went on to pass the following resolution: 
"9. That it be an instruction to the National Executive to enquire into the principles 
of Social Credit as a basis for our financial and economic policy. 
123 NCP Bulletin, no. 5, December 1935, D/Jus8/296, NAL 
124 Ibid. 
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"10. That the present money system has failed to fulfil its purposes i. e. distribution 
of produce to the community, and that some means of distribution, such as the Social 
Credit plan should be adopted. "125 
Once again, the party failed to commit itself wholeheartedly to the adoption of 
Social Credit as official policy, but it was further step towards its adoption as an 
alternative to other fiscal policies. Around this time, the BUF in Britain was adopting 
Social Credit as part of its policy. In Ireland, the issue was discussed across the 
political spectrum and in 1936, a short-lived and ineffectual, political party, the Irish 
Social Credit Party, was formed. A series of lectures held at the Red Bank Restaurant 
in Dublin's D'Olier Street led by Captain Neville H. Roberts and chaired by Mr. 
D. Walsh promoted the ideas of Major Douglas from June 1934 onwards. 12'5' However, 
the NCP saw no need for one more single-issue party to divide the electorate and 
argued that it was a policy issue that all political groups could debate and consider. 
Other parties discussed monetary reform and Fianna Fail enthusiasts set up the 
Financial Freedom Federation to promote Douglas' ideas. 127 At its 193 5 Ard Fheis, 
Fianna Fail debated a motion in favour of an enquiry into the national control of credit 
and this was only narrowly defeated by 190 votes to 180. 
The Kerryman was one of a small number of newspapers that endorsed the ideas of 
Major Douglas. O'Connell, writing in The Nation argued that the issue was largely 
ignored by the press as the papers were "controlled by those who have also heavy 
interests in the present banking system. " 128 In promoting the ideas of Major Douglas, 
125 The Nation, August 1936. 
126 The New, 4ge, 7 June 1934, LSE Youth Movement Archive YMA/KK 191 (B). 
127 Financial Freedom Federation file, D/Jus8/34 1, NAL 
128 The Nation, February, 1936, 'Social Credit. ' 
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O'Connell recommended that Greenshirts should read booklets on monetary reform 
such as A State in Fetters and The Fruits ofFreedom. 129 
The founder of Social Credit, Major Douglas, had made it clear that he was 
vehemently opposed to fascism. He was opposed to the New English Weekly's drift in 
that direction. Writing in this j ourrial, he identified fascism as an evil ideology and 
went on to specifically name the BUF and the Blueshirts as examples of this. 130 A 
British Social Credit journal had commented on the Blueshirts back in 193 3: 
"During these last few days we have seen the start of a new movement of a Fascist 
nature in the Irish Free State. We refer of course to the Blueshirts. The Blueshirts 
work in the limelight provided by their backers and sponsors- the International Credit 
Monopolists ... the Bankers' army. " 
131 
One point to note is that at the time that the NCP was discussing these Social Credit 
ideas, the green shirt replaced the blue shirt as party uniform. The green shirt was, at 
the time, the party uniform of the Social Credit Party in Britain, where they were 
known as 'The Greenshirts. ' O'Duffy's adoption of green however was not a 
ideological one connecting him to the social credit movement but an appeal to 
nationalist symbolism. 
AGRICULTURE IN THE CORPORATE STATE 
The National Corporate Party was a farmers' party. Many of its members came 
from farming backgrounds and agriculture dominated the national economy. 
Agriculture had a central place in the new party's economic programme. It could not 
afford to do otherwise. The division of Ireland had deprived the IFS of its industrial 
129 Ibid. 
130 
New English Weekly, 20 December 1934. 131 Keighley Greenshirt Review, no. 2 September 1933, LSE Youth Archive 1919-83 YMA/KK/J 76 (B). 
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base and Ireland's foreseeable economic future would therefore have to depend on 
agriculture. Where the NCP differed from other parties was its stress on a 
coordinated, directive approach to agriculture with a clear perception as to where this 
control would lead. It was party policy to develop agriculture with the express aim of 
ending emigration, increasing the population and providing the financial base for the 
future development of Irish industry for domestic use, not export. Agriculture was to 
remain the source of Ireland's foreign currency. To this end, it vehemently opposed 
the economic war with Britain, which it feared would do irreparable harm to Ireland's 
export trade. It also argued that the best way to develop agriculture was to put the 
decision-making process firmly in the hands of the farmers themselves, working 
through the corporate structure that would follow an NCP victory at the polls. 
The Blueshirt movement had grown in numbers as the economic war with Britain 
hit harder. The NCP, aware that its opposition to this dispute was a major contributor 
to recruitment, gave a great deal of time to arguing for a speedy end to the dispute and 
the compensation of farmers who had borne the brunt of the financial costs of the 
dispute. The party saw it as a political issue that Fianna Fail had hijacked and they 
wanted it made a national cross-party issue. The party called for an independent 
commission to be set up to look into the economic costs of the war to ensure that the 
fanner wasjustly compensated, and that the country as a whole, notjust those 
involved in agriculture, shared the cost of the protracted economic war. 132 The party 
vowed to represent the farmers and fight for their demands and promised that on 
attaining power the interests of the farming community would be paramount. 133 
The Blueshirts had often been accused by their enemies, particularly on the left, of 
being the party of 'the Ranchers' (those involved in the production of meat for export 
132 The Blueshirt, 15'h June 1935, 'Resolutions Passed by Congress' Articles l4b and 14c. 
133 lbid, article 15. 
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rather than production for domestic consumption), and by implication pro-British, and 
there is some truth in this. The Blueshirts recognized that Irish development was 
dependent on the maintenance of high export levels. The infant state, already deprived 
of its Northern industrial base kv the Treaty, needed to secure its economic 
infrastructure as part of its strategy of national survival. Economically, Ireland 
remained tied to the British market. The Blueshirts were prepared to accept the reality 
of this fact and work within it, but with a clear goal of using this dependency to 
national advantage. True, the Irish economy was dependent on the metropolitan 
British market., but this market was a secure one and even the Great Depression had 
little effect on Irish exports. 
The Blueshirts recognized the importance to the national community of 'the 
Ranchers' and was prepared to work with them, in the national interest. Indeed, their 
programme of agricultural development in the national interest would favour the 
larger farmers. The party did advocate the breaking up of unproductive ranches and 
estates, 134 but the stress here was on 'unproductive. ' The party wished to revise the 
existing system of Land Commission control and wished to see locally appointed, 
non-political committees set up in order to advise the Land Commission on the 
suitability of applicants for land. 135 
At the same time, the party wanted to encourage more people to stay on the land, 
thus reducing the need for emigration, and leading to a growth in population. To 
provide for this increased population, the party promoted increased tillage, 136 
presumably on the land that would be provided by the release of property coming 
from unproductive estates. The party also recognized that the way to keep people in 
agriculture was to provide them security. To ensure this, the party hoped to amend 
134 Ibid, article l4e. 133 lbid, article 2 1. 136 Jbid, article l4d. 
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the Land Act of 1933 to restore security of tenure, 137 to provide "insurance against 
unavoidable failure of harvest and potato crop, " 138 and to provide the opportunity for 
smallholders to buy their homes and land under easy credit terms. 139 The complete de- 
rating of smallholdings, and the partial de-rating of larger farms would also, it was 
hoped, give the farmer more financial security. 140 
These policies were designed to appeal to the farming community. The larger plan, 
to control agriculture to provide for national economic regeneration, was given less 
coverage but was central to the party's economic policy. The party policy, agreed at 
the first party congress in June 1935 covered the policy in one article: 
"9. Adoption of a planned system for agricultural development, to maintain 
agriculture as the basis of national life and to elevate conditions of those engaged 
therein. " 141 
Party documents outlining the corporate plan give pride of place to agriculture 
which the party envisaged as being the largest and most important of the corporations, 
principally because of the number of citizens involved in farming. However, 
O'Duffy's corporatism was based on the ideas of Ernest Blythe which would put 
selection for the corporate bodies firmly in the hands of the Blueshirts, thus ensuring 
that it was their decision, not those of the fanners, that would initiate policies. 
In O'Duffy's speeches there is a great deal of time spent talking of workers' 
conditions, strikes and lockouts but the fact of the matter was that the numbers 
engaged in industry were small compared to those engaged in agriculture and 
associated occupations. The corporate system would give control over the whole 
system to the farmers' representatives, overwhelming the industry-related 
117 lbid, article 14g. 
"" I bid, article 14i. 
139 lbid, article 23. 
140 lbid, article 14f. 
14 1 National Corporate Party Policy, Article 9, Jusg/296, NAL 
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corporations. The agricultural corporation, representing the majority of the workforce, 
would in effect make the corporate chamber an agricultural chamber where the 
interests of the agricultural community would always be in a dominant position. The 
corporation was also expected to control agriculture to a much greater extent than 
Ireland was used to. National need, and not private profit, would guide production. 
Ireland needed a firm economic base, and the NCP accepted that agriculture was the 
only industry capable of providing this. Ireland has no great natural resources other 
than her land and people and was heavily reliant on imports to provide for many of 
her needs. Whilst De Valera preached on about frugality, O'Duffy's party took an 
entirely different tack. The party wanted to provide for the needs of Irish people by 
building up domestic industry, where possible, to provide for national needs, as 
opposed to industrial development for export, whilst ensuring that Ireland had a 
healthy export economy, grounded in the supply of agricultural produce. This would 
tie Ireland firmly into the international economy and provide an increased standard of 
living for the rural population of the Free State. 
In his 193 5 Ard Fheis statement on the party's Labour Policy, O'Duffy declared that 
the party's aim was for industrial expansion and the protection of domestic industry. 
However, without the necessary purchasing power, such expansion would be 
worthless. O'Duffy therefore saw a need to increase the purchasing power of the 
workforce, which in Ireland meant principally the farmers. 142 The rational 
development of agriculture, through careful planning and coordination by the 
agricultural corporation, would create the purchasing power amongst the agricultural 
community, which in turn would fuel the development of industry for domestic 
consumption. This was the basis of NCP economic policy. 
142 The Nation, 22 "d June 1935, 'Director General's Statement on Labour Policy. ' 
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The party's economic policy had marked similarities to that of pre-] 921 Sinn Fein, 
but also to those of Fianna Fail, as well as to the protectionism of many capitalist, 
including fascist, economies in the thirties. Indeed, Regan, in The Irish Counter- 
Revolution, argues that it was Cumann na nGeadheal's failure to advocate a Policy of 
protectionism that contributed to its failure to win elections during the thirties against 
Fianna Fail. 
One rural community close to the heart of many nationalists was the Gaeltacht, 
comprising those areas where Irish was still the main spoken language. The N. C. P 
recognized the importance of these areas to the future restoration of Irish as a living 
language amongst the majority population. It was part of the mind-set of nationalists 
who envisaged the restoration of a rural Gaelic utopia. There is a parallel here with 
Salazar's Portugal, where the Portuguese dictator tried to rally support for his regime 
by combining his corporate ideas with an ideology that romanticized rural life, 
attachment to the land and loyalty to the church, particularly as represented by the 
local priest. 
Little had been done since independence to stimulate the Gaeltacht areas which 
were amongst the most deprived parts of the new nation. The NCP responded by 
announcing that: 
"... we must make sure that the people who are the custodians of our language and 
traditions are assured some means of decent livelihood. " 143 
O'Duffy ruled out doles as a solution to Gaeltacht poverty. As early as 1934, 
speaking at a rally in Clifden, he had suggested having Blueshirt uniforms made in the 
Gaeltacht to stimulate the local economy. Nothing, however, came of this suggestion. 
O'Duffy, as leader of the NCP, declared that the economic war with Britain had hit 
143 The Nation, 13 th jUlY 1935, 'The Gaeltacht Problem. ' 
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the Gaeltacht particularly hard, but that the party's policies on de-rating and an end to 
the collection of annuities would be a big help. Other suggestions for reviving the 
Gaeltacht economy included developing the turf industry and encouraging the fishing 
industry by supplying the Gaelic-speaking enclaves with fishing boats at government 
expense. By putting the Gaeltacht on a secure economic footing, the party hoped to 
tackle the issue of language preservation in a practical way. 
The 1936 Ard Fheis reiterated the usual Blueshirt/Greenshirt message about 
annuities, the division of unproductive estates and increased tillage, along with 
removing the economic war from the arena of party politics and making it a national 
issue. However, by this stage the party had failed to win widespread support from any 
section of the farming community (which was far from homogenous in its interests). 
O'Duffy was preaching to an increasingly uninterested audience who believed that it 
was Fianna Fail and Fine Gael, not the NCP, which had the real, and realizable, 
solutions to the problems of the fanning community. 
THE 193 6A RD FHEIS OF THE NCP 
The 1936 Ard Fheis introduced very little that was new to party policy. The August 
1936 edition of The Nation lists the motions that were passed by the last party 
congress. Many of the motions carried by the delegates confirmed the existing party 
platform adopted the previous year, for example the Labour Policy and Agricultural 
Policy. Any new items were of minor, topical importance, for example the Lough 
Foyle fishing dispute, the need to maintain by-ways, a National Scheme of Public 
Works, the development of aviation and deep-sea fishing, and the setting up of a 
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munitions factory. The party also adopted in its entirety the original National and 
Political Policy of the National Guard. 144 
The NCP also called for the restoration of university representation in the Dail, the 
establishment of a special Ministry for the Gaeltacht, the restoration of the 
referendum 145 and the enfranchisement of the Garda Siochana. 
146 
From an organizational point of view, Congress clearly expected the party to have a 
long-term future. Congress passed a motion calling for each division and company to 
raise funds for Central Headquarters, whilst other fund-raising events were to raise 
money to be used locally as a General Election Fund. Congress decided to send 
O'Duffy to the USA to solicit funds and to organize the NCP amongst expatriate 
Irishmen. Other officers were to be sent to "centres in Britain with a large Irish 
Population, " 147 with the intention of recruiting expatriates and fund-raising. This 
could have been a useful exercise given the disproportionate number of Irishmen who 
Tere attracted to Mosley's BUF. 
In the light of the party's decision at Congress to encourage the establishment of 
)men's units, it is interesting to note that the party completely neglected to discuss 
role of women in the new society that their corporate policies would create. This 
, common to European fascism. Fascism was an overwhelmingly masculine 
rement which, as Stanley Payne states: 
.. made a perpetual fetish of the "virility" of their movement and its programme 
tyle, stemming no doubt from the fascist concept of the militarization of politics 
ie need for constant struggle. " 148 
Ippendix-The National and Political Policy of the National Guard. 
'ecourse to referendum had been abolished by the Cumann na nGaedheal government in 1928. 7ardai did not possess the right to vote in 1936. 
lation; August 1936, 'Resolutions Passed by Congress. ' 
S, Fascism, Comparison and Definition (Madison, 1980), p. 12. 
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Women had been prominent numerically in the earlier Blueshirt movement, but as 
already noted, this support had declined considerably. No women sat on the National 
Executive of the party. Only one woman, Esther Meehan, was a regular contributor to 
the partyjournal, and even then she did not discuss women's issues. There was a lack 
of attention given to women's issues in what was a very masculine organization. 
Women had the vote in Ireland, but apart from a brief burst of activity in the 
independence struggle, women had not played a major role in post-Treaty politics. 
Given the fact that women had the vote, it is surprising that O'Duffy did not realize 
the potential of this group to his bid for power. In Germany, women voters formed a 
significant portion of the Nazi electorate and contributed enormously to the success of 
the NSDAP, in spite of its anti-feminist policies and image (In the November 1932 
German Reichstag elections, female and male votes for the Nazis were almost 
equal 149). However, given the fact that very few women in Ireland were employed at 
this time, except for some in farming and a small number in manufacturing, they 
would have found their position in a corporate structure based on occupation tenuous 
at best, unless they were to be given a vote based on the family's main occupation. 
The NCP never made this clear. 
Congress submitted other organizational items to the National Executive for further 
consideration. These included: the creation of youth and units, the appointment of a 
Director of Propaganda, the compiling of a roll of public speakers and a reduction in 
the size of the divisions. The party was trying to consolidate itself but O'Duffy was 
unable to create a mass organization like the earlier Blueshirts. By the summer of 
1936, this was a party in serious decline. The 1936 Ard Fheis was just going through 
the motions. O'Duffy, who would have had the clearest overview of the situation was 
149 I. Kershaiv, Ilitler 1889-1936 (London, 1998), p. 380. 
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quick to transfer his organizational skills into the recruitment of an Irish Brigade for 
Spain. O'Duffy would rather try his hand in a new venture than flounder around in the 
political wilderness at home with a party in decline and with an election in the near 
future which would only serve to confirm the party's declining fortunes. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE SOURCES OF IRISH CORPORATISM 
INTRODUCTION 
The National Corporate Party presented the Irish people with a political programme 
that combined Irish republican nationalism with continentally-inspired corporatism. 
Corporatist ideas were not new to Ireland. Intellectuals, churchmen and social 
reformers had been discussing corporatist ideas for almost half a century, since the 
publication of Leo XIII's De Rerum Novarum in 1891. The Blueshirt movement was 
the first political group to adopt corporatism as a central article of policy. The ensuing 
merger with the Centre Party and Cumann na nGaedheal was dependent on this policy 
being adopted by the new Fine Gael coalition. Irish intellectuals such as Michael 
Tierney, James Hogan and Ernest Blythe who, through various journals and 
publications, were familiar with current trends in continental thought, were 
particularly anxious to put Catholic social ideas into practice. They therefore adapted 
corporatist ideas to suit Irish conditions and presented them to the public through Fine 
Gael and the Blueshirt movement. 
General O'Duffy enthusiastically supported and promoted these ideas. Partly 
because he became convinced that Fine Gael did not share his enthusiasm, he set out 
to form his own party in which corporatism was one of the central elements. 
However, the statist corporatism he was now advocating had moved away from the 
Catholic corporatism of men like Tierney and Hogan and had developed on more 
fascist authoritarian lines. Corporatism was a radical policy initiative for Irish politics, 
but it was widely seen as a foreign import irrelevant for Ireland, and as such failed to 
win any enthusiasm from potential voters. 
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THE DE VEL OPMENT OF CORPOR, 4 TEM 
According to Schmitter, there were four distinct types of corporatist thought by the 
turn of the twentieth century which he labelled Social-Christian (as exemplified by de 
Mun, Tour du Pin, and Joaquin Azpiozu), authoritarian-bureaucratic (as exemplified 
by Spann and Mussolini), a radical, bourgeois, solidarist tradition (as exemplified by 
Bourgeois and Gide), and a leftist, syndicalist line. ' Corporatist ideas appeared in the 
wake of the fall of the ancien rigime at the close of the eighteenth century. Initially it 
was essentially a Catholic riposte to Protestant liberalism. 2 The nineteenth century 
saw the rise of industrialism and capitalism and the emergence of theories of 
liberalism, individualism, and democracy. Corporatism was one response to this, but 
unlike Socialism, it did not oppose the capitalist system. 
Corporatism opposed the atomistic theories of liberalism in favour of organic 
notions of the state, with the stress on the needs of the national community rather than 
the individual. The organic nature of society was to be expressed in political and 
economic arrangements that would create a consensual society. Easly corporatists 
criticized liberalism for stripping property of its moral and social responsibilities, 
which they vowed to restore. Corporatists stressed the need for harmony, but they 
gave a moral role to the state, the basis of this morality being either religion or 
nationalism. 3 
Constantin Franz argued that corporatism was necessary to protect property but also 
to put a brake on the growing excesses of power in increasingly centralized nation 
states, an argument followed through by Catholic corporatist thinkers. Franz believed 
that corporations would give people a sense of belonging, replacing the mob with 
As noted in IIJ Wiarda, Corporatism and Development-The Portuguese Experiment (Boston, 1972), 
F. 70. 
P. J. Williamson, Varieties ofCorporatism. Chapter 2. 
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community and encouraging the cooperation that capitalism was threatening to 
destroy. 
In early nineteenth century Germany, men such as Friedrich Schlegel, Franz Von 
Bader and Adam Muller developed corporatist theories that stressed the organic 
nature Of SoCiety. 4 Corporatist ideas really took off after 1850, in response to rapid 
industrialization throughout Western Europe and the emergence of the class struggle, 
which threatened to disrupt the-unity of Europe's emerging nation states. Corporatists 
saw the need to restore harmony in the workplace, protect private property, and 
prevent the rise of an organized, socialist workforce. 5 
The form that the corporate state would take was varied. In France, La Tour du Pin 
argued for a strong monarchy and a bicameral system with one chamber representing 
taxpayers, and a Chamber of Estates to represent a variety of groups including 
churches and the liberal professions. He saw the need to protect the rights of workers 
in order to prevent social upheaval and he criticized the competition between 
capitalists for being wasteful. 6 
The twentieth century saw the application throughout Europe, in various forms and 
to various degrees, of corporatist ideas that had been developing since the French 
Revolution. Corporatists argued that there was a need for an interventionist state 
appropriate for a modem, industrial, capitalist economy that was equipped to deal 
with the problems that had come with rapid modernization. During World War One, 
there had been varying degrees in the increase in state intervention necessitated by the 
needs of a war economy and there were many who thought that this strategy was also 
3 Peter Milliarnson, Corporatism in Perspective, An Introductory Guide to Corporatist Theory 
(London, 1989), pp. 21-25. 
4 Carl Landauer, Corporate State ideologies, p. 12. 5 Ibid. p. 13. 
6 Peter Milliarnson, Varieties ofCorporatism, Theory and Practice, p. 39. 
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appropriate for a peacetime economy. 7 This prompted a number of nations, such as 
Italy, Portugal and Austria to experiment with a corporate political structure during 
the nineteen thirties and beyond. Corporatism was not a new mode of production, but 
a new form of representation based on vocation rather than geography, status or 
sectional interests. It was a distinct political system of interest mediation and 
economic intervention with various forms of functional representation. The aim was 
to abolish class conflict because the state would become the arbiter between 
employers and workers. Corporatism can manifest itself either as a distinct state form, 
or as a system that complements and co-exists alongside parliamentarianism. It was 
an explicit alternative to the pluralism and anarchism of the free market of liberal 
capitalism and the parliamentary democracy which developed alongside it. It was a 
form of economic planning and organization that was posited as a third way between 
Socialism and liberal capitalism. 
Corporatists hoped to control capitalism in the national interest by curtailing the 
excesses and anarchy of the market place. Corporatists criticized the free-market 
system for being wasteful and divisive, and held it responsible for the rise in the 
militancy of the working class. However, in contrast to other political philosophies, 
such as Marxism, Corporatism is not concerned with distribution but with production, 
and aims to maximize national economic potential. The emergence of corporatist 
ideas in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries paralleled not only the 
development of capitalism, but also the growth of nationalism and the nation state. 
Corporatism was seen as a way of uniting different social classes to create a strong 
national body, whilst also ensuring that production is controlled in the national 
interest. 
7 Carl Landauer, Corporate State Ideologies, Berkeley Research Series, no. 54,1983, p. 6 1. 
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Corporatism shifts the role of the state from that of a supportive to a directive 
regulator of social and economic activities and organization: third-way collectivism. 
The directive state has five basic economic functions; price regulation, the regulation 
of production, the determination of wages and conditions of work, regulation of the 
professions and the administering of a social welfare programme. 8 Corporatism 
endeavours to prevent the occurrence of conflicts in the workplace and to promote 
harmony amongst competing interests, thus contributing to the restoration of the 
social bonds that liberalism and laissez-faire capitalism had ostensibly destroyed. 9 
The implementation of corporatist ideas inevitably creates a stronger state, with a 
greater concentration and centralization of power and decision-making. Corporatism 
became associated with totalitarian and authoritarian regimes such as Mussolini's 
Italy, Salazar's Portugal and Franco's Spain, but this is only one form of corporatism, 
authoritarian corporatism. In these authoritarian systems, there were no effective 
checks to arbitrary power. 
There are other forms of corporatism where the corporations support the democratic 
parliamentary system and act as intermediaries between the individual and the state, 
in theory reducing state power and supplementing participatory democracy. This was 
the structure advocated by Catholic social thinkers who opposed the growing power 
of the state, and who saw corporate bodies as adjuncts to the parliamentary system 
rather than its nemesis. 
The corporatist political system emphasizes social community and the central place 
of higher moral principles transcending the individual or sectional interests of 
society's members or factions. The hierarchical corporatist state therefore conferred 
8 P. J,. Williamson, Varieties of Corporatism, Theory and Practice, p. 53. 9 Ibid. p. 55. 
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rights but also demanded duties. 10 This especially applied to the use of property. The 
right to property would cease to be an inalienable right but ownership would be 
provisional upon the performance of certain social duties. ' 'Discipline, not liberty and 
rights, were inherent in this approach. 
Underscoring the corporative ideology was the idea that class collaboration was not 
only possible, but desirable. It would promote the interests of all classes not any one 
faction. The pluralism of the free-market, laissez-faire system of nineteenth century 
capitalism had led to conflict between worker and owner as capitalists competed to 
lower prices, at the expense of the wages and conditions of the worker. Workers and 
owners had used the strike and lockout as bargaining tools, often at public and 
national expense and discomfort. The corporate state intended to make the use of 
strikes and lockouts illegal, with compulsory arbitration by neutral state parties to 
restore stability to society and the economy. However, corporatism is not egalitarian, 
but adheres strictly to the principles of hierarchy. A corporate state creates an unequal 
distribution of power that does not favour the workers. In a corporate state, the 
workforce would be required to surrender its economic muscle and accept its position 
in the social hierarchy, in exchange for material improvements. 
Catholic theorists had stressed that workers not only had duties but certain social 
rights as well, including a just wage. This appeal to natural justice was not always 
echoed by authoritarian corporatists. They hoped that vocational solidarity would 
break the class solidarity of the working class. 12 The vocational groups were supposed 
to reflect the communitarian aspect of society, with a strong state in control that 
would reflect a single 'National Will, ' which would keep the parts in harmony. 13 
10 Ibid. pp. 45-6 
" Ibid. pp. 45-6. 
12 p. j. Williamson, Varieties ofCarporatism, Theory andPractice. Chapter 2. 13 Ibid. Chapter 2. 
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Corporatism came to prominence at the same time as the growth in popularity of 
the anti-liberal ideas of men like Mosca, Pareto and Michels, with their belief in the 
hierarchical, organic nature of society and the elevation of group over individual 
rights and with a strong state which posited itself as the moral leader. 14 The state 
combined the hierarchical and communitarian aspects of society and state in a 
harmonious unity for the common good. 
CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT 
The Roman Catholic Church made its own specific contribution to corporatist theory 
in a response to the social dislocation caused by the rapid industrialization of 
nineteenth century society. The reformist ideas of the Church, as exemplified in the 
social encyclicals De Rerum Novarum (189 1), issued by Leo XIII, and Quadragesimo 
Anno (193 1), issued by Pius XI, offered an alternative to Socialism and unregulated 
capitalism. The encyclicals were based on the ideas of several key Catholic thinkers, 
but also built on traditional Catholic ideas about hierarchy, property and the family. 
The nineteenth century saw a number of key figures in the Catholic Church 
proposing solutions to the problems of society within the framework of Catholic 
theology. Industrialism had failed to abolish poverty as early eighteenth century 
thinkers thought it would. Industrialization had created new problems such as 
unemployment, urban slums and a breakdown in the extended family. The depression 
of 1873-96 was a major stimulus to corporatist ideas. Senior Catholic figures such as 
Cardinal James Gibbons in the United States, Cardinal Manning in Britain and 
Archbishop Walsh of Dublin raised the issue of the problems caused by the rapid 
14 1 I. j. Wiarda, Corporatism and Development, The Portuguese Experiment, p. 69. 
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modernization of agriculture and industry and the need for action to alleviate distress 
caused by massive social dislocation. 
The Catholic Church believed that it had the moral right and duty to respond to the 
social question. The Risorgimento in Italy had already weakened the Papacy's 
temporal power and the Church could not risk a further dilution in its influence by 
failing to respond to the problems that seemed to beset modem industrial society. The 
social and economic upheavals created problems with moral implications, which the 
Church felt duty-bound to address, especially when others were proposing solutions 
that clashed with Catholic teaching. Many in the church saw the trends as irreversible 
and believed that the Church would have to adapt. Even before the great social 
encyclical, De Rerum Novarum, the Papacy had skirted around social issues in an 
attempt to show that the Church was relevant to the modem era in its willingness to 
face up to the problems of a capitalist industrial world. It sought to portray itself and 
its teachings as an anchor of moral stability in a time of rapid change. In 1888, Leo 
XIII's encyclical Libertas reiterated Catholic ideas about human liberty within the 
context of traditional Catholic views on marriage, the family and state, and it touched 
on the rights and duties of management and labour. It accepted democracy as a 
legitimate form of government that was compatible with Catholic teaching. This 
encyclical, along with Immortale Dei paved the way for De Rerum Novarum in 1891 
by portraying the Church as responsive to modem developments, thus imbuing the 
Church with a new relevance. 
Leo XIII's social encyclical, De Rerum Novarum set down guidelines for the 
solution of the problem of human relations named the "social question. " Issued on 
May 15 th 1891, the encyclical was a broad social charter that owed a great deal to the 
emergent Catholic social movement. Leo XIII laid down a set of principles governing 
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the rights and duties of workers and employers and, importantly, the state. His 
arguments and solutions were based on the concept of natural law, which stressed the 
dignity of the individual and the right to private property. The right to private property 
was made distinct from its use. This prohibited the abuse of the right to property 
through its misuse. Owners have a duty to use property in the right way. This had 
important repercussions for the treatment of the worker. Leo XIII emphasized that the 
dignity of man precluded him from being treated as a commodity. De Rerum 
Novarum stated: 
"It is shameful and inhuman to use men as things for gain and to put no more 
value on them than what they are worth in muscle and energy. "' 5 
The right to private property rested on man's independence, his self-control, his 
self-direction and his right to found and maintain a family. The encyclical declared 
that poverty was detrimental to the family and this prompted the need for social 
justice. The state could promote social justice by protecting private property, 
regulating work conditions, ensuring a just wage, and by encouraging the widespread 
distribution of property. Workers had a right to protect themselves and their families 
and were therefore entitled to organize in order to oppose exploitation and the abuse 
of private property. 
De Rerum Novarum-was a response to the problems of industrialization and 
capitalism but it was also a response to the growth of Socialism and communism. Leo 
XIII recognised the need to improve the lot of the working class but believed that 
liberalism and Socialism were not the answer as they were incompatible with Catholic 
teaching on individualism and property. Ile saw the need for the state to have a more 
interventionist role in order to protect private property and also to regulate work 
l' Leo XIII, De Rerum)Vovarum, para. 20. 
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conditions, but also saw the benefits of voluntary associations that promoted these 
ends. For Leo XIII, Socialism violated the principles of private property, personal 
initiative and natural inequality. However, he also recognized that capitalism was also 
an abuse of private property when it enslaves the worker. The language used in the 
encyclical to denounce unbridled capitalism is often stronger than that used to 
denounce Socialism. 
The solution to the problem, similar to that of the Distributists, was to ensure 
widespread property ownership. The encyclical said: 
"The law, therefore, should favour ownership, and its policy should be to induce 
as many as possible of the people to become owners... Men always work more harder 
,, 16 and more readily when they work on that which belongs to them... 
It was a reformist, not a revolutionary, programme, but it did commit the Church to 
defending the rights of workers. Where it differed from the other critiques of 
capitalism was the derivation of its central social values from Catholic theology, 
which in turn gave it a very paternalistic edge. It marked a significant development 
for the Catholic Church, indicating its willingness to face the challenges of the 
modem world and its acceptance of the important role that the state would have to 
play in the coming century. It shifted the stance of the Church in favour of the poor 
and exploited andjustified the intervention of the Church in social and economic 
matters. It encouraged Catholics to involve themselves in the trade union movement, 
particularly in the United States. 
The Church believed that it had to take a temporal role as well as a spiritual one, 
and saw itself in the forefront of a crusade to support the rights of the working class 
whilst preventing him from falling into the errors of Socialism, with its perceived 
16 Leo X111, De Rerum Novarum, para. 4. 
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anti-Christian values. However, its approach had limited appeal to those societies that 
were predominantly non-Catholic. 
Forty years to the day after the publication of De Rerum Novarum, Pius XI 
published Quadragesimo Anno (On Reconstructing the Social Order), which built on 
the social ideas of Leo XIII and developed the ideas of corporatism as a structural 
answer to capitalist dislocation. Pius XI advocated the need to change the structure of 
society for the common good through the creation of reformist vocational bodies. He 
was inspired by the negative problems of the class struggle, destructive competition, 
and the growing concentration of state power (and in some respects the document is a 
critique of Mussolini's brand of corporatism and his authoritarian state), and the 
positive example of the mediaeval guild system. 
Pius XI made frequent references to De Rerum Novarum in his encyclical, 
extending and developing Leo XIII's ideas. The church issued the document with the 
Wall Street Crash and the Great Depression still fresh in the minds of people. The 
document began with a critique of capitalism that defended it as a valid economic 
system but condemned its abuses whose root cause was identified as unlimited and 
unregulated competition. This had led to repression, bankruptcy, depression and 
monopolies. Competition had a positive aspect in that it stimulated effort and led to 
efficiency. The document envisaged a greater role for the state that would in effect 
create a social market economy and certainly, his call for reform did focus on the 
state. The state would supervise healthy competition whilst preventing the rise of 
monopolies. Pius XI wanted to put the moral element back into the economic system, 
through the principle of 'just distribution, ' declaring 
"Each class, then, must receive its due share, and the distribution of goods must be 
brought into conformity with the demands of the common good and social justice, for 
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every sincere observer is conscious that the vast differences of wealth ... constitute a 
grave evil in modem society. " 17 
The document reminded Catholics that the right to private property was distinct 
from its use and incurred duties as well as rights. This required the property owner not 
only to consider his own advantage but the good of society. The need to control 
competition, to ensure workers' rights and to end the conflict between labour and 
capital meant that the state would have a much greater role to play in the economy 
and in the field of social legislation. Pius XI also feared authoritarianism and state 
oppression and argued that the best way to prevent this was to delegate as much 
authority as possible to a local, accountable level. This delegation of power to 
intermediaries such as corporations was the cornerstone of the corporate society that 
he envisaged. He referred to mediaeval guilds as models of Christian social order. 18 
What he advocated was a corporative society in contrast to the sort of corporate state 
that Mussolini was creating. 
Pius X1 intended society to set up industry councils representing management and 
unions where the two could collaborate for the common good. There would be a 
hierarchy of organizations leading up to a national economic council. These industry 
councils would be semi-public bodies with legal rights to enforce rules in the areas of 
efficiency and production. The syndicates that he envisaged would be voluntary 
associations to maintain the rights of workers and employers and they would have the 
exclusive right to settle labour problems. 19 The resulting structure would create unity 
of purpose between labour and management. He saw the primary duty of the state to 
17 Pius XI, Quadragesirno Anno, (193 1) in Ed. AC Pegis, The Wisdom of Catholicism (London, 1962), 
p. 739. 
18 Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno (193 1), Ibid. p. 747. 
'9 Pius X1, Quadragesimo Anno (193 1) Ibid. p. 749. 
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"abolish conflict between classes with divergent interests, and thus foster and promote 
harmony between the various ranks of society. , 20 
The social philosophy of the church was a new departure, but it had an enormous 
influence across Catholic countries in the pre-war years. Corporatist ideas based on 
the Papal encyclical were adopted in Portugal and Austria, and to some extent in 
Spain. Political groups advocating the Popes' ideas included the Cagoule in France, 
the Belgian Rexists, the Irish Blueshirts and Fine Gael, the Falanga of Poland, the 
League of National Christian Defence in Romania, and Ljotic's radical unitary Zbar 
movement in Yugoslavia. 21 Academics, the clergy and lay study circles discussed the 
encyclicals. Various organizations, such as Muintir na Tire in Ireland, promoted the 
ideas in practical ways. Political leaders such as Dolfuss in Austria and Salazar in 
Portugal justified their authoritarian corporatism by reference to the social 
encyclicals. However, their greatest importance lies in the fact that the Catholic 
Church saw that it could not stand on the sidelines and neglect the temporal for the 
spiritual. The encyclicals gave the green light to greater state involvement in the 
economy and social issues, which prompted several Catholic states, including Ireland 
to reassess their policies in the light of the Papal instructions. 
The rise of nationalism in the nineteenth century pushed social and economic issues 
onto the sidelines, but with increased industrialization and the organization of labour, 
social questions gained more prominence. There had been strong clerical involvement 
in the issue of land rights but none with the urban poor or the issue of trade 
unions. 22 The clergy responded to De Rerum Novarum and to the ideas of 
Distributism, particularly at the influential training college for the clergy at Maynooth 
20 Ibid. p. 745. 
21 Mike Cronin, The Blueshirfs and Irish Politics, p. 87. 
22 Dermot Keogh and Finin O'Driscoll, 'Ireland' in Tom Buchanan and Martin Conway, Ed. Political 
Catholicism in Europe 1918-65 ( Oxford, 1996). 
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where a number of papers and treatises on the social question were produced. The 
group at Maynooth was led by Walter MacDonald, assisted by Dr Peter Coffey and 
Dr Wiliam Moran (in his pamphlet Social Reconstruction in an Irish State he argued 
that the capitalist system was unworkable and that a new political order was 
necessary). However, the ideas were discussed only by a minority of radical clerics, 
men such as Father Coyne and Reverend Myles Roanan, the majority of clergy being 
isolated in rural areas. The hierarchy did not share these radical ideas. From 1912 
onwards, the influential Jesuit publication Studies promoted the discussion of Catholic 
social ideas. The Jesuit Irish Messenger published a series of 28 titles in its Social 
Action Series by 1918, the most prolific writer being Father Lambert McKennan 
(1870-1956). 23 
A number of groups made their appearance in the first decades of the twentieth 
century to discuss and promote Catholic social. thought in Ireland. The Catholic 
National Society was set up in 1926 as a form of Catholic Action. The group only 
accepted University College students as members but it did provide a specifically 
Catholic angle to the discussion of political and economic issues. A more widespread 
grassroots organization formed the same year was An Rioghacht. It was the creation 
of Reverend Cahill. An Rioghacht (The League of the Kingship of Christ) was set up 
following Pius XI's encyclical Quas Primas to promote social principles and social 
action. 24 The organization particularly emphasized the need for strong Church 
involvement in education. In principle, it advocated as strong influence for the Church 
in government, a confessional state where the nation's morals would particularly 
come under Church direction and control. The movement grew further with the 
publication of Quadragesimo Anno. Reverend Cahill published The Framework ofa 
23 Ibid. 
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Christian State in 1932 arguing the case for a corporate political system. 25 
Interestingly, Eamon De Valera was known to have attended some meetings of An 
Rioghacht but was wary of continental models of Catholic Action. The Catholic 
Young Men's Society, founded in 1928 in Dublin, played a crucial role in raising the 
intensity of the debate through its study weeks which attracted influential people. 
The publication in 1931 of Quadragesimo Anno stimulated further discussion of 
social ideas in the Catholic press. Particularly influential were magazines such as 
Catholic Mind, Catholic Monthly, Irish Monthly, Hibernia, Studies, and Outlook. The 
concern over associating corporatism too closely with the fascism of Mussolini led to 
the widespread adoption of the term 'vocationalism' as an alternative. 
Father John Hayes set up the organization Muintir na Tire (People of the Land) 
26 
only a week before the Pope's encyclical was published in 1931 . Hayes had 
originally envisaged it as an agricultural economic cooperative but the study 
weekends to discuss social thought became very influential, attracting large numbers 
of people. Ireland was a rural society and many believed that vocationalism supported 
their conservative way of life, linking prosperity to the land. In Ireland, the hierarchy 
initially showed little interest in vocationalism and its promotion was a grass-roots 
phenomenon. The hierarchy was quite late in adding its support to vocationalism. The 
proposals of Catholic corporatists were too radical for the church hierarchy, 
conservative politicians, and the Irish Civil Service who were concerned that radical 
changes to Irish social life would damage the infant state and undermine their power. 
Whilst both Fianna Fail and Fine Gael politicians discussed corporatist ideas, their 
adoption was piecemeal, half-hearted and incomplete. Whilst respecting Pius XI's 
encyclical, traditional politicians put nationalism and economics ahead of social 
24 Ibid. 
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change and so any acceptance of Catholic social ideas tended to be opportunistic, 
tokenistic and temporary. Mainstream politicians and civil servants were also 
reluctant to embrace corporatism from fear of a resulting diminution of their powers. 27 
THE LIFE AND CORPORATIST IDEAS OF MICHA EL TIERNEY 
Michael Tierney was an influential politician, academic, and political theorist in 
Ireland throughout the nineteen twenties and thirties. He was also a major promoter of 
corporatist ideas, introducing them into the Irish political mainstream, though his 
conception of corporatism was not always compatible with that of O'Duffy. fie was 
Professor of Greek at University College, Dublin, 28 an Irish speaker, and a contributor 
to academic j ournals such as Studies. He was the son-in-law of Eoin MacNeill, leader 
of the Irish Volunteers and Cumann na nGaedheal Education Minister from 1922 to 
1925. He had supported the Treaty in the aftennath of the independence struggle and 
finally won a seat for the pro-Treaty Cumann na, nGaedheal Party in County Mayo 29 9 
in the far west of Ireland, a seat he held until 1932. Tierney was active in Cumann na 
nGaedheal in the twenties, particularly on committees concerned with economic 
policies. 
Ile was an early member of the Army Comrades Association and, along with Blythe, 
encouraged O'Duffy to become the leader. Tierney suggested the name 'Fine Gael' 
for the new coalition between his party, the Centre Party and the Blueshirts. 30 The 
25 Rev. Cahill, The Framework ofA Christian State (Dublin, 1932). 26 Terence Brown, Ireland- a Social and Cultural History 1922-79 ( Glasgow, 198 1), p. 160. 27 See article by J. Lee, 'Aspects of Corporatist Thought in Ireland' in A. Cosgrove (ed. ), Studies in 
Irish History Presented to R. Dudley Edwards. 
28 M. Manning, The Blueshirts, p. 93. 29 J. M. Regan, The Irish Counter-Revolution 1921-1936, p. 222. '0 M. Manning, The Blueshirts, p. 93. 
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name had first been used at the Irish Race Convention in 1923 .31 Tierney supported 
O'Duffy as President for Fine Gael, believing that he would provide the vigorous 
32 leadership needed to offer a credible opposition to Fianna Fail. He helped to draw 
up the Fine Gael constitution, where prominence was given to the corporatist ideas he 
had been expounding. He had previously worked on the constitution of Cumann na 
nGaedheal. 
As a politician in the new Fine Gael party, though without a seat in the Dail, his 
initial support for O'Duffy soon turned to disillusionment when he realized that the 
path that O'Duffy was taking was not the constitutional route he would prefer to 
follow. Tierney was more concerned with economic, social and political issues than 
the nationalist and constitutional issues with which O'Duffy became more concerned. 
Tierney continued his association with Fine Gael, and although he was never to hold a 
Dail seat again, he became a member of the Senate. His advocacy of corporatism led 
to his appointment by De Valera to the Government Commission on Vocational 
Organization. 33 The Commission's advocacy of a corporatist state, however, came to 
nothing. 34 
Professor Tierney came to corporatism through a study of Catholic social thought, 
and through an analysis of continental systems of corporatism, particularly those of 
Portugal and Austria. He wrote extensively on the subject35 and, as a key figure in 
Fine Gael, he was largely responsible for formulating the party's corporate policy. 
Disillusioned with the poor development of the Irish Free State both economically and 
politically, he came to the conclusion that it was the political structure inherited from 
the British that had mired politicians in discussing nationalist and constitutional issues 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. p. 98. 
33M. Cronin, The Blueshirts and Irish politics, p. 8 8. 
34 Ibid. 
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instead of the economic and social issues that he believed should be at the top of the 
political agenda. Tierney believed that the political structure of the Irish Free State 
failed to reflect the organic nature of Irish society and the need to involve the whole 
population in the democratic process. The solution he advocated was based on 
supplementing, but not replacing, the parliamentary system with syndicates based on 
a modernization of the mediaeval guild system. He intended his system to reflect the 
social thought of papal encyclicals and provide an Irish Catholic solution to the real 
issues of the day. He studded his writings with references to continental corporate 
systems, reassuring his readers that a study of these models did not mean the adoption 
of authoritarian goverment in Ireland. O'Duffy, as leader of Fine Gael, vigorously 
propagated Tierney's corporatist ideas. However, O'Duffy soon moved on to 
advocate his own of corporatism that owed more to authoritarian models than to 
Catholic social thought. 
Tierney had played an important role in the politics of the infant Free State but by 
the early nineteen-thirties he had become disillusioned with the political development 
of the nation. He believed that too much attention had been paid to constitutional and 
national issues and not enough to economic issues. One of the root causes of this, he 
believed, was the liberal-democratic political framework inherited from the British 
which he felt was not suitable for either Ireland or modem economic life. Whilst he 
did not want to alter radically the constitution, 36 he concluded that the political 
structure needed to be changed in order to provide a forum for the discussion of 
economic issues. The solution that he offered was the addition of a corporate structure 
to the existing parliamentary one. 
35 In scholarly journals such as Studies, and in Fine Gael publications such as United1reland. 36 Notes for lecture by Michael Tierney to YlA on 'The Corporate State', LA30/349, Michael Tierney 
Papers, UCD Archives. 
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Ireland's parliamentary infrastructure was, Tierney argued, unsuitable for dealing 
with crucial economic decision-making, and he wanted to create a political structure 
specifically to deal with social and economic issues: 
"We must try to get economics divorced from party politics and to have economic 
questions decided on their merits by people who know something about them, or have 
some real interest in them apart from the inspiration of political factionaliSM.,, 37 
He described the parliamentary system as un-Irish, an inheritance, like 
republicanism, from Cromwell. 38 Ile did so in order to challenge those who might 
accuse him of looking abroad for political ideas. By adding a vocational element to 
the political structure, Tierney expected a diminution in the role of parliament. But 
this would not be a threat to democracy as the state would then be organized all the 
way down, with ordinary citizens having a much greater role to play in the political 
process, and in the shaping of social and economic policy. 39 
Tierney outlined the structure that he envisaged: 
"At the base we will have the national network of vocational groups bringing 
together employer and worker, abolishing class distinctions and ensuring the fullest 
realization of social equality. At the top we will have the machinery by which these 
vocational groups will gradually take over into proper and popular control many of 
the functions now being carried out by unqualified or ill-organized bodies or 
persons. '40 
37 Ibid. 
38 Speech of Professor Tiemey to YIA 13.7.34. No title LA30/349, Michael Tiemey Papers, UCD 
Archives. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
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Tierney was concerned at the growing power of parliament, 41 which was described 
by him as "a battleground for personalities which has risen above all constitutional 
, -A2 constraints. The electoral system of proportional representation had only served to 
exacerbate party rivalries and had encouraged the proliferation of minor parties often 
representing sectional interests, and divisive politics. 43 He also opposed the current 
voting system because it was "beset by frauds, primitive mechanisms of voting, 
, -A4 propaganda and physical violence... [and it was] a mathematical extravaganza. 
At the heart of his argument for change was the idea that the rapid development of 
capitalism, which in itself had created massive social and economic problems, had left 
behind the liberal democratic system that had risen with it in the nineteenth century. 
The political system had given capitalism a free rein and this had proved a complete 
failure. Manning, summarizing Tierney's critique of capitalism, says that for Tierney, 
individualistic capitalism had led to: 
"... the partial and unequal organization of Labour; the lack of any real organization 
of productive forces, except for individual and profit-making purposes; the fact that 
the country had only an elementary system of law to regulate relations between 
employer and worker, or between both and public; the fact that great inequalities still 
existed-and this he saw as the chief source of the 'current endemic unrest'; the fact 
that a Christian society still had all the 'social sub-divisions and snobberies that were 
the hallmark of Victorian. capitalism in its hey-day. , 945 
The development of capitalism had altered the nature of society. As Tierney said: 
"The course of material development has for good or ill rendered every modem state a 
41 'Critique' by Michael Tierney of John Horgan's 'The Problems of Government', in Studies 22: 1933 
Dublin. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 M. Manning, The Blueshirts p. 220. 
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structural ly-rel ated whole. A6 This had created a need for the state to play a greater 
role in the management of the nation's economy to ensure that the whole nation 
benefits from this material progress. 47 This role was too much for parliament on its 
own, as constituted at the time. In defining this increased role for the state, Tierney 
stressed that individual rights were still sacrosanct. The structure he proposed would 
take a middle course between excessive individualism and communism: 
6" ... and consists in a recognition of the 
fact that while the individual and family are 
prior to the State and possess natural rights independent of any concessions on the 
part of the nation, yet man is a social being, even property has social obligations, the 
community has rights and obligations which have been neglected in the era of 
expanding capitaliSM., -A 
What unbridled capitalism and liberal democracy had ignored, said Tierney, was the 
organic nature of society, which should involve all citizens in the political process. 
The existing parliamentary system allowed for only limited participation by the 
majority of Irish citizens, but a corporate structure would encourage each citizen to 
"pronounce on issues within his competence. "49 In recognizing the organic nature of 
society, man recognizes the dignity of all work, and the value of all citizens. By 
organizing society on vocational lines, with a diminution of the role of parliament, 
each person, as part of the economic whole, would enjoy greater equality. Man would 
play his part through his economic contribution rather than because of a sectional 
political interest. Tierney believed that this organic unity had been all but destroyed 
over the last two centuries. The result had been the emergence of an all-powerful state 
46 Report on the party's plans to initiate a corporative or guild system through the medium of vocation 
at or economic councils by M. Tierney, LA30/350, Michael Tierney Papers, UCD Archives. 
47 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
49 United lrelant4 31 March 1934, 'Nothing Revolutionary in the Corporative System- Syndical System 
Explained', M. Tierney. 
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leaving the individual to stand in increasing isolation. " Tierney wanted to reaffirm 
the importance of the organic nature of society, and wanted the political and economic 
structure of Ireland to reflect this. Ile recognized that: 
"... the individual is in society and that society is an organic whole, and that 
therefore in the general interest the whole body of production must be treated from 
the national point of view. "51 
Tierney claimed that Ireland in the thirties was faced with the challenge of bringing 
about a state of equilibrium between the freedom of private enterprise and the 
complicated requirements of the social organism. 52 In advocating a more planned 
economy, he was keen to avoid the excesses of increased state interference. The 
solution to this lay in the corporate principle of subsidiary function, concordia 
ordinum (harmony of order), with its stress on decision-making at the lowest level 
possible. 53 The integration of vocational organizations into the political system would 
give it the organic dimension that it had previously lacked. It would take power out of 
the hands of self-seeking committees of politicians and factional parties and place it 
back with the citizens. 54 
Tierney was advocating the need to reform the political structure in order to cope 
with the needs and demands of the twentieth century. In doing so, he claimed that it 
was Pius XI's encyclical, Quadragesimo Anno, that was the leading inspiration for his 
ideas and he urged all politicians, regardless of party affiliation, to study the 
50 M. Tierney, 'Quadragesimo Anno' , LA30/349, Michael Tierney Papers, UCD Archives. 51 M. Tierney, 'Report on the party's plans to initiate a corporative or guild system through the medium 
of vocational or economic councils'. LA30/350, Michael Tierney Papers, UCD Archive. 52 Ibid. 
53 United Ireland, 31' March 1934, 'Nothing Revolutionary in the Corporate System-Syndical System 
Explained', Michael Tierney. 
"4 Speech by Michael Tierney to YlA, No title, 13'h March 1934, LA30/349, Michael Tierney Papers, 
UCD Archives. 
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document and come up with an appropriate programme for Ireland's needs. 55 Tierney 
recognized that the Pope's social programme would be carried out in different ways in 
different countries, and believed that it was the basis for Mussolini's Italian system. 56 
Tierney saw it as the Christian answer to the crisis of capitalism, and as the answer to 
the 'Bolshevik heresy. ' 57 The corporate system was, he said: 
"... in essence traditional, Christian, hierarchical while offering its freest scope to 
personality and seeking to create in action a regime in which all citizens shall enjoy 
equal dignity in work, in well-being and in suffering.,, 58 
The existing state machinery, with the increased responsibilities that it had taken 
upon itself, was inconsistent with the Pope's ideas. 59He believed that the drift towards 
parliamentary totalitarianism could only be prevented by the addition of a vocational 
structure that would take power from parliament, particularly over economic and 
social issues, and put the decision-making into the hands of the producers. 
Tierney boasted that corporatist ideas were being discussed and adopted across 
Europe, but reassured the Irish that Ireland would not come to corporatism by the 
same path as Italy, nor needed it be associated with fascism, dictatorship or 
totalitarianism. 60He saw the value of analYsing the system as it operated in other 
countries, especially where circumstances were similar to those in Ireland. However, 
whereas the situation might be similar, and here he cited Italy before the rise of 
Mussolini'61 it was not identical. He was sure that the Italian way, via dictatorship, 
55 Notes for lecture by Michael Tierney to YIA on 'The Corporate State', LA30/349, Michael Tierney 
Papers, UCD Archives. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
5" Speech of Michael Tierney to the YIA, No title, 13'h March 1934, LA30/349, Michael Tierney 
Papers, UCD Archives. 
59 M. Tierney, 'Ireland and the Reform of Democracy', Studies 23; September 1934, Dublin. 
60 Notes for Lecture by Michael Tierney to YJA on 'The Corporate State', LA30/349, Michael Tierney 
Papers, UCD Archives. 
6 'Notes for speech tot YIA, IP March 1934, LA30/349, Michael Tierney Papers, UCD archives. 
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would not be the Irish way. 62 There would be no constitutional overhaul, as in Italy, 
and no revolution. 63 Whereas Mussolini's corporatism was an Italian response to 
Italian circumstances, Ireland would come to corporatism through the constitutional 
process. The corporatist idea was not the monopoly of one country and was not tied 
up with totalitarianism or fascism. 
,, 64 Tiemey referred to corporatism as "the guild system brought up to date, which 
would reform capitalism by directing it to social ends whilst maintaining private 
enterprise. 65 The corporate system, like the mediaeval guilds, would have as its ideal: 
"... the harmony of differentiated ftinction in Society, which has always been the 
dominant ideal in sound Christian, and indeed pre-Christian, political philosophy. , 66 
Corporatism, therefore, upholds the Christian idea of hierarchy, whilst respecting all 
individuals as workers. The hierarchic state of the Middle Ages had developed into 
one where egoism, anarchy and individualism were now in control. Unless something 
was done, argued Tierney, totalitarianism would be the only way to cope with such 
anarchy. 67 In advocating corporatism, Tierney claimed that the Irish system of 
government would the be "based rather on Catholic philosophical principles than on 
the relics of the nineteenth century parliamentarian radicaliSM.,, 
68 
Tierney describes the vocational system as one whose: 
central ideas are 'autonomy and equality', but it preserves and enables the 
principles of subordination and discipline upon which the whole structure of State and 
62 M. Tierney, 'Nothing Revolutionary in the Corporative System-Syndical System Explained' United 
Ireland, 31" March 1934. 
63 M. Tierney, 'Representative Democracy only basis of Irish Government, ' United Ireland, 7 th April, 
1934. 
64 Notes for Lecture by Michael Tierney to YIA on 'The Corporate State' 1934-35, LA30/349, Michael 
Tierney Papers, UCD archives. 
65 M. Tierney, 'Report on the party's plans to initiate a corporate or guild system through the medium 
of vocational councils' LA30/350, Michael Tierney Papers, UCD Archives. 
66 Notes for Speech of Professor Tierney to YIA , No title, 13'h March 1934, LA30/349, Michael Tierney Papers, UCD, Archives. 
67 M. Tierney, 'Ireland and the Corporative State, ' United Ireland, 16 December 1933. 
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Society are built.,, 69 Because it stressed, as its core ideas, the principles of autonomy 
and equality, Tierney argued that it therefore "cannot be identified with any transient 
00 
regime of political dictatorship or nationalist egotism... 
Tierney wanted to modify the political apparatus, not radically alter it. Initially, he 
envisaged the creation of a corporation in two sections, employers and employed .71 
Once a certain percentage of workers in a trade or occupation had given their support 
to the syndicate, legal recognition would go to that body, which would then come 
under state supervision, within statutory limits. 72 The syndicate would have the right 
to speak for all members of that occupation. To avoid division, there would only be 
one syndicate for each occupation. The local branches would be supervised by a 
national corporation whose decisions would be binding on all the branches. A central 
body would supervise all the different corporations leading eventually to the creation 
of a Ministry of Corporations. 73 
At a later stage, Tierney envisaged that the Senate would be vocationally organized 
with the corporations as the electoral body, thus giving the corporations a place in 
parliament without affecting the part played in representation by universal suffrage. 74 
Tierney said that the two-fold structure would ensure that: 
"at the base we will have the national network of vocational groups, bringing 
together employer and worker, abolishing class distinctions and ensuring the fullest 
realization of social equality. 
68 M. Tierney, 'Ireland and the Reform of Democracy', Sludies: 23, September 1934 (Dublin). 
69 Notes for speech of Professor Tierney to YIA, No Title, 13'h March 1934,, LA30/349, Michael 
Tierney Papers, UCD Archives. 
') th 1 70 M. Tierney, 'Fine Gael to Adopt Pope's Social Programme', United1reland, N March 934. 
71 M. Tierney, 'Report on the party's plans to initiate a corporate or guild system through the medium 
of vocational or economic councils', LA30/350, Michael Tierney Papers, UCD Archives. 72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
74 M. Tierney, Notes for Speech to YIA, No Title, 13th March 1934, LA30/349, Michael Tierney 
Papers, UCD Archives. 
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"At the top we will have the machinery by which these vocational groups will 
gradually take over into proper and popular control many of the functions now being 
05 badly carried out by unqualified or ill-organized bodies or persons. 
In setting up the Senate as a corporative chamber, Tierney envisaged that it would 
be more than just a consultative body. 
76 He wanted a vocational Senate to have the 
right to initiate and control legislation affecting the economic life of Ireland, thereby 
separating economics from party politics. It would also have the advantage of having 
economic matters decided by experts and those involved in the occupation or industry 
concerned. It would allow farmers, businessmen and workers to defend their own 
interests, safe from government interference. 
77 It would mean parliament giving up its 
control over a number of key policy areas. 
As well as having an economic role, the corporations would also be involved in 
offering "assistance and education of a professional and national character .,, 
78 Tierney 
hoped that this would give workers a sense of responsibility. In giving greater dignity 
to the worker, the vocational system would put him on the same footing as the 
management, giving him the same social rights and duties: 
"The corporative economy ensures the solidarity of the various factions of 
production in the general intereSt. 9,79 
Optimistically, Tierney expected the abolition of class and social divisions "by 
,, 80 giving every kind of work a recognized and legally protected status. 
75 M. Tierney, 'Representative Democracy as the Basis for Government', United Ireland, Th April 
1934. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
78 M. Tierney, 'Report on party's plans to initiate a corporative or guild system through the medium of 
vocational or economic councils', LA30/350, Michael Tierney Papers, UCD Archives. 
79 Ibid. 
go Speech of Professor Tierney to YIA, No Title, 13'h March 1934, LA30/349, Michael Tierney Papers, 
UCD Archives. 
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Tierney's corporatism was a conservative attempt to deal with the economic 
problems that beset Ireland in the nineteen-thirties. Ile wanted a greater role for 
experts in economic decision-making, a reduction in union power, and a greater 
concentration on economic and social issues rather than nationalist and constitutional 
ones. His ideas for developing a second chamber on vocational lines would be 
discussed, during the nineteen thirties, across the political spectrum. For many, 
Tierney's vocational ideas, based largely on the Papal encyclicals were the acceptable 
face of corporatism, particularly amongst the conservatives who dominated Fine Gael. 
The party adopted a vocational programme as official party policy, but enthusiasm for 
the idea soon waned when Fine Gael politicians realized that it was not a vote-winner. 
Corporatism was too closely associated with fascism and authoritarianism in the 
public's mind to find widespread acceptance. 
THE CORPORATISM OFJAMES HOGAN 
James Hogan supplemented the work of Tierney on corporatism with his occasional 
contributions to the Fine Gael partyjournal. Neither Tierney nor Hogan were simply 
'constitutionalists' but were ambiguous in their views on the relative merits of liberal 
democracy and fascism. 81 The admiration of Tierney, Hogan and other Treatyites for 
authoritarianism-which miffors similar responses by elites when challenged in other 
countries, for example the Republicans in Spain- followed on from rejection by the 
electorate in two elections. Hogan was heavily influenced, like Tierney, by the Papal 
social encyclicals, to which was added a virulent hatred, and fear of communism. Ile 
was not a career politician and never held elected office. Hogan was Professor of 
81 See Bew et al, The Dynamics ofIrish Politics. 
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History at University College, Cork. 92 Ile had fought in the Irish Civil War, had 
supported the Treaty and joined Cumarm na. nGaedheal. On its formation, Hogan 
joined the Army Comrades Association and was an active member of the Blueshirts 
throughout its many manifestations. He was also a Vice-President of the Fine 
Gael/United Ireland Party. 83 He was one of the intellectuals responsible for 
introducing corporatist ideas into the A. C. A. and into Fine Gael. 84 Hogan was a 
conservative, and a constitutionalist who, alarmed at the way that O'Duffy seemed to 
be taking Fine Gael, felt compelled to resign from Fine Gael in late 1934. His 
resignation began the process which led to O'Duffy's own resignation soon after. 
Once O'Duffy had left, Hogan rejoined Fine Gael and the League Of yoUth. 85 
Hogan was heavily motivated by his fears of communism, and the development, by 
degrees, of Socialism in the Free State. He believed that there was a need to provide a 
Christian response that would satisfy the needs of the workers, and save them from 
atheistic communism. Throughout his writings this need to combat communism was 
ever present. It was an approach that held great appeal for O'Duffy, who had himself 
been involved, as Chief of Police, in monitoring communism. Hogan claimed to have 
discovered a major effort by communists to undermine the state and his work helped 
to fuel the Red Scare in the run-up to the 1932 General Election. He later wrote Could 
Ireland Become Communist? The Facts ofthe Case in 1935.86 It chronicled the rise of 
communism internationally and, also, domestically, with the emergence of the I. R. A. 
splinter party, Saor Eire. 97 The book catalogued the dangers that he believed 
communism posed, though the book did not go into any detail of how the state could 
12 M. Cronin, The Blueshirts and Irish Politics, p. 9 1. 
" Ibid. 
94 M. Manning, The Blueshirts, p. 75. 85 Ibid. pp. 186-19 1. 
96j. Hogan, Could Ireland Become Communist? The Facts ofthe Case. (Dublin, 1935). " M. Cronin, The Blueshirts and Irish Politics, p. 93. 
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tackle the communist threat. He reserved the solution to the communist problem to his 
writings in United Ireland. 
Hogan was concerned that Socialism was creeping into Irish political culture and 
that state Socialism along Soviet lines, what he termed 'Statism, ' was a real threat to 
88 Irish democracy. He argued that the faults of capitalism, which needed to be 
addressed, had caused serious class divisions, which in turn, had led to conflict and 
unrest. 89 An increase in distrust and mutual antagonism between employer and worker 
could only lead to class war, which socialists and trade unionists were only too happy 
to encourage to further their sectional ends. He saw the threat of communism as 
something on the near horizon, and urged politicians to face up to the challenge 
immediately. 90 
There was a sense of urgency in his writings. Hogan, in Could Ireland Become 
Communist? clearly stated that there was no room in Catholic Ireland for Socialism, 
in any way, shape or form: 
"Because we are apt to think of ourselves as very different from the people of other 
countries we are inclined to imagine that it is possible for us to reconcile what in their 
case we are prepared to admit as irreconcilable. Rather than abandon some cherished 
hope or give up some pet theory, there will be people to say: 'We will show in Ireland 
it is possible to be a Socialist without ceasing to be a Catholic. ' The present Pope in 
his great and profoundly meditated Encyclical Quadragesimo Anno, has summed up 
and answered that question in the following words: 'If, like all effors, Socialism 
contains a certain element of truth, it is nevertheless founded upon a doctrine of 
human society peculiarly its own, which is truly opposed to true Christianity. 
"Religious Socialism", "Christian Socialism", are expressions implying a 
's J. Hogan, 'A Safe Alternative to 'Statism, " United Ireland, 2 nd June 1934. 
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contradiction in terms. No one can be at the same time a sincere Catholic and a true 
Socialist. "'91 
In order to be able to challenge communism effectively, workers and employers 
would need to be organized, and capitalism would need to be supervised. In effect, a 
restructuring of society was needed. However, the move towards a new, organic 
corporate structure, which was what Hogan was advocating as a Christian bulwark 
against the threat from the left, could not come about through increasing state power. 
This would only play into the hands of those he tcrtned the 'Statists. ' Moreover, 
setting up the corporate structure from the top down, as in totalitarian states, was alien 
to the Catholic concept of society. 92 Hogan's form of corporatism would lead to the 
devolution of power, not an increase in state control. 93 Like Tierney, Hogan argued 
that corporatism had nothing to do with authoritarianism or totalitarianism, but that it 
followed a middle course between individualism and communism, thus reconciling 
the conflicting claims of collective and individual life. This would provide Ireland 
with the unity, peace and stability that it so desperately needed. Hogan claimed: 
"The truth of the matter is the corporate form of society is not wedded to any 
particular form of government, whether by kingship, democracy or oligarchy. , 94 
Hogan was opposed to both individualism and communism, which he believed erred 
against Catholic teaching. 95 The corporative system would avoid "the competitive 
9996 anarchy of capitalism and the slavery of bureaucratic communism. Corporatism 
would reflect the organic nature of society, recognizing that the individual in society, 
89 James Hoggan, 'University Support for Corporative Policy', United Ireland, 19 'h May 1934. 
90 Ibid. 
91 James Hogan, cited by M. Cronin, The Blueshirts and Irish Politics, p. 93, from Hogan, j., Could 
Ireland Become Communist? (Dublin, 1935), p. 137. 
92 James Hoggan, 'Production to be Brought Under Discipline. A New structure of Society. Devolution C, 
of Power. ' United Ireland, 26" May 1934. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Quoted by M. Manning, The Blueshirls, p. 227, from United1reland, 2 nd June 1934. 
9' James Hogan, 'The Need for Vocational Org 1h 
.,, 
anizations', Uniledlrelan4 4 October 1933. 
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could only fulfil his full potential as a participant in society, which should be treated 
by politicians as an organic whole. For Hogan, corporatism represented "the civil 
equivalent of Christian theology,,. )97 with universal validity, hence its acceptance 
across Europe. Hogan summarized his approach to corporatism: 
"We mean by a Corporative Society, a society in which the fwnily, the 
occupational group, the State, each having its own sphere of influence and creativity, 
would nevertheless be organically linked to each other by the fact that all would tend 
to the same social ends, namely, the highest possible development of the individual 
,, 98 within society. 
This did not imply "the corporatizing of the entire life of the nation"99as the 
Christian corporatist state clearly, for Hogan, distinguished between factional state 
politics and social-economic politics. ' 00 The corporate state, on the contrary, 
"develops the individual and harmonizes"101 it with higher interests, but never absorbs 
it. Unlike bureaucratic Socialism the corporate state would "stress the creative note of 
personality in the service of society as opposed to the soulless and impersonal 
collectivism of Socialism, "' 02 which denies the rights of individuals and society. By 
eliminating conflict and promoting unity by ensuring the "solidarity of the various 
factions of production in the general interest, " 103 the corporatist state would also be 
able to fulfil the nationalist idea of unity. Hogan was wary of Irish nationalism. He 
said that in Ireland, as elsewhere, "an idolatrous nationalism is only too often a cloak 
for the ugly reality of class war. "104 By overcoming the antithesis of capital and 
96 Ibid. 
97 James Hogan, 'University Support for Corporativism', United Ireland, 19'h May 1934. 
98 James Hogan, Ibid. 
99 James Hogan, 'A Safe Alternative to 'Statism. " United Ireland, 2 nd June 1934. 
100 Ibid. 
10' Ibid. 
102 James Hogan, 'The Need for Vocational Corporations', United Ireland, 4 1h October 1934. 
'O'James Hogan, 'The Formation of Economic Corporations', United/reland, 21' October 1933. 104 Hogan quoted by M. Manning, The Blueshirts, p. 226, from United1reland I 91h May 1934. 
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labour, by raising the nation above the divisions of class, the national ideal could be 
105 
realized, rescuing the nation at the same time from nationalist 'Statists' , such as 
Saor Eire, and their allies (that is, De Valera, the IRA, and the trade union 
movement). 
Hogan and Tierney had very similar ideas, but Hogan went into more detail in 
describing the corporate structure he envisaged. In both, the corporations would be the 
basis of a planned economy. 106 Hogan saw the corporatization of economic life as a 
natural development of economic activity, if it was to be directed to a "rational, just, 
profitable end. "' 07 The rapid economic development of the industrial revolution and 
beyond had made modem states a structurally inter-related whole, 108 and it was 
therefore necessary for the state to coordinate economic activity so that the whole 
nation would benefit. 
Like Tierney, he envisaged that there would be two separate organizations for 
workers and employers to begin with, to avoid any initial difficulties. They would be 
united in a federation under a joint supervisory council with equal representation. Any 
disagreements between the two subsidiary organizations would go to a labour court, 
which would have the power to make binding decisions. 109 The role of the 
corporations would be to maintain just and fixed prices and wages, regulate 
apprenticeships, uphold quality, promote mutual aid, and make provisions for 
holidays and insurance. " 0 It was expected that the coordination of production at a 
national level would lead to wage and price stability and significantly reduce 
unemployment. Hogan stated that a corporation would require a certain percentage of 
105 Jannes Hogan, ' The Formation of Economic Corporation, ' United Ireland, October 21 " 1934. 
106 James Hogan, 'University Support for Corporative Policy', United1reland, I 91h may 1934. 107 Ibid. 
log James Hogan, 'The Need for Vocational Corporations', United Ireland, 4 th October, 1 934. 
109 James Hogan, 'Production to be Brought Under Discipline', United Ireland, 26" May 1934. 
110 Ibid. 
211 
212 
the workforce in a particular trade to join before it was legally recognized, but 
suggested a low figure of only twenty per cent. ' 11 There would only be one legally 
recognized corporation for each category. Once legally recognized, the corporations 
would come under state supervision, but he expected them to function democratically. 
However, in cases of mal-administration, or breaches of the law, the state would have 
the authority to intervene. 112 These local corporations would in turn come under a 
National Economic Council for that trade, occupation or industry. 113 
The corporate structure would assist parliament, but would "relieve parliament of a 
multitude of matters which it was never designed to transact. "' 14 The second house, 
suggested Hogan, might be developed into a corporative, or economic, 
parliament. ' "Corporatism would serve the task of healing the breach between 
economics and politics caused by the political divisions associated with 
parliamentarianism. 116 Hogan predicted that a Department of State would be 
necessary to supervise the corporations. 117 Hogan recognized that the powers of the 
corporations and their relationship to a vocational senate would have to be discussed 
at some length. Personally, Hogan believed that the vocational councils "should have 
the power to draft a Bill and have it brought before Parliament, and Parliament could 
refer a Bill to them for report. "' 18 The root argument, for Hogan, was that the 
technical, vocational councils that he envisaged were more suitable, and competent, 
than Parliament to deal with social and economic matters. 
1" James Hogan, 'The Formation of Economic Corporations', United Ireland, 21" October 1934. 
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This functional, or economic democracy, with its expected wealth of expertise and 
skill, would complete the democratic process in Ireland, put a much needed brake on 
the bureaucratisation of politics, and lead to the devolution of power. Its regulation of 
the economy would "introduce a degree of regulation to ensure an equilibrium 
between the freedom of private enterprise and the complicated requirements of the 
social system. "' 191t would restore to the community those rights and obligations that 
had been neglected with the rise of unfettered capitalism, 120 by tempering the 
spontaneity of private enterprise for social ends. 121 The multiplicity and division of 
powers implied in a mixed economy would correct the excesses of increased state 
control and unbridled capitalism. 122 However, for Hogan the most important result of 
adopting corporatism would be to heal the class divisions that threatened to lead to 
class war and the rise of Socialism and communism. For Hogan, it was the urgency of 
the communist threat that necessitated the immediate addition of vocational bodies to 
the government structure. 
FINE GAEL AND CORPORA TISM 
For a short time, from] 933 to 1935, the second largest political party in Ireland 
adopted corporatism as a central plank of its policy platfonn in order to improve its 
chances of winning power. 123 These vocational ideas were introduced into the Fine 
Gael alliance by intellectuals associated with the Blueshirts, who had been advocating 
124 corporatism since July 1933 . The 
intellectuals, principally Tierney and Hogan, had 
enormous influence, especially considering the small corpus of work these men 
"9 James Hogan, 'The Need for Vocational Corporation's, United lrelan, ý 4, h October 1933. 
120 Ibid. 
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produced. 125 Whilst there was strong support from the intellectuals in the party for 
these ideas, they failed to win widespread support from the grass-roots membership 
who found the ideas foreign and irrelevant. The intellectuals looked to Europe and 
specifically Catholic thinkers for their inspiration. Once O'Duffy had left the alliance, 
the party quickly reverted to policies that were almost indistinguishable from those of 
the earlier Cumann na nGaedheal party. 
The Blueshirt constitution that was adopted shortly after O'Duffy took over as 
leader in July 1933 contained a clause advocating the adoption of vocationalism and 
the creation of a corporate state structure. 126 O'Duffy made it a precondition of 
Blueshirt membership of the Fine Gael alliance that the new party would adopt 
corporatism as official party policy. 127 The foundation of Fine Gael sparked off a 
great deal of interest in corporatist ideas and their possible application to Irish politics. 
The committee set up to draw up the new party's constitution was under the 
chairmanship of Michael Tierney. James Hogan also sat on the same policy 
committee. It was an attempt by a number of intellectuals within the party to give Fine 
Gael the ideological base that its predecessor, Cumann an nGaedheal, clearly lacked. 
Drawing their inspiration largely from the Papal encyclicals, they were trying to put 
their stamp on the new organization, and at the same time establish the role of the 
Blueshirts within the new organization. For the Blueshirts "it was a way to integrate 
the movement in the state machine" as a unifon-ned state auxiliary. 128This was not 
officially stated in the new party constitution but it was taken as a given by Blueshirts 
entering the new coalition. 129 
124j. M . Regan, The Irish Counter-Revolution 1921-1936, (Gill and Macmillan: Dublin, 1999) p. 337. 125 M. Cronin, 'Putting New Wine into Old Bottles, ' p. 96. 126 Ibid, p. 337. 127 Ibid, p. 352. 128 J. Regan, The Irish Counter-Revolution 1921-36, p. 352. 129 Ibid. p353. 
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The Fine Gael party politicians and the party journal, United Ireland, promoted 
corporatist ideas, though some Fine Gael leaders such as Blythe, FitzGerald, O'Duffy 
and O'Higgins were more vocal than others in its advocacy. 130 Articles advocating 
corporatism appeared on a weekly basis in the Fine Gael party newspaper, and were 
devoted to promoting corporatism, commenting on its progress abroad, and detailing 
how it could be implemented in Ireland. The titles of some of the articles are worth 
perusing as an indication of their general content and as an indication of Fine Gael's 
policy direction: 
'The need for vocational corporations-limitations of Parliamentary Democracy. 
Antithesis of Socialism. ' 131 
'The formation of economic corporations. A uniform pattern not desirable. Industrial 
Courts with final jurisdiction needed. ' 132 
'The need for economic corporations-abolition of class conflict-Popular confidence in 
the State-Failure of laissez-faire. ' 133 
'Vocational groups-Fine Gael's policy in harmony with Papal Encyclical. Pope 
condemns individualism. ' 134 
'Production to be brought under discipline-A new structure of society. Devolution of 
power. v 
135 
'Editorial-Corporative system and labour. ' 136 
'The brave, new Ireland of tomorrow. What an Irish Corporative System might mean. 
Humanizing national economic life. ' 137 
"0 M. Manning, The Blueshirls, p. 230. 
131 United Ireland, "The Need for Vocational Corporations', 4h October 1933. 
132 United Ireland, 'The fon-nation of economic corporations', 21" October 1933. 
133 UnitedIreland The need for economic corporations', 6 th January 1934. 134 United Ireland, 'Vocational groups', I O'h March 1934. 135 United Ireland, 'Production to be brought under discipline', 26'h May 1934. 
136 United1reland, Editorial', 301h June 1934. 
137 United Ireland, 'The Brave New Ireland of Tomorrow', I" September 1934. 
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' Machinery and Spirit in the Corporate State. Effecting the transformation of political 
activity. Greater harmony and happiness. ' 138 
' To end bitter party strife. The political outlook formed during the Civil War. New 
alignments under Corporate System. ' 139 
' An Irish corporate system, Catholic principles the essential element of foundation. 
Importance of the Pope's encyclical. ' 140 
' P. R. and 'Corporative system. ' The possibilities of non-party Government. 
Dictatorship unnecessary. ' 141 
Blueshirt publications gave even greater space to promoting Fine Gael's corporatist 
ideas, and the national press devoted considerable column inches to the subject in 
response to Fine Gael's policy stance. This included giving considerable space to 
reporting the speeches of Fine Gael politicians on the subject. 
The policy committee on the party constitution, which reported to the National 
Executive of Fine Gael in November 1934, initially adopted a clause that committed 
the party to a corporate political structure, without going into detail concerning its 
organization or implementation. 142 The party declared that they would adopt as part of 
their policy: 
"... the planning of our national economic life with a view to increased 
industrialized efficiency and harmony by the organization of industrial corporations 
with statutory powers, assisted by industrial courts and functioning under the 
guidance of a national economic council. " 143 
"8 UnitedIreland, Nachinery and Spirit of the Corporative State', 15 th September 1934. 
139 United Ireland, To End Bitter Party Strife', 22 nd September 1934. 
140 United Ireland, 22 nd September 1934. 'An Irish Corporative System' 
141 United Ireland, 2nd February 1935. PR. and 'Corporative System, ' 
142 J. M. Regan, The Irish Counter-Revolution 1921-1936, p. 352. 
143 As cited in K. Mullarkey, 'Ireland, the Pope and Vocationalism, 'p. I 11, Ed. Joost Augusteijn, 
Ireland in the 1930s (Four Courts Press: Dublin, 1999). 
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It was the speech by General O'Duffy at the party Ard Fheis in February 1934 that 
gave substance to the ideas. The party published the speech as "An Outline of the 
Political, Social and Economic Policy of Fine Gael (United Ireland). " The speech was 
shot through with references to the underlying vocational ideas of men like Tierney 
and Hogan. It meant a sea-change for the party coalition, committing them to a whole 
new political agenda that would "turn its back on the philosophy of individualism and 
State intervention and follow instead a philosophy of complete involvement and 
representation for all in society, most specifically in their respective sphere of 
economic interest. " 144 The speech detailed the specific working of the vocational 
system, which O'Duffy called a "Christian Social Programme. 91 145 The programme, 
based largely on the ideas of the Papal encyclicals clearly looked to the continent for 
its inspiration. Placing their corporatism in a European context, United Ireland 
declared: 
"We are Europeans and obviously continental philosophies will affect us here. 
Fascism and Bolshevism are in a conflict we cannot avoid, and we will have to 
embrace one of the two, but as Irishmen there cannot be any doubt about what our 
choice will be. "146 
O'Duffy reiterated his commitment to corporatism in his speech to the Blueshirt 
Congress in August 1934. In reviewing the corporatist policy of Fine Gael, O'Duffy 
proudly claimed that it was this idea that: 
"... we brought with us as our chief contribution to the policy of the united 
organization, and which was unanimously accepted and which is now the chief plank 
in the policy of Fine Gael for the rehabilitation of Ireland. "147 
144 M. Cronin, The Blueshirts and Irish Politics, p-82- 
145 Ibid, p. 82. 
146 United Ireland, 3 February 1934, 'The New Democracy'. 
147 O'Duffy quoted in M. Manning, The Blueshirts, p. 14 L 
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Following the party Ard Fheis in February 1934, O'Duffy toured the country 
promoting the party's corporatism. He made two key speeches, one at Kildare on 25 th 
February and one at Sligo on II th March, which Fine Gael published in its policy 
series. 148 These two publications summarize the corporatist ideas of Fine Gael. 
In his 1934 Ard Reis speech, O'Duffy put corporatism at the very centre of Fine 
Gael's programme. The party called for the restructuring of Irish society along 
corporate lines. He presented the new policy as a distinctly Irish system, opposed to 
the individualism and state interventionism inherited from Britain, and promoted by 
De Valera and Fianna Fail. 149 The s; ystem was sold as Ireland's alternative to 
communism, in line with Papal social thought, with the aim of uniting Irishmen and 
women in a system that would guarantee liberty and make them able to "serve the 
actual needs and fill the actual economic conditions of Irish life. "150 O'Duffy claimed 
to be championing the cause of the workers, declaring in a speech at Sligo on II th 
March 1934 that he had "an appreciation of the position of the working man, "' 51 and 
claimed that the Blueshirts themselves were a "workingmen's association, " 152 whose 
members were "farmer's sons and labourers, many of them unemployed. " 153 
The Ard Fheis speech reflected Tierney's corporatist ideas to the letter. Workers' 
and employers' associations would combine in a Federation which would elect 
members to a National Economic Council. Strikes and lockouts would be made 
illegal. Any disputes between the associations would be dealt with by an impartial 
Industrial Court whose decisions would be binding on all parties. The speech 
14' E. O'Duffy, The Labour Policy offine Gael, (Fine Gael Policy Series, no. 2: Dublin, 1934). 
149 E. O'Duffy, An Outline of the Political, Social and Economic Policy of Fine Gael, (Fine Gael Policy 
Series no. 1: Dublin, 1934). 
150 Ibid. p. 13. 
"'Quoted in E. Broderick, 'The Corporate Policy of Fine Gael, ' in Irish Historical Studies; 29 May 
1994. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Ibid. 
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predicted the withering away of political parties, as they would be a meaningless 
encumbrance to the new arrangement. The corporations would work out policies 
which the Dail, representing the 'National Interest, ' would pass. 154 Fine Gael put 
agriculture at the centre of Ireland's economic development, and the source of 
Ireland's wealth, and recognized that, as a result of its key economic role, the 
agricultural corporation would be the most powerful. 155 
As Cronin describes it: "The Christian Social Programme, as O'Duffy called it, was 
a completely new departure for Irish PolitiCS.,, 156 As a new policy, the party was 
careful to put it into a context likely to appeal to a traditional, rural, nationalist and 
Catholic electorate. O'Duffy said: 
"If you read my Kildare speech, in so far as it dealt with labour policy, you will see 
that what we are about to do is to establish on lines suited to Irish needs and 
conditions the kind of vocational organizations which the present pope has 
recommended as necessary to stand between the individual and the state 
machinery. "' 57 
The stress in Fine Gael's corporatism was on reforming capitalism by instituting 
some form of planning to economic life and protecting the worker from the excesses 
of capitalism and the threat from extremist alternatives, thus "... it will save us from 
communism and bring order out of chaos ... it will preserve private property. " 
158 
O'Duffy could not let go of the bogey of communism, even though since the Red 
Scare of 1932 there had been no discernable increase in communist activity in Ireland. 
In response to accusations of fascism from the left, O'Duffy and Fine Gael were at 
pains to deny that corporatism meant totalitarianism, though O'Duffy did not flinch 
154 Ibid. 
"5 Ibid. 
156 M. Cronin, The Blueshirts and Irish Politics, p. 83. 157 O'Dufry speech at Sligo, I Ith March 1934, The Labourpolicy ofFine Gael. 
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from admitting that Mussolini's corporatist organization was the model that the party 
looked to for inspiration. At Kildare, O'Duffy had admitted that the Fine Gael 
"corporate system [was] modelled roughly on that which is giving good results in 
Italy. "' 59 The policy, O'Duffy argued, was based on foreign examples but adapted to 
Irish needs. 160 The party j ournal, however, was not averse to publishing book titles for 
readers to build up their knowledge of corporatism. United Ireland suggested that 
readers might like to consult The Universal Aspects ofFascism by W. J. S. Barnes, The 
Italian Corporate Slate by F. Pitigliani, The Economic Foundations ofFascism by A 
Einzig, and The Working ofa Corporative State by RE Good and M. Currey. 161 
Fine Gael was not advocating a statist form of corporatism, thus reflecting the ideas 
of Hogan. The system it was offering the electorate, whilst radical, focused on the fact 
that it was partly autonomous and partly under state regulation. Fine Gael claimed that 
its societal form of corporatism would reduce the role of the state, though it is difficult 
how to see how this was possible given the economic history of the Free State to that 
point. State interference had been minimal, in comparison to what the party was now 
advocating. For O'Duffy, the programme he was promoting as leader of Fine Gael 
was the corporatist minimum. He was not an intellectual himself, and relied on others 
to provide the theories and policies he was to advocate. It would not be long before he 
found the corporatist minimum of Fine Gael was not radical enough and that statist 
corporatism was, for him, the answer to Ireland's ills. 
Fine Gael's adoption of corporatism elicited a hostile response from other political 
groups. Earlier, its adoption as Blueshirt policy caused Senator Thomas Johnson of 
the Labour Party to announce: 
15' O'Duffy speech at Kildare 25'h February 1934, The Labour Policy of Fine Gael. 
'59 Ibid. 
'60 O'Dufry speech at Sligo, II th March 1934, The Labour Policy of Fine Gael. 
161 Unitedireland, 15 September 1934, 'Books on the Corporative System-Educating Public Opinion. ' 
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"We had a number of declarations ... all deliberately I think ... to spread the idea 
abroad that the National Guard under the leadership of General O'Duffy was a new 
Fascist organization, a new Hitlerite organization, with Irish associations. " 162 
The Irish labour Party and Irish TUC distributed a pamphlet, A Manifesto Against 
Fascism, to the public outside Connolly railway station in May 1934. The document 
stated that the pronouncements on labour by members of Fine Gael "constitute a 
grave danger to the free existence of trade unions as well as pointing to the overthrow 
of democratic government. " 163 They declared that the aim of the corporate state was: 
"To replace Trade Unions, puppet organizations will be established with 
constitutions and rules drafted by the Government, who will appoint the officers and 
control their policy ... Here is the graveyard of civil liberty. " 
164 
In its fourth Annual Report, the Labour Party devoted considerable space to what it 
termed "The Menace of Fascism. " 165 The report stressed the seeming ambivalence of 
the Blueshirts and Fine Gael as to the source of their ideas, sometimes admitting, 
sometimes denying, that the main source of their corporatism was continental 
fascism. 166 The Labour Party highlighted the position of the corporatists when it came 
to the unemployed, denying the man his dole, the determination of wages by the state, 
and an end to the strike power. The document also warns that the adoption of the 
Blueshirt/Fine Gael programme would lead to a "... Fascist state from which 
individual liberty and representative government will have disappeared. " 167 
162 Senator Thomas Johnson, Seanad Eireann Debates. xvii, 1165,2"d August 1933. National Archives 
of Ireiand, 
163 Manifesto issuedjointly by the Administrative Council ofthe Irish Labour Party and the National 
F-recutive ofthe Irish TUC, May 6h 1934. 164 Ibid. 
165 Report of the Administrative Council of the Irish labour Partyfor the Year 1933-34. 
166 Ibid. 
161 Ibid. 
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In the light of the opposition to the new policy of Fine Gael, the key question is 
how deep was the new party's commitment to corporatist ideas? The party felt the 
need for a clear ideological identity, which the vocational ideas of Tierney and others 
seemed to provide. The corporatist ideas attracted a few new members to the party 
and to the Blueshirt movement, but failed to have a large-scale effect on recruitment, 
as evidenced by the declining number of party branches after the adoption of a 
corporatist programme. 168 It is clear that the adoption of corporatist ideas was the 
work of a core group of enthusiasts and intellectuals who had entered the coalition on 
the proviso that their vocational ideas become official policy. Traditional 
conservatives in the party such as Cosgrave gave lip service to the ideas, but little 
more. After the departure of O'Duffy, even the Blueshirts under Cronin gradually let 
the corporatist ideas slip away, though continuing to advocate corporatism for a short 
time after it was dropped as Fine Gael policy at the party Ard Fheis on 21" March 
1935.169 This in itself is indicative of the tensions and splits within the Fine Gael 
coalition on an ideological level. Its speedy abandonment by Fine Gael reveals that 
the ideas failed to win large-scale support amongst rank and file members, or in 
Ireland as a whole. For most members of the party the issue was an academic one that 
had little relevance for them. Frank MacDermott, who had united his Centre Party 
with the Blueshirts and Cumann na nGeadheal, had never promoted corporatism, and 
on the exit of O'Duffy he criticized Fine Gael, which he was soon to leave, for 
adopting corporatist ideas which he called "flirting with fascism. " 170 O'Duffy, once 
he had resigned from the party, was scathing in his attacks on Fine Gael, not least for 
their lukewarm advocacy of corporatism, which he believed they did not take 
168 A Cronin, The Blueshirts and Irish Politics, p. 104. 169 J. M. Regan, The Irish Counter-Revolution 1921-1936, p. 370. 
'"The Blueshirt, g1h December 1934, 'Editorial. ' 
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seriously. 17 1 The Blueshirt published an article on Fine Gael's luke-wann attitude to 
the subject, declaring that Fine Gael politicians had paid little heed to the corporate 
policy of the party: 
"The policy did not advance. It was stifled by minor policies, but these are hardly 
more important than the nation's welfare in defeating anarchism and communism. " 
172 
The departure of O'Duffy, and the end to vocational policies by the party, meant 
that Fine Gael "retreated back into the ideological void of Cumann na nGaedheal. " 
173 
The corporatism of Fine Gael had not inspired the electorate to return a Fine Gael 
government, and with the departure of the Blueshirt faction and its enthusiasm for the 
idea, Fine Gael reverted to a more traditional conservative political platform. The lack 
of any new ideas, and the stigma of its flirtation with corporatism, which increasingly 
was equated with European-wide totalitarianism, would condemn Fine Gael to years 
in the political wilderness. This leads to a discussion of the corporatist ideas of Ernest 
Blythe, who had little influence on Fine Gael, but enormous influence on O'Duffy in 
advocating a statist form of corporatism. 
"HE CORPORATIST PR OGRA MME OF ERNEST BLYTHE 
IMest Blythe took the corporatist ideas of Tierney and Hogan and created his own 
licies and programmes, schemes and frameworks. A leading light in the Blueshirt 
ivement from its earliest days, Blythe came to believe that the corporatization of 
and would depend on the Blueshirts for its implementation. O'Duffy came to 
'pt Blythe's corporatist ideas over those of Tierney and Hogan, and when he 
- Manning, The Blueshirts, p. 230. 
,e Blueshirt, 20th October 1934, 'The Blueshirts and the Corporative System. ' 
4. Regan, The Irish Counter-Revolution 1921-1936, p. 370. 
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created his own political organization independent of Fine Gael, it was Blythe's ideas 
that formed the bedrock of NCP policy, even though Blythe himself remained within 
Fine Gael. Blythe had taken the ideas of the party's corporatist intellectuals and added 
a political dimension of his own. He turned these ideas into a detailed plan for the 
new corporate structure which he came to believe would largely replace the existing 
parliamentary structure. It would depend on the Blueshirts being given, and 
maintaining, a key role in Irish political life. Speaking at Newbliss, Co. Monaghan, on 
June 29th 1934, Blythe stated that the Blueshirts were notjust a temporary part of the 
Fine Gael election machine, but that once the party was elected to government they 
would be as much a part of the State as the Civic Guards or the National Army. In 
carrying out the corporate policy of O'Duffy, they would change the country just as 
much as Sinn Fein had after 1918.174 
Blythe, as a key figure in the new Fine Gael coalition, devoted much of his time, as 
a career politician, to articulating the ideas of others into practical party programmes. 
He was able to take the ideas and then adapt them. He had accepted corporatism as 
Blueshirt policy and enthusiastically promoted it as the practical implementation of 
the Papal social encyclical, Quadragesimo Anno. Gradually, his corporatism moved in 
a more authoritarian, statist direction that distanced himself, and O'Duffy, from men 
such as Tierney and Hogan. It was a direction that could be perceived as fascist. A 
number of key documents written by Blythe reveal this drift in direction. They are: 
175 'The Heads of Policy' , outlining Fine Gael's political programme, 'Preliminary 
Notes on Planned Economics', 176 a 'Memo on Vocational Corporations', 1 77'Notes on 
174 Irish Times, 30'h June 1934. 
175 Emest Blythe, Heads of Policy, Emest Blythe Papers P/24/677, UCD Archives. 
176 Emest Blythe, Preliminary Notes on Planned Economics, EmestBlythe Papers, P/24/678, UCD 
Archives. 
177 Emest Blythe, Memo on Vocational Corporations, Emest Blythe Papers, P124/679, UCD Archives. 
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the Idea of Vocational Corporations as Recognized by the Present Pope, ' 178 and 'An 
Agricultural Corporation. ' 179Together, the documents outline a plan for the 
corporatization of Irish political life that Fine Gael would reject, but which was 
enthusiastically taken up by O'Duffy, his Blueshirt faction and later, his National 
Corporate Party. 
The development of capitalism and the piecemeal interference by the state to 
remedy injustices and alleviate problems was for Blythe, as for many corporatists, the 
starting point of his argument for the need for corporatism. He argued that there was a 
need for an economic plan, under the supervision of corporatist organizations, to 
overcome the chaos into which capitalism was developing. In his 'Preliminary Notes 
on Planned Economics, '180 he argued the case for a planned economy in which 
agriculture, which he described as an industry, would play the central role. Ile saw 
"the vital necessity of a comprehensive economic plan embracing all forms of 
economic activity... "' 81 He was realistic enough to recognize that Ireland, as a small 
nation, could not compete internationally when it came to industry. Ile hoped that the 
industrial base he envisaged, built on the foundation of agriculture, would offer "the 
complete supply of the needs of the home market, "' 82 though this in itself was tied up 
with the purchasing power of the agricultural sector. The need for a regulated price 
for agricultural produce was given as one of the reasons for the need for a planned 
economy. A planned economy would also move agriculture away from subsistence 
farming to production for the national good, a policy bound to appeal to larger and 
medium-sized farmers than to the smallholders of the west of Ireland, thus appealing 
'7s Ernest Blythe, Notes on the Idea of Vocational Corporations as Recognized by the 'Present Pope, ' 
Emest Blythe Papers, P/24/68 1, UCD Archives. 
179 Emest Blythe, An Agricultural Corporation, Emest Blythe Papers, P/24680 (b), UCD Archives. 
180 Emest Blythe, Preliminary Notes on Planned Economics, Emest Blythe Papers P/24/678, UCD 
Archives. 
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to the traditional voters of the Fine Gael coalition. Such a policy could only be 
achieved through central economic planning, which would also require strict 
supervision and control of imports. The long-term effects of such a policy would be to 
consolidate agriculture as the major source of Ireland's wealth in order to lay the 
foundations for industrial production for domestic use rather than export. It was this 
autarkic strain in Blythe's thought that led him to stress the need for the state "to 
produce as much of our annual requirements as is economically possible. " 183 
Central to the planned economy were the vocational councils that the party 
proposed "for the purpose of organizing more intelligently and harmoniously the 
industrial life of the country. " 184 Blythe enthusiastically advocated the creation of a 
corporate structure to take on some of the burdens of an increasingly complex 
economic system: 
"The object of the Vocational Corporations contemplated in the policy 
memorandum will be to provide a means whereby the Government or a Department 
of State may ascertain the views of a particular industry taken as a whole. They Mll 
also serve to provide conciliation machinery between employers and employed. The 
Vocational Corporations ought in operation to lead to greater efficiency in industry by 
settling in a reasonable and considered way many things that are now left unsettled or 
even decided in a more or less haphazard way. "] 85 
The Memo on Vocational Corporations articulated the ideas of Tierney and Hogan 
in a practical programme, and their ideas run through the entire document. The 
development of the vocational system was to be gradual and flexible, initially with 
sections for employer and employed, organized on vertical lines with all members of 
182 Ibid. 
183 Ibid. 
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the same industry, irrespective of trade, in one corporation. 186 National corporations 
would include all sectors of the industry and reflect the geographical distribution of 
the trade. 187 Government-appointed consultants representing the public would attend 
meetings of the National Council of the Corporations, advising and tending 
information. 188 The Government would consult the corporations when relevant 
legislation arose, whilst the corporation itself might prepare legislation for 
Government debate. 189Corporations would deal with matters of pay, conditions of 
work and insurance and a judicial body would settle disputes arising between workers 
and management. 190 Blythe, like Tierney and Hogan was advocating a form of 
corporatism very much in line with the Papal encyclicals, with their stress on 
corporations as adjuncts to the state. Blythe was moving on however, and this 
document was his baseline. In future Blythe was to move away from this corporatist 
minimum and fall more in line with the corporatism of Mussolini. 
In 'Notes on the Idea of Vocational Corporations as Recommended by the Present 
Pope', 191 Blythe continued to elaborate on the Tierney-Hogan corporate line. He 
stressed the urgent need to develop the Vatican's social programme in order to 
prevent the "soul-destroying absolutism of communism" 192 taking root in Ireland. Ile 
continued to stress the need for flexibility and gradualness, but he had also moved on 
in his ideas. Ile began to stress that the National Corporations would be more 
representative of the workforce than parliamentary government and to this end, all 
186 Ibid. 
187 Ibid. 
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workers would have to join a vocational body. He spoke of an end to party politics as 
the new structure: 
"... would do away with the necessity for the formation of political parties 
representing particular classes of economic interests. Once the corporations were 
established it would in fact become necessary that the parliament should represent, in 
all cases, the 'National Interest. ' Of course, the establishment of the corporations 
would relieve parliament of many functions. " 193 
Parliament's role would significantly change under this form of corporatism, acting 
as little more than a sounding board of a vaguely defined national interest, and 
reduced to a ratifying chamber. In a speech at Middleton, County Cork, Blythe 
referred to the parliamentary system as "kangaroo democracy. "194 The shift was clear. 
Blythe was advocating that the role of the corporations would be less supportive and 
more directive. He envisaged a*corporative structure where the corporations would 
have the key role and where an end to the party political process was encouraged. 
'An Agricultural Corporation' 195 not only gave a detailed outline of the 
implementation of corporatism and its specific structure, but significantly gave the 
Blueshirts the key role in ensuring its continued success. Cronin noted this change of 
emphasis: 
"This document demonstrates that Blythe is applying his intellectual ideas in a 
different way to Tierney and the others ... Blythe was the most committed Blueshirt of 
all the intellectuals and it is possible to argue, the intellectual steering most closely to 
fascism. Blythe's thinking, and the use of the Blueshirts, goes far beyond an Irish 
'9' Ibid. 
194 Blythe speaking at Middleton Co. Cork, quoted in Republican Congress, 2 June 1934, 'What 
Fascism Means. ' 
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adaptation of Quadragesimo Anno. Blythe is using the encyclical as a basis for ideas 
that will lead to Blueshirt control of all spheres of life. " 196 
'An Agricultural Corporation' 197 is Blythe's detailed plan for a vocational system, 
using agriculture as the main example. The tone of the document is more prescriptive 
than his previous expositions of the corporate idea, and he stressed a central role for 
the National Guard from the very first paragraph: 
"l) It is doubtful if any guild or corporation which would be a valuable addition to 
the Governmental and economic machinery of the state could be established and run 
without the cooperation of a voluntary disciplined public service organization like the 
National Guard again become non-political. "198 
The corporatism he was now advocating was built on a pyramid structure, beginning 
at the parish level and extending through district council, county councils and 
constituency councils to the national level. 'Blythe believed that such an electoral 
structure would ensure that: 
"... no farmer could reach the national council unless he was a man in whom a 
great number of his fellow farmers had confidence-no an can each the top without 
satisfying the selecting authorities (who would reflect the community as a whole) that 
he had the broad moderate patriotic public-spirited outlook necessary to deal with all 
problems not of the farmers merely but all Irishmen. "199 
The Blueshirts were to be involved in the electoral process at every stage. He 
argued that the selection of candidates could not be left to the whim of the vocational 
electorate. The involvement of the National Guard would ensure that only "successful 
'96M. Cronin, The Blueshirts and Irish Politics, p. 97. 197 Ernest Blythe, An Agricultural Corporation, Ernest Blythe Papers, P/24/680(b), UCD Archives. 
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and industrious farmers living by the land"200 would win office, and that those farmers 
selected toed the Blueshirt line. Selection began at a parish meeting, but attendance 
was not open to all members of corporations. The parish council meeting would be 
attended only by: 
"... the most industrious, most hard honest and most patriotic of the farmers of the 
parish [who] would be summoned by the appropriate officer of the National Guard. 
The number summoned might be anything from a tenth to a quarter of the farmers of 
the parish"201, irrespective of the size of their farms. 
Even at this low level in the pyramidal electoral process, there was no real 
democracy. The National Guard had the job of selecting a minority of electors at their 
own personal whim, rejecting "the very old, those who had an ill-reputation, the 
windbags, the notoriously lazy, the drunkards, those who for any reason were 
,, 202 notoriously bad farmers. Blythe's scheme did state that in selecting the parish 
electors the National Guard officer would consult an informal committee of 
representatives from the parish, but the role of this body was purely advisory. At the 
parish meeting panels of candidates would be chosen to represent the different types 
of farin in the parish, for example, poultry, pig farmers and graziers. 
The next stage in the process was intended to be the parish Panelmen's meeting at 
which a National Guard Officer would select one person from each panel to represent 
the parish at the district council. It was expected that the officer would not choose 
anyone against whom strong feelings were registered. Clearly, at this level, and 
throughout the process, the involvement of the fan-ners was consultative rather than 
elective. Because selection at the parish level, the lowest level in the pyramid process, 
200 Ibid. 
201 Ibid. 
202 Ibid. 
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was under the control of the National Guard, the NCP would effectively control the 
whole election system, ensuring Blueshirt supporters were elected at every level. 
The district council level of selection would be attended by those chosen at parish 
level from the panels selected by the National Guard officer. Once again, the District 
council elections were "attended by a National Guard Officer of higher rank than the 
officer deputed to deal with parish meetings.,, 203 It was this higher-ranking officer 
who "would choose from each panel a member to represent the district on the council 
for the county. "204 This was subject to approval from National Guard headquarters, 
placing control firmly in the hands of the National Guard central command structure, 
and ultimately, the Director-General. 
The county council of the Agricultural Corporation would consist of these district 
delegates as well as representatives of ancillary industries, chosen again by a member 
of the National Guard from panels which represented associated industries such as the 
creameries, veterinary surgeons and agricultural merchants. These county councils 
were to meet regularly and carry out the functions of the former county council 
agricultural committee. They would also discuss any bills relating to agriculture that 
were to be introduced in the Dail. A paid, part-time secretary would "furnish the 
Goverriment with reports of the committee's views on all such legislative 
proposalS.,, 205 
The National Council of the Agricultural Corporation, formed from representatives 
from the counties, would meet monthly. Each county would send from three to five 
representatives from the county panels to represent all types of agriculture and 
ancillary trades and industries. The National Council would elect a Chairman who 
would act as Minister for Agriculture. The National Council would take on the 
201 Ibid. 
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committee stage reading of all pertinent bills. The council also would have the power 
to draft bills and send them to the Dail. On the receipt of the bill by the Clerk of the 
Dail, it would be deemed to have had its first reading. The Agricultural Corporation 
would elect two members of the Daij. 206 
A less wieldy body of twenty members would form a Standing Committee that 
would meet on a fortnightly basis. Its main task would be to enquire into any 
agriculture-related business before the Dail and provide "a statement of its views of 
,, 207 the effect on agriculture of every piece of ordinary legislation. 
All the councils at every level were to be elected for four years, and each was to 
meet on a monthly basis to discuss agricultural issues and pass on their views to a 
higher level in the pyramid structure. Blythe intended that the system would ensure 
that fanners' views were taken into account when their interests were at stake or their 
expertise was required for the national good. 
Blythe had moved a long way from his earlier corporatist ideas based on 
Quadragesimo Anno. In Blythe's policy document 'An Agricultural Corporation, ' he 
was advocating Blueshirt control over the electoral apparatus that would create the 
vocational councils. His scheme did not guarantee full involvement by everyone in an 
occupation, only a small minority that Blueshirt officers felt were suitable, and 
amenable to Blueshirt policy. The system made some allowance for consultation, but 
this was in an advisory capacity. The pyramid structure, with one level electing a 
higher level, but with Blueshirt control at the base, ensured that the democratic 
process was ham-strung from the start. It allowed for totalitarian control by the 
Blueshirts acting on instructions from Headquarters. The hierarchical command of the 
204 Ibid. 
205 Ibid. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Ibid. 
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National Guard ensured that control was ultimately exercised by the Director-General. 
The system did not do away with politics as Blythe predicted, only with competitive 
politics, replacing them with a totalitarian solution that would allow for only one 
political programme, that of the Blueshirts. 
Blythe was aware that many opponents would interpret his proposals as fascist and 
he was correct. He said: "This may be attacked as undemocratic and fascist but it is 
necessary. , 208 Gomez Homen had reported to Mussolini that Blythe was well-read in 
the primary sources of fascism and was more than willing to lead Ireland in a 
corporatist direction. 209 It is a fascist form of corporatism that is most in evidence in 
this document. O'Duffy found these ideas very attractive and adopted them after his 
split with Fine Gael, and as the cornerstone of his new party's election programme. 
Blythe, choosing to remain within Fine Gael, found that the party hierarchy rejected 
his extremist ideas and within a short while jettisoned its experiment with 
corporatism. Blythe, meanwhile, kept to his extremist views and proceeded to 
propagate and expound upon them as a leading theoretician within Ailtiri na 
hAiseirighe. 
CONCLUSION 
Corporatist ideas were seriously discussed, and implemented, particularly in 
Catholic countries such as Austria, Portugal, Italy and Ireland, whilst fascism made 
them even more popular in the inter-war period. The crisis of capitalism, evidenced in 
the Depression, led politicians and intellectuals to consider the need for radical 
solutions to reforrn a system which clearly was not working. Countries such as Italy, 
208 Ibid. 
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Austria and Portugal all adopted variations of corporatism, but nowhere was a 
complete system put in place. The models to which corporatists in other countries 
looked for inspiration were incomplete structures. Any economic success that arose in 
these countries came in spite of corporatism, not because of it. As the thirties 
progressed, corporatism became tainted by its association with fascism and its earlier 
appeal was rapidly subsumed under the barrage of negative propaganda associated 
with repressive regimes. 
Irish Catholics seized upon corporatism as an expression of Ireland's religious 
identity, marking Ireland out as different from Britain, and the institutions and 
political culture it had bequeathed to Ireland. Cumann na nGaedheal had suffered a 
severe blow in defeat in two elections and appeared to be suffering an identity crisis. 
The rapid rise of the Blueshirt movement in 1932-33, and its connection with the 
former governing party of the Free State, provided Cumann na nGaedheal/Fine Gael 
with an answer to its problem of recruitment and identity. The prospect of having a 
young, committed and Organized ally, coupled with the Blueshirt movement's 
precarious legal position, led to the union of Cumarm an nGaedheal with the 
Blueshirts and the Centre Party under the proviso that the new party adopt 
corporatism as its central plank. The need for a new policy led to a flurry of activity 
amongst corporatist idealists in the new coalition to come up with a programme that 
would win the party electoral success, with vocational ideas at the forefront of the 
party's new identity. 
The first year of the party's existence was dominated by the Blueshirts in the 
coalition, with their leader at the helm as party president. The commitment of the 
other members of the coalition to these new ideas was at best lukewarrn, and though 
209 Keogh, D., Ireland and Europe 1919-48 (Gill and Macmillan: Dublin, 1988). 
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the party journal gave space to their promotion there is a distinct lack of enthusiasm in 
speeches made by former members of Cumann na nGaedheal in support of the ideas, 
something of which O'Duffy was increasingly aware. O'Duffy's own corporatist 
ideas were also developing on different lines from even his Blueshirt colleagues, and 
were combined with an increasingly vocal admiration for fascism. O'Duffy came to 
accept the ideas of Ernest Blythe as a more radical alternative to the papal-inspired ' 
ideas of Tierney and Hogan and an acrimonious spilt with Fine Gael became 
inevitable. Though the party and Cronin's followers promoted corporatism for a time 
the policies were soon dropped, leaving O'Duffy's miniscule National Corporate 
Party as the only Irish party promoting corporatist ideas. His failure to inspire more 
than a handful of followers is an indication of the increasing indifference to 
vocational ism/corporatism amongst a population who had found that they had little 
desire to follow the route of many other Catholic countries in Europe who had found 
that the adoption of corporatism meant a significant curtailment of freedom. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: FASCISM AND CORPORATISM IN IRISH POLITICS AFTER 
THE GREENSHIRTS 
INTRODUCTION 
General O'Duffy failed to revive the National Corporate Party after his return from 
Spain in 1937, but this was not the end of his involvement in Irish politics, nor the end 
of the political ideas that he espoused. Over the next ten years, several organizations 
advocating corporatism appeared on the Irish political scene. Whilst membership of 
the groups was small, they were significant in providing a home for former Blueshirts 
and Greenshirts and fascist/authoritarian ideas. One of the groups, the Irish Christian 
Front, had a brief but important role in Irish politics, but the others were shadowy 
organizations with small memberships, short lives, and little influence. One political 
movement, Ailtiri na hAiseirighe (Architects of Resurrection), was significant in 
being the only one of these political formations to win elections, albeit at a local level. 
The importance in studying these ephemeral groups is that it allows us to analYse the 
ideas of men such as O'Dufly, Blythe and their followers in the light of their later 
political careers. Men like O'Duffy and Blythe had been key figures in the twenties 
and thirties, and their ideas had found a place in the political mainstream, as their 
prominence in the second largest party, Fine Gael indicates. 
What will become clear in this chapter is that the ideas that men like O'Duffy, 
Gunning, Belton, McCabe and Blythe had begun to articulate in the Blueshirt period, 
amidst accusations of fascism (which they were at pains to deny), were their genuine 
political beliefs. Most of the political groups examined in this chapter were blatantly 
pro-fascist, anti-democratic and totalitarian in intent and went completely against the 
grain of Irish political culture as it had developed since independence. 
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The Emergency' in Ireland that followed the outbreak of the Second World War 
resulted in strict censorship, surveillance, and the restriction of those political groups 
that the government perceived as a potential security risk. The monitoring of these 
groups by Military Intelligence (G2), goverment agencies concerned with 
censorship, and the Special Branch provide a rich source of material for the historian, 
but conversely, stricter censorship meant that the same political groups were severely 
restricted in their ability to publicize, recruit and develop. The material does reveal 
that there was some crossover in membership, and that these same people were often 
former colleagues of O'Duffy's in the various Blueshirt and Greenshirt organizations. 
They also showed a similar ideological interest in extreme nationalism, corporatism, 
authoritarianism and fascism. This chapter will look at the history, membership and 
ideology of these organizations. They were the direct ideological descendents of 
O'Dufly's organizations, but they had even less political influence than their 
forebears and, with the exception Ailtiri na hAiseirighe, they had even shorter lives. 
IRISH CHRISTIAN FRONT 
The Spanish Civil War, which broke out on 17 th jUly 1936, the same day that the 
National Corporate Party held its last congress, had a great effect on the Irish people. 
Ireland had close historical ties with Spain. The outbreak of civil war in Spain, after 
years of political instability during the Second Republic, and even before, was the 
culmination of a growing, and irreparable rift between the defenders of the republic 
and its opponents. Particularly poignant for the Irish, as co-religionists, was the 
increased hostility of the Spanish left to the Catholic Church, which had been dis- 
established in Spain in 193 1. The Nationalists, led by Franco, were able to pose as the 
1 The term "the Emergency" was used in Ireland to refer to the years of WW 2. Ireland was neutral 
throughout the war. 
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defenders of the Church, a response which coloured the loyalties of many Irishmen. 
The most high-profile response in Ireland in support of the Nationalists came from 
O'Duffy, whose Irish Brigade went out to fight for Franco, and the Irish Christian 
Front led by Patrick Belton, and fonned in August 1936. However, the lCF was 
manipulated by its Dublin leadership to propagate a political agenda that was 
unsupported by the membership, leading to its eventual demise. 
The newspapers in Ireland, particularly the Irish Independent, devoted a great 
many column inches to describing the war in Spain. The newspapers encouraged the 
identification of Irish interests with those of Franco, who was portrayed as the 
defender of Christian values against the atheistic Republicans. To many Catholics in 
Ireland "Franco was a Christian crusader rescuing Spain from Communist 
,, 2 revolution. The church hierararchy came out strongly in support of the Spanish 
Church. Cardinal MacRory, the Primate of all Ireland, speaking to pilgrims in 
Drogheda said: 
"There is no room any longer for any doubt as to the issues at stake in the Spanish 
conflict. It is not a question of the Army against the people, nor the Army plus the 
aristocracy and the Church against Labour. Not at all. It is a question of whether 
Spain will remain as she has been for so long, a Christian and Catholic land, or a 
,, 3 Bolshevist and anti-God one. 
The support for Franco was channelled into the creation of a new group calling 
itself the Irish Christian Front (a title which mirrored that of the Popular Front in 
Spain), which had its first meeting on 31" August 1936 at the Mansion House, 
Dublin. The creation of the movement had been announced by Alexander McCabe on 
22 nd August 1936, though it was Patrick Belton who was the prime mover behind the 
2 J. H. Whyte, Church andState in Modern Ireland (Dublin, 1980), P. 90. 3S. Cronin, Frank Ryan, P. 79, 
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organization. 4 The organization's leadership made it clear that the ICF was not 
exclusively concerned with the Spanish Civil War, but aimed "to initiate and 
coordinate anti-communist activity in the Free State. "5 It initially claimed to be non- 
party political, and it also claimed to be non-sectarian, in order to secure a wide 
membership. The manifesto of the ICF said: 
"The ICF is a national movement not drawn from any political party, but we invite 
,, 6 adherents of all political parties who subscribe to its objectives to join. 
It appeared to most to be a broad-based pressure group whose main purpose was to 
offer support to the Spanish Nationalists and the Church through large-scale 
demonstrations and fund raising, with the expectation that the government of De 
Valera would eventually be pressurized into recognizing Franco as the Head of State 
in Spain. It also provided an opportunity for Belton to reunite the forces of the Irish 
right in opposition to De Valera. 7 In contrast to O'Duffy, Belton believed that the best 
way to help Spain was with humanitarian aid. He was to tell the Irish Press: "I do not 
agree with the wisdom of Irishmen going out to Spain. 958 
The ICF Standing Committee created in August 1936 consisted of Patrick Belton 
(President), Dr James P. Brennan (Vice-President)9, Aileen O'Brien (Organizing 
Secretary)' 0, Alexander McCabe (Secretary) and Liam Breen. ' 1 General O'Duffy was 
not involved as at this point Belton had developed a personal antipathy towards 
O'Duffy. He did not approve of his Irish Brigade initiative, though he did not 
condemn it outright. The leadership was un-elected. There were no criteria for 
4 F. McGarry, Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War, p. 109. 5 R. A. Strad ling, The Irish and the Spanish Civil Uar, (Manchester, 1999), p. 12. 6 Cited in F. McGarry, frish Politics and the Spanish Civil War p. I 10. 7 F. McGarry, Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War, p. It 2. 8 Irish Press, 26 November 1936. 
9 Brennan was Dublin City Coroner and an executive member of Cumann na Poblacht na hEireann. '0 Aileen O'Brien was prominent in the Catholic group, Pro Deo. 11 Ibid, p. Ill. 
239 
240 
membership and little control from the Dublin leadership over the branches that 
spontaneously appeared all over the country. In September 1936, when the ICF 
decided to forrn branches, the Irish Independent reported five thousand applications 
for membership. 
The first rally of the ICF attracted fifteen thousand people. 12 The ICF used the rally 
to publicize its aims, portraying the war in Spain as a holy war against Godless 
Communism. Even at this early stage, the wider political agenda of the movement 
was made clear when Liam Breen, speaking at the rally, referred to the need for the 
Free State to adopt corporatism. The leadership in Dublin had a political agenda very 
different from that of the membership in the provinces who saw the ICF primarily as a 
way of highlighting the needs of the Church in Spain, and as a vehicle for fundraising. 
This dichotomy of interests was to cause problems later on. The movement soon 
dropped the pretence of being non-political when in September 1936, De Valera was 
urged to terminate trade relations with Republican Spain. 13 De Valera's government 
had decided that non-intervention was the best policy. On August 25, h 1936, the 
Government Information Bureau issued the following statement: 
"The policy of non-intervention has been adopted in the conviction that it is in the 
interests of Spain itself and ... which will best serve the cause of European peace... the 
Government of Saorstat Eireann in common with the Irish people and the Christian 
world are profoundly shocked by the events that have taken place in Spain. " 14 
Patrick Belton was later to claim that "the sympathies of the Fianna Fail party are 
entirely with the Red Government in Spain. " 15 
12 Irish Independent, 3 1' August 1936. Headline, p. 1. 13 F. McGany, Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil 11ar, pp. 116-117. 14 Cited in J. Canavan. jrish Political and Press Reaction to European Events 1935-1939, PhD. 1972. 15 Dail Debates, Vol. 65, Cot 745,3 Feb 1936-12 March 1937, NAL 
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September and October 1936 saw a rapid growth in membership. The ICF was 
particularly strong in Leinster. 16 A number of mass rallies and provincial meetings 
followed where listeners were told of atrocities committed against the Church, nuns 
and religious brothers. At the rallies, participants would demonstrate their support by 
raising their arms over their heads in the shape of a cross and cry out "Long Live 
Christ the King. "17 Present on the platforms would be local dignitaries, politicians 
(usually from Fine Gael), the Press, and significantly, local priests who often 
functioned as officials in local branches. The ICF continued to gain momentum 
during October and November with a demonstration at Waterford attracting twelve 
thousand and one in Dublin on 25th October 1936, attracting forty thousand. 18 
From its inception, the leadership of the ICF had had a wider political agenda than 
advocacy of support for the Nationalists and the Church in Spain. The leadership used 
the mass rallies, to which people came to demonstrate their support for Franco, to try 
to promote their own agenda. For example, at a Galway ICF meeting on November 
22 nd 1936, was persuaded to "... pledge the ICF to bringing about an economic 
system based on the Papal Encyclicals. " 19 
Corporatism and anti-communism were also on the agenda at a meeting in Cork in 
September 1936, attended by 40,000 supporters. 20 Belton called for currency control 
and the management of credit to tackle the problems of unemployment and poverty. 21 
At some rallies the international agenda was widened when speakers expressed 
support for Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. In December 1936, at Drogheda, Father 
O'Connell argued that "Italy and Germany today would be communist but for 
16 F. McGarry, Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War, p. 117. 
17 C. Foley, Legion ofthe Rearguard, (Pluto Press, London, 1992), p. 16 1. 
18F. McGarry, Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War, p. 122. 
19 R. A. Stradling, The Irish and the Spanish Civil War, p. 35. 20 F. McGarry, Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War, p. 119. 
21 1 bid, p. 122. 
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, 922 Mussolini and Hitler.. . whilst Desmond Bell of the ICF supported Hitler 
for setting 
up concentration camps to control the communists. 23 Belton himself had said: 
"When our organization's work is complete we will make Ireland a very hot spot 
for any communist to live in ... 
if it is necessary to be a fascist to defend Christianity 
then I am a fascist and so are my colleagues. , 24 
Belton was an anti-Semite, and told Cardinal MacRory: 
"The Jews have a stranglehold here and present arrivals mainly consist of those 
expelled from European countries for their communist activities. They have an 
international organization and they control money. They did their job well in Spain 
and can do here if not checkmated. 925 
The leadership was hampered by the weak organizational structure of the ICF, 
which meant that the mass movement could not easily be manipulated by the 
leadership in Dublin. Whilst sympathizing with their co-religionists in Spain, the 
members of the ICF had no sympathy with Belton's wider agenda or the prospect of 
the ICF developing into a militant clerical Catholic party. Some expressed concern at 
Belton's authoritarian leadership. In spite of initial enthusiasm, senior politicians and 
the senior hierarchy of the Irish Catholic Church were not supporting the ICF either. 
Fearghal McGarry argues that the central ideological strain amongst the 
membership, as distinct from Belton and his coterie, was Catholic Action, a 
movement which had arisen in the nineteenth century as an apostleship of the laity to 
disseminate Catholic principles in public life and to help the poor through Catholic 
social teaching. 26 This is a rather benign view of the movement. The ICF was 
becoming more like the Spanish CEDA than any social action movement. The 
22 The Worker, 12'h December 1936. 
23 Irish Times, 15'h December 1936. 
24 Irish Independent, 12 1h October 1936. 
25 Letter Belton to MacRory as quoted in F. McGarry, Ireland and the Spanish Civil War, p. 128. 26 F. McGarry, Irish Politics and theSpanish Civil War, pp. 114-115. 
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movement was not a monolithic one but was represented through such organizations 
as An Riogacht, the Central Catholic Library and the Catholic Young Men's 
Association. Some envisaged that the ICF would develop as a coordinating body for 
these groups. 27 
The ICF was successful in raising over E30,000,28 which mainly went to provide the 
Spanish Nationalists with medical supplies. In contrast, its success as a political force 
was limited. Local councils, public bodies and organizations, including trade unions, 
were asked to introduce the Clonmel Resolution, which advocated breaking relations 
with the Spanish Republic and the recognition of the Franco regime as the legitimate 
government of Spain. Its failure became evident when the Dail passed the Spanish 
Civil war (Non-Intervention) Bill on 24'h February 1937, which declared it illegal for 
any Irish citizen to participate in the Spanish Civil war. 
A number of councils did pass the Clonmel Resolution, the resolution usually being 
introduced by a member of Fine Gael. In fact, the movement was often portrayed as a 
front for Fine Gael, particularly by the pro-De Valera Irish Press. The latter went 
even further, calling the ICF a Blueshirt organization, particularly when the ICF 
began to discuss the economic war and the threat from the republican left. 29 There 
were a significant number of Blueshirts in the ICF, but the disputes with O'Duffy and 
the distancing from Fine Gael belie this accusation. 
Belton, in a speech at the Mansion House following a visit to Spain to supervise the 
distribution of money raised, presented a new manifesto for the ICF which failed even 
to mention Spain but instead concentrated on anti-communism, social policies and a 
need to change the Irish political system. 30 By this point, only Breen and Belton were 
27 lbid, p. 115. 
28J. Bowyer Bell, 'Ireland and the Spanish Civil war' in Studia flibernica, No. 9; 1963, Dublin. 29 F. McGarry, Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War, p. 127. 30 Ibid, p. 127. 
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left of the original organizing committee. The 85 delegates at the ICF Convention 
held on P February 1937 at the Ormond Hotel Dublin were deeply divided. Liam De 
Roiste protested against Belton's overtly political stance. A delegation from Drogheda 
opposed Belton for chairperson. T. P. Clarke of Drogheda said: 
"Some members are putting politics before Catholicism and are doing more harm 
to the movement than many communists. It is very hard to convince many people that 
,, 31 the movement is non-political, when some heads of the movement are politicians. 
The movement began to rapidly disintegrate, in spite of the potential for mass 
mobilization on religious and nationalist lines. Most branches quietly dissolved after 
the convention, though it was to limp on over the summer, finally disbanding in 
October 1937. Belton himself had resigned from the presidency of the lCF in August, 
having also lost his Dail seat in the general election, where his campaign on anti- 
communism, support for the farmers, and rabid anti-Semitism failed to hold enough 
appeal, the voters instead preferring the Labour Party candidate, G. C. McGowan. The 
1937 election itself demonstrated that the electorate were not really concerned about 
international issues when compared with the domestic economic agenda. 
McGarry criticizes the ICF for embodying many negative aspects of the Free State 
including the invention of communist conspiracies, demand for increased censorship, 
sectarian and anti-Semitic undertones and obsession with sexual morality, whilst 
further demonstrating the irrelevance of corporatist ideas to the majority of 
Irishmen. 32 The ICF meant different things to the leadership and the membership, the 
former finding themselves unable to motivate the mass following into pursuing a 
more radical, far-sweeping political agenda. However, the ideas that were still being 
advocated by men such as Belton were to be promoted again over the next decade. 
31 Quoting T. P. Clarke, in M. O'Riordan, The Connolly Column (Dublin, 1979), p. 99. 
32 F. McGarry, Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil A'ar p. 235. 
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IRISH FRIENDS OF GERWNYI CUAMNNNAISIUNTA 
General O'Duffy forged links with the German Embassy in Dublin and maintained 
contact with them throughout the late thirties and early forties. 33 In 1938, the Abwehr, 
German Military Intelligence, asked Oscar Phaus, founder of the German Bund to 
establish links with the IRA. Landing in Ireland on 3 rd February 1939, he made 
contact with O'Duffy, presuming that he would be able to arrange a meeting with the 
leaders of the IRA. Phaus was eventually to do so, but without O'Duffy's help. 34 it 
would appear that it was O'Duffy's secretary, Liam Walsh, who was eventually to set 
up a meeting between Maurice Twomey, an IRA activist, and Phaus. 35 
O'Duffy was moving in a pro-German direction and involved himself in the 
formation of an organization that initially called itself 'The Irish Friends of Germany. ' 
This was an anti-Semitic, pro-Nazi fringe group that anticipated an early and 
successful invasion of Britain by the Germans in the not too distant future. It came 
under strict surveillance from Irish Military Intelligence from April 1940, and 
continued to be closely monitored. 36 The group, which soon changed its name to the 
more patriotic-sounding National ClublCumann Naisiunta, was a small group of Nazi 
sympathisers who met on a regular basis in Dublin, and which from the outset 
contained a number of former Blueshirts and Greenshirts in its membership. 
A meeting of twenty-fivc people, including O'Duffy, met at Liam Walsh's house at 
42, Higbfield Park, Dublin on the 14"' April 1940,37 and this was followed by the first 
official meeting of the Irish Friends of Germany at Wynn's Hotel, Dublin, a venue 
33 E. Stephan Spies in Ireland, (Dublin, 1963), p. 232. 
34 T. P. Coogan, The IRA, (Glasgow, 1980), p. 273. 
35 R. Fisk, In Time of War, p. 76. 36 Weekly Misc. Report DMD, w/e 15 April 1940, G2/X/0253, Irish Friends of Gennany, G2 
Archives, Rathmines Barracks. 
37 Ibid. 
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that had always been a favourite of O'Duffy's. Also in attendance were Liam Walsh, 
Alexander McCabe 38 and James Burke. In procuring a room for their meeting, the 
group registered as the IFG, but the Detective Branch observers were unable to 
ascertain the full size of the group as a launch meeting of the New Republican Party 
39 
was taking place at the same time in the hotel. Other meetings of the IFG took place 
at Walsh's home and at Dublin restaurants, such as the Savoy Restaurant and the 
Swiss Chalet. 
The IFG continued to recruit but changed its name to the National Club4o after the 
German invasion of the Low Countries. The regular meetings, held on the second 
Friday of every month, were to be "directed to social events, musical interludes, talks 
on current, cultural and travel topics and other interesting features. "41 The real 
purpose of the meetings can be gauged from a lecture on the 31" May 1940, when 45- 
50 people, including 18 women, met at the Red Bank Restaurant in D'Olier Street 42 to 
hear George Griffin, an ex-Blueshirt, speak on the subject of "The Jewish 
Stranglehold on Ireland. i-A3 Griffin mentioned many Jews by name and went on to 
advocate that "... we should never pass a Jew on the street without openly insulting 
h A4 im. The meeting was chaired by Alex McCabe, another former Blueshirt and ex 
45 Cumann na nGaedheal T. D ., who 
in addressing the meeting denied that the 
movement was a fifth column, but that a German victory would result in the complete 
38 McCabe had been a key figure in the formation of the ICF. 
39 Detective Branch, Garda Siochana Report, 16 th May 1940, IFG, M. J. Wymes, G2/X/0253, IFG, G2 
Archives. 
40 Letter from T. A. O'Gorman and L. Walsh, Cumann Naisiunta, G2/X/0253, IFG, G2 Archives. 
41 Ibid. 
42 The Red Bank Restaurant had been the regular meeting place, before the war, of Adolph Mahr's 
German Association. Mahr had been a leading Nazi official in Dublin, and also the Director of the Irish 
National Museum. The German Association would often invite sympathetic Irishmen to these dinners, 
where the table was ceremoniously draped in a swastika, flag. Fisk, R., In Time of 14"ar, p. 289. 
43 Report from P. de Beantaligh to Lt. V de Valera, 3 1' May 1940, G2/X/0253, I FG, G2 Archives. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Alexander McCabe had been a Sinn Fein T. D. and then Cumann na nGaedheal T. D. (1918-24). lie 
had been Secretary of the ICF Standing Committee. 
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46 independence of the thirty-two counties of Ireland . Special Branch reported that the 
meeting was attended by "ex-Blueshirts, ex-members of the ICF as well as 
RepublicanS, -A7 but that General O'Duffy had telephoned to say that he would be 
unable to attend. 48 
A later report on the 1FG named several key figures of the group in the Dublin and 
Wicklow area, including Francis Stuart, who was later to broadcast pro-Axis 
propaganda from Gen-nany, and Kevin Cahill ("connected with the Blueshirt 
movement, and later the Irish Brigade for the Civil War in Spain in cooperation with 
General O'Duffy'49). At a meeting on 26 June 1940 at the Swiss Chalet Restaurant, 
Dublin, where there was an attendance of twenty-four, "when asked who were the 
founders of the organization, Griffin replied General O'Duffy, Liam Walsh, Seamus 
Burke and O'Callaghan, a Civil Servant. "50The first three in Griffin's list had attended 
the initial meeting at Wynn's Hotel on 15 th May 1940. An analysis of the people who 
attended the meetings, and whose names we know, reveals little, other than the fact 
that a fifth of them were women and a fifth had a doctorate to their name. 51 There is 
no record in the G2 Military Intelligence files that Ernest Blythe was involved in the 
group but in the Blythe Papers, held by University College Dublin, there is a 
typewritten document written by Blythe headed An Cumann Naisiunta, that was 
written in the forties, and listed the objectives and programme of the named group. 52 
It is not known if Blythe was planning on offering this programme to the group, or if 
it was an outline proposal for a movement that he intended to set up himself, or if it 
46 Report from P. de Beantaligh to Lt V de Valera, 31' may 1940,02/X/0253, I FG, G2 Archives. 
47 ]bid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Chief Sup. Office Report, 22 nd June 1940, List of IFG or National Club resident in Dublin and 
Wicklow Division, G2/X/0253, IFG, G2 Archives. 
'0 Weekly Misc. Report, DMD, We 8 July 1940, Section D 'Aliens' G21XI0253, IFG, G2 Archives. 
51 See Appendix -Persons Connected with the I FG. 
-12 An Cumann Naisiunta, Ernest Blythe, Blythe Papers, P24/977, UCD Archives, Dublin. 
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was the actual programme of the movement. The National ClublCumann Naisiunta, 
as the IFG was now known, produced a policy document which the Intelligence 
Service was able to view, but was unable to copy. On the basis of his memory, an 
agent's report summarized the aims of the organization as follows: 
"I. Control of Finance. 
"2. All property of aliens to be confiscated without any compensation. 
"3. That all persons who took up residence here since 1916 to be expelled from the 
country. 
"4. All charity to be discontinued and work found for all unemployed persons. 
"5. The training of the Youth of the Country. , 53 
The group therefore had distinct political aims, rather than the cultural ones they 
had originally claimed. They wished to make the country exclusively Irish and 
focused on the youth of the nation as the key to the nation's future success. 
There are some points of similarity between the Blythe document and that viewed 
by Military Intelligence, notably the stress on youth, ending the dole and increasing 
the state's control of finance. However, what is significantly missing is the racism of 
the programme as cited by the G2 Intelligence officer. The Blythe document has 
much in common with the policies of Ailtiri na hAiseirighe, with whom Blythe was 
involved during the forties, but with a greater stress on culture. 
Following bis initial enthusiasm, O'Duffy appears to have taken a back seat in the 
organization. There is no record of his attending any of the later meetings, though he 
continued his association with the group. fie was still anticipating a German victory. 
In a meeting with Maurice O'Connor on 23d July 1940, O'Duffy told him that he had 
not had time to organize a pro-German political party, but that he wanted O'Connor to 
53 P7a/220, Intelligence file, Agent's report, Ist July 1940, Mulcahy Papers, UCD Archives. 
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organize people in the anticipation of German success in the war. 54 This would imply 
that O'Duffy expected to be involved in a puppet pro-German government in the near 
future. Asked to a meeting the following month, O'Duffy declined, telling O'Connor 
that "he would prefer not to attend in case his presence might bring them under 
notice. " He said, however, that he would give all the help he could, and that he would 
send two trusted men to the meeting, one of whom would be "Colum Kerry, who is 
connected with Kerry's advertising agenCy.,, 55 Maurice O'Connor would maintain his 
links to the extreme right, meeting with Griffin, who had set himself up as leader of 
the People's National Party, in January 1941. 
The organization gradually petered out, the only flare of interest on the part of the 
intelligence network being the attendance of three Free State soldiers at a meeting 
56 held in October 1940. The National Club's place was taken by a new political party, 
the People's National Party, which was even more overtly pro-Nazi. 
O'Duffy continued to hope for a German victory and proposed the creation of an 
Irish Division to fight for Germany on the Eastern Front against the Soviet Union, 
much as he had done against the Republicans in Spain. 57 He suggested to German 
Embassy officials that the Nazi government should provide him with a plane to fly to 
Berlin to discuss the formation of an Irish Volunteer Legion, but this offer was not 
taken seriously by the NaziS. 58 Even after the failure of his pro-Nationalist escapade in 
Spain, O'Duffy still felt he had a role to play in the international fight against 
communism. 
54 Garda Siochana Detective Branch Report, 26 Ih july 1940, re: Cumann Naisiunta or IFG, G2/X/0253, 
IFG, G2 Archives. 
5' Ibid. 
56 G2 Branch Dept. of Defence letter to Carroll, 19 October 1940, G2/X/0253, IFG, G2 Archives. 
57 E. Stephan, Spies in Ireland, (Dublin, 1963), p. 232. 
58 Ibid. p. 232. 
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THE PEOPLE'S NA TIONA L PARTY 
The demise of the IFG/NC was followed by the creation of an openly pro-German 
political group calling itself the People's National Party. The party was created by 
George Griffin at a time when the National Club had virtually ceased to exist. 59 
Griffin founded the party in the summer of 1940. In August 1940, the Nationalist and 
Leinster Times received a memorandum from "the PNP for proper national 
planning'960 which stated: "For eighteen years we have seen a country in decay 
become prey to British and Jewish Financial and Economic penetration, " and then 
proceeded to present its solution in its draft policy of aims. 61 The party's policy was 
clear from the start. A police report quoted Mrs Griffin as saying that "the party is 
purely Nazi in outlook7' and that they wanted to overthrow the government. 62 
George Griffin, who had been active in the Irish Friends of Germany, now headed 
his own small fringe party, which spurned democracy and set out to overthrow the 
government. Griffin set himself up as the un-elected President of the new party with a 
support committee consisting of a Vice-President (G. Sinclair), Treasurer (F. Dillon), 
Secretary (Father T. Fahy), two trustees( Father Fahy and C. Crowley), and eight other 
ex-officio committee members (Joe Andrews, R. Burgess, F. Corrigan, C. O'Leary, 
H. O'Neill, J. J. Byme, P. Byrne, and J. Graham). The size of the Executive is no 
indication of the size of the movement. To all intents and purposes, the Executive was 
the party. A Detective Branch report concluded that: 
59 Organizational Weekly Misc. Report, DMD, w/e 12 August 1940, G2113/0453, PNP, G2 Files, 
Military Archives, Rathmines. 
60 National and Leinster Times, 17 August 1940, 'A New Party. ' 
61 Ibid. 
62 Organizational Weekly Misc. Reports, DMD, w/e/ 12 August 1940, G2/13/0453, G2 Files, Military 
Archives. 
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"... although the names given are supposed to be those of directly elected officers 
and committee, no meeting of subscribers or what might be termed nominal members 
has, so far as is known, been called ... [The officers] 
function only on a paper basiS.,, 63 
Recruitment to the party was unsuccessful, in spite of some publicity in the press. 
Griffin had optimistically expected to see the spread of a network of branches, 
beginning with a launch in Carlow. 64 He saw the two teenage party members, 
O'Leary (aged 17 V2 ) and Graham (aged 15 
V2) 
as the nucleus of a "Youth Movement 
,, 65 on the lines of the Hitler Youth Movement . At the party meeting on 20 November 
1940, the police summary reports that "Griffin referred to General O'Duffy, and said 
he would not invite him into is party, but he would consider taking in J. J. Walsh, " a 
,, 66 former Cumarm na nGaedheal politician. This is the only reference to General 
O'Dufry in papers on the movement, which would belie Fearghal McGarry's claims 
. 
that O'Duffy was actively involved with the party. 67 
The party was never on a firm financial footing, and only had one pound in funds in 
November 1940.68 Mrs Griffin had earlier claimed that: 
"Maurice O'Connor of Cumann Naisiunta was receiving support from Germany, 
financial and otherwise, but that her husband was dependent solely on support from 
within the country. , 69 
The PNP focused on County Carlow to launch the party. The local paper was 
prepared to give some space to making the movement known, printing its programme 
63 Detective Branch Report, 19 November 1940, Activities of George Griffin, G2113/0453, The PNP, 
G2 Files, Rathmines. 
64 Detective Branch Report, 23 November 1940, Activities of George Griffin, G2/13/0453, The PNP, 
G2 Files, Military Archives. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 McGarry, F., Irish Politics and1he Spanish Civil War, p. 47: "His only political activity following 
his return from Spain was with the secretive pro-Nazi People's National Party during WW U. " 
68 Weekly Misc. Reports, 18 November 1940, Section D- Aliens, Meeting of the Executive Committee 
of the PNP held on 18 November 1940, G2/B/0453, The PNP, G2 Files, Rathmines. 69 Organization Weekly Misc Reports, DMD, w/e 12 August 1940, G2/13/045, The PNP, G2 Files, 
Rathmines. 
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in full and reporting on a meeting held in early December 1940. The meeting was held 
under the auspices of a group calling itself the National Monetary Reform 
Association, which claimed to be unaffiliated to any political party. 70The organization 
stood for: 
" I. Establishment of a Christian Social Order. 
"2. Control and issue of money to be invested in the people's Government. 
"IThat as the present Judeo-Masonic system of world finance is inimitable to the 
, 41 tradition of a Christian state, make pledge to work for its abolition. 
The main speakers at the meeting, Mr Dorley of Numey and ex-T. D. Seamus 
Lennon, were followed by Edgar Corrigan 72 and George Griffin, both of the PNP, who 
used the occasion to launch the new party. The local paper reported that Corrigan said 
that: "[The] PNP came to the people with a policy of national, social and economic 
planning. They were not just another party encouraged by the party-system of so- 
,, 73 called democracy or byjob-hunting politicians. 
Griffin stated that the "only way to national freedom was through the economic and 
financial freedom which a new social order would offer. , 74 
The party continued to meet occasionally at 3, Lower Abbey Street, Dublin, where 
the party's headquarters were located . 
75 The meetings grew less frequent with the 
passing of time, until by May 1941 the party existed in name only. As Special Branch 
reported: 
70 National and Leinsler Times, 7 December 1940, 'The People's Sovereignty: The Power of Money. ' 
71 Ibid. 
72 Corrigan had been arrested the previous week and expelled from Northern Ireland. Weekly Misc 
Reports w/e 4 December 1940, G2/13/0453, The PNP, G2 Files, Rathmines. 
73 Nationalist and Leinster Times, 7 December 1940, 'The People's Sovereignty: The Power of Money. ' 
74 Ibid. 
75 PNP Letter-headed notepaper, G2/130453, The PNP, G2 Files, Rathmines. 
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"I beg to report that in so far as is known, the party is practically liquidated. No 
activities have recently come to notice and although Griffin still resorts to Abbey 
Street, he has no following and is shunned by those who associated with hiM. ', 76 
Special Branch believed that this decline was due to Griffin's "dictatorial attitude" 
with the result that "he has now little or no support and is not believed to be making 
any headway in the formation of a party. , 77 
The PNP produced two editions of its i ournal, Penapa (the name combines the 
initial two letters of each word in the party's title), which was sold on the streets. The 
two issues were published in December 1940 and January 1941 and apparently sold 
Well. 78 The j ournal was overtly anti-Semitic. The January 1941 edition had a crude 
anti-Semitic cartoon on the cover, very much in the style of Julius Streicher's Der 
Sturmer, which implied that Jews were in control of Irish banks and finance. The 
paper included a number of anti-Semitic articles such as 'The Jewish Nation and 
Freemasonry. ' 79 Ireland's restrictive censorship laws led to the seizure of eight 
thousand copies of the second edition from the printers in Drogheda and from the 
party's Dublin headquarters. " The print run of the journal was large at ten thousand 
copies for the first edition, 81 which raises the question of who was funding the 
printing in the light of the party's recent precarious financial position. There is no 
indication in G2 Military Intelligence files of any foreign or domestic large-scale 
donations, so it must be assumed that the money came from domestic sources. 
The party was openly pro-Nazi. At a meeting on 20th November 1940, attended by 
Griffin and six other party members, Griffin commenced proceedings by saying that: 
76 Special Branch Report from MJ Wymes, 27 May 1941, G2/B/0453, The PNP, G2 Files, Rathmines. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Weekly Misc. Report, DMD, vv/e 16 December 1940, G211310453, The PNP, G2 Files, Rathmines. 79 Penapa, January 1941, 'The Jewish Nation and Freemasonry. 'National Library, Dublin. "0 MA OCC 2/47 Penapa, Coyne to Insp Reynolds, 16 June 1941, and other correspondence, reports 
etc. Dec 1940-June 194 1, cited in Fisk, R., In Time of War, p. 375. 
81 Letter from JM Stanley of the DroghedaArgus, G211310453, The PNP, G2 Files, Rathmines; 
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"... the twelve point programme of the PNP was taken directly from the twenty- 
five originally expounded by Herr Hitler, and were those he considered most suitable 
for the needs of the country. He said the party's first aim would be to spread National 
Socialist ideas, and that coming second was the Jewish problem which was all- 
important as their anti-Jewish teachings were likely to bring them support from 
certain sections of the people who might otherwise look unfavourably upon them. , 82 
This anti-Semitism was a key feature of the party and it served to attract interest; 
Richard Collins of Cork wrote to Griffin offering his services as a local agent of the 
party "with a specific interest in the furtherance of anti-Jewish feeling in Cork. "83 The 
12-point programme, produced in full as an appendix, reveals the party's virulent 
hostility to aliens in Ireland as half of the articles specifically relate to 'non-citizens. ' 
The party's policy package had much in common with that of O'Duffy's earlier 
National Corporate Party, including corporatism, national planning and the 
reunification of Ireland, whilst laying a much greater stress on the need for an 
exclusivist Irish-Ireland that was anti-alien, and specifically anti-Jewish. The party, 
however, failed to secure any real following and had no impact nationally or locally. 
The existence of the party reveals the existence of a core of Nazi enthusiast, a 
potential fifth column and Quisling-style government in waiting. It was also a direct 
descendent of the IFG, and the NCP. The evidence disproves McGarry's assertion that 
O'Duffy was involved in the PNP and also clears up the confusion presented by 
Donal 0 Drisceol in Censorship in Ireland 1939-45.0 Drisceol combines the lFG 
and PNP into one organization, whereas in reality they were two separate and distinct 
groups, though with some overlap in membership and common policy elements. 
12 Detective Branch report, 22 Novemeber 1940, Activities of George Griffin, G2/B/0453, The PNP, G2 
File, Rathmines 
93 Memo, 4 January 194 1, G2/B/0453, The PNP, G2 Files, Rathmines. 
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AILTIRINA hAISEIRIGHE-A BRIEFHlSTORY 
As the People's National Party faded into political oblivion, another right-wing, 
authoritarian and corporatist political party appeared on the Irish political scene. The 
new party, Ailtiri na hAiseirighe (The Architects of Resurrection), was the creation of 
Gerald Cunningham, an extreme nationalist who created his own far-right political 
party to campaign for the restoration of a culturally distinct Gaelic republic based on 
Irish cultural nationalism, Catholicism, - corporatism and outright authoritarianism. 
Unlike all the other groups mentioned in this chapter, Ailtiri na hAiseirighe fought 
elections at national and local levels, winning local council seats. It had a longer life 
than the other groups, continuing into the nineteen-fifties, although declining to fight 
elections after 1948. There was some continuity with the other organizations 
discussed in this thesis. Ernest Blythe, for example, was a leading theoretician of the 
new party, developing the corporatist ideas he had propounded as a leading Blueshirt. 
The party promoted a similar programme of fascist policies to that advocated by 
O'Duffy's NCP in the mid-thirties, notably its opposition to liberal democracy, party 
politics and communism. Ailtiri always described itself as a movement, not a party. 
Its promotion of cultural nationalism, and its penchant for publicity, gave it a higher 
profile than its small membership would normally merit. Its policies were far too 
extreme for most Irishmen, and it failed to win widespread electoral success. The 
emergence of Clann. na Poblachta, 84 combined with a politically inexperienced, young 
membership base led to Ailtiri's rapid demise in the late forties. 
84 Clann na Poblachta, founded by Republicans in 1946 was a radical party that had some success at the 
polls, joining in the inter-party government after 1948. 
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Ailtiri na hAiseirighe first appeared in October 1942.85 Gerald Cunningham set up 
the party with its headquarters initially at 27, South Frederick Street, Dublin, 86 where 
around thirty to forty people met on Thursdays on a weekly basis. Cunningham (who 
also went under the Gaelicised versions of his name of Seamus Cunningham and 
O'Cuinnegain) first came to the attention of the intelligence services in September 
1940, when he was reported as a person interested in the activities of the Irish Friends 
of Germany. 87 In that same month, he founded an organization called Craobh which 
affiliated to the Gaelic League 88 and committed itself to the Irish language revival. 
When it disaffiliated, it changed its name to Glun na Buaidhe. Cunningham left the 
organization in order to form Ailtiri as he wanted to avoid politicising the language 
organization, Craobh, which continued to function separately. 89 The police report on 
his language classes states that it was Cunningham's intention to use the classes to 
give lectures, in Irish, on Germany, and to use the classes to set up an Irish version of 
the Hitler Youth Movement. " A police report describes Cunningham as "a fervent 
Catholic who attends daily Mass, [who] has become a political fanatic believing that 
the policy of Dictator is the only one for Ireland. "91 Cunningham was born in the 
north of Ireland, but moved south to the Free State in order to take up a post as a 
85 Garda Siochana Report, 16 October 1942, Report on Ailtiri, G2/X/ 1320, Ailtiri na hAiseirighe, G2 
Files, Rathmines. 
86 Ibid. 
" Garda Siochana, Report on O'Cuinnegain, II November 1942, G21X/I 320, Ailtiri na hAiseirighe, 
G2 Files, Rathmines. 
88 The principal organization for the promotion of Irish language and culture, the Gaelic League was 
founded in 1893. 
'9 Report on Ailtiri na hAiseirighe. Ailtiri, Glun na Buaidhe, no date, G2/X/1320, G2 Files, Rathmines. 
90 Garda Siochana, Report on O'Cuinneagain, II November 1942, G2/)UI320, Ailtiri na hAiseirighe, 
G2 Files, Rathmines. 
91 Garda Siochana Report, 16 October 1942, Report on Ailtiri, G2/)UI320, Ailtiri na hAiscirighe, G2 
Files, Rathmines. 
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minor executive in the Department of Defence, a post he resigned in 1932 in order to 
devote his time to learning Irish in the Gaeltachl. 92 
Cunningham, like Blythe, was an Ulsterman who found that after independence he 
was politically severed from his home in the North. Similarly, the Nazi Party 
attracted a disproportionate number bom outside Germany into its leadership ranks; 
men such as Hess (born in Alexandria), Rosenberg (born in Tallin), and of course 
Hitler himself, who was Austrian, compensated for their suspect birthright by 
becoming extreme nationalists. Blythe (an Ulster Protestant) and Cunningham both 
adopted extremist positions regarding the Irish language and the need to reinforce 
national identity. 
In spite of its opposition to the idea of parliamentary democracy, Ailtiri contested 
local and national elections. In 1943 it fielded four candidates in the General Election 
and secured the following first preference votes: Cork Borough, 10 19 (Sean 0 
Duibhgaill), Dublin North-West, 607 (Gearoid Cunningham), Waterford, 926 (Tomas 
93 0 Dochartiaigh) and Louth, 585 (Eoin 0 Coigligh). The following year another 
General Election was held, and this time the party fielded seven candidates, all of 
whom lost their deposits. The total of 5,805 first preference votes were distributed as 
follows: Cork Borough, 674 (Sean 0 Dubhghaill), Dublin North-West, 705 (Gearoid 
0 Cuinneagain), Dublin County, 607 (Oisin 0 Droighneain), Louth, 795(Eoin 0 
Coighligh), Roscommon, 1217 (Joseph O'Kelly), Tipperary, 1072 (Tomas 0 
Dochartaigh) and Waterford, 739 (Liam Walsh). 94 Liam Walsh had been O'Duffy's 
secretary and one of the founders of the IFG/NC. During the early part of the war, 
when he was in the employ of the Italian Legation and in contact with the German 
92 Election Pamphlet for Gearoid O'Cuinneagain, G2/X/I 320, Ailtiri na hAiscirighe, G2 Files, 
Rathmines. 
93 Parliamentary election Results in Ireland, ed. by BM. Walker (Royal Irish Academy: Dublin, 1992). 
94 Ibid. 
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Fichte Bund, 95 he had sent a number of propaganda articles to Germany and was 
interned in the Curragh Prison for short while for subversive activities. 96 In 1948 the 
party managed to field only one candidate, William Hargada, who stood in Sligo and 
only managed to secure 323 votes. 97 In this election, many of the supporters of the 
party changed their allegiance to Clann na Poblachta. Ailtiri fought local elections and 
in 1945 put forward 105 candidates. Ailtiri managed to win two seats out of twelve on 
the Drogheda Municipal Council (where its six candidates polled an impressive 2,636 
first preference votes). 98 
The party had members across the country, whilst its headquarters were in Dublin, 
initially at South Frederick Street and later, from 1945 onwards, at Harcourt Street. 
The membership was young, a police report describing the organization as having "a 
preponderance of enthusiastic youth who have little or no experience of politics, and 
as a consequence have no political predilections. "99No membership lists are available 
but a G2 Military Intelligence report from 1942 assessed the strength of the 
movement as between thirty and forty members in the Dublin area. 100 Details of 
attendance at the party's annual conference give an idea of where concentrations of 
party members were located. The 1946 party conference was attended by delegates 
from Dublin, Cork, Louth, Roscommon, Waterford, Tipperary, Sligo, and 
Longford, 101 and the party Executive included a representative from each of the four 
historical provinces of Ireland. 102 
95 The Fichte Bund was a quasi-official German propaganda organization. 
96D. O'Drisceol, Censorship in Ireland 1939-45 (Cork, 1996), p. 76. 
9' Ibid. 
98 Irish Press, 5 June 1945, 'Election Results. ' 
99 Craobhe na hAiseirighe, Ailtiri na hAiseirighe, Glun na Buaidhe, no date, G2/X/1320, Ailtiri na 
hAiseirighe, G2 Files, Rathmines. 
"' G2 Report on Ailtiri, 16 October 1942, G2/X/1320, Ailtiri na hAiseirighe, G2 Files, Military 
Archives, Rathmines. 
'0' Irish Independent, 7 December 1946, 'Plans of Ailtiri na hAiseirighe. ' 102 Irish Independent, 5 December 1947, 'Annual Convention of Ailtiri na hAiseirighe. ' 
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The party's finances were always a problem. The police investigated the party's 
source of revenue in 1943, and concluded: 
"... our enquiries and investigations have produced no evidence whatever that this 
organization is being financed by anything but National sources. An appeal for a 
E100,000 fighting fund yielded f goo.,, 103 
A later report stated that "revenue seems mainly to be derived from subscriptions, 
sale of pamphlets, and social functions. "' 04The party charged five shillings a year 
subscription, reduced to one shilling for the unemployed, but also asked for a weekly 
collection to be held by every branch. There was also an annual collection, seventy- 
five per cent of which was to be forwarded to the National Finance Officer and the 
remainder was to go to the Divisional Area Finance Officer. 105 The party also printed 
large numbers of copies of its journal and other publications, which all sold well, 
often into the thousands. In 1946, the party journal, A i1firi boasted a circulation of ten 
thousand copies. 106 
Ailtiri na hAiseirighe was organized, on paper at least, across the whole of Ireland, 
north and south. Each county counted as a divisional area. Dublin (Alha Cliath), 
Belfast (Beal Feirste), Cork (Corcaigh), and Doire Chomlmcille were divisions 
additional to these. Each division had an officer responsible for the area (An I-Ard- 
Cheannasaidhe ), who was directly responsible to the party leader (Ceannaire). The 
party leader was responsible for appointing the Executive (Ard-Fhuireann) 
comprising the Secretary, Finance Officer, Propaganda Officer and Organizer. By 
1947, the Executive was much larger with thirteen members, and included 
representatives from all four provinces. The divisions were further subdivided into 
103 Garda Siochana 1513143 P. Carroll to Officer in Charge G2 Re: Ailtiri na hAiscirighe, G2/X/1320, 
Ailtiri na hAiseirighe, G2 Files, Rathmincs. 
104 Notes on Ailtiri na hAiseirighe, 12 March 1945, G2/X/I 320, G2 FILES, Rathmines. '0' For National Government andAction, Ailtiri na hAiscirighe, ref Jr. 94109, NLI, Dublin. 106 Irish Independent, 9 December 1946, 'Plans of Ailtiri na hAiseirighe. ' 
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districts, which corresponded to the local government election areas, and in rural 
districts to the parish areas. 107 
There were two classes of membership, as there had been in the NCP, active and 
ordinary. Every member, on payment of their five shillings subscription, was required 
to wear the emblem of the organization, which consisted of a large lower case 'e, ' 
standing for Eire, entwined with the Christian cross. Every active member was 
required to become fluent in Irish within two years ofjoining. Ordinary members 
were given five years to achieve fluency. 108 The only other demand was that officers 
were required to attend the annual conference. A Military Intelligence report from 
August 1944 reported rumours that the party was due to create an armed body within 
the movement, but this did not occur. 109 
Apart from fielding candidates in the elections and putting out considerable 
amounts of printed materials, the party indulged in a number of symbolic gestures 
which gave it much needed publicity. During Easter Week, 1946, the 1916 
Proclamation was read by Aindrias 0 Scolaidhe, in Irish, on the steps of the GPO, 
followed by a parade to Arbour Hill Barracks. ' 10 In January 1946, the party had sent a 
telegram to the President of the UNO demanding England's evacuation of the North 
and recognition of the 1919 Dail Eireann Declaration of Independence. "' Two years 
earlier, in 1944, the party asked local authorities and public bodies to pass a resolution 
calling for a national plebiscite on the question of partition. A number of public 
bodies passed such a resolution. 112 The IFG had used a similar tactic to promote its 
107 AiltirinahAiseirighe, For National Government andAction, Ir. 94100, NLI, Dublin. 108 Ibid. 
109 Memo, 21 August 1944 quoting Captain M. Crotely, G2/X/1320, G2 Files, Military Archives, 
Rathmines. 
"0 Irish Press, 29 April 1946, 'Ailtiri flonours Easter Week. ' 
1" Irish Independent, 12 January 1946. 
112 Notes on Ailtiri na hAiseirighe, G2/X/ 1320, Aitiri na hAiseirighe, G2 Files, Rathmines 
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Clonmel Resolution to pressure De Valera's Government into recognizing the 
Nationalists as the legitimate government of Spain. 
By 1947, the party was in rapid decline. The collapse of the fascist powers isolated 
the party politically. The emergence of a new republican party under Sean MacBride, 
Clann na Poblachta (Children of the Republic), with its platforrn of "radical 
republicanism and social and economic reform"' 13 led to the defection of many of 
Ailtiri na hAiseirighe's membership. 114 Clann na Poblachta, "with its rousing 
speeches and torchlight processions, "I 15 combined with its statement that it intended 
to "give practical effect rather than lip service" to the Social Encyclicals of the 
popeSI 16 pulled in former members of Ailtiri na hAiseirighe. The wounded party 
struggled on, however, and continued to publish Ailliri into the fifties, but it had long 
since ceased to be an active political force. 
THE POLITICA L PR OGRA MME OF A IL TIRI NA hA ISEIRIGHE 
Ailtiri na hAiseirighe presented a programme to the Irish electorate that was 
unashamedly extreme, arguing for totalitarianism in place of parliamentary 
democracy at a time when Europe was engaged in a bitter war between the forces of 
democracy and authoritarianism. The party was extremely nationalistic and believed 
that the only way to create a uniquely Irish-speaking Gaelic state was through the 
creation of an interventionist, authoritarian government under a strong dictator who 
would create a Christian corporatist state that would be forced into becoming Gaelic 
and Irish-speaking. It was a clerico-fascist programme designed to appeal to a 
113 J. A. Murphy, 'The Irish Party System 1938-51', in Ireland in the War Years and After 1939-1951, 
ed. by Kevin B. Nowlan and T. Desmond Williams (Dublin, 1969), p. 157. 
114 Clann na Poblachta appealed to Republicans and former Blueshirts with its message of ending the 
bitterness of post-Civil War politics. 115D. G. Boyce, Nationalism in Ireland, (London, 1982), p. 358. 
116 Irish Independent, 24 January 1948. 
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devoutly Catholic population. After centuries of repressive anti-Gaelic British rule, 
this was deemed the only alternative to a parliamentary democratic system that had 
failed to restore a Gaelic Ireland, thus failing the martyrs of the 1916 Rising. The 
party produced copious amounts of literature to promote its cause, and its stress on 
politics as a way of restoring the Irish way of life gave it a cultural appeal that kept it 
in the limelight longer than its small membership would normally merit. 
The party presented its ideas within the framework of a critique of modem Irish 
society, particularly its culture and politics. It was this stress on Irish culture, and 
particularly language, that gave the movement its distinctive motif The party grew 
out of the Irish language movement. The Free State's adoption of Irish as the national 
language alongside English had failed to ensure the language's growth and use in 
everyday life. Ailtiri believed that the adoption of Irish as the sole national language, 
and its use as the vernacular of everyday life was essential if Ireland was to become 
completely independent of Britain. One pamphlet urged that every word of Irish 
spoken would help "to drive English and the Godless modernistic culture for which it 
stands out of Ireland once and for all. "' 17 The imposition, by an authoritarian state, of 
Gaelic as the spoken language would therefore isolate Ireland from those foreign 
influences which had undermined Irish culture in the first place. 
Ailtiri associated Britain with liberalism and atheism. ' 18 Blythe, one of the leading 
theoreticians and writers for the movement, described liberalism as a godless creed: 
"with its law of the jungle code of economics and social 'justice, ' economic 
disorganization, scarcity and plenty, vast annies of unemployed, millions for war, 
nothing for bread and economic production. "' 19 
117 N! Dhubhslaine, 1942, p. 6. Ailtiri pamphlet quoted in Gallagher, M., Irish Political Parties, p. 108. "'E. Blythe, The New Order in the New Ireland, (Dublin, 1942), NLI fr. 32341. 119 Ibid. 
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Ailtiri expected that the end of the Second World War would also see the end of 
liberalism which had already been severely crippled after the First World War. Ailtiri 
claimed that the economic and political dislocation caused by the war was too great 
for liberal economics to cope with, and therefore the death knell of liberal economics 
had been sounded. The scale of the problem caused by the war would require a drastic 
solution. Ailtiri offered as its solution, "ordered governmental control of production 
and Christian cooperation, " 120 and the immediate replacement of parliamentary 
democracy which was so intimately connected with economic liberalism. 
Ailtiri na hAiseirighe wanted to overhaul the economic, cultural and political 
structure of Ireland and modernize the state, making Ireland a role model for others to 
imitate. In Ailtiri na hAiseirighe's 16-point programme, the first article pronounced 
that : 
"[The] answer to communism is 'actualised Christianity. ' Restoration of national 
freedom and language will afford the necessary foundation for world service, because 
,, 121 only then can we fulfil adequately our modem international mission. 
Ailtiri na hAiseirighe envisaged that Ireland had a mission to act as a model for the 
successful application of Christian corporatism, but that this could only be achieved 
with the reunification of Ireland and the complete isolation of the people from the 
cultural, political and economic influence of Britain. This isolation from Britain was 
to be achieved through the enforced Gaelicization of Irish life, politics and culture and 
the elimination of foreign influences to as great an extent as possible. This would 
require the creation of a political system that recognized the principle of strong 
leadership, which the party claimed was one of the characteristics of the historic 
120 Ailitiri na hAiseirighe, The New Order in the New Ireland, (Dublin, 1942), NLI, 16234 1. 
12 1 Ailtiri na hAiseirighe, The New Order in the New Ireland, (Dublin, 1942), Ir. 32341, NLL 
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Gaelic state. 122 The party did not go into a great deal of detail about how such a 
marked change would come about, but ambitiously stated that: 
"All must give up speaking English. This can be done in five years with films, 
, 023 newspapers, radio etc. Bold decisive action is needed, now, before it is too late. 
But, before Gaelicization took place, complete independence from Britain was a 
political necessity. This would then be followed by "the fostering and strengthening 
of national morale through the restoration of the national language and the protection 
and promotion of Irish culture. " 124 Ailtiri na hAiseirighe recognized the value of 
modem propaganda methods and intended to make full use of them. 125 
Language was seen by the party as important in not only shielding Ireland from the 
perceived pernicious influence of Britain, but also in isolating Ireland from what the 
party saw as the inherent atheism of modem culture. Ailtiri wanted to replace it with a 
culture based on Catholic values and teachings. The party stated: 
"The importance of the national language as a shield against materialism and 
atheistic cultural influences is obvious. We shall be most Christian when we are most 
Gaelic, as in the past, for then we shall be nearer to capturing the spirit of 
Colmcille. "126 
The authoritarian state envisaged by Cunningham would exert complete control 
over the media. The ultimate vision was of a united Irish state where all spoke Ireland 
as a first language, read Irish literature and newspapers, listened to Irish radio 
broadcasts and watched Irish films, all wholesomely presented and deeply imbued 
with a Catholic and Gaelic ethos, as defined by the party. The extremism of these 
ideas, a form of cultural authoritarianism, attracted a group of enthusiasts who saw 
122 E. Blythe, Governmental PlanfOr the New Ireland, Blythe Papers P124/969, UCD Archives. 
123 Ibid. 
124 AWN na hAiseirighe, For National Government andAction, (no date), Jr94109, NLL 125 Ailtiri na hAiseirighe, The New Order in the New Ireland, (Dubl in, 1942), lr. 3234 1, N Ll. 
126 Ibid. Colmcille was a saint from Ireland's mediaeval golden age. 
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themselves as the vanguard of a new Gaelic revival. They viewed their mission as the 
promotion of a messianic message, a crusade to restore Catholic Ireland to its glorious 
heritage, thereby rescuing it from the defilement of British godless materialism. 
Catholicism, particularly its social angle, was central to its programme, and every 
party document stressed the importance of creating a state where the ideals of 
Christianity would flourish. Strict censorship, aided by the fact that publications in 
Gaelic would eventually replace all other language publications, would protect the 
population from ideas that were inimical to Christianity, but also presumably that 
were not in agreement with Ailtiri policies. In the field of economics, the imposition 
of corporatism would replace laissez-faire liberalism with Christian cooperation. In 
adopting the ideas of the Papal Encyclicals, Ailtiri hoped to ensure that society was 
"reorganized on a Christian vocational basis. "127 This creation of a model Christian 
state was presented by the party as a prerequisite for Ireland's new role in the world. 
Ireland would demonstrate the "re-presentation realistically to the modem world in a 
modem way of what is Christianity. "128 Christianity would be presented to the world 
as a practical creed for the twentieth century. Ailtiri hoped to create "in Ireland the 
most modem and progressive world state, but all along rigidly in accordance with 
Christian principles of social and economic justice. "129 Ailtiri proposed that the 
creation of a reinvigorated, overtly Christian state would give Ireland a cultural role in 
the twentieth century that would be as important as Greece had had in classical times. 
Ireland, as "the gateway to Europe and landing stage for America"13" had the 
advantage of geographical location from which to launch its Christian message to the 
world. The party's over-optimistic vision can also be gauged from the following 
127 Ibid. 
12'G. 0 Cuinneagain, Ireland's Twentieth Century Destiny, Blythe Papers P/24/974, UCD Archives. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid. 
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statement, when Cunningham stated that Ireland could, "in cooperation with Divine 
Providence ... settle the affairs of the universe for another two thousand years. " 
131 
Central to the party's political platform was the promotion of Catholic corporatist 
ideas. The party, unlike other right-wing groups, such as the NCP and the PNP, 
insisted that the source of its corporatist ideas was exclusively Catholic, and owed 
nothing to fascist states such as Mussolini's Italy. The most frequently cited model 
was Salazar's quasi-corporatist Estado Nuovo in Portugal. Ailtiri argued that Christian 
corporatism, which was frequently referred to as 'Functional Democracy, ' 132 was "the 
complete answer to the tyranny of modem atheistic statism, " 133 which would ensure 
that "human liberty and human dignity will be protected and safeguarded whilst ... the 
efficiency of economic and political administration is guaranteed. "] 34 
Ailtiri na hAiseirighe stressed that corporatism was being promoted as the only way 
to introduce Christian principles into the social and economic life of the nation. The 
party, in spite of its intense nationalism, looked abroad for inspiration and the party's 
publications had nothing but praise for "the modernization of the mediaeval guild 
system being so successfully re-introduced into Portuguese life by Salazar. " 135 The 
party had its own distinct vision of how the Irish corporate state would be structured 
and, largely under the guiding hand of Ernest Blythe, set out its own scheme of 
corporate organization in order to realize the ultimate aims of the party: 
"1G. 0 Cuinneagain as quoted in M. Gallagher, Irish Political Parties, p. 108. 132 The term 'Functional democracy' was used by Blythe, for example in Governmental Planfor the 
New Ireland, Blythe Papers, P/24/969, UCD Archives. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Ailtiri na hAiseirighe publication as cited in M. Gallagher, Political Parties in the Republic of 
Ireland, p. 108. 
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"Ailtiri na hAiseirighe will replace this absurd outmoded system with Christian 
Corporatism-Functional Democracy in a modem Gaelic State for thirty-two County 
Ireland. " 136 
The usual arguments for corporatism were put forward by the party; increased 
involvement by all the community in national politics, 137 the welfare of the nation, to 
preserve the sanctity of private property "consonant with the welfare of the 
community, " 138 and the embodiment of Christian principles in national economic 
iife. "139 
Aitiri was not afraid to align itself on the side of authoritarianism and even 
totalitarianism. The party argued that authoritarian government under a strong 
national leader was the key feature of Gaelic government, and that in modem terms 
this meant government by a single national party. 140 The party wanted "the Head of 
State to be the supreme authority during his seven years of office. ", 41 The new party 
would combine "the will of the people f with] the true welfare of the people. " 142 
Central to the idea of loyalty to the state would be "loyalty to a leader's fidelity to the 
noblest ideas, faithfulness to death ... true Celtic characteristics. " 
143 Party documents o 
frequently expressed the ideas of authoritarianism and loyalty to a leader as 
representing the Gaelic tradition, without recognizing that the tradition to which they 
referred was a pre-Mediaeval one and that political life had moved on since then. 
The difficult task ahead, said Ailtiri, would require a strong government under a 
firm leader: 
136 Ailtiri na hAiseirighe, Governmental Planfor the New Ireland, Blythe Papers, P/24/939, UCD 
Archives. 
137 Ibid. 
"8 G. 0 Cuinneagain, Ireland's Twentieth Century Destiny, Blythe papers, P/24/97 1, UCD Archives. 139 Ailtiri na hAiseirighe, For National Government andAction, pamphlet, no date, Ir 94109, NLI. 14" Ailtiri na hAiseirighe, Governmental Planfor the New Ireland, Blythe Papers, P/24/939, UCD 
Archives. 
14 ' G-0 Cuinneagain, Ireland's Twentieth Century Destiny, Blythe Papers, Pf24/97 1, UCD Archives. 
142 Ibid. 
143 
Ibid. 
267 
268 
"If we are in earnest in demanding that our national independence and territorial 
integrity be recognized, that a progressive financial, social, economic and Gaelic 
policy be implemented forthwith, we must be logical and practical and put in power a 
government that will be strong enough to resist dictation from any quarter 
whatsoever. "' 44 
Ailtiri's Gaelicization policy was coupled with a marked hostility to alien influences 
on Irish society. Ailtiri's policy and programme contained two closely linked 
statements: 
" 12. Measures to be taken for race preservation through the prohibition of 
emigration and the introduction of a scheme of State marriage grants and family 
allowances. 
"15. The elimination of the controlling influence of aliens and Freemasons and the 
expropriation of ground landlords. "145 
Hostility to Freemasonry, and other secretive organizations, had been evident in the 
Blueshirt and Greenshirt constitutions. Fascists and extreme nationalists worldwide 
objected to the secrecy of the Freemasons, but also to its adherence to the principle of 
universal brotherhood and its Deist philosophy. Ailtiri asked: 
"How an Irish Government can tolerate the existence of this anti-national, anti- 
Christian secret society for twenty-four hours is as mysterious as the ramifications of 
masonry itself. "146 
The party envisaged a complete overhaul of the system of government. A National 
Council of a hundred deputies would be created, fifty of whom would be elected by 
vocational bodies, and thirty-f ive nominated by the National Party. These deputies 
144 Ailtiri na hAiseirighe, The New Order in the New Ireland, (Dublin, 1942), Jr. 3234 1, NL1. 
145 Aitiri na hAiseirighe, For National Government and Action, pamphlet, 111.94109, NLL 146 Ailtiri na hAiseirighe, The New Order in the New Ireland, (Dublin, 1942), Ir. 3234 1, NLL 
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would sit for six years. W These eight-five deputies would elect the Ilead of State who 
would "... nominate an additional fifteen Deputies from amongst men of outstanding 
merit not otherwise selected and thus its independence of all parties and vested 
interests would be emphasized, and the National Council made truly representative of 
the nation, irrespective of political or economic affiliations. " 148 
The role of the National Council would be "to discuss all legislation and national 
affairs generally but voting will only take place on the occasion of the election of a 
Ceannaire Stait. "149 The deputies would also have the authority "to remove a head a 
State should this be necessary for a grave cause by a 66% vote. "] 50 
The county councils as they existed at the time were to be abolished and replaced by 
four provincial assemblies. 15 1 These would be elected triennially on a vocational 
electoral roll. Each province would have a Provincial Governor (Ceann Aiseidhe), 
appointed by the Head of State to be the Chief Executive officer in that province. 152 
This would ensure that there would be no regional power base to oppose the central 
government. The party hoped that the creation of these provincial assemblies would 
offer a solution to the partition problem as well helping to ensure economic efficiency 
and administrative modernization. 153 The Assembly for Ulster, however, would be for 
all nine historic counties of Ulster, not just those under the Stormont administration. 
This would guarantee a Catholic voting majority in the province. The seat of the 
Ulster Assembly would be at "Dun Geanainn, the seat of the O'Neill, " not in 
147 AiltirinahAiscirighe, Governmental Planfor the Nov Ireland. P/24/939, Bly1he Papers, UCD 
Archives. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Ailtiri na hAiseirighe, For National Government andAction, In 94109, NLI. "0 Ailtiri na hAiseirighe, Governmental Planfor the New Ireland, Blythe Papers, P/24/969, UCD 
Archives. 
'5' Ibid. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Ibid. 
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Belfast. 154 This governmental reorganization was then extended to the local level, with 
new parish councils elected solely by the heads of families. 155 The whole system of 
government envisaged in this plan was very centralized with real power resting firmly 
in Dublin and concentrated in the hands of the Head of State. There would only be 
one national party, which would allow controlled internal debate, but once a decision 
had been made it would be binding on all members: 
"In place of a multiplicity of petty bickering party organizations, a single national 
party, membership of which will be open to all patriotic Irish citizens who are willing 
to undertake systematic, unpaid public service. "' 56 
A national vanguard of committed youth would be the key to the implementation of 
Ailtiri's programme. This youthful vanguard, personally loyal to the party leader, 
disciplined and Gaelic in inspiration, would establish the state that the 1916 Easter 
rebels had fought and died for, replacing "talk, promises, procrastination and 
betrayal"157 with action. A national youth movement would organize the youth of the 
nation. Cunningham's intention was that "our youth will be the salt and salvation of 
the new Ireland, the real creators of the A iseirighe era. ', ' 58 Ailtiri would create a 
young, militant vanguard force who would replace the "tired and flabby politicians"' 59 
who had ruled the Free State. For Ailtiri, this "Young Ireland [was] the history of 
Ireland that is to be. "160 
Ailtiri's plans were for a complete overhaul of the Free State constitution, but the 
party also presented a package of social and economic reforms that it hoped would 
serve to modernize Ireland. The party sought root and branch reforms across the 
154 G. 0 Cuirmeagain, Ireland's Twentieth Century Destiny, pamphlet, NLI. 
155 Ibid. 
156AnPhaimpleidMalba, Blythe Papers, P/24/970, UCD Archives. 
157(3.0 Cuinneagain, Ireland's Twentieth Century Destiny, Blythe Papers, P/24/974, UCD Archives. 
15' Ibid. 
159 Ibid. 
160 Ibid. 
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legislative, economic and social spectrums and offered the Irish electorate a unique 
and radical alternative to the other parties. Ailtiri came into existence after the 
Depression, but the problems caused by the economic downturn and the economic 
war with Britain were still vivid in the eyes of the people of Ireland. Moreover, 
Ireland was still troubled by the problems of overpopulation and underemployment. 
Central to the programme of Ailtiri was an end to economic migration and the only 
way they saw to do this was to create more employment at home. The party proposed 
a massive programme of public works. It called for the erection of a hundred thousand 
new homes, the electrification of the railway system, the construction of a modernized 
road infrastructure, a national drainage scheme, the development of harbours, canals, 
and airports, shipping construction, the development of the turf industry as a solution 
to the fuel problem, and the exploitation of the nation's mineral wealth. 161 This 
enormous scheme of public work would have required massive funding and an 
unprecedented involvement by the government in the economy of the state. It was 
ambitious but it clearly aimed at creating a modem Irish state that could take its place 
in the family of modem European nations. 
Ailtiri's programme was over-ambitious and unrealistic and its programme of an 
interventionist state committed to control and nationalization "for the true welfare of 
the people"162 was hardly likely to appeal to a largely rural, conservative electorate. 
Ireland had seen little real economic development since independence. It was still 
economically backward, heavily reliant on an agricultural system tied to one market 
(Britain), and lacked a modem infrastructure. Ailtiri tied its demands for a Gaelic 
republic to a massive programme of modernization. Unfortunately, Ireland did not 
possess the industrial base or natural resources to fund the party's programme. It was 
161 Aildri na hAiseirighe, For National Government andAction, pamphlet, Ir. 94109, NLI. 
162M 
. Gallagher, Political Parties in the Republic ofIreland, p. 109. 
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a scheme that was consistently rejected by the voters throughout the 1940s. The 
population might, and did, show some interest in, and indeed enthusiasm for, the 
party's commitment to Irish language and culture but it remained unconvinced by its 
political or economic programme. Ultimately, Ailtiri na hAiseirighe served the Irish 
language well through its tireless and high profile campaigns for increased use of the 
language. However, it was unable to appeal to an electorate with its authoritarian 
political programme at a time when totalitarianism had been seen to be the cause of so 
much misery elsewhere in Europe where it had been tried, tested and found wanting. 
7be extremist organizations that emerged during the war years owed much of their 
membership and ideas to O'Duffy and his movement, but they tended to be more 
radical and more open in their commitment to extremist policies than the Blueshirts 
and Greenshirts had been. None of the movements were very large, consisting mainly 
of fascist fellow travellers. Much of the policy content of the movements was 
imitative, and they clearly showed a greater debt to Nazism than to Italian fascism. 
O'Duffy and Blythe continued to be involved peripherally but Irish politics had 
moved on and a new leadership began to emerge that coalesced around 
O'Cuinneagain and his extreme nationalist party. The small size of these movements 
demonstrates that the support for fascism was weak, though they could have provided 
Ireland with a fifth column of Axis collaborators in the event of a German invasion of 
Ireland. It was Ailtiri that owed the greatest debt to O'Duffy and the Greenshirts. The 
other groups were continental imitations that had no place in the political tradition of 
Irish nationalism. 
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CHAPTER SIX-THE CLAIM BY O'DUFFY TO ROOT IRISH FASCISM IN THE 
INDEPENDENCE STRUGGLE 
INTRODUCTION 
In the Greenshirts, Ireland had its own home-grown fascist movement that 
O'Duffy claimed was rooted in Irish history and political culture. Fascism was a 
European-wide ideology that only appeared after the First World War, but the ideas 
that were later synthesized to create fascist ideology and practice were present in 
European culture and politics long before then. This was the case in Ireland as in the 
rest of Europe. Fascism was an international phenomenon, and its focus on 
nationalism ensured that every country had its own particular form of fascism 
dependent on national character, history and politics, though they all owed a heavy 
debt to Italian Fascism and German Nazism. Fascism's opportunism and anti- 
intellectualism and its stress on action rather than ideas make defining generic fascism 
very difficult. O'Duffy was insistent that Ireland would take its own path to fascism, 
whilst acknowledging his debt to men like Mussolini. In this chapter, I shall explore 
the roots of Irish fascism and try to define what was particular about O'Duffy's 'green 
fascism. ' 
Ireland's long struggle for independence was led by a diverse group of men and 
women whose different political beliefs crystallized around Irish nationalism which 
would lead to the establishment of an independent state. After 1922, Ireland took the 
constitutional path of democracy though the insurrectionary tradition remained a 
powerful political influence. O'Duffy was able to pick out certain elements of the 
melange of ideas that had been aired and promoted during the independence struggle, 
promote them within a fascist organizational framework, and present the NCP as the 
logical development of these ideas. 
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THE GREENSHIR TS ASA FA SCIST MO VEMENT 
Payne acknowledges the difficulty of defining fascism because it often stressed 
action over ideology, and was a very pragmatic movement in practice. But fascism 
was more than this. It was also an ideology with a focus on creating a new ethos and 
an organic and united national state based on the principles of duty and hierarchy. 'All 
of these features are in evidence in the Greenshirts, a movement which placed great 
stress on youth and action to achieve national rebirth and regeneration, and where 
violence was hailed as the motive force of Irish history. 2 The action style of fascism 
was reflected in the extremism of its opposition to liberal democracy and socialism 3 
and its military-style organization, using the liturgical trappings of a theatrical style of 
politics in an attempt to inspire and to mobilize the population. 4 O'Duffy imitated 
continental fascism, selectively adapting it to fit his nationalist vision, focusing his 
energies on destroying liberal parliamentarianism and parading corporatist ideas as 
the panacea for what he perceived as the failure of Irish governments to carry through 
the ideals of the Irish revolution. 
Historians who have examined the Blueshirts are in agreement that it was not a 
fascist organization, though in its early days it had the potential to develop into a 
fascist movement as its extra-parliamentary, corporatist and aggressive style seemed 
to indicate. However, the drift in a fascist direction came to a halt with the absorption 
of the movement into the conservative Fine Gael alliance, which was able to 
effectively neuter the growing fascist element in the movement, as would happen 
1S. G. Payne, Fascism- Comparison and Definition (Madison, 1980), p. 8. 
2 Z. Sternhell, in The Birth ofFascist Ideology (Princeton, 1994), pp. 7-8, recognized fascism's focus 
on vitalism and violence, and the exaltation of force as the motivating force of history and a necessary 
expression of national unity against any threat, external or internal. 3 S. G. Payne, Fascism-Comparison and Definition (1980), p. 7. 4 Ibid. p. 11. 
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elsewhere in Europe. The subject has been discussed in some detail by Mike Cronins 
and Maurice Manning. 6 
The Blueshirts contained a fascist element amongst the leadership but the rank and 
file members was more concerned with issues related to the Civil War and domestic 
politics (particularly the economic war) than with promoting a comprehensive fascist 
agenda. Whilst the Blueshirts possessed some fascist traits7 they were not opposed to 
8 democracy as such, nor did they advocate a dictatorship. The absorption into Fine 
Gael, and the inability of the few genuine fascists in the coalition to transform the new 
party, resulted in the Blueshirt split of 1934 and the emergence over the next year of 
Ireland's fascist party, the NCP. 
Inspired by his participation in the international fascist scene, and embittered by his 
experience in the Fine Gael coalition, O'Duffy created a fascist party, though like 
most fascist parties it never used that label. 9 Stanley Payne defines generic fascism as 
identifiable by a common set of negatives (anti-liberalism, anti-communism and anti- 
conservatism), 10 a new style and organization and a new orientation in political 
culture, " which would place the Greenshirts within this political grouping. 
O'Duffy's Greenshirts adopted a "vague Weltanschaung (world view) rather than ... an 
intellectual dialectic, "12 and presented to the Irish people a programme that reflected 
this. The party was anti-liberal, anti-democratic, anti-parliamentary and anti-British 
but it was more than this. The party aimed to win power through the electoral process 
and then destroy the liberal-democratic parliamentary system that O'Duffy closely 
'5M. Cronin, The Blueshirts and Irish Politics, pp. 38-68. 
6 M. Manning, The Blueshirts, pp. 232-244. 
7 These fascist elements include nationalism, a commitment to corporatism, the liturgical element and a 
strong commitment to youth. 
8 M. Manning, The Blueshirts, pp. 243-244. 
9 S. Payne, Fascism, Comparison and Definition, p. 4. 
'0 Ibid. p. 7. 
11 Ibid. p. 6. 
12 A. Cassels, 'Janus: The Two Faces of Fascism, ' in H. A. Turner (ed), Reappraisals ofFascism (New 
York, 1975), pp. 69-70. 
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associated with continuing British hegemony. The NCP, more than any other fascist 
movement in Europe, committed itself to corporatism as its core policy, offering a 
clear alternative that would have transformed the Irish political structure and political 
culture. A central idea in fascism was the idea of a 'national revolution. ' 13 There is 
still no consensus about whether fascism was revolutionary or reactionary in nature 
and the Greenshirt movement provides a further example of a movement beset by 
these contradictions. 
The party owed a major debt to Italian fascism. Ledeen notes that after the 
Montreux conference in 1935, O'Duffy went to Rome along with Meyer, Loutkie, and 
Fonjallez, "ultramontanist members of the International,, " 14 who specifically looked to 
Italy for a lead. On numerous occasions, O'Duffy praised Mussolini in speeches and 
in print. Like Mussolini's Italy, O'Duffy portrayed Ireland as an organic community 
and emphasized the need for national rebirth after centuries of decline. This also had 
much in common with the Belgian fascist Degrelle's concept of Le Pays Reel, which 
in turn owed much to Maurras' idea of an organic nation. This rebirth would involve 
the nation in a spiritual revolution against the materialism and cultural hegemony of 
alien forces that were a threat to the organic community. 
The NCP, unlike the Blueshirt movement, was a political party that aimed to have a 
wide enough appeal to win power through the ballot box and O'Duffy set up an 
organizational structure to achieve this aim. Membership was open to all who 
supported the party's aims but leadership remained firmly in the hands of the 
uniformed vanguard section, the Greenshirts. 15 Like other fascist movements, it was 
populist in seeking to activate the whole nation whilst being elitist in that the popular 
13 Zeev Sternhall discusses the idea of the 'national revolution' in detail in The Birth offascist 
Ideology (Princeton, 1994). 
14 M. A. Ledeen, Universal Fascism (New York, 1987), p. 128 
15 Special Branch Report, SJune 1935, D/JusS/296, NAL 
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will was presumed to be embodied in a cadre of uniformed activists. 16 The existence 
of this military wing is demonstrative of the party's commitment to a new kind of 
militarised, masculine politics that stressed strength, vitality, action and aggression. 
In common with most other fascist movements, the party was organized 
hierarchically with a strong leadership focus on O'Duffy. The unifonned Greenshirts 
were required to take a pledge of loyalty to the party and its leadership. As an 
authoritarian fascist party, the NCP hoped to replace pluralist politics with a 
hierarchical one-party state with O'Duffy as it leader. Whilst hardly a charismatic 
leader, O'Duffy was a popular, and well-known, national figure. He had a loyal 
personal following and a long history of service to the nation. He always took centre 
stage and there was an attempt to develop a leadership cult around him, as 
demonstrated by his reception at party meetings with the cry 'Hoch O'Duffy. ' His 
agenda was adopted wholesale at party conferences and O'Duffy always appeared as 
the central figure at rallies and ceremonies. The party depended on O'Duffy for its 
focus and drive, and with O'Duffy out of the country in 1936-7, the party folded, 
unable to function without his leadership and motivation. 
The party stood on an avowed platform of creating a new political culture and a new 
political system to go with it. The replacement of the pluralism of the parliamentary 
system with a corporate political structure under a strong president would put an end 
to party politics, whilst ensuring a central role for the Greenshirts in the new 
monolithic corporate republic as a uniformed state auxiliary, thus integrating party 
and state. Political unity would replace the divisiveness of party politics. The NCP 
intended to ban all political parties but the mobilization of society would be 
16 FL Griffin, The Nature ofFascism, p. 37. 
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guaranteed by participation in the corporate structure by the population at all levels. 17 
The party was populist in intent but elitist in practice. 18 
O'Duffy frequently spoke of the need for the nation to make sacrifices on the road 
to national greatness and aimed to use the state apparatus and control of the economy 
to mobilize the population and to force through the changes he believed were 
necessary. O'Duffy wanted a dictatorship of the Irish people, whose 'National Will' 
would be embodied in the Greenshirt movement. He personally stated that he had no 
problems with Ireland becoming a dictatorship, 19 providing that he was the dictator. 
National unity was essential for O'Duffy, and he proposed a radical social 
programme to ensure that the workers were won over to the nation state, and not 
sidetracked by class politics. This social element was common to most fascist 
movements, the twist being that it was socialism based on the nation and not on 
divisive class interests. In the independence struggle, many nationalists had been wary 
of class politics side-tracking the pure nationalist struggle, though others such as 
Connolly looked to independence as a way of inaugurating a socialist Ireland. The 
NCP presented a full programme of social security benefits, welfare and 
unemployment legislation in order to create a society that was not divided by 
economic disadvantage and privilege, and to seduce the workers from socialism. 
O'Duffy believed that an interventionist state would bind together the citizens of 
Ireland, ensuring their loyalty by tackling the social question. This led to a stress on 
community rather than the individual, positing the idea of organic community rather 
than liberal individualism where rights were less important than duty. The new fascist 
17 Documents issued by L of Y (O'Duffy Section), D/Jus 8/296, NAL 
18 R. Griffin, The Nature offascism, P. 4 1. 
19 The Blueshirt, 15 June 1935, T lueshirt Corporate Policy. ' 
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man would be grounded in what Sternhell refers to as "organic solidarity.,, 20 The 
policies and publications of the Greenshirts continually stressed the interests of the 
community over the rights of the individual, and vilified anything that threatened the 
unity of the community. Irish fascism, like all fascisms, was "fundamentally a 
conception of life, a total conception of national, political, social and economic life. ý92 1 
The social measures that the NCP proposed were intended to put an end to class 
politics and to stamp, out any tendencies to the divisiveness of socialism, where class 
rather than nation was paramount. Like many after the Great War, the Greenshirts 
-22 came to believe that "the motor of history is not Class but Nation. O'Dufly's 
continued his promotion of the idea of a 'Red Menace' in Ireland, making clear his 
fascist party's commitment to anti-communism. He intended to use it to mobilize 
support for his party, the most hostile of Irish parties to communism. However, as 
Stradling notes, "anti-Communism ... became a highly convenient vehicle for his 
political cared"23 much as for Senator McCarthy in fifties America. Like most fascist 
parties, the NCP made the struggle against communism one of the central aims of the 
movement. O'Duffy objected to communism on ideological grounds particularly its 
internationalism, its opposition to hierarch Y24 and its stress on economic determinism. 
Pragmatically, the party's vehement opposition to communism was intended to appeal 
to a devoutly Catholic population, but it failed to strike a chord. 
O'Duffy wanted to control the economy in the national interest. The state would 
mobilize the country's economic potential to modernize the Irish nation and create a 
sound economic base, with a larger industrial sector, to ensure the nation's economic 
20Z. Sternhell, 'Fascist Ideology, ' in Walter Laquer, Ed., Fascism, a Reader's Guide (flannondsworth, 
1979), p. 371. 
21 Ibid. p. 354. 22 Z. Stemhell, La Droite Revolutionnaire 1885-1914, Les Origines Francaises Du Fascisme, p. 411. 23 R. Stradling (1995), Franco's Irish Volunteers, p2. 
24 Labour in the Corporate State, Lecture by O'Duffy, D/Jus8/296, NAL 
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as well as political independence from Britain. The policy had much in common with 
Arthur Griffith's Sinn Fein programme. Sternhell's statement that fascism aimed to 
"root the national economy in the nation's Soil, qiM is particularly relevant to the 
Greenshirts whose economic policy was based on the control of the Irish agricultural 
economy in order to develop Ireland's weak industrial infrastructure. The state would 
become an agent of modernization. O'Duffy wanted to control free market capitalism 
to create a "new communal or reciprocal productive relationship. , 26 Whilst NCP 
policy documents were thin on detailed plans and policies, the structure of the Irish 
corporate republic reflected fascism's obsession with planning and direction. 
Griffin's analysis and definition of fascism gives a central place to the importance of 
what he termed 'palingenetic myth. 927 Fascism promotes the idea of a revolutionary 
utopia whilst trying to achieve power, which provides an outlet for the idealism and 
sacrifice of its supporters. At the core of fascist ideology is the myth which unites and 
mobilizes, promising a transformation of a decadent society in crisis into a dynamic 
utopia that combines nostalgia for a romanticized past with a modernizing vision of 
the ftiture . 
28 As Griffin argues: "The basic drive of a fascist regime is to create a 
strong state as the protector of a national community immune from the 'anarchic' 
, iN forces of dissent so that its distinctive vulture can flower once more. 
This palingenetic ultra-nationalism is evident in O'Duffy's movement. The concept 
of "a national rebirth to be brought about by finding a 'Third Way' between 
liberalism/capitalism and communism/socialism"30 was central to O'Dufly's 
programme. He claimed that the Free State had failed to realize the ideals for which 
25Z. Sternhell, Fascist Ideology, p. 374. 26S. Payne, Fascism, Comparison and Definifiot4 p. 10. 27 R. Griffin, The Nature ofFascism, p. 26 28 [bid. pp. 31-33 29 Ibid. p. 48. 
30 R. Griffin, International Fascism: Theories, Causes and the New Consensus, p. 23 8. 
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he claimed the rebels of 1916 had died. He pictured Ireland as being in a state of 
crisis. He did not create a new myth but developed an existing one. His aim was the 
creation of a united, Gaelic, 32-county republic, a nation that would be a cultural 
beacon fully independent, politically and economically, from Britain. The creation of 
a republic was central to his programme and he claimed to have inherited the 
nationalist mantle of Pearsc, Collins and Griffith. At Beal na Blath in 1937, O'Duffy 
reminded his followers that Michael Collins "had left behind a message for the Irish 
people that should he fall, Eoin O'Duffy would carry on.,, 3 'He argued that the party 
politicians had abandoned the ideals of the 1916 revolution in pursuit of self-interest. 
They had failed to carry through on those ideals or diluted them. However, in reality 
the political ideals of the 1916 revolutionaries were as disparate as they were vague. 
O'Duffy's speeches were full of nationalist rhetoric and the promise of a golden age 
based on the ideals of his nationalist predecessors. He took these ideals and presented 
them in the context of 1930's politics. Obviously, the world had moved on since the 
Easter Rising, and for O'Duffy fascism was best suited to carry the nation on to the 
Republic. Liberal democracy had failed and action, organization and the mobilization 
of the entire nation was O'Duffy's fascist alternative. His speeches were full of calls 
for sacrifice, including the ultimate sacrifice of blood and the need for a national 
cleansing through violence against those who had held Ireland back. 32 
This call to arms was accompanied by the constant use of nationalist symbolism, 
and O'Duffy stressed the need for ceremony, liturgy and the adulation of martyrs, 
imitating the trappings of continental fascism. This was in evidence from the launch 
of the party at the Ard Fheis in 1935 where so many of the motions were concerned 
with the symbolism of the movement. The later change of uniform colour to Irish 
31 Speech by Eoin O'Duffy at Beat na Blath, 30 August 1936, cited in R. Stradling, The Irish and the 
ýpanish Civil War (Manchester, 1999), p. 32. 3z The Nation, March 1936, 'Tribute to Released Prisoner. ' 
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green, the return to the uniform hat of 1916, the shamrock flag, and the title of the 
party journal were all attempts to hijack national symbols in the fascist cause. The 
uniform, marching songs and graveside orations owed much to continental fascism, 
but also to Irish nationalism which had witnessed the rapid, though temporary, 
militarization of society from 1912 onwards. His attempt to re-militarise Irish politics, 
an increasingly anachronistic approach by the thirties, led to a stress on youth and 
masculinity, 33 to action and vitalism than to detailed programmes. The Greenshirts 
were never responsible for the levels of violence associated with the Blueshirts but 
this was principally due to the small size of the movement. It would eventually lead to 
O'Duffy organizing the Irish Brigade. The Spanish Civil war would provide an 
opportunity to give his followers a taste of warfare that Irish society had not seen 
since the Irish Civil War. 34 War was the ultimate masculine experience, a form of 
political activity that shaped character. 35 The evidence for the irrational in Irish 
fascism comes from O'Duffy rhetoric of struggle, war, blood sacrifice and the need to 
root the nation in the soil to preserve Irish culture. The Iron Guard of Romania 
similarly combined agrarian radicalism with a tradition of romantic nationalism 36 and 
added an element of religious mysticism, 37 whilst the liturgical element owed much to 
Nazi and Italian Fascist examples. For both Romanian and Irish fascists, nationality 
was embodied in the people and soil, and for both movements national imperialism 
mainly constituted the expulsion of foreigners and foreign interests rather than 
territorial expansion. 38 The Iron Guard also utilized religion as a propaganda tool in 
33 Females were 26% of Blueshirt membership, but this had declined to only 7% of Greenshirts. See 
chapter 4 of this thesis, p. 83. 34 It would also allow O'Duffy to support an ideological ally, Franco. 35 M. Neocleous, Fascism (Buckingham, 1997), p. 17. 36 p. Hayes, Fascism (London, 1973), p. 55. 37 B. Vargo, 'Fascism in Eastern Europe, ' in W. Lacquer, Fascism, a Reader's Guide, 
(Harmondsworth, 1975), p. 277. MIdeology ofRomanian Fascism, p. 4. Retrieved October 2003 from: 
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order to win over a devout, and superstitious, Orthodox population. Frequent use was 
made of prayers, chants and religious processions, whilst it was claimed that 
Christianity was an essential part of Romanian fascist ideology because it was 
considered responsible for the continuity of the Romanian people. 39 O'Duffy followed 
in the footsteps of Irish nationalists in recognising the Catholic faith as an essential 
part of the Irish identity, where 90% of the population were Catholics, and practicing 
Catholics at that, 40 and including a religious element in the liturgical trappings and 
propaganda of the Greenshirts. 
The NCP was a fascist party of action, of deeds not words. Therefore, we find that 
ideological content, practical programmes and concrete policies were distinctly 
lacking in a movement that stressed the need to exploit every situation to achieve the 
party's aims, rather than rely on detailed policies and paperwork. It was this focus on 
action that would help to mould the new fascist man providing the mobilized 
vanguard which would inspire the nation into embracing the new fascist era and focus 
and direct the 'National Will. ' The Greenshirts would be at the top of a hierarchical 
system that would radicalise, politicise and mobilize the population. They were to 
form a new elite whose destiny would be to replace the tired old men of the 
independence struggle and Civil War and those who had failed to carry through on 
their promises and vision. O'Duffy would ensure that his new party would be an 
autonomous movement with its own social base in the youth of the nation. O'Duffy, 
like "Degrelle, like the Italian Futurists and Jose Antonio in Spain, knew how to build 
, A1 on the conflict of generations. 
This idealism, and the need to isolate the party from the divisiveness of Treaty 
politics, led to the idealization of youth so evident in most fascist movements. This 
39 Ibid. p. 5 
40 Rý Stradling, 'Franco's Irish Volunteers' p2. 41 H. R- Kedward, Fascism in ivestern Europe 1900-45 (Glasgow, 1969), p. 97. 
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was not only reflected in the number of young people attracted to fascism throughout 
Europe, but also in the youthfulness of the party leadership. O'Duffy himself was 
only forty when he became leader of the Blueshirts, and forty-four when he founded 
the NCP. Many other fascist leaders, such as Degrelle, Mussolini, and indeed Hitler 
himself became party leaders at a comparatively young age. 42 
O'Duffy distanced himself on several occasions at this time from the biological 
fascism of Hitler's Nazism. 43 However, his party j ournal produced a number of anti- 
Semitic articles, and later, during the war, O'Duffy was to come down firmly on the 
side of Hitler, as did his colleagues Walsh and Gunning, embracing Nazi racism and 
anti-Semitism. O'Duffy was not just a cultural or chauvinistic nationalist. His 
nationalism was imbued with racism, and the idea of a superior Irish 'race' was 
central to his political vision. Lacking any significant national minority, O'Duffy 
focused on Ireland's traditional enemy, Britain, and on the politicians in Ireland who 
had worked so closely to ensure that Ireland was still politically and economically tied 
to Britain. He vilified Britain at any opportunity and racial slurs, vulgar stereotypes 
and falsifications were part of O'Dufly's rhetoric when describing Britain's continued 
influence on his country, just as Maurras vilified external enemies, principally Britain 
and Gen-nany at every opportunity. 44 The irredentist problem of Northern Ireland was 
also used to mobilize support, and he was not averse to using extremely aggressive 
language, including threats of military action towards the British in the North, to 
rouse his supporters. 
O'Duffy's militant nationalism was an inclusive one that did not take account of the 
economic, cultural, political and national identity of the Northern Protestants. Ile was 
42 For an in-depth discussion of the background of fascist leaders see ed. S. E. Larsen, B. I langtvet, and 
JP Mykelbust et at, no Were the Fascists; Social Roots ofEuropean Fascism (Bergen, 1980). 43 The Nation, 29 June, 1935, 'Editorial. ' 
44 E. Nolte, Three Faces offascism (New York, 1969), pp. 175-6 
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a practicing Catholic and he used Catholicism as an identifying badge of Irishness. 
However, his was not a clerico-fascism that envisaged a significant political role for 
the Catholic Church in the new state on the lines of Croatian Ustashism. Ile used 
Catholicism pragmatically, as he used anti-communism, to attract a religious 
population to his fascist programme. He did not, in his speeches or policy documents, 
envision the positive cooperation between clericalism and fascism that presupposes a 
clergy more or less identical with the fascist elemene5 and clerical support for the 
Greenshirt movement was distinctly lacking. O'Dufly's corporatism owed more to 
Mussolini than to the Vatican's social encyclicals, though he led people to believe that 
his party's programme was in line with the Catholic Church's social programme. 
O'Duffy wanted to create a strong national state that would be able to achieve full 
and complete independence from Britain. As a small nation, Ireland could never hope 
to be a major world power or imperialist nation. O'Duffy hoped that fascism would 
create the conditions with which to create a nation of cultural importance. O'Duffy 
envisaged that Ireland's small size would be out of proportion to its eventual cultural 
significance. 46 For O'Duffy, the liberal democratic state had failed Irish cultural 
nationalism, and only an authoritarian directive state could force through the policies 
needed to rescue Ireland. Like fascists across Europe, O'Duffy was convinced that 
strong personal leadership was essential for the implementation of the drastic 
programme he envisaged. O'Duffy believed that he was the leader that Ireland 
needed, and that he could restore the Gaelic nation which would be an inspiration to 
the rest of Europe. By this time, however, for most people in Ireland, fascism meant 
oppression and violence (and much of O'Duffy's aggressive rhetoric only served to 
support this idea), and Ireland was not a country ready to return to that path. 
43 G. Whitlock, What is Clero-Fascism? Retrieved October 2003 from: 
hl! p: //home: earthlink. net/-velid/cf/wicfhtml 
43 E. O'Duffy, Lecture on Corporative System, DIJusIS1296, NAL 
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Independent Ireland was well on its way on the road to modernisation in spite of its 
weak economic base, and the polarities in its politics was very different from the rest 
of Europe, which allowed large-scale fascist parties to emerge. 
O'DUFFY'SAZTEMPT TO ROOTIRISHFASCISMIN THE INDEPENDENCE 
STRUGGLE 
Modem Irish nationalism bound together people who held a wide range of 
conflicting views on the nature and structure of the future Irish state. It rose as an anti- 
colonial movement within a liberal democracy. Organizations such as Sinn Fein 
exploited Anglophobia and resentment for propaganda purposes. There was no single 
Irish historical political tradition, but a complex interplay of ideas that nationalists 
promoted. O'Duffy claimed that post-independence Ireland was bitterly divided, 
though as Regan argues, a particular consensus had in fact emerged in Irish politiCsý7 
that was "Conservative, Catholic and homogenoUS,, A8 Irish fascism failed because his 
programme was at odds with this political consensus. 
O'Duffy was not alone in reaching back to the independence struggle for its myths 
and source of legitimacy. Politicians and intellectuals needed to create the "imagined 
community"A9 of the new nation. Kiberd argues that the politicians of the Free State 
were not successful because nationalists did not have a clear enough image of what an 
independent Ireland would be like. 50 As Beffesford Ellis notes, "Successive 26-county 
governments [and political parties] from 1921 to date, have claimed an inheritance 
from the national struggle for independence, and appeals have been made to the spirit 
47 J. M Regan, The Irish Counter-Revolution 1921-36, Chapter] 6. 
48 T. J. White, Nationalism and Liberalism in the Irish Context. Eire-Ireland Journal offrish Studies p. 5 49 Ibid. p. 3 
50 D. Kiberd, 'Modem Ireland: Postcolonial or EuropeanT in S. Murray, Not On Any Map: Essays on 
Postcoloniality and Cultural Nationalism (Exeter, 1997). 
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of every uprising from 1798 to 1916. " 51 The emergent Free State reflected the values 
of the revolutionaries, creating what O'Brien terms "holy Catholic national iSM.,, 52 
Violence was seen by some of the 1916 insurrectionists as essential in confirming 
Ireland's identity, arguing that independence could only be won through struggle, not 
bestowed on the Irish by the British. The collective liberation of the Irish people was 
tied in with an almost mystical belief in the value of sacrifice, martyrdom and 
violence. However, this was a minority view until 1916. The Great War had served to 
radicalise Irish politics which had been drifting in a stable constitutional direction for 
the previous forty years, and in which the Irish Parliamentary Party, not Sinn Fein, the 
IRB nor the Gaelic League, had the key role. The IPP was the "backbone of the new 
Irish Catholic political establishment" who, along with most Irish men and women, 
were satisfied with the imminence of Home Rule. 53 Ireland, as an integral part of the 
United Kingdom had shared in its growth and modernisation, to the extent that Lee 
claims that Ireland betweenl 848 and 1918 had showed the most rapid progress 
towards modernisation of any country in Europe. 54 Ilere had been a cultural 
explosion at the end of the Nineteenth century; the small number of active cultural 
nationalists however were disproportionate in the influence they managed to wield. 
However, they were a minority movement who were eclipsed by the appeal to the 
55 
electorate of IPP pragmatism. 
The 1916 insurrection changed the face of Irish politics; "it was a gesture spawning 
myths of considerable power. , 56 The Proclamation of 1916, which O'Duffy was later 
to adopt as the central plank of his national policy, was a "simplistic version of 
51 P. Berresford Ellis (1989) 'Revisionism in Irish Historical Writing' p. 2 
52 C. C. O'Brien, God Land, Reflections on Religion and Nationalism (Cambridge, 1998) 
53 R. V. Comerford, The Fenians in Context, p. 248. 
54 J. Lee, The Afodernisation of Irish Society 1848-1918, (1973), p. 168 
'55 F. S. L. Lyons, IrelandSince the Famine, p. 260. 
56 R. English, Radicals in the Republic. Socialist Republicanism in the IFS 1925-37. p. 2 
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Ireland's past and present ... mutilated for contemporary propaganda purposes.,, 
57 It 
was the propaganda of a clique who were claiming to act in the national interest, 
perceiving the Irish as a united nation, and binding and committing the disparate band 
of insurrectionists, nationalist and socialist, to a vague programme that ignored the 
realities of contemporary Ireland, and which vilified Britain as Ireland's historical 
oppressor. The ideologically unsophisticated Volunteers, whose numbers were 
swelled by the imposition of conscription, were inspired by opposition to the English 
as Ireland's oppressor, which in turn justified their insurrectionary response. 58 For 
most Volunteers it was not cultural nationalism that inspired them to fight, but the 
long historical oppression of the Irish by the British over centuries (particularly 
demonstrated in the struggle over the land issue) and the history of resistance to this 
rule. 59 There was less a positive image of what Irishness was, than a negative attitude 
to the British. Republicans were at great pains to argue strongly for a distinct Gaelic 
Irish nation, an indication of the lack of widespread acceptance of such an identity. 
"In reality, Volunteers themselves rarely claimed that it was its distinct cultural and 
,, 60 social order that gave Ireland its right to independence. A significant number were 
socialists, followers of Connolly, who in allying themselves with the IRB nationalists 
effectively neutered Irish socialism for years. These socialists defined their 
nationalism "by particular, material, socio-economic conflicts and relations" based on 
the image of the British as class oppressors, rather than the spiritual nationalism of 
nationalist mythology. 61 But anti-capitalist class conflict was not the main cause of the 
1916 revolution, though there were significant socio-economic dynamics that 
57 Ibid. pp. 4-5 
58 J. Auguseteijn, 'Motivation; Why Did they Fight For Ireland. The Motivation of Volunteers in the 
Revolution! p. 104 59 Ibid. p. 109-114. 60 Ibid. p. 103 6' R. English Radicals and the Republic. Socialist Republicanism in the Irish Free State 1925-3 7 
(Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1994), p. 10. 
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contributed to the radicalisation of Irish politics. 62 Significantly, O'Duffy, and many 
others, failed to acknowledge the key role played by socialists in the independence 
struggle. 
A decade later, O'Duffy returned to the myths of the independence struggle for the 
source of his ideals. He wanted to lead a political party that, in his view, would 
"recapture that afl-embracing transcendental position occupied by the Sinn Fein 
movement of 1918-2 1. )963 What he failed to acknowledge was that "it was a 
phenomenon peculiar to the circumstances, not some magical ideology that could be 
bottled and kept for use in future elections. '*64 By this time, he had been strongly 
influenced by the fascism of Mussolini. He took the ideals of the earlier nationalists 
and blended them in a new synthesis with corporatist ideas. To this new synthesis, 
O'Duffy added the trappings of fascism. De Valera was promoting his own nationalist 
vision, but within a liberal democratic framework as opposed to O'Duffy's corporate 
state; de Valera "conceptualised the ideal Irish society as rural, athletic, agrarian 
ascetic, religious family-centred if not communal and (many would argue) sexist. , 65 
The people of Ireland wholeheartedly rejected O'Duffy's option, its methods and 
programme. The early part of this chapter identified the fascist nature of the 
Greenshirt movement. The rest of this chapter will take different aspects of O'Duffy's 
programme and trace their development from the earlier independence struggle. 
62 R. English, 'Socialist Republicanism in Independent Ireland 192249' in M. Cronin and J. Regan 
(eds), Irelan& The Polincs ofIndependence, 1922-49(London, 2000) pp. 88-89 63 B. Feeney, Sinn Fein (Dublin, 2002) p. 9 1. 64 Ibid. p. 91 
65 T. J. White, Nationalism vs Liberalism in the Irish Context, Eire-Irelan4 p. 6 
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THE GAELIC REPUBLIC 
The Gaelic Revival of the late nineteenth century led by men such as Eoin 
MacNeill, 66 Douglas Hyde 67 and David Moran 68 argued the case for a distinct Irish 
identity. The Free State adopted the Gaelic revival as state policy, particularly in the 
education system and support for the Gaeltacht. In the 1930s, O'Duffy was to claim 
that the two major parties had failed to follow through on the Gaelic Ireland idea that 
encapsulated a republic and cultural nationalism. He claimed that only an 
authoritarian state would have the power to carry these through to completion, 
including the restoration of the communitarian aspect of Gaelic culture through the 
creation of a corporate system. However, it is important to stress that the utopian 
myths were just that, myths, and that their value was as propaganda and as 
legitimising agents. Regan argues that Gaelic and Catholic idealism, coupled with 
romantic nationalist assumptions served to bind together Irish nationalists, thereby 
transcending the class backgrounds of the rebels. 69 
The Gaelic Revival brought together neo-traditionaliStS, reformists and 
assimilationists 70 in a movement that was "committed to conservative, atavistic and 
even racialist principles .,, 
7 1 Each group had a different focus but the two main strands 
of the movement were linguistic (proposing the reconstruction of a populist rural 
Gaelic civilization based on customs and language) and literary (stressing the reality 
of Ireland as an Anglo-Irish nation, they focused on the use of the English language 
and literature infused with the legends and ideas of the Gaelic peasant). The two 
6613oin MacNeill was ajournalist and nationalist who later became C in C of the Irish Volunteers and 
later Minister for Education in 1925. 
67 Douglas Hyde was an academic who became President of the Gaelic league in 1893, and was later a 
member of the Senate and first president of Ireland. (193845). 
68 D. P. Moran founded the Leader in 1900, which became a focus for nationalist sentiment. fie was 
active in the Gaelic League. 
69 R. English, 'Socialist Republicanism in Independent Ireland 1922-49, ' p. 88 
70 J. Hutchinson, The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism (London, 1987), p. It 7. 71 S. F. Moran, The Politics ofRedemption (Washington, 1994), p. 54. 
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separate visions came together in the Gaelic Revival. Hyde, Moran and MacNeill led 
the former group, central to whose mission was the re-establishment of Gaelic as the 
vernacular of the Irish people. They hoped that a revitalized Ireland would act as 
cultural world leader. 72 Nevertheless, there were major divisions between these 
individuals, particularly Hyde and Moran. Hyde, for example, derived his inspiration 
from "Anglo-Irish, rather than Gaelic concepts of Ireland. "73 Hyde was unable to 
distinguish between Anglicisation and modernization, and the need to adopt new 
cultural norms for a modem society. It is important to stress too that it was a cultural 
not a political movement. For the Gaelic League "language revival came before 
politics9,74 and whilst the IRB gradually infiltrated the movement it could never be 
,, 75 seen as "a nursery of revolutionaries. 
W. B. Yeats, as the most important representative of the Anglo-Irish vision, saw the 
peasant as the custodian of national culture in contrast to the urban culture of the 
British. He sought the "resurrection of the spirit that would launch a new renaissance 
,, 76 of the Irish people. Yeats foresaw the emergence of a New Man, purified by his 
rejection of British materialist culture and a return to rural peasant values and an 
almost mystical attachment to the soil and the community. His extreme approach with 
its stress on peasantism and ruralism was distinctly anti-modem. Yeats was a member 
of a number of mystical occult groups and adopted the evolutionary metaphysics of 
these groups, using them to create a vision of Ireland's degeneration and her 
renaissance with the artist and poet playing a messianic role in articulating the myths 
of Irish greatness and heroism, particularly as exemplified by heroes such as the 
legendary Cuchulainn. Yeats saw in Irish myth a correspondence with his occult 
72 
Ibid. pp. 125-6. ' J. Lee, The Modernization of1rish Society 1848-1918. p. 13 8 74R-F. 
Foster, Modern Ireland 1600-1972, p. 450. 75 
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findings and he came to see Ireland as a holy land, "a repository of primal 
knowledge. 47 Both Irish and German nationalist revivals of the nineteenth century 
were heavily influenced by occult groups, particularly the theosophical movement and 
its offshoots, which fostered a belief in messianism. 78 Yeats' anachronistic nationalism 
contrasted strongly with that Connolly and particularly Pearse who, as " modernizers, 
created the past in the image of the future ... [ with Pearse using the sagas] as weapons 
to achieve his goal of modernization without anglicisation , 79 
The Gaelic cultural revival of the late nineteenth century was integral to the search 
for national identity. What began as an intellectual movement amongst poets and 
academics led to the creation of cultural organizations such as the Gaelic League (to 
promote the learning of the Irish language) and the Gaelic Athletic Association (to 
encourage the playing of Irish sports). Nevertheless, the organizations did not have 
mass membership though they did have an influence disproportionate to their size. 80 
The revivalists sought to rescue the Irish people from British domination by 
promoting the indigenous Gaelic culture and by looking for models from the past. In 
some ways the movement was conservative and anti-modem. 81 In the process, the 
revivalists posited the Irish 'race' and its culture in contrast and superior to other 
cultures, specifically that of the English. 82 Foster argues that "the emotions focused by 
cultural revivalism around the turn of the century were fundamentally sectarian and 
even mcialiSt,.,, 83 though this racism was historical and literary rather than based on 
scientific or biological claims such as Nazi racism. In defining the superiority of Irish 
6 race' and culture, they posited the idea of a Golden Age which existed prior to the 
77 Ibid. p. 13 1. 79 W. I. Thompson, The Imagination ofan Insurrection (New York, 1967), p. 52. 
79 j. Le hMhSi 1848 e, Te odernization OfIris oc ety -1918, p. 141. "0 F. S. L. Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine, p. 247 "'J. F. Moran, Patrick Pearse and the Politics ofRedemption (Washington D. C., 1994) pp. 53-54. 32 Ibid. p. 58. 
" R. Foster, Alodern Ireland 1600-1972, p. 453 
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arrival of the English and their culture. The conception of a Golden Age was wrapped 
in the vagaries of myth and legend and in reality would not stand up to close historical 
scrutiny. Nor was the threat from British culture as relevant as the Irish-Irelanders 
claimed. As Lee points out, "Ireland was no more anglicised in 1892 than in 
1848 ... The transformation of the tenurial system, the euthanasia of the aristocracy, 
marked a major victory for native values-all the more remarkable in that these values 
were themselves transmuted through the centuries. The native mind responded to the 
English challenge not by clinging blindly to old concepts but by creating new 'native' 
values which it then compelled the conqueror to recognise as 'immemorial 
tradition'... "84 Historical reality was less important than the perception of a rich and 
cultured past and the need to return to the core values of that culture to save Ireland 
from the materialist modernism of the English. The revivalists saw themselves as 
missionaries rescuing a fallen peasantry from the corruption of the English, returning 
them to their pure, authentic Gaelic soul. 717hey presented themselves as religious 
crusaders, for example producing pamphlets such as D. Figgis's Sinn Fein Catechism, 
whilst a separatist priest wrote The Faith andMorals ofSinn Fein. '" Post-1917 Sinn 
Fein came to hold dear several sacred texts including the 1916 Easter Proclamation, 
the Dail Republican Declaration of 1921 and the 1921 Election Manifesto . 
86 ne 
intellectuals cast themselves as a new cultural elite which was able to articulate the 
myths and re-present them to the masses in the hope of using the population for their 
political ends. However, being mostly middle-class intellectuals, these revivalists 
"were not in harmony with the peasant soul but with an image of it.,, 87 The Rising, 
moreover, served to isolate those Catholic intellectuals, largely recruited from 
94 J. Lee, The Modernisation ofIrish Society 1848-1918, pp. 139-140 
85M. Laffan,, The Resurrection ofIreland (Cambridge, 1999), p. 216. 
16 Ibid. p. 246. 
97 M. Goldring, Pleasant the Scholar's Life (London, 1993), p. 69. 
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University College Dublin, who had seen the IPP as the way to power and who 
would find themselves isolated in the new radicalised nationalist post- 1916 Ireland, 
despairing of its fanaticism and provincialism. 88 
Ireland's high literacy rate and a large newspaper circulation allowed the ideas of 
the intellectuals to filter down to the general population. It gave dignity to the Irish 
and their culture. Nationalism became a spiritual force that created a national 
consciousness supposedly rooted in a mythical Gaelic past. The Land League in the 
nineteenth century had "pioneered on a mass basis a technique destined to become 
indispensable in nationalist agitation, the appeal to spurious historic rights. , 89 In 
particular, nationalists perceived the western Irish peasantry as the guardians of 
Gaelic culture, mainly due to their ability to speak Irish. For these cultural 
nationalists, the Irish-Irelanders, political independence alone could not create an Irish 
nation. Ireland would have to be reborn as a culture as well as a political entity, and 
this synthesis alone, effected by the masses, could revitalize Ireland. The rapid decline 
in the number of Irish speakers and the growing influence of English culture created a 
sense of urgency that required the issue to be addressed sooner rather than later. 90In 
an important article in The New Ireland Review-written in 1899, D. P. Moran made it 
clear that, though men like Emmet and Tone might have been the harbingers of 
independence, it was in the peasantry that Ireland's salvation lay: 
"We are proud of Grattan, Flood, Tone and Emmet and all the rest who dreamt and 
worked for an independent country, even though they had no concept of an Irish 
nation; but it is necessary that they be put in their place, and that is not at the top as 
88 S. Paseta, 'Ireland's Last Home Rule Generation: the Decline of Constitutional Nationalism in 
Ireland 1916-30' in M. Cronin and J. Regan (eds), Ireland; The Politics ofIndevendence 1922-49 
(London, 2000), p. 20 89 J. Lee, Ae Modernisation of1rish Society 1848-1918, p. 95 90 D. McCartney, 'Hyde, D. P. Moran and Irish Ireland' in F-X. Martin ed. Leaders and Men ofthe 
Easter Rising (London, 1967), p. 46. 
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the only beacon lights to subsequent generations. The foundation of Ireland is the 
Gael, and the Gael must be the element that absorbs it. "91 
The cultural revival provided the myth that supported, but did not drive, the political 
movement for independence; it was a myth that posited an Irish ideal specifically 
against a very negative perception of the value of English culture, which was 
criticized as being alien, materialistic, rationalistic and modernistic. The cultural 
revival provided the inspirational language for future revolutionaries but, as Foster 
argues, it is important not to over-stress these cultural developments. 92 It supported 
the nationalist attempt to undermine British rule, through the creation of a negative 
view of the English, and in many ways it was a negative nationalism, not a thought- 
out notion of what an Irish-Ireland should be like. 93 Most of the unsophisticated 
Volunteers fighting for independence had little idea about what specifically 
constituted 'Irishness' and this lack of a positive self-image was to affect the 
development of post-independence Ireland. 94 
The mystical poet W. B. Yeats in particular promoted the idea of an innocent, 
peasant-based culture imbued with lofty spiritual values as against the mass 
vulgarised society of the modem scientific state embodied in his portrayal of 
Britain. 95 Eoin MacNeill also believed that the Gaelic revival would stem the modem 
tide: "As a Catholic, I also believe that the Irish revival will do more than any other 
secular effort to keep Ireland free from the secularising tendencies of other - 
91 D. P. Moran, 'The Pale and the Gael, ' New Ireland Review, June 1899. 
92 R. F. Foster, Modern Ireland 1600-1972, p. 456 
93 J. Augusteijn, Motivation: Why Did They Fight For Ireland? The Motivation of Volunteers in the 
Revolution. p. 115. 
94 Ibid. p. 115. 
93 J. Hutchinson, The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism (London, 1987), p. 132. 
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. 06 countries. Myth seemed to take on a more important role than the reasoned 
republicanism of the United Irishmen for men like Pearse. 
Ireland found itself as part of the European-wide revolt against reason and the 
positivist ideas of progress and logic. 97 With independence, the new IFS was rich in 
integrative resources in this repository of myths and legends derived from the 
nineteenth century revivaOs These were augmented with new myths and heroes 
drawn from the Easter Rebellion. However, like the Fenian rebellion, the 1916 
rebellion became "invested in popular perception and in generations of historiography 
with a quasi-mystical aura which distorts understanding. "99 However, these myths 
were to play a formative role in defining the character of the modem Irish nation state 
( Gaelic revivalism became state policy). Nevertheless, nation-building came to take 
priority over cultural matters. Bureaucracy and the mundane won out over idealism. 
Fianna Fail in office. found itself forced into the same bind, whilst making continued 
use of nationalist myth and symbolism to legitimise itself O'Duffy, similarly, realised 
the value in myth in creating a strong nation state, as Mussolini and Hitler had already 
done in their respective nations, regardless of historical accuracy and fact. 
The Gaelic Revival stressed the continuity of Irish identity but saw the need for the 
rural periphery, its values and myths, to re-conquer the urban centre, arguing that the 
former encapsulated pure Gaelic values whilst the later embraced corrupt English 
culture. Ancient Ireland was romanticized as a classless, harmonious society in which 
any foreign influences were seen as destructivc. 1001n effect, it also posited traditional 
conservative rural values against alien, urban trends. The Gaelic revival however was 
96 Letter from Eoin MacNeill to Father Coventry, 19 10, MacNeill Papers, UCD, cited in M. Tierney, 
Eoin MacNeill (Oxford, 1980), p. 105. 97 S. F. Moran, Patrick Pearse and the Politics ofRedemptioA p. 179. 98T. Brown, Irelang a Social and Cultural Historyl922-79 (Glasgow, 198 1), p. 80. " PLV. Comerford, The Fenians in context. Irish Politics and Society 1848-62. p. 223 100 M. Goldring, Pleasant the Scholar's Life (London, 1993), p. 29. 
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not simply a response to modernisation but also a device used by modernizers to 
legitimise their image of the fature. ' 01 As Lee points out, the modernisers created the 
4 
past in their own image and were not simply reactionaries evoking a distant Celtic 
past. 102 
O'Duffy himself was very aware of the accusations levelled at him that he was 
importing fascism, a continental and alien political philosophy. O'Duffy responded by 
wrapping his movement in Irish nationalist symbolism, evoking the names of Irish 
patriots, and rooting his philosophy in the ideas of the Gaelic Revival. O'Duffy's 
party advocated the communitarianism of the Revival, in which the mystical idea of 
an organic racial community rooted in the land was stressed. For O'Duffy, as for the 
Gaelic nationalists, the Irish nation would be one where culture, territory and state 
coincided and hence it was exclusivist, refusing to acknowledge the separate identity, 
for example, of the Northern Protestants, though unlike Maurras in France, O'Duffy 
never saw the Northern Protestants as an internal enemy. For O'Dufly, as for the 
cultural nationalists, Ireland could only be Gaelic and Catholic, but in rejecting British 
culture, they were also ignoring centuries of cultural history. 
The Gaelic revival was a response by the emerging Catholic intelligentsia to a 
culture and political system in which they had been unable to effectively compete. 
This new class created a cultural alternative, and this was Gaelic cultural nationalism; 
"it was a sine qua non that they should accept and uphold the Catholic rural-oriented 
and property-conscious values of the dominant social ideal. "103 O'Duffy, in the 
thirties used cultural nationalism in a similar way to rouse support for a political 
movement whose practical policies were remarkably few but which was intent on 
creating a new Greenshirt elite from the youth of the nation who were untainted by 
"' See J. Lee, The Modernisation ofIrish Society, 1848-1918, pp. 140-148. 102 Ibid. p. 141 
103 FMComerford, The Fenians in Context. Irish Politics and Society 1848-82. p. 249. 
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the bitterness of divisions opened up by the Civil War. 104 In contrast to conservative 
right-wing movements such as the Action Francaise, the Greenshirts envisaged the 
development of a new elite rather than a dependency on traditional elites. 
The myth of a Golden Age and the resurrection of Gaelic Ireland was added to the 
republican tradition handed down from Wolfe Tone. The 1916 Rising and the 
subsequent struggle for independence only served to heighten the almost hysterical 
worship of the concept of the Republic. However, the reality was that the republican 
ideals of the united Irishmen had all but vanished in the cultural nationalist vision of a 
pre-conquest utopia, what Patteson calls "a cooperative gemeinschaft. ", 05 After 1916, 
Sinn Fein preached the need for the Republic without expounding on republican 
sentiments. O'Duffy was to take exactly the same approach. He argued that declaring 
Ireland a republic was central to his party's political platform, but then he 
subsequently ignored the ideals of men like Tone, actively criticizing 
parliamentarianism and democracy. For O'Duffy, the Republic simply meant Ireland 
without allegiance to the Crown. He completely abandoned the ideals of Irish 
republicanism whilst holding to the symbolism of the Republic. Irish fascism 
examined the disparate strands of the Irish nationalist tradition, and rejected the ideals 
of the republican element which in themselves had emerged with the French 
revolution. Like other fascist movements, the Greenshirts rejected this republican 
tradition, with its emphasis on reason, tolerance, progress and self deten-nination. 106 
The Greenshirt movement was unique amongst nationalists in taking the nationalist 
tradition and isolating and rejecting a key element, republicanism, and promoting the 
romantic, organic nationalism of men like Pearse and Yeats. For O'Duffy, Ireland 
needed to look to its own myths and culture to inspire a national revival. 
'04 1 Pragcr, pp. 404 1. 
105 H. Patteson, The Politics ofIllusion (London, 1989), p. 17. 
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The Easter Rising of 1916 added to the nationalist myth. The Rising itself had no 
chance of success; it was a symbolic gesture, but as a symbolic act it provided the 
impetus to reinvigorate the nationalist movement. 107 It also provided the nationalist 
movement with contemporary martyrs who had sacrificed themselves in the cause of 
Ireland's freedom. O'Duffy would later add the names of three Blueshirt martyrs to 
place his movement within this nationalist tradition. As well as a struggle for political 
freedom, the War of Independence was portrayed by Irish nationalists as a battle 
between Irish and English culture, and Sinn Fein remained devoted to the abstract 
principles of the Gaelic revivalists. The mythology created around the 1916 Rising 
also served to create a more mystical Sinn Fein, where the leadership began to 
perceive themselves as a caste distinct from, and above, the masses. 108 Ireland, for 
many in the republican movement, became an idealised concept distinct from the Irish 
people, comparable to the idea of the German Fatherland or Russian Motherland. For 
the Sinn Fein leadership the movement came to act as the "political embodiment of 
the will of the Irish people and as the vehicle for expressing it. "' 09The mythology 
surrounding the Rising was more important than historical accuracy. Ireland, as 
perceived by Sinn Fein, was becoming a metaphysical image. Sinn Fein 
acknowledged its debt to the Rising in creating the mythology that inspired a 
reinvigorated nationalist movement. Sean T. O'Kelly"O was to state: 
"Sinn Fein's birth certificate [had been] written with steel in the immortal blood of 
the martyrs of 1916. " 111 
107 S. F. Moran, The Politics ofRedemption (Washington DC, 1994). p. 1. 
108M. Laffan, The Resurrection ofIreland (Cambridge, 1999), p. 216. 
109 B. Feenan, Sinn Fein, p. 121 
110 Sean T. O'KellY was an active member of the IRB and was to become first President of the 
Republic of Ireland in 1949. 
1'1 Sean T. O'KellY cited in R. D. Edwards, Patrick Pearse-The Triumph offailure (London, 1990), p. 
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Irish history in the twentieth century and beyond would see nationalists vying to co- 
opt the rebels of 1916 to legitimise themselves. O'Duffy was just one of these. 
Nationalist recognized the value in placing their political movements in the 
mainstream of Irish cultural and political tradition, as Patrick Pearse had recognised in 
his play Ghosts: 
"Like a divine religion, national freedom bears the marks of unity, of sanctity, of 
catholicity of apostolic succession. Of unity, for it contemplates the nation as one; of 
sanctity for it is holy in itself an in those who serve it; of catholicity for it embraces all 
men and women of the nation; of apostolic succession, for it, or the aspiration after it, 
passes down from generation to generation from the nation's fathers. "' 12 
Like Mussolini, Pearse seemed to believe that some form of secular religion based 
on nationalism could emerge to define the new nation. 113 
AMSCUUNITY, VIOLENCEANDSELF-SACRIFICE 
Rebellion, rural terrorism, armed bands and sectarianism have all contributed to the 
violent strand in Irish history and politics. It must be stressed however, that violence 
and rebellion were not the norm; constitutionalism was. After the Civil War there was 
a consensus condemning the use of violence for the cause of nationalism and 
unification. Before the 1916 Rising, the Irish Parliamentary Party was seen as the 
most effective means of achieving the political aspirations for some form of limited 
Home Rule, 114 and most believed that "the ashes of revolt had long since gone 
112 P. Pearse, Ghosts, as cited in Edwards, R. D. p. 253. 113 E. Gentile, The Sacralization of Politics in Fascist Italy (Cambridge, USA, 1996). Gentile argues 
that Fascism emerged as a form of secular religion. 114 F. S. L. Lyons, IrelandSince the Famine, p. 260. 
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cold. "' 1 SThc struggle for independence culminating in the 1916 Rising saw violence 
transformed into a new ideal, providing proof of commitment to the nationalist cause. 
'Ilie ideal of self-sacrifice was raised to new heights. General O'Duffy was to praise 
the values of violence and death demonstrated in the independence struggle and make 
them an intrinsic part of the path to his fascist revolution. 
Historically, frustration in Ireland often led to violence as other, constitutional, 
outlets were found to be less effective. The nationalist rebellions of the United 
Irishmen and the Fenians became symbols to later generations. The land struggle led 
to the creation of extra-legal, frequently violent, rural secret societies such as the Peep 
O'Day Boys, the Whiteboys, and the Ribbonmen. Daniel O'Connell won widespread 
support by his threatened use of violence whilst Pamell rose to power in the wake of 
rural unrest. 116 The Land League was an agrarian organization that used violence and 
intimidation to press its demands. 117 Irish nationalism had acquired a tradition of 
violence and nationalist legitimacy was often linked to the extent to which nationalists 
were prepared to use violence in the cause of Irish freedom. Violence came to be 
accepted as a legitimate response to disaffection and frustration with constitutional 
methods. After 1917, the IRA became so powerful in a state where the Dail 
government was underground that "IRA officers came to assume the right to control 
local Sinn Fein cumainn (clubs) and, as the war continued, their ability to do so 
became greater, "' 18 equating the national with the military interest. 
Most nationalists did not accept the physical force tradition, however. Whilst the 
IRB came to see violence as a political, spiritual and moral force, 119 other such as 
115 Ibid. p. 318. 
"6 S. F. Moran, The Politics ofRedemption (Washington, D. C., 1994), pp. 96-97. 
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Moran, Hyde and Griffith (at least initially) opposed the use of violence in the 
independence struggle. In Irish history, constitutional and violent routes existed side 
by side. Politicians were often required to reconcile the two forceS. 120 I lowever, the 
creation of the Irish Volunteer Force in response to events in the North'2 'coupled with 
opposition to conscription, caused a militarization of Irish politics that led to the 
military uprising of Easter Week 1916. The Irish Volunteer Force, initially created as 
a defensive force, soon developed, under the influence of the IRB, into an instrument 
of armed rebellion. As late as 1920, the Supreme Council of the IRB was declaring 
itself as the sole government of the Irish Republic. 122 Freedom could only be achieved 
through an act of successful rebellion. Freedom had to be won, not given by the 
British. The rapid demise of the Irish Parliamentary Party only served to vindicate the 
physical force tradition to which Sinn Fein now subscribed, though it was soon to 
witness a rapid return to constitutional norms through its participation in the electoral 
process and the creation of Dail Eireann. 
The increased use of violence served to highlight the masculinity of the Irish 
struggle. Pearse insisted on "a virile nationalism. " 123 The cultural revival had stressed 
the traditional perception of Mother Erin. Like the French Marianne, this was a 
feminized conception of the island nation, though perhaps a closer comparison would 
be Maurras' concept of the Deesse France purged of all foreign influences. ' 24 The 
motherly connotations demanded that she be defended and given protection. This 
120 T. Garvin, The Evolution ofirish Nationalist Politics (198 1), pp. 180-18 1. 
121 In Ulster, the UVF had been created to oppose I-lome Rule. 
122 K. B. Nowlan, 'Unity and Division, 1919-21 in D. Williams, ed. The Irish Struggle 1916-26 
(London, 1966), p. 48. 
123 M. Goldring, Pleasant the Scholar's Life (London, 1993), p. 13 1. 
124 E. Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism (New York, 1969), p. 145. 
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perception of Ireland's feminine identity was reworked by nationalists into "an 
oppressed and violated woman calling her sons to fight and die on her behalf. " 125 
I'lie central position of violence to the myth of national renewal reached its 
apotheosis in the life, writings and death of Pearse. He elevated self-sacrifice and the 
purgative effects of violence to new heights until it came to take on a religious hue 
akin to the sacrifice of Christ. The rise of spiritual nationalism only increased with the 
execution of Pearse and his colleagues by the British who were then glorified as 
martyrs for thenationalist cause. This adulation of nationalist dead often bordered on 
the sacrilegious. In his speech at the grave of Wolfe Tone, Pearse had said: 
"We have come to the holiest place in Ireland; holier to us ever than the place 
where [Saint] Patrick sleeps in Down. Patrick brought us life, but this man died for 
us... l am right in saying that we stand in the holiest place in Ireland, for it must be 
that the holiest sod of the nation's soil is the sod where her dead lies buried. 9,126 
As the prophet of the violent stream of nationalist thought, Pearse articulated an 
idea and programme that became the defining feature for republicans in the 
independence struggle. In his speech at the funeral of O'Donovan Rossa 127 in August 
1913 he said: 
"Life springs from death, and from the graves of patriot men and women spring 
living nations. "128 
Many of Ireland's nationalists committed themselves to using violence to achieving 
their aims. The continued subjugation of Ireland was indicative of their failure in the 
face of overwhelming odds, but in no way detracted from their standing, in the eyes of 
125 S. F. Moran, Patrick Pearse and the Politics ofRedemption (Washington, 1994), p. 9 1. 
126 Patrick Pearse, Address delivered at the Grave of Wolfe Tone in Bodenstown Churchyard, Co. 
Kildare, 22 June 1913, Proinseas Mac Aonghusa, ed. Quotationsfrom P. H. Pearse, (Cork, 1979), p. 7. 
127 O'Donovan Rossa was a Fenian who had directed a bombing campaign in mainland Britain. I le had 
died in the USA and his body was returned to Ireland for burial in Glasnevin Cemetery 
128 Patrick Pearse funeral oration for O'Donovan Rossa, I" August 1915, cited in R. D. Edwards, 
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their followers, as nationalist heroes. Violence had become, for some, "the standard 
of political validation. "' 29Pearse saw himself as the contemporary avatar of the 
republican martyr and used his journalistic and literary writings to emphasize his 
coming role. In the years up to the 1916 Rising, men such as Connolly, Plunkett, 
MacDonagh and MacDermott came to share Pearse's central idea of the efficacy of 
violence in the independence struggle and the need for the martyrdom of Irishmen to 
achieve independence. J. M. Plunkett and T. MacDonagh in particular wrote of death 
in the service of the nation as a source of life for future generations, and their writings 
came to eroticise the idea of a violent death. 
PeaTse's increased radicalism and the extremism of his rhetoric, particularly after 
1912, provided the IRB with the leader that they needed to front an insurrection, a 
man who was not afraid to die in the process. The success, or otherwise, of the 
resurrection was immaterial for a man like Pearse who was more than willing to take 
on the role of sacrificial martyr for a cause greater in worth than an individual's life. 
Pearse was developing a cult of death and sacrifice similar to that of the later 
Romanian fascists. It is poignant that the Rising was planned for Easter, the holiest 
date in the Christian liturgical calendar. The Easter Rising would be the re-enactment, 
by Pearse's generation, of the myth of the failed insurrection, with himself as the 
central character. He longed to be the martyr for his generation, as Tone and Emmett 
had been for theirs. In his last speech to the pupils of his Gaelic boy's school, St. 
Enda's, Pearse said: 
"As it took the blood of the Son of God to redeem the world, so it would take the 
blood of Irishmen to redeem Ireland. "130 
129 Ibid. p. 95. 
130 Patrick Pearse, cited in ST. Moran, Patrick Pearse and the Politics of Redemption, p. 160. 
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Pearse saw Ireland's fight for freedom as a Holy Crusade. His writings and speeches 
were rich in religious imagery. For instance, after the Howth gun-running, which saw 
the death of a number of Volunteers, Pearse wrote that "the whole movement, the 
,, 131 whole country, has been re-baptised by bloodshed for Ireland . 
The need to fight to achieve Irish freedom was portrayed as a sacred trust handed 
down by each generation. Pearse's writings were intended to inspire others to fight for 
freedom and to be willing to make the ultimate sacrifice. He himself was willing to 
take on a role that would lead ultimately, and almost inevitably, to his own death. 
Whilst awaiting execution, he wrote to his mother: 
"We are ready to die and we shall die cheerfully and proudly. Personally I do not 
have a desire to live ... You must not grieve 
for all this. We have preserved Ireland's 
honour and our own. Our deeds of last week are the most splendid in Ireland's 
history. People will say hard things of us now, but we shall be remembered by 
posterity and blessed by unborn generations. You too will be blessed because you 
were my mothm"132 
Just as Christ had willingly accepted death for the redemption of mankind, Pearse 
was willing to sacrifice himself in order to achieve the resurrection of the Irish nation, 
and its Gaelic and Catholic soul. His willingness for self-sacrifice was also tied to 
Irish myth, and he combined the Gospel ideas of Christ's sacrifice with the Irish 
legend of the self-immolation of the legendary hero, Cuchulainn, in a rising which 
attempted to "embrace the power of the myth in the service of a chiliastic vision. "133 
Pearse %%Tote: 
131 Letter from Patrick Pearse to J. McGarrity, 28hApril 1916, in ed. S. O. Buachalla, The Letters of 
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"We must be worthy of Ireland... the high tradition of Cuchulainn; the Christ-like 
tradition of Colm Cille, 'if I die, it shall be from excess of the love I bear the 
Gael. "'134 
In the end, Ireland's freedom was won when it turned from reason to myth. But 
whereas Christ's mission could be perceived as altruistic, Pearse's motive was partly 
a selfish one. He wrote: 
"I care not though I were to live but one day and one night provided my fame 
and my deeds live after me. "135 
Pearse therefore placed himself in the vanguard of the physical force tradition, 
developing the cult of the nationalist martyr and preparing to fulfil that role himself, 
in the footsteps of the Manchester Martyrs, and the rebels of 1798,1848 and 1867. In 
his last play, The Singer, Pearse portrayed a revolutionary leader who dies in self- 
sacrifice for the Irish nation, a role he was soon to assume himself. The Rising of 
1916 would add a completely new swathe of names to the nationalist pantheon of 
dead heroes and would set apart the 1916 Rising as the defining myth that led to the 
creation of the Free State. Irish historical tradition was used to justify the use of arms 
and violence as an alternative to constitutional politics to the point where violence and 
became the bench-mark of legitimacy, in a nation where the temporary 
arrogation oi a conspiratorial minority"'. ' was the response to the failure of 
constitutional methods. The tendency to speak in terms of a spiritual nationalism 
backed up by physical force increased after 1916. Pearse himself had envisaged the 
134 Pearse, P. The Story of a Success, June 1909, in Proinsias Mac Aonghusa, Quotationsfrom P. H. 
Pearse, p. 34. 
135 Patrick Pearse cited in R. D. Edwards, Patrick Pearse. The Triumph offailure, (London, 1990), p. 
344. 
136 S. F. Moran, Patrick Pearse and the Politics ofRedemplion (Washington D. C., 1994), p. 36. 
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fighters being elevated above ordinary men and women, those he described as "the 
heroes who stand midway between God and man. -137 
Ernest Blythe wrote in Irish Freedom in October 1913: 
"As in the national language is all sanity and strength, so in the first blood of the 
martyrs is all hope and pride and courage ... Let the little-hearted talk of living for 
Ireland, but be well-assured that it is a fine thing to die for Ireland and more profitable 
than to win great victories. ', 138 
Pearse's own death before a British firing squad put him firmly in the nationalist 
pantheon of martyrs. What was distinctive about the martyrs alongside whom he was 
laid was that they were all heroic failures, the vanquished. This did not detract from 
their status and perceived nobility of purpose. The mere willingness to die for Ireland 
was accepted as proof of nationalist sanctity. In the struggle for Ireland's soul, it was 
those heroes who were prepared to go -to 
the extreme in spite of failure that were 
consciously remembered. O'Duffy's speeches and writings continued to use the 
language of violence and self-sacrifice in the tradition of Pearse, claiming that if the 
Republic was ever to be established it could only be done so by the shedding of more 
blood, glorying in the prospect of further violence. The mere spilling of blood 
precluded any talk of defeat, because sacrifice was in itself a victory. It had required 
poets and writers such as Pearse to romanticize death and sacrifice, the poet becoming 
a freedom fighter "tinged with the smell of gunpowder. , 139 O'Duffy was no poet but 
men like Pearse had made the use of violence a legitimate political weapon. Pearse 
himself had said: 
137 Patrick Pcarse, Address delivered at the Robert Emmet Commemoration in the Academy of music, 
Brooklyn, New York, 2 March 1914, Proinseas Mac Aonghusa, Quotationsfrom P. H. Pearse, p. 9. 138 Ernest Blythe writing in Irish Freedom, October 1913, cited in A Laffan, The Resurrection of 
Ireland (Cambridge, 1999), p. 216. 139 M. Goldring, Pleasant the Scholar's Life, p. 42. 
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"I should like to see any and every body of Irish citizens armed. We must 
accustom ourselves to the thought of arms, to the sight of arms, to the use of 
arms ... bloodshed 
is a cleansing and sanctifying thing and the nation which regards it 
as the final horror has lost its manhood. ', 140 
The fascist cult of self-sacrifice, duty and heroism with its emphasis on the value 
of continuous struggle and its elevation and worship of strength, virility and the 
masculine can all be found in the writing of Patrick Pearse. The growing acceptance 
of violence by extreme nationalists resulted in the militarization of Irish politics that 
made the Rising possible. It also meant that Pearse and his fellow physical force 
nationalists came to accept the struggle as an end in itself, which resulted in a distinct 
lack of substance in their political philosophy or any concrete policies. O'Duffy was 
to find himself in a similar situation twenty years further on, but where he differed 
from Pearse was that he had a purpose and a programme. It is important to note, as 
Lee argues that "Shades of Sorel, Maurras and Corradini loom from Pearse's page, 
but superficial similarities with contemporary continental neo-romantics or proto- 
,, 141 fascists conceal fundamental differences. Pearse rejected totalitarianism andany 
authoritarian concept of the state, which he saw as a means, not an end in itself. 
O'Duffy, like many nationalists was influenced by Pearse's writings, but O'Duffy 
differed markedly from Pearse in that there is no evidence to suggest that he wished to 
sacrifice himself for his cause. However, fascists of all stamps would have had no 
difficulty relating to Pearse's glorification of violence as an end in itself, for Pearse's 
writings were as extreme as any fascist's when he could write such as this (referring 
to the Great War): 
140 Patrick Pearse, writing in Claidheamh, December 1912, cited in R. D. Edwards, Patrick Pearse. The 
Triumph ofFailure (London, 1990), p. 179. 
141 J. Lee, The Modernisation ofIrish Society 1848-1918. p. 148 
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"It is good for the world that such things should be done. The old heart of the earth 
needs to be warmed with the red wine of the battlefields. " 142 
However, the IRB version of the 1916 Rising, as Foster points out, with its idea of 
"the mystic rebirth of nationality through an Easter sacrifice 9143 whilst romantic and 
certainly inspiring, is far from the full story. Independence allowed a new elite to 
emerge to replace the Anglo-Irish ascendancy, a new Irish Catholic class who had 
taken up nationalism as a force to push through a change in Ireland's political culture. 
The vehicle they used, Sinn Fein, replaced the IPP as the leading party of change, 
creating a new mass movement that was still unsure what it had fought for, other than 
a pre-occupation with the issue of national sovereignty. 
POPULISM, A UTHORITARIANISMAND THE PUBLIC BAND INIRELAND 
The Irish independence struggle led to the temporary victory of the physical force 
tradition after the failure of constitutional methods. The Irish Parliamentary Party had 
failed to win independence, though for years it had struggled to absorb violent and 
constitutional forces and as a result it developed into a "mass, militant and cross-class 
political party. , 144 Sinn Fein was built up in the image of its precursor and to contrast 
the separatist tradition of Sinn Fein with the Irish Parliamentary Party's 
constitutionalist nationalist tradition is too simplistic. 145 Though independence was 
won through violence, the new state administration quickly restored democratic 
methods and a liberal constitutional structure. However, the physical force tradition 
only went underground reflecting the fact that the history of extra-constitutional 
142 Patrick Pearse writing in Spark, December 1915, Ibid. p. 23 8. 
143 R. F. Foster, Modern Ireland 1600-1972, p. 491 
144T. Garvin, The Evolution ofIrish Nationalist Politics (Dublin, I 98 1), p. 180. 
145 D. Fitzpatrick, Politics In Irish Life 1913-21, p. 233. 
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methods to achieve political change was an important part of Irish political culture. 
The struggle for independence had seen the rise of militarists who claimed to 
represent the 'National Will' and who were better able to represent the people better 
than elected bodies such as the DaiL 
The Irish Parliamentary Party represented the moderate constitutional approach to 
Irish Home Rule. The party was always condemned to be a minority party in the 
British Parliament, but it was able to pressurize a Liberal minority government into 
passing a Home Rule Bill for Ireland, suspended for the duration of the First World 
War. The British government was perceived by extreme nationalists as conceding a 
modicum of self-government, but they believed that it had to be won by force of arms 
if necessary, not won at Westminster. These nationalists, such as members of the IRB, 
could never accept the constitutional approach, though the vast majority of Irishmen 
and women were constitutionalists until the Rising of 1916. 
Nationalists were not united in their approach to independence. Griffith and his 
minority Sinn Fein party proposed abstention from the British parliament and the 
creation of an alternative administration in Ireland with elected representatives. 
Abstentionism was the tactic adopted after 1917, when Sinn Fein took the majority of 
Irish seats. This approach, whilst recognizing the importance of elected 
representatives and the democratic element, also allowed for the creation of 
alternative administrative structures to those already in place. Sinn Fein was to set up 
Dail Eireann as "the supreme body of a pan-nationalist party rather than as a true 
,, 146 inter-party parliamentary assembly in the Anglo-American tradition. The campaign 
against Westminster fostered a distrust of parliamentary methods. Griffith had argued 
that attendance by Irish politicians at Westminster only served to sanction British 
146 T. Garvin, The Evolution ofIrish Nationalist Politics (London, 198 1), p. 183. 
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rule, 147 and that Ireland's independence could only be worked out in Ireland. The new 
Irish Free State, anxious to promote its identity became obsessed with 'Irishness' in 
an authoritarian state; "the regime showed its derivation from latter-day Sinn Fein, 
never unduly fastidious about democratic procedure. "148 
It was the rise of Ulster Unionism that undermined the democratic process in 
Ireland, and challenged the political culture based on parliamentary representation at 
Westminster. The opposition of the Ulster Unionists to Irish Home Rule led to the rise 
of para-militarism in the south in the shape of the Irish Volunteers and the Irish 
Citizens' Army. 149 The Ulster Volunteer Force provided the model for the Irish 
nationalists to emulate, and they were inspired by the successful challenge of the 
Unionists to constitutionalism in the Lame gun-running 150 and the Curragh Mutiny. 151 
The decades preceding independence had seen the growth in Ireland of local 
government and local democracy, whilst major decision-making continued to take 
place at Westminster. The creation of a Catholic University in Dublin meant that a 
new educated Catholic elite began to emerge, some of whom were prepared to work 
within the British administration. Nevetheless, a large number, who were unable to 
find jobs commensurate with their education or who were unwilling to work within 
the system, found themselves frustrated and angry. Many of these, radicalised by the 
Gaelic revival, sought a republic that broke all ties with Britain. Their attitude towards 
democracy was often ambiguous and they began to seek influence through their 
147S. O'Luing, 'Arthur Griffith and Sinn Fein' in FX Martin ed., Leaders and Men of the Easter 
Rising (London, 1967), p. 56. 148 R. F. Foster, Modern Ireland 1600-1972 
149 F. S. L. Lyons, 'The Passing of the Irish Parliamentary Party' in Williams, D., ed. The Irish Struggle 
1916-26 (London, 1966), p. 96. "0 The Lame gun-running incident landed substantial munitions from Germany to arm Ulster 
Unionists. 
151 The refusal by 60 British officers based in Ireland to oppose the Ulster Volunteers effectively meant 
that the Army could not be used against thern, 
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involvement in alternative sources of influence such as the IRB and the Volunteer 
movement, groups that became a new focus for legitimacy. 
It was the extreme republicans in the IRB and the Volunteers who declared the Irish 
Republic on the steps of the GPO in 1916. The armed force of the republic existed 
before the Irish state had its own, Irish, parliamentary institutions which were created 
only after abstention from Westminster after 1917.152 Whilst the Dail was to ratify, in 
1919, the Republic as declared in 1916, in the previous August, An t0glach, 153 
declared the Volunteers to be "the army of the Irish republic, the agents of the 
National Will. ýA54 This created a problem of legitimacy. In 1919, the Volunteers were 
associated with, but not subordinate to, the Dail, and in spite of an oath of loyalty to 
the latter, the Volunteers remained an autonomous force and focus of legitimacy. This 
question was not settled until the autumn of 1921, when the Dail ceased to function as 
an underground organization and entered into dialogue with the British. 
The length of the struggle, and the repression of the British military forces had 
forced Republican military commanders, men like O'Duffy, to act autonomously and 
resulted in a "mystical, hysterical, neurotic worship of The Republic and The 
Army. "' 55 The army commanders were elected by the rank and file and claimed their 
own legitimacy, alongside of, if not superior to, the Dail, 156 with the Army claiming 
its own historical mandate, and its claim to be rooted in the Public Band tradition. The 
Treaty shattered this Public Band source of legitimacy, replacing it with a 
constitutional commitment to "open, law-based and democratic" politics. 157 The pro- 
152 K. B. Nowlan, 'Dail Eireann and the Army-Unity and Division 1919-21', in D. Williams, ed. The 
Last Struggle (London, 1967). 
153 An t0glach was published by the IRA. 154 An t0glach as cited in Nowlan, K. B. p. 69. 155 E. Rumpf, and A. C. Hepburn, Nationalism and Socialism in Twentieth Century Ireland 
(Liverpool, 1977), p. 33. 156 T. Garvin, The Birth ofIrish Democracy (Dublin, 1996), p. 40. 
157 Ibid., p. 53. 
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Treaty Government would achieve this through the imposition of political order by 
the State, which meant the creation of a democratic political structure, and the 
rejection of the claim by the IRA, that it was morally superior to the State. The ERA 
continued to oppose the Treaty Government because it was partitionist. It was seen as 
the creation of the British and in their opinion it had betrayed the 1916 Republic. The 
ensuing Civil War had increased the power of the military and the government had to 
tackle the problem by drastically reducing its size, reducing its pay and subordinating 
it completely to the government once peace was achieved. It was a victory for the 
constitutionalists. The new political administration had to balance the need to ensure a 
functioning democracy with the ongoing problem of people who insisted that the gun 
was still a legitimate form of politics. As O'Halpin notes, it led to the state having to 
adopt an intrusive surveillance system coupled with a willingness to curtail civil 
liberties which was, however, acquiesced in by most of the population who were 
anxious to return to normality and peace. 158 The IRA was defeated but it did not 
disappear and as the people of Ireland voted for peace in 1922, the IRA met in 
convention, where they advocated a military dictatorship in the face of their inevitable 
defeat at election. 159 
PERSONALISMAND A UTHORITARIAMISMIN IRISH POLITICAL CULTURE 
hish culture possessed a system of human relations distinguished by personalism 160 
and authoritarianism. In Irish history, the attitude of the public to its leaders was 
emotional and authoritarian, and always with the possibility of abuse. Men like 
158 E. O'Halpin, Defending Ireland: The Irish State and its Enemies Since 1922 (Oxford, 1999). 
159T. Garvin, 1922-The Birth offrish Democracy, p. 124. 
160 Personalism is a term used by D. E. Schmitt in The Irony ofIrish Democracy (1973) to refer to the 
strong focus in Irish political culture on the strong bond between constituents and representative, at all 
levels of government with a stress on reciprocity and brokerage. 
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O'Connell and Pamell were key figures who relied on their personal charisma to 
dominate Irish politics, through a direct appeal to the populace. They were able to 
appeal to the deference of the population to its leaders, a deference that was in 
evidence right down to the lowest level, the family. In Ireland, the principle 
socializing agents, the family, community, education system and a particularly austere 
and puritanical Irish Catholic Church are all authoritarian. The Church itself 
encouraged the emulation of ecclesiastical styles by political parties- "pragmatism, 
,, 161 internal unity, authoritarianism and social oninivorousness , with secrecy 
heightening these trends. This extended to the church-controlled education system, 
which institutionalised generalized authoritarian values. 162 As Basil Chubb remarked, 
authoritarian attitudes, fostered by the education system and by a strongly patriarchal 
society, do not usually bode well for democracy. 163 However, democracy became the 
norm in the Free State, and the failure of potential authoritarian challenges from the 
IRA and the Blueshirts indicate the strength of democratic ideals that deference to the 
legitimate government in power reinforced. 164 
There ýras a strong focus in national politics on the individual as opposed to party, 
and the adulation of the heroic figure in Irish history. There arose a strong focus in 
Irish politics in which the public interest was equated with that of the leader and his 
followers. 165 It led to a political relationship based on brokerage and reciprocal 
favours. Ireland's small size and small population allowed this to develop. But "this 
loyalty was to persons and institutions rather than ideas"I 66 which meant people 
tended to support one political party consistently, making it difficult for new political 
161T. Garvin, The Evolution of1rish Nationalist Politics (London, 198 1), p. 215. 162 D. E. Schrnitt The Irony of1rish Democracy (Lexington, Mass., 1973), p. 50. 163 B. Chubb, iýe Government and Politics ofIreland (Harlow, 1992), P. 17. '64 Ibid. p. 18. 
165 Ibid., p. 55. 
166 13. Chubb, The Government and Politics ofIreland, p. 19. 
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movements to challenge the essentially bi-polar nature of Irish politics. O'Duffy had a 
loyal following based on his long-term involvement in Irish politics, particularly in 
the border counties where he was born. He also hoped to use the authoritarian and 
deferential strand in Irish culture and politics to legitimise his hierarchical political 
philosophy, promote the masculine element in his movement and justify his 
concentration on the value of strong leadership. As Commissioner of Police, O'Duffy 
had been a leader who was very concerned with the rank and file of his force, a tactic 
that won him a great deal of support. He fought hard for the rights of the police 
against the State. O'Duffy was always aware of his patriarchal role whether as 
Commissioner or politician. 
The physical shift in the political process from Westminster to Dublin after 1916 
with the failure of constitutional politicians and the victory of the extreme nationalists 
led to a political cleavage between democrats and insurrcctionists that threatened to 
challenge the prevailing political culture of democracy and parliamentarianism. For a 
time between 1916 and 1922, the political culture of Ireland underwent an enormous 
change, as new forces were released that were to challenge the mindset of Irish 
politics up to the present day. However, the swift return to constitutionalism after the 
Civil War, and the rapid demise of militarism ensured that the new political 
infrastructure bore a remarkable resemblance to that at Westminster. De Valem and 
his party continued their policy of abstentionism by refusing to send its elected 
representatives to the Dail until legislation by the Cumann na nGaedheal government 
forced de Valera's hand. O'Duffy was a key figure in this return to constitutional 
normality. As O'Halpin argues, O'Duffy played a key role in the creation of a 
professional police force that, together with the army, played a key role in ensuring 
the return of Ireland to democracy, including the smooth transfer of power to De 
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Valera in 1932, through ensuring that the loyalty of these two key institutions to 
government and not to any particular party. 167 However, in 1931 he found himself 
faced with a hostile De Valera administration and was unable to accept the smooth 
transition to power of the party representing the forces he had fought against a decade 
earlier. The voters' rejection of Cumann an nGaedheal turned him against a political 
system which had returned De Valera. The apparent continuation of Civil War politics 
alienated him from constitutional democracy and led him to return to the tradition of 
the Public Band with the Blueshirts and the creation of the NCP which he had hoped 
would do away with the democratic process altogether, returning to the single party 
politics and militarism of post- 1916 Sinn Fein. 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES 
The independence struggle focused almost exclusively on the issue of national self- 
determination. Events pushed the discussion of social and labour issues into the 
background. The socialism of Connolly and Larkin virtually disappeared off the 
mainstream political agenda. The nationalists came to believe that any discussion of 
such issues was side-tracking the national struggle. In the years leading to 
independence, the economic and social ideas of Arthur Griffith, though in the 
background, remained Sinn Fein party policy until 1922. This meant that ideas of 
autarky, state control over the economy, the defence of capitalism and opposition to 
socialism, and even corporatism were central to the policy of the Sinn Fein 
movement. Their abandonment by Cumann na nGaedheal only pushed the ideas 
underground until O'Duffy was to resurrect them in the nineteen thirties. 
167 E. O'Halpin, Defending Ireland: The Irish State and its Enemies Since 1922 (Oxford, 1999) 
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The early years of the twentieth century saw the emergence of Sinn Fein under 
Arthur Griffith and the adoption by the party of many of his ideas. The meteoric rise 
of the party after 1916 led to a greater stress on the national question, whilst the 
economic platform that the party had developed was largely neglected. Griffith was 
profoundly influenced by the Church on social questions and by the German 
economist Friedrich List on economic issues. 168 Griffith's economic ideas, lifted 
largely from List, were accepted by the Sinn Fein party convention in 1905 and were 
to remain party policy until 1922.169 Griffith, echoing List, believed that Ireland's 
dependence on agriculture should be reduced by the creation of a strong industrial 
base, built up by the introduction of a protectionist policy that relied on tariffs. 170 
Banking and finance were to be controlled in order to serve the interests of the Irish 
economy. 17 1 Tariffs were essential if Ireland's dependence on the British market was 
to be broken. It would inevitably lead to a much greater control by the state over the 
economy in order to serve national interests, and the abandonment of laissez-faire 
policies. It was posited as a third way between unbridled capitalism and socialism. 172 
Griffith's Sinn Fein party rejected liberalism and individual rights in favour of a 
"mild corporate state where the individual became a means to the higher life of the 
body PolitiC.,, 173 Labour and capital would both be submitted to government 
regulation. Protectionism and tariffs would replace free trade. This was deemed as 
essential to secure a base for a truly independent nation that would be economically as 
well as politically free of Britain. 
168 E. Rumpf and A. C. Hepburn, Nationalism and Socialism in Twentieth Century Ireland (Liverpool, 
1997), p. 9 1. 
'69 M. Cronin, 'Golden Dreams, Harsh Realities; Economics and Informal Empire in the Irish Free 
State' in M. Cronin and J. M. Regan, Ireland: The Politics ofRedemption 1922-49 (Macmillan Press: 
G. B. 2000), pp. 148-50. 
170 Ibid. p. 151 
171 Ibid. p. 151 
172 C. Townsend, Ireland in the Twentieth Century (London, 1999), p. 49. 
173 R_ Davis, Arthur Griffith and Non-Violent Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1974), p. 152. 
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Griffith and Sinn Fein played a major role in Irish politics after 1916, but 
concentrated almost exclusively on the national struggle, taking a largely integrative 
approach to labour issues. A focus on labour issues, class struggle or socialism were 
all perceived as detrimental to the focus on the independence issue, and by 1923 
"Griffith's concept of classless nationhood ... was victorioUS.,, 
174 By this time the 
government of Cumann na nGaedheal had completely abandoned the social agenda 
that Sinn Fein had begun to develop after 1916. The Labour Party and the unions had 
been prepared to subordinate the social question until after independence, though at 
the time some concern was expressed over this. In a report in 1918, the Labour Party 
and ITUC were concerned that a dominant Sinn Fein would be just "another political 
mouthpiece of the capitalist class in the country. " 175 
Sinn Fein's 'Democratic Programme' (drawn up by Sean T. O'Kelly of Sinn Fein 
and Thomas Johnson of the Labour Party) was adopted by the party after 1916. Whilst 
pruned of most of its socialist content, the document implied that the social order 
would be changed in Ireland after independence with "a general and lasting 
improvement in the conditions under which the working classes live and labour. , 176 
The policy further stated that: 
"... the nation's sovereignty extends not only to all men and women of the nation, 
but to all its material possessions; the nation's soil and all its resources, all the wealth, 
and all the wealth-producing processes within the nation and ... we reaffirm that all 
rights to private property must be subordinate to the public right and welfare. "177 
174J. Lynch 'The Social Revolution That Never Was, ' in D. Williams, Ed. The Irish Struggle 
(London, 1966), p. 51 175 ITUC and Labour Party Annual Report of 1918, p. 106. 176 The Democratic Programme of January 1919, cited in Laffan, M., The Resurrection ofIreland 
(Cambridge, 1999), p. 259. 177 Democraic Programme of Sinn Fein, cited in E. Rumpf and A. C. Hepburn, Twentieth Century 
Ireland, p. 2 1. 
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At the time of the War of Independence, Ernest Blythe took an aggressive stand on 
the social question, saying that social reconstruction should go hand in hand with the 
language revival, as it was the poor who were always prepared to die for Ireland but 
who were rarely rewarded. 178 
Though labour organizations contributed to the independence struggle, many of the 
nationalists, particularly in the IRB and IRA were wary of watering down the 
nationalist struggle with the distractions of social issues. Indeed, many in the 
nationalist movement, including Griffith, saw socialism as a foreign import. The 
Catholic Church's hostility to socialism was very important in Ireland. The Church 
was able to offer the alternative of Catholic social thought, such as that present in De 
Rerum Novarum. Others in the nationalist movement were heavily influences by 
Gaelic Romanticism and its vague ideas of a communitarianism. and cooperation. 179 
The nationalist movement wanted to embrace all classes and was opposed to any issue 
that might cause a class cleavage. This was a reflection of Griffith's enthusiasm for 
compulsory capital and labour arbitration by the state, and his admiration for the New 
Zealand arbitration system. He believed that labour troubles only served to cause 
disharmony amongst the Irish nation, dividing and weakening the nation. There was 
therefore a necessity, in the national interest, for the speedy resolution of strikes and 
lockouts, and preferably, their prevention. In August 1919, the Sinn Fein Ard 
Chomhairle was advised of the need for all classes to live in harmony: 
66 ... consequently the labour troubles give much cause for concern. Every effort 
should be made to prevent strikes, lockouts etc. and when these cannot be prevented, 
persevering efforts should be made to bring about settlement and reconciliation. "' 80 
178 M. Laffan, The Resurrection ofIreland (Cambridge, 1999), p. 255. 179 11. Patterson, The Politics ofIllusion (London, 1989), p. 17. 180 Hon. Secretary's Report to the Ard Chomhairle, 30th August 1919, cited in Laffan, M., The 
Resurrection ofIreland, (Cambridge, 1999), p. 254. 
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Griffith's policies, and his interest in Catholic social thought point to the mild form 
of corporate politics, where the nation takes priority over the individual and individual 
rights and both labour and capital come under governmental regulation. 18 'This was 
reflected in Article 45 of the Free State Constitution of 1922 which authorised the 
Oireachtas to "provide for the establishment of Financial and Vocational Councils 
representing branches of the social and economic life of the nation, " which in turn 
was based on Article 165 of the Weimar Constitution 182 
Aodh de Blacam, ' 83 a leading Sinn Fein propagandist, was advocating a change to 
a corporate parliament by 192 1, saying that the parliamentary system of the British 
was "played OUt.,, 184 In his writing, De Blacam advocated a utopian neo-Gaelic and 
Catholic order. The corporate alternative he suggested was to set up a voting system 
based on "some existing, natural group- an industrial union or cooperative society in 
which he can be in constant touch with his representative. "' 85 The government would 
bestow executive authority on experts who would work closely with the council of 
colleges, one representing each vocation. Only the Upper House would be elected 
territorially. De Blacam envisaged: 
"... the disappearance of the party system. The latter is the inseparable companion 
of parliamentarianism ... if administration ceased to be the prize and plaything of party 
rivalry, the need for periodic elections would disappear. , 186 
The new structure would more truly represent the Irish nation as "it is for patriotism 
to harmonize competing interests and to keep the ideal of the nation ... before the eyes 
18'R. Davis, Arthur Griffith and Non- Violent Sinn Fein (Dublin 1974), pp. 152-154. 182 1922 Irish Free State Constitution cited by J. Lee in Aspects of Corporatist Thought in Ireland-77je 
Commission on Vocational Organizations 1938-42, p-324 
193 Aodh de Blacarn, (I 890-195 1), born in London of Irish parents, and a convert to Catholicism, wrote 
for republican and Catholic journals. He later joined Fianna Fail but defected to Clann na Poblachta. 184 A. De Blacarn, fflatSinn Fein Stands For (Dublin, 1921), p. 132. 
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of all. "' 87 De Blacam acknowledged his debt to Daniel Figgis' book, The Gaelic State, 
and to AE (George Russell) and his book The National Being as the source of many of 
his ideas. 188 De Blacarn wrote an important article in 1918 titled Nationality in 
Economics in which he saw the three pillars of Irish society as Church, State and 
family, respectively providing for the soul, social instincts and bodily necessities. He 
came to define the Nation as standing between individual and collectivity, 
coordinating life for the enrichment of community and individual., 891n his utopian 
vision of Ireland, he saw the towns as " the ancient centres of rural contagion [and 
stressed] ... a return to a rural society based on co-operative communes. 
"' 90 During the 
thirties, De Blacam. was to write in support of both Salazar and Franco "as exponents 
of a Catholic social order free from the evils of capitalism". 191 
The focus on the independence struggle sidelined Sinn Fein away from social and 
economic issues. However, the autarkic ideas of List, the corporatism of men like De 
Blacam and Arthur Griffith, and visions of a rejuvenated Irish economy supporting a 
population of up to twenty million enjoyed a temporary vogue. With independence, 
and a return to party politics, the new Cumann na nGaedheal govenu-nent pursued a 
cautious policy of fiscal and economic conservatism, promoting stability rather than 
radical change. It would be O'Duffy in the thirties who would revive and develop the 
radical economics of pre-1922 Sinn Fein, frequently acknowledging his debt to 
Griffith. He believed that the Irish state was stable enough to move on to tackle the 
social and economic issues raised during the independence struggle as a means to 
reunite and advance the Irish nation. 
187 Ibid. p. 148. 
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O'Duffy used the independence struggle and particularly its myths to mobilise his 
followers and attract support. This was a political mistake. Whilst attachment to such 
values and ideals as motivated the rebels of 1916 were part of nationalist tradition and 
rhetoric, they were not the inspiration for most Irish voters. The myths were already 
part of the Fee State's identity. Very few in the thirties wanted a return to the 
bitterness engendered by constitutional arguments and the consensus of Msh politics 
left no room for ideological parties that threatened to upturn the status quo. O'Duffy, 
throughout his speeches and publications, paraded the myths of the utility of violence 
in producing change, the unity of Ireland in the struggle as embodied in Sinn Fein, 
and the ultimate goal of an autarkic Gaelic nation freedom all ties with Britain. The 
lack of substance in all these myths in immaterial. For O'Duffy they provided an 
inspirational myth that he believed would inspire a new generation. The implication 
was that fascism was rooted in Irish political culture, or at least in certain strands of 
that culture. What O'Duffy failed to recognise was that the norm in Irish politics was 
constitutionalism, with violence the aberration. By the thirties, Ireland was "well on 
the way to overcoming its own history, and achieving a stable underlying political 
consensus. "' 92 Whereas Ireland had moves on, O'Duffy was na7fve enough to imagine 
that rehashing a plethora of selective myths particularly around the independence 
struggle would inflame a new generation who would use his fascist party to create a 
new Ireland. O'Duffy's failure is indicative of his misunderstanding of Irish political 
culture, his selective memory and use of myth, and the alien nature of fascism to 
mainstream Irish political culture. 
192 R. Stradling, 'Franco's Irish Volunteers, ' p. I C, 
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CHAPTER SEVEN - CONCLUSIONS 
O'Duffy promised that any political programme that he introduced into Ireland would 
take account of Irish culture and political traditions. He frequently claimed that his 
National Policy was based on the Easter Proclamation and that he was indebted to 
nationalist leaders such as Griffith, Pearse and Michael Collins for his inspiration. 
O'Duffy, himself an active participant in the independence struggle, was able to take 
from this period some of the nationalist-republican ideas of the independence struggle 
to legitimise his fascist movement, which was largely derived from an imitation of 
continental models. The independence struggle had seen a reaction against British 
culture and politics and the search for an alternative. It was coloured by the utopian 
influence of the Gaelic Romantic movement and by the organization of the struggle 
around the militarization of Irish politics. The militarization of Irish politics and the 
Public Band tradition was to emerge again in the thirties with O'Duffy's Blueshirts 
and Greenshirts, an attempt to by-pass the constitutional structure by a direct appeal to 
action with the Public Band representing the National Will. O'Duffy was able to 
hijack nationalist symbolism in order to legitimise his political force. However, in this 
case, he was using the Public Band against a nationalist government, elected by the 
populace, which was itself engaged in a struggle against the British and against a 
stable political system that was successfully able to face the threat from O'Duffy's 
military style of politics. 
The struggle for Home Rule came at a time when Europe as a whole was witnessing 
the development of the nation state. Ireland's development was coloured by her close 
economic and historical links to Britain, and her Catholic culture. Surprisingly, many 
in the nationalist struggle paid only lip-service to Ireland's Catholicism, but the 
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powerful influence of the Church was an accepted part of Irish life and it would 
continue to have an enormous influence on the development on the new nation. 
The independence struggle saw many changes in Irish political culture and the 
temporary upset of liberal democratic culture in Ireland. The resolution of the land 
issue at the end of the century had created a conservative property-owning and largely 
rural electorate. This was the bedrock of Irish political culture. The bombastic 
rhetoric, the appeal to sacrifice, the Gaelic idealism and search for alternatives to the 
British political and cultural model were all part of the aberration of the nationalist 
uprising. Whilst they were an interesting, but temporary, aspect of the struggle, peace 
saw a rapid return to liberal democratic norms. 
During the thirties, O'Duffy tried to resurrect a number of these ideas and attach 
them to fascist organization and corporate authoritarianism. The stability of the Free 
State and. the strength of the democratic tradition, coupled with the conservatism of a 
rural population who had had their important demands met (particularly the land 
issue), meant that O'Duffy never had the mass base from which to build an effective 
fascist movement. 
In some ways, O'Duffy's ability to reach into the Irish past to pad out and legitimise 
his fascist programme is evidence that the fascist tradition did appear to have its roots, 
at least superficially, in the Irish historical process. Different fascist leaders 
throughout Europe had created their own fascist movements whose programmes 
reflected native nationalist traditions and struggles, whilst also sharing common 
ideological elements. The fascism of the interwar period was a heterogeneous, 
European, and even international, movement'which produced national varieties with 
their own peculiar identities. O'Duffy was able to look to the independence struggle 
to find some of the same raw ingredients to add to fascism in order to create an Irish 
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variation. By the time that he had formed the NCP in 1936, however, Ireland was able 
to absorb any threat he posed and he found himself without the mass base that 
Mussolini and Hitler had managed to forge at a time of political and economic crisis. 
Irish Fascism, as a result, was condemned to the fringes of Irish politics. 
O'Duffy's unsuccessful development of fascist ideas within the context of Irish 
political culture demonstrated the narrow context in which successful fascist 
movements emerged in the inter-war years. The failure of the Irish fascist movement, 
in spite of the temporary crisis caused by the Depression and Economic War with 
Britain, demonstrates once again the narrow range of conditions from which 
successful fascism could develop. Fascism was not just a type of extreme nationalism; 
in Ireland, extreme nationalism was the norin at the time. It was not a response to 
rapid capitalism development and social upheaval; Ireland remained an 
underdeveloped and rural society. Nor was it a response to a failed political system; 
Ireland remained a nation committed to liberal democratic society. The factors which 
had led to the emergence of fascism in Italy and Germany were just not present in the 
right combination in Ireland, nor in most of the rest of Europe. 
Irish fascism failed to develop into a mass-based political party. It was a fringe 
group based on the leadership and personality of O'Duffy, a key figure in post 
independence Irish politics. The NCP was the rump faction of the Blueshirt 
movement bound to O'Duffy's personalist appeal. The movement failed to grow; 
indeed it went into rapid decline over the year of its existence and it collapsed 
altogether when O'Duffy left the country to fight in Spain, no doubt taking his most 
ardent followers with him. O'Duffy clearly had an inflated opinion of himself and of 
his role in the destiny of independent Ireland. In the decade following independence, 
he played a key role in national affairs that made him a credit to his nation, only to 
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have his reputation irreparably tarnished by his attempt to raise his status to that of 
dictator, even to the point of being willing to act as Ireland's Quisling in the event of 
the German defeat of Great Britain. In spite of his nationalist credentials, for O'Duffy 
his own personal advancement, not the Irish nation, was his priority. 
O'Duffy used fascism to provide a theoretical framework to support his personal bid 
for power. He was a believer in fascism and corporatism but he was a political realist 
as well. Like that of all fascisms, his was a pragmatic political philosophy that bent 
with any opportunity, the only real goal being absolute power. O'Duffy was a 
nationalist who clearly saw the need to carry on the path trodden by Pearse, Collins 
and others, as long as he led and decided where the path was heading. The nationalist 
cause was a way of promoting O'Duffy's personal quest for national prominence. In 
the event, neither nationalism nor fascism was to give him the role he desired. Even 
his hish Brigade's foray into Spanish politics was a farce, winning him neither martial 
glory nor renown as the defender of Catholic Christendom, as he had hoped. Others 
may have seen O'Duffy as a potential charismatic dictator, to be used as a front man 
in the erection of a fascist state, flattering his ego in the process. Nevertheless, though 
he might have been an excellent organizer, he was not an inspiring leader and failed to 
arouse widespread support, as Irish nationalists such as Pamell or Daniel O'Connell 
had done in the past through their rousing rhetoric and broad national appeal. 
O'Duffy was an experienced organizer but not a great charismatic leader, and 
Ireland did not want or need a charismatic champion to de-stabilize the infant nation 
state. O'Duffy thought he was indispensable for modýrn Ireland. Believing him to be 
superfluous, the Irish people did not flock to his green fascist standard. They were not 
roused by his rhetoric or frightened by his apocalyptic vision. They failed to laud him 
as their saviour. They voted for liberal democracy, fiscal rectitude and political 
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neutrality. In rejecting O'Duffy, the Irish people rejected the politics of confrontation, 
including the coming world war. O'Duffy offered strength at the cost of violence, 
unity at the cost of repression and conformity at the cost of freedom. Neither the man 
nor the vision which he offered were worth further sacrifice. O'Duffy's memory is 
besmirched with his tawdry involvement in fringe fascism which served to wipe out 
all the good that he had done for his nation in its formative years. Nonetheless, he was 
given a state funeral in 1944 as a mark of honour for his service to the nation, a nation 
which was prepared to forgive him his flirtation with fascism only because it had been 
such an abject failure. It is interesting to ponder how he would have been treated if he 
had taken Ireland down the same tragic path as Nazi Gennany, Ustashi Croatia or any 
of the Nazi puppet states of occupied Europe. 
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3. Units and divisions voting in favour of General Eoin O'Duffy 
leading the Blueshirt movement in opposition to Edward 
Cronin, as recorded in 'The Blueshirt' 7.11.34-1.3.3 5. 
Sample size-84. 
0 
Represents one unit or division. 
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APPENDIX FOUR 
MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL CORPORATE PARTY (Sources; Blueshirt 
publications, bulletins and circulars, correspondence, Dept of Justice files) 
NAME SOURCE POSITION 
COUNTY'_ 
J. Abbey Bulletin no. 5 12/35 Deputy/Director 
Dublin NE 
Dublin 
*Alice Barrett Bulletin no. 18/3 5 Secretary, City 
Ladies 
Limerick 
Ernest Bates Garda Rep. 22.6.36 Party member Tipperary 
*Miss E de 
Blaquiure 
Bulletin no. 5 12/35 Leader (Women) 
South Dublin 
Dublin 
H. Bolger The Nation, 4/36 Director Waterford 
Thady Bolger Bulletin no. 5,12/3 5 Wexford 
A. Borgor Bulletin no. 5,12/3 5 Treasurer, South 
Dublin 
Dublin 
Hugh Brady The Nation, 5/3 6 Deputy Director Cavan 
James Butler Garda Rep. 22.6.36 Member Tippqrary 
John Butler Garda Report, 
22.6.36 
Vice-Captain, 
Cashel Company 
Tipperary 
William Butler Garda 
Report, 22.6.36 
Secretary, Cashel 
Company 
Tipperary 
Dr. Butterfly Bulletin no. 5,1235 Louth 
Pat Brennan The Nation, 5/36 Divisional Director Dublin 
Dr. P. Cagney The Nation 6/3 6 Cork 
*Miss Cahill Bulletin no. 5,12/3 5 Secretary (Women), 
Dublin NW. 
Dublin 
Thos. Cahill Garda Report 
22.7.36 
Member Tipperary 
C. G. Campbell The Nation, 6/36 Secretary Dublin 
P. J. Campbell Bulletin no. 5 12/3 5 Divisional 
Secretary 
Donegal 
Thos. Carew Garda Report 
22.7.36 
National Executive Tipperary 
Col. T. Carew Bulletin no. 5,12/3 5 Staff Officer Tipperary 
Dennis Carrol The Nation, 6/36 Limerick 
P. J. Carolan The Nation, 5/36 Secretary Cavan 
T. Casey The Nation 4/36 
. 
Cork 
*Miss S. Casserly Bulletin no. 5,12/35 Leader (Women), 
Dublin NW. 
Dublin 
Mr. J. Cassidy The Nation, 6/36 Captain Cavan 
T. J. Caulfield The Nation, 6/36 Roscommon 
Jos. Coffey The Nation, 5/3 6 Captain Cork 
P. Coffey _ The Nation 4/36 Treasurer Waterford 
Dennis Collins The Nation 5/36 Treasurer, Bandon Cork 
J. Coleman The Nation 6/36 Sec. Co. of Agric. Cork 
340 
James Collins Garda Report 
23.6.36 
Member Cork 
John Collins Garda Report 
23.6.36 
Member Cork 
Terence Connelly The Nation, 4/36 Assistant Director Sligo 
Patrick Connolly The Nation 4/3 6 Secretary Monaghan' 
Dr. J. Conway Bulletin no. 5,12/35 Staff Officer Dublin 
*Mrs Conway Bulletin no. 5,12/35 Treasurer (Women) 
Dublin Townships 
Dublin 
Thos. Cooke The Nation, 5/36 Director Cork 
J. Corcoran The Nation, 6/36 Deputy Director Cork 
Danny Coughlan The Nation 5/3 6 Captain Cork 
Capt. P. J Coughlan Letter 23.9.35, 
D/Jus Files 
Deputy Director- 
General N. C. P. 
Cork 
J. Cooney Bulletin no. 5,12/35 Divisional Director Meath 
John Corr The Nation, 5/36 Mayo 
Paddy Connolly The Nation, 6/36 Limerick 
MI. Coulter The Nation, 6/36 Mayo 
John Cowhy The Nation 5/3 6 Director Cork 
Joe Cox The Nation, 5/36 Divisional 
Secretary 
Roscommon 
Patrick Coyle The Nation, 4/36 Monaghan 
Capt. Creed The Nation, 6/36 Captain Cork 
J. Crerand The Nation, 6/36 Assistant Director Dublin 
John Croker Garda RepoM 
22.7,36 
Divisional 
Secretary 
Tipperary 
M. Cloonan The Nation, 4/36 Treasurer Meath 
James Cronin The Nation, 4/36 Director Kerry 
B. Crowley The Nation, 5/36 Director Cork 
Capt. J. Crowley The Nation, 5/36 Captain Cork 
P. Cuddihy The Nation, 6/36 Kilkenny 
D. Culhane The Nation, 4/36 Assistant Secretary Cork 
Michael Cusack The Nation, 6/36 Mayo 
J. P. Currid The Nation, 6/36 Sligo 
C. Dalton Bulletin no. 5 12/3 5 Divisional Director Monaghan 
Eugene Daly The Nation, 2/36 Divisional Director Cork 
J. Daly The Nation, 4/36 Treasurer Meath 
Patrick Daly The Nation, 8/3 6 Carlow 
Michael Darcy Garda Reportý 
22.7.36 
Captain Wexford 
E. J. Delaney The Nation, 6/36 Kilkenny 
Dr. V. S. Delaney The Nation, 6/36 Trustee of N. C. P. Longford 
W. F. Delaney The Nation, 6/36 Limerick 
Dennis Dempsey The Nation, 5/36 Vice-Captain Cork 
Michael Denning The Nation 5/36 Treasurer Cork 
P. Desmond The Nation, 6/36 Se retary 0 
Peter Dineen The Nation, 5/36 Deputy Director Cork 
John Joe Daly Nation, 4/36 Deputy Divisions] Cork 
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Director 
Comdt. T. 
Donnelly 
Bulletin no. 5,12/35 Divisional Director Monaghan 
John Donohue Garda Rep. 22.6.36 Member Cork 
C. B. Donoghue The Nation, 3/36 Divisional Staff Cork 
John Donovan Sr. The Nation, 4/36 District Treasurer Kerry 
John Donovan The Nation, 5/36 Secretary Cork 
Alfred Donovan The Nation, 5/36 Captain Cork 
Garet Donovan The Nation, 5/36 Captain Cork 
J. Doyle Bulletin no. 5,12/35 Secretary, South 
Dublin 
Dublin 
John Dowdall The Nation, 5/36 Roscommon 
S. Dowling The Nation, 3/36 Westmeath 
Patrick Duffy The Nation, 5/36 Director East Cavan 
Chas. Dullea The Nation, 5/3 6 Treasurer Cork 
Thos. Dunne Garda Report, 
22.6.36 
Treasurer Tipperary 
Edward Dwyer Garda Report, 
22.6.36 
Member Tipperary 
Sonny Dwyer Garda Report, 
22.6.36 
Member Tipperary 
*Mary Egan Bulletin no. 5 12/3 5 Deputy Leader, Sth 
Dublin ( men's) 
Dublin 
J. Egan The Nation, 2/36 Divisional Director Cork 
V. Eivers The Nation, 4/36 Assistant Director Meath 
MI. Farrel Bulletin no. 1,8/35 Deputy Director Kilkenny 
Col. Farrelly Bulletin no. 5,12/35 Divisional Director Leitrim 
Dr. E. Fehilly Garda Report, 
29.10.35 
Divisional 
Treasurer, W Cork 
Cork 
Maurice Fielding The Nation 5/36 Director Cork 
John Fitzpatrick Garda Report, 
23.6.36 
Member Cork 
J. Fitzgerald The Nation, 4/36 Director Waterford 
F. B. Fitzgerald The Nation, 4/36 Secretary Waterford 
Thos. Fitzgerald The Nation, 4/36 Secretary Waterford 
F. Fitzgerald The Nation, 4/36 Treasurer Waterford 
Terence 
Fitzpatrick 
The Nation, 5/36 Deputy Director Cavan 
Michael Fleming The Nation, 5/36 Secretary Cork 
Richard Fleming The Nation, 5/36 Treasurer Cork 
Patrick J. Fleming Garda Report, 
22.6.36 
Tipperary 
F. Flynn Bulletin no. 5,12/35 District Director Leitrim 
Gerald Flynn The Nation 6/3 6 Director Roscommon 
D. Foley The Nation, 4/3 6 Vice-Captain Limerick 
_ 
Sidney Gallagher Bulletin no5,12/35 Divisional Director I Sligo 
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Patrick Gallagher Garda Report, 
7.11.36 
County Director, 
Sligo 
Sligo 
Joseph Gannon The Nation, 5/36 District Director Roscommon 
P. J. Gaynor The Nation, 3/36 Divisional Staff Cork 
T. Gerety Bulletin no5,12/35 Divisional Director Longford 
James Gilligan The Nation, 3/36 Sligo 
J. Gleeson The Nation, 3/36 Divisional Staff Cork 
Patrick Gleeson Garda Report, 
22.7.36 
Tipperary 
W. Grayden Bulletin no5,12/35 Deputy Director, 
DublinNW. 
Dublin 
T. P. Gunning Letter O'Duffy, 
7.8.35 
Editor of The 
Nation 
Dublin 
Patrick Hanratty The Nation, 4/36 Secretary Monaghan 
MI. Harte TheNation, 5/36 Treasurer Cork 
Thomas Hartley The Nation, 6/3 6 Kilkenny 
MI. Hayes The Nation, 5/36 Treasurer Cork 
MI. Hannan The Nation, 5/36 Secretary Cavan 
J. Hector Bulletin no5 12/35 Director, Dublin 
NW 
Dublin 
J. Hegarty The Nation, 4/36 Cork 
Patrick Henney Bulletin no 1,8/3 5 District Secretary Kilkenny 
Dr. John 
Hpnnessey 
Garda Report, 
22.7.36 
Naiional Executive Tipperary 
P. J. Henry The Nation, 6/36 Roscommon 
Donald Herlihy The Nation, 2/36 Secretary Cork 
*Miss W. Hickey The Nation, 5/36 Captain Cork 
MI. Higgins The Nation, 4/3 6 Cork 
Lt. M Hiney The Nation, 4/36 Deputy Director Meath 
Danny Holland The Nation, 513 6 Treasurer Cork 
T. Holmes The Nation, 4/36 Divisional Director, 
N. Dublin 
Townships 
Dublin 
*Miss M. Hurley The Nation 5136 Treasurer Cork 
Capt. P. Hughes Bulletin no. 5,12/35 Staff Officer Dublin 
Tom Hyde The Nation, 4136 Cork 
L. Ingham Bulletin no5,12/35 Treasurer, Dublin 
NE. 
Dublin 
J. Irish Bulletin no. 1,8/35 District Director Kilkenny 
J. Kearney The Nation, 4/3 6 Vice-Captain Waterford 
T. Kearney The Nation, 4136 Secretary Waterford 
D. Keating The Nation, 4/36 Divisional 
Secretary 
Tipperary 
J. Keating The Nation 4/36 Secretary Tipperary 
James Kearns Garda Report, 
3.10.36 1 
Treasurer Wexford 
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J. J. Kelly Bulletin no5,12/35 Divisional Director Wexford 
M. Kelly Bulletin no5,12/35 Treasurer, Dublin 
NW. 
Dublin 
Michael Kelly Garda Report, 
22.6.36 
Captain Tipperary 
Capt. T Kelly The Nation, 3/36 District Director Cork 
C. Kelly The Nation,, 3/36 District Director Cork 
Dennis Kelly The Nation, 5/3 6 Roscommon 
Sonny Kelly The Nation, 5136 Director Cork 
*Miss Josie Kelly The Nation, 5/36 Treasurer Cork 
Tom Kennedy The Nation, 6/3 6 Sligo 
Wm. Kennedy The Nation, 6/36 Tipperary 
*Miss M. King Bulletin no. 5,12/35 Secretary, South 
Dublin (Women) 
Dublin 
John Killigrew The Nation 4/36 Captain Waterford 
T. Kinsella The Nation 8/3 6 Cork 
Thomas Kinsella Garda Report 
27.7.36 
Member Wexford 
Patrick Mahoney Garda Report, 
23.6.36 
Member Cork 
John Martin Bulletin no. 5,12/35 Divisional Director Cavan 
Thos. Martin The Nation, 4/35 Deputy Director Cavan 
Patrick Martin The Nation, 5/36 Secretary Cavan 
Sean Martin The Nation, 4/35 Cavan 
R. Matthews The Nation, 6/36 Carlow 
*Miss Nora Mawe The Nation, 5/36 Captain Cork 
Thos. Mawe The Nation, 5/36 Captain Cork 
John Markham The Nation, 4/36 Captain Limerick 
James Masterson The Nation, 5/36 Deputy Director Cavan 
Dennis Mahoney Garda Report, 
23.6.36 
Member Cork 
James Maher The Nation, 6/36 Director Dublin 
Nth. Townships 
Dublin 
J. MacGillicuddy The Nation, 4/36 Secretary Kerry 
John MacNamee The Nation, 5/3 6 Treasurer Cavan 
J. J. McCarthy Garda Report, 
27.10.35 
Cork 
J. F. McCarthy Letter O'Duffy, 
29.10.35 
Cork 
P. McCabe The Nation, 3/36 Divisional Director Westmeath 
H. V. McConnell Bulletin no. 5 12/3 5 Director, Dublin 
NE. 
Dublin 
Ed. McCarthy The Nation 5/36 Secretary Cork 
Tim MCarthy The Nation, 5/36 Captain Cork 
Chas. McCarthy The Nation, 5/36 Secretary Cork 
W. McAuliffe The Nation, 4/36 Director Limerick 
T-McCormack The Nation 3/3 6 Captain Longford 
D. S. McCarthy The Nation, 4/3 6 Cork 
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S. McCarthy The Nation, 4/36 Cork 
J. M. McDonnell The Nation, 3/36 Divisional 
Secretary 
Longford 
Joe McDonald The Nation, 3/36 Captain Longford 
F. L. McEoin The Nation 6/36 Galway 
T. McDonagh 
Mahoney 
The Nation, 6/36 Kerry 
P. J. McElligott Correspondence 
issued by NCP 
Former Divisional 
Director 
Kerry 
Mr. McGarry Garda Report, 
20.6.36 
Dublin 
P. McGorick Bulletin no. 5,12/35 District Director Kildare 
MI. McGinn The Nation, 5135 Deputy Director Cavan 
Mr McGonaghe The Nation, 3/36 Donegal 
J. McGrath The Nation, 4/3 6 Director Waterford 
Sean McKieman The Nation, 4/36 Director Cavan 
J. P. McKiernan The Nation, 3/36 N. C. P. Treasurer Cavan 
Bern. McMahon The Nation, 4/36 District Director Monaghan 
John McMahon The Nation, 5/36 Treasurer Cavan 
T. McSweenqy The Nation, 6/3 6 Treasurer, Council 
of Agricul 
Cork 
George 
McSweeney 
Garda Report 
20.6.36 
Captain Tipperary 
Jasper Meher The Nation, 6/3 6 Director, Dublin 
Townships 
Dublin 
Jack Meade The Nation, 4/36 Deputy Director Meath 
Sean Mooney The Nation, 4/36 Deputy Director Limerick 
Jackie Morrissey The Nation, 5/3 6 Captain Tipperary_ 
Roger Morrissey The Nation, 5/3 6_ Captain Tipperary 
John Mooney The Nation, 4/36 Director Limerick 
John Morrissey The Nation, 5/3 6 Secretary Tipp 
Jack Moran TheNation, 3/36 District Director Mayo 
*Miss A. Moloney Bulletin no 1,8/3 5 Limerick 
Walter Morrissey The Nation, 4/36 District Director Kerry 
Patrick Mulligan The Nation, 5/36 Secretary Cavan 
J. Mulvihill The Nation, 3/36 Longford 
B. Mulvihill The Nation, 3/36 Divisional Director Longford 
P. J. Mulcahy The Nation, 4/36 Treasurer Waterford 
Patrick Munday The Nation, 4/36 Divisional Staff 
Office 
Monaghan 
Tim Murphy The Nation 4/36 Director Limerick 
Sean Murphy Bulletin no. 5,12/35 Staff Officer Cork 
D. J. Murphy The Nation, 2/3 6 Assistant Divisional 
Director 
Cork 
J. T. Murray The Nation, 2136 Divisional Director Cork 
Jack Murphy The Nation, 5/3 6 Vice-Captain Cork 
Pat Murphy The Nation, 5/36 Treasurer, 
Templernartin 
Cork 
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Eoin Newman The Nation, 4/36 Director Meath 
Thos. Nolan Garda Report 
22.6.36 
Deputy Divisional 
Director, Cashel 
Tipperary 
Patrick Nolan Garda Report 
22.6.36 
Vice-Director, 
Cashel 
Tipperary 
J. Nolan The Nation, 3/36 Captain LonEford 
James Noctor The Nation, 4/36 Director, Dublin 
NW 
Dublin 
Mick Norris The Nation, 4/36 Divisional Director Waterford 
John Nulty The Nation, 5/36 Director Cavan 
Nicholas Nulty The Nation, 5/3 6 Director Cavan 
John Oakey The Nation, 6/36 Kilkenny 
Denis O'Brien The Nation, 4/3 6 Ki Ikenny 
John O'Brien The Nation 4/36 Deputy Divisional 
Director 
Tipperary 
Morris O'Brien The Nation, 4/36 District Director Tipperary 
Chris O'Brien Garda Report, 
22.7.36 
Member Tipperary 
*Mollie O'Brien Bulletin no. 1,8/3 5 Limerick 
Thomas O'Connell NCP 
Corre ondence 
Divisional Direc tor Kerry 
Louis O'Connell NCP 
Correspondence 
Divisional Director Kerry 
O'Carroll Bulletin no. 5,12/35 Staff Officer Galway 
*Mrs H. O'Connor Bulletin no. 5,12/35 Leader (Women) 
Dublin Townships 
Dublin 
Dr. O'Connor Special Branch 
Report, 20.6.36 
Dublin 
Joe O'Callaghan The Nation, 2/36 Secretary Cork 
W. O'Connor The Nation, 3/36 Cork 
T. O'Connor The Nation 3/3 6 Vice-Captain Longford 
*Miss F. O'Connell The Nation 6/36 Kýe 
P. S. O'Carolan The Nation, 6/36 Cavan 
Eoin O'Duffy HQ circular, no. 5 
19.6.35 
Director --General 
NCP 
Dublin 
Sean O'Donnell Garda Rep, 22.7.36 Member Tipperary 
Sean O'Dell The Nation, 2/36 Director Kerry 
T. O'Duffy The Nation, 3/36 Westmeath 
John O'Donoghue The Nation, 4/36 Director Kerry 
C. B. O'Donoghue The Nation, 5/36 Secretary Cork 
Tbos. O'Donoghue The Nation 5/36 Captain Cork 
Brian O'Driscoll The Nation 5/36 Secretary Cork 
John O'Donovan The Nation, 5/36 irector Cork 
Cornelius 
O'Driscoll 
The Nation 5/3 6 Secretary Cork 
*Mrs C. 
O'Driscoll 
The Nation, 6/36 Cork 
John O'Hea The Nation 6/3 6 Captain Roscommon 
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J. O'Hanlon Bulletin no. 5,12/35 Staff Officer Galway 
*Miss B. 
O'Hanlon 
Bulletin no. 5,12/35 Leader(Women)NE Dublin 
S. O'Hanlon The Nation, 3/36 Secretary Dublin 
T. O'Keefe Special Branch 
Report, 20.6.36 
Dublin 
Don O'Leary The Nation, 4/3 6 Secretary Waterford 
Sonny O'Leary TbeNation, 5/36 Secretary Cork 
*Miss H. O'Leary The Nation, 5/36 Captain Cork 
Arthur O'Leary The Nation, 5/3 6 Cap Cork 
J. J. O'Leary The Nation, 6/36 Cork 
, John O'Mahoney The Nation, 5/36 Secretary Cork 
Con O'Neill The Nation, 5/3 6 Vice-Captain Cork 
Jeremiah O'Neill The Nation, 4/36 Director Kerry 
P. O'Regan The Nation, 4/36 Assistant Secretary Cork 
Bernard O'Reilly The Nation, 5/36 Secretary Cavan 
P. J. O'Reilly The Nation, 5/3 6 Deputy Director Cavan 
Sean O'Reilly Bulletin no. 5,12/35 Divisional Sec. Wexford 
John O'Reilly Garda Reportý 
27.7.36 
Member of League 
of Youth 
Wexford 
Comdt. D. 
O'Sullivan 
Bulletin no. 5,12/35 Deputy Divisional 
Director 
Wexford 
D. O'Sullivan The Nation 6/36 Assistant Director- 
General of NCP 
Dublin 
M. O'Sullivan The Nation, 4/36 Cork 
John J. O'Sullivan The Nation, 4/36 Director Kerry 
Patrick O'Sullivan The Nation, 4/36 Deputy_Director Kerry 
J. F. Owens The Nation, 6/36 Cork 
Kevin Patton Garda Rep. 16.5.37 Member L of Y Westmeath 
J. Pierce The Nation, 4/36 Cork 
W. Pierce The Nation, 4/36 Cork 
Michael Pender Garda Report, 
3.10.36 
Captain, Ferris 
Company 
Wexford 
George Plunkett The Nation, 3/36 Cavan 
John Poland The Nation,, 4/36 Cork 
J. Power The Nation 4/3 6 Deputy Director Waterford 
I Power The Nation, 6/36 Tipperary 
Thomas Quinlan Garda Report 
22.6.35 
Director Tipperary 
*Minnie Quigley Captain, Ferns 
(Women's) 
Wexford 
William Quinlan The Nation, 2/36 Divisional Director Cork 
Frank Quirke The Nation, 4/36 e 
Thos. Quirke _ The Nation, 4/36 District Secretary Kerry 
James Redmond The Nation, 8/3 6 Carlow 
D. Reeves Bulletin no. 5,12/35 1 Staff Officer Dublin j 
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James E. Reilly The Nation, 4/36 Secretary Donegal 
A. Roche The Nation, 4/36 Cork 
John Roche The Nation, 4/36 Director of 
Elections 
Dublin 
Matthew Ryan Garda Report 
22.6.36 
Divisional 
Secre 
Tipperary 
MI. Ryan Garda Report 
22.6.36 
Member , 
Cashel 
Company 
Tipperary 
Jas. Ryan Garda Report 
22.7.36 
Member, Cashel 
Company 
Tipperary 
Jim Ryan The Nation, 2/36 Staff Officer Cork 
B. Ryan The Nation, 3/3 6 District Director Longford 
S. Ryan The Nation, 4/36 Waterford 
T. Ryan The Nation, 4/36 Divisional Staff 
Officer 
Cork 
Dr. Garry Scanlon The Nation, 6/3 6 Limerick 
James Scanlon The Nation, 4/36 Limerick 
John Shaw The Nation, 6/36 Kerry 
Patrick Sheridan Garda Report 
22.6.36 
Member Tipperary 
John Sheridan The Nation, 5136 Director Cavan 
Philip Sheridan The Nation, 5/36 Secretary Cavan 
Miss M. Sheehy The Nation, 5/36 Secretary Cork 
Miss M. Sheehan The Nation 5/36 Secretary Cork 
John Shaw The Nation, 6/36 Kerry 
Jack Skinner The Nation, 5/36 Secretary Cork 
P. Skelly The Nation, 4/36 Director Meath 
T. Slattery The Nation, 4/36 Divisional 
Treasurer 
Kerry 
John Spilane The Nation, 5/36 Captain Cork 
H. Steward Bulletin no. 5 12/35 District Director Galway 
Mrs Sunderland Garda Report 
3.10.36 
Vexford 
Tim Sullivan Garda Report 
22.7.36 
Member, Cashel 
Company 
Tipperary 
Capt. M. Sweetman Bulletin no. 5 12/3 5 Divisional Director Dublin 
P. Tennyson The Nation, 6/36 Kilkenny 
J. Tobin The Nation, 4/36 Secretary Waterford 
William Tobin Garda 
Report22.6.36 
Member Tipperary 
Mrs Toner Bulletin no. 5 12/35 Deputy 
Leader(Women's), 
Dublin NW. 
Dublin 
James Traynor Ie Nation, 8/3 6 Monaghan 
Patrick Treanor The Nation, 4/3 6 Deputy 
-Director 
Monaghan 
E. Tuohy The Nation 4/3 6 Captain Waterford 
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Jack Tuffy The Nation, 6/36 Divisional 
Secretary 
Mayo 
W. J. Tuohy The Nation, 4/36 Assistant Director Waterford 
Tom Tully_ The Nation, 4/36 Director Meath 
J. Turner The Nation, 4/36 Cork 
Bertie Veale The Nation, 6/3 6 Deputy Director Waterford 
Capt. L. Walshe Bulletin no. 5 12/35 Acting-Secretary, 
NCP 
Dublin 
Louis Walsh The Nation, 8/3 6 Deputy Director Dublin 
Miss K. Walsh Bulletin no. 5 12/3 5 Secretary 
(Women's) Dublin 
Townships 
Dublin 
P. T. Walshe The Nation, 4/36 Director Waterford 
John Walshe The Nation, 4/36 Assistant 
Divisional Director 
Tipperary 
Dr. P. Whelan Bulletin no. 5 12/35 Director Dublin 
MI. Whelan Garda Report 
22.7.36 
Member, Cashel 
Cornpany_ 
Tipperary 
Mr Whycherly The Nation, 8/36 Deputy_Director Dublin 
R. Woulfe The Nation, 3/36 Kerry 
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APPENDIX FIVE 
CHART TO SHOW RELATIVE STRENGTH OF THE NCP BY COUNTY. 
IRELAND, 1935-6 
(Sourcesmational and regional newspapers, NCP journals, bulletins, circulars and 
newsletters, Department ofjustice files including Garda Reports, and personal 
correspondence of Eoin O'Duffy and other NCP members. Sample size for members, 
337, and for meetings, 106. 
County Number of local members Number of local meetings 
CARLOW 3 2 
CAVAN 25 10 
CLARE 0 0 
CORK 95 22 
DONEGAL 3 1 
DUBLIN 41 14 
GALWAY 3 2 
KERRY 20 9 
KILDARE 1 2 
KILKENNY 9 6 
LAOIS 0 0 
LEITRIM 2 1 
LIMERICK 14 1 
LONGFORD 10 1 
LOUTH 1 0 
MAYO 5 6 
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MEATH 8 2 
OFFALY 0 0 
MONAGHAN 9 3 
ROSCOMMON 8 2 
SLIGO 6 2 
TIPPERARY 39 7 
WATERFORD 20 3 
WESTMEATH 4 5 
WEXFORD 10 6 
WICKLOW 0 0 
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APPENDIX SIX 
PERSONS CONNECTED WITH THE IFJSH FRIENDS OF GERMANY 
Source: G2 Military Archives files on the IFG, Rathmines Barracks, Dublin 
Dr Booth 
Mrs Booth 
Seamus Bourke 
James Burke 
Kevin Cahill 
Dr. J Carroll 
Dr. P Collins 
Kevin Duff 
George Griffin 
Michael Herlihy 
Clourn Kerry 
Mrs Mallin 
Seamus Mallin 
Alec McCabe 
Miss Louie McCahy 
Dr Patrick McCartin 
Dr Nora McNaly 
Mr O'Callaghan 
Maurice O'Connor 
Eoin O'Duffy 
Mr O'Gorman 
T O'Rourke 
Francis Stuart 
Captain Liam Walsh 
Mrs Liam Walsh 
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APPENDIX SEVEN 
MEMBERS OF THE PEOPLE'S NATIONAL PARTY 1940-41 
(Source-G2 Files on the People's National Party, Military Archives, Dublin). 
NAME POSITION 
George Griffin President 
G. Sinclair Vice-President 
Thomas Fahy Trustee and Secretary 
C. Crowley Trustee 
R. Collins Member 
Edgar F. Corrigan Committee member 
Francis Dillon Treasurer 
Con O'Leary Committee member 
Eamon Graham Member 
Joe Andrews Committee member 
R. Burgess Committee member 
H. O'Neill Committee member 
J. J. Byrne Committee member 
P. Byrne Committee member 
I Graham Committee member 
Mrs Griffin Member 
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APPENDIX EIGHT 
PARTY PROGRAMME FOR PNP FOR NA TIONAL PLANNING 
I. Currency. Control of the issue of currency and credit. 
2. Political. The reunion of the 32 counties. The severance of political connections 
with England. 
3. Employment. The state shall concern itself in the first instance with the task of 
providing employment for all its citizens. 
4. Citizenship. Irish citizenship can be claimed by Irish nationals, The Jew has a 
distinct Nationality of his own. No Jew, therefore, may be an Irish citizen. 
5. Persons who have no title to Irish citizenship are to be allowed to live in Ireland but 
will have no claim to civil or legal rights. All such non-citizens referred to, who 
immigrated to Ireland after 25h April 1916, must leave Ireland at once. All ftirther 
immigration, except under license, must be stopped immediately. 
6. Education. The teaching of all subjects in the Primary and Secondary Schools and 
Colleges in the Gaeltacht to be in Irish. 
7. Agriculture. Land reforms in keeping with our national requirements. The passing 
of an Act of law to enable the State to expropriate land held by non-citizens without 
compensation. Abolition of all ground rents payable to non-citizens and exterior 
trusts. 
8. Traders. The elimination of chain-stores, controlled or financed by non-citizens. 
9. Revision of laws relating to non-Irish controlled Factories and Companies. 
10. Civil Service. All Civil Service posts, no matter what kind, to be filled by Irish 
citizens. 
11. Social. Provision of decent housing for all Citizens. 
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12. Corporate Charities. The creation of Corporate Councils in every county, 
representative of all professions and trades, in order to help in Social and Economic 
planning. ' 
1 Party Programme for PNP for Proper National Planning, G2/B/0453, The PNP, G2 Military Archives 
Files, Rathmines. 
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APPENDIX NINE 
AN CUAMAWNAISIUNTA by Emest Blythe 
The document in the Blythe Papers lists the objectives of An Cumann Naisiunta as: 
" To carry on the National tradition. 
"To utilize the power of Government in the hands of the Irish people as well as 
other forms of political activity for the fuller development of the Nation's heritage, 
political, cultural and economic. "' 
The document goes on to present the following political programme: 
"To secure the territorial unity of Ireland and to combine the divergent elements of 
the Nation in a common bond of citizenship. 
"To present and foster the National language, literature, games and arts and every 
element of National culture and custom which tends to give Ireland distinction as a 
Nation. 
"To stimulate and safeguard the development of manufacturing, industry, fisheries 
and natural resources. 
"To make the whole soil of Ireland available for the use of the people by 
completing land purchase and utilizing the depopulated grass lands in accordance 
with a broad National Plan. 
"To obtain the provision of adequate financial assistance for a National scheme of 
housing, urban and rural. 
"To substitute as far as possible for the unemployment dole, National schemes of 
useful work, including arterial drainage, reafforestation, improvement of roads and 
waterways. 
1 An Cumann Naisiunta, Ernest Blythe, Blythe Papers P24/977, UCD Archives, Dublim 
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"To encourage proper physical development of the children of the Nation by the 
provision of meals, the introduction of dental and medical examination in Schools, 
and the organization of National pastimes. 
"To promote the extension of education facilities by easy access from primary to 
higher schools, so that all children shall have opportunities for the fullest training of 
,, 2 their mental powers. 
Ibid. 
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APPENDIX TEN 
O'DUFFY'S ITINERARY 1935-6 
8 June 1935 Annual conference, Dublin 
21 June 1935 Dublin Division Pears Street HQ 
29 June 1935 Conference at Karrickshock, Co Kilkenny. 
Meeting at Knockbrock, Glemnore 
5 July 193 5Hugginstown , Co. Kilkenny 9 July 1935 Conference at Boardford, Co Kildare. 
17 July 1935 Conference of officers, Knocktopher District, Hugginstown, Co 
Kilkenny 
18 July 1935 Public meeting in Owning Hall, Kilkenny 
18 July 1935 South Tipperary Conference at Clonmel 
20 July 1935 Director-General visited several places in Co Louth with a view to 
holding a conference at a later date 
23 July 1935 National Executive meeting Dublin HQ 
4 August 1935 Cavan Divisional Convention 
II August 1935 Sligo NCP Convention 
August Beal na Blath Commemoration ceremony 
29 September 1935 Cork Divisional meeting 
September-Italy, Montreux, Germany 
2 October 1935 Navan Co Meath 
20 October 1935 North Kerry Divisional Convention at Listowel 
Early November Navan NCP Convention 
9 November 1935 Central Mayo District 
10 November 1935 Westport District, Mayo 
10 November 193 5 Claremorris District, Mayo 
10 November 193 5 Ballinrobe District, Mayo 
II November 1935 Visits to key men in north Mayo 
12 November 1935 National Executive Cttee in Dublin 
24 November 1935 Monaghan District Convention 
17 November 1935 Public meeting at Ferns 
November series of meetings in Dublin city and area inc 14th National Executive 
I December 1935 South Kerry Division Convention, Sneern 
2-3 December 1935 Conference in Co. Cork 
4 December 1935. District dance at Dungarven 
8 December 1935 Co Monaghan Conference Ballyboy 
15 December 1935 Co Kilkenny anniversary of Carrickshock 
31 December 1935 Dance at Party HQ Pearse Street, Dublin 
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12 January 1936 Inishannon Commemoration Parade 
12 January 1936 Millstreet, Co Cork N Cork constituency meeting 13.1.36 Macroorn 
Divisional Meeting West Cork 
16 January 1936 Bandon 
Also in January -Bantry and Roscarbery 
9 February 1936 Cashel dance 
16 February 1936 District Conference Ballymahon. Co Longford 
23 February 1936 Conference of officers, Bruff Co Limerick 
I March 1936 Cavan county convention 
7 March 1936 Dinner and presentation at Grand Hotel Dublin 
15 March 1936 Mulingar, Westmeath Convention of district and divisional officers 
19 April 1936 Clonakilty for fimeral of Mrs Micky Murphy 
29.4.36 Roscommon conference of officers 
6 May 1936 Lecture at TCD Historical Society Dublin 
9 May 1936 National Executive meeting Dublin 
17 May 1936 Consecration of new church in Merrion Park 
May; conferences attended at; 
Carlow town 
Carbury Co Kkildare 
Tyrrellspass, Co Westmeath 
Ballycanew Co Wexford 
1916 Commemoration, Arbor Hill 
Aviation Day at Phoenix Park, including flight over Dublin. 
Attendance at Fairyhouse, Punchtown and Callery race meetings. 
Attendance at funeral of Mr E. Fitzpatrick of Newtownbutler, CoXermanagh, in spite 
of N. I. banning order. 
20 June 1936 NCP Meeting at Cashel 
21 June 1936 NCP meeting at Rosscarbery 
June conferences attended; 
County Cork 
Cork city 
Ballineen 
Bantry 
Cloakilty 
Rosscarbery 
Bandon 
Macroom 
18 July 1936. NCP First Annual Convention, Rathmines Dublin. 
9 August 1936 Ten-day holiday to Holland 
30 August 1936 Annual commemoration service at Beal na. Blath in memory of 
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Michael Collins and Blueshirt martyrs. 
21 September 1936 O'Duffy leaves for Spain to meet Franco 
13 November 1936 First Volunteers leave for Spain 
22 June 1937 O'Duffy arrives back in Dublin from Spain. 
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APPENDIX ELEVEN 
ERNESTBLYTHE (1889-1975)- A BRIEF BIOGRAPHY 
Ernest Blythe was born in Lisburn, Co. Antrim in 1889 to a Protestant family of 
Orange persuasion. ' As a Northern Protestant in the Free State Government, Blythe 
was able to offer to the Irish cause a unique and insightful perspective on the issue of 
Irish unity. In his three-volume autobiography, Trasna na Boinne written in Gaelic 
under the Irish form of his name, Eaman de Blaghd, Blythe admits that he was 
ignorant, as a youth, of the Gaelic Catholic culture of his native area. In 1905, now an 
impressionable teenager, he moved to Dublin where he joined the Civil Service in the 
Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction, 
2 and began to immerse himself 
in Irish culture and language with all the zeal of a convert. Under the influence of his 
close friend, the playwright Sean O'Casey, he joined the Irish Republican 
Brotherhood and the Gaelic League. 3 He was strongly influenced by the nationalism 
of Griffith and Sinn Fein. 4 
His interest in journalism was fostered by his contributions to W. P. Ryan's 
newspaper, The Peasant, which promoted the ideas of the Irish-Ireland movement. He 
returned to Ulster to land his first job as a paid journalist with The North Down 
Herald, which was published in Bangor. 5 
In Dublin, he had begun to learn Irish, and this would become his life's passion. It 
prompted him to go and live in Corca Dhuibne, the West Kerry Gaeltacht, in 1913 in 
order to improve his fluency in the language. 6 He supported himself by working on 
1 Maye, B., Fine Gael 1923-1987 (Blackwater Press, Dublin, 1993), p., 289. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 O'Gadhra, N., 'Eaman de Blaghd' in Eire-Ireland, 11,3 (1976). 
5 Maye, B., Fine Gael 1923-1987, p. 289. 
6 Ibid. 
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the land as a farm labourer. By this time, he had completely rejected his Orange 
background and saw himself as an Irishman firmly committed to the nationalist cause. 
During 1914-16 he organized the Irish Volunteers in Muster and south Connaught. 
He was ordered to leave Kerry by Government edict in July 1915, and was arrested in 
March 1916 for failing to do so. He was imprisoned in Brixton, where lie met Roger 
Casement'7 and was then transferred to Reading Gaol. His detention meant that he 
was unable to take part in the Easter Rising of 1916 in Dublin. On his release, he 
continued to organize the Volunteers and as a result was re-arrested and imprisoned 
first in Cork and then in Belfast. 
Blythe summarized his career to date as follows: 
"I was appointed shortly after the start of the war8 as an I. R. B. organizer in the 
South ... At the beginning of 1915 
1 was sent south as an official organizer under the 
direction of the Volunteer Executive, and more particularly under the direction of 
Hobson9who was its general secretary. I was assigned the counties of Cork, Kerry, 
Limerick, Clare and part of Tipperary. '" Much of this area was later to be a 
stronghold of the Blueshirt movement. 
In 1918, he was elected to the Executive of Sinn Fein and to the first Dail, 
representing the constituency of North Monaghan. " He was to hold this constituency 
for the next fifteen years. He first met O'Duffy when the latter stood in the same 
multi-member constituency with Blythe on a shared pro-Treaty platforrn in 1922. ' 2 He 
was appointed Director of Trade and Industry (April 1919) by the first Dail. He 
7 Roger Casement (1884-1916) was a British diplomat and Irish patriot. A member of the Gaelic league 
he had helped to found the Volunteers. He sought German material aid for the Irish cause and was 
arrested by the British for treason. Found guilty at his trial, he was hanged in August 1916 (The Oxford 
Companion to Irish History). 
8 World War I. 
9 Bulmer Hobson was an Ulster Protestant and Secretary of the Irish Volunteers. 
10 Ernest Blythe, 'Eire, ' in Resistance Against Tyranny ed. by Eugene Hein-fler (Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, London, 1966). 
" Maye, B., Fine Gael 1923-87, p. 289. 
12 Regan, J. M., The Irish Counter-Revolution 1921-1936 (Gill and Macmillan, Dublin, 1999), p. 61. 
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supported the Treaty during the Dail Treaty Debates but, unlike most of his 
colleagues, he argued that the Irish state had the right to coerce the six Northern 
counties into a united Ireland. 13 He was later to justify his support for the Treaty by 
claiming that the Irish language question needed to be addressed immediately if the 
language was to be saved. 14 
He was a prominent figure in the new Cumann an nGaedheal administration 
following the acceptance of the Treaty by the Dail and the end of the Irish Civil War 
that followed. He occupied the posts of Minister for Local Government (1922-23), 
Minister for Finance (1923-32) and Minister for Posts and Telegraphs(I 927-32). 
Following the murder of Kevin O'Higgins, 15 he became Vice President of the 
Executive Council. Blythe was a fiscal conservative and is widely remembered, and 
was severely criticized at the time, for reducing old age pensions in his 1924 budget. 
He saw the need for economic cooperation with Great Britain as vital if the infant 
Irish Free State was to be a viable political entity. He saw a stringent economic policy 
as essential to consolidate markets and earn international respect and recognition. 
Blythe used his powerful position in government to promote his views on cultural 
identity and nationalism, not least on the language issue. He believed that a strong 
state was necessary for the language revival. For this reason he was opposed to 
proportional representation, believing that it could lead to weak government. He used 
his position as head of the finance department to coordinate the work of language 
revival. Gaelic was introduced as a subject in all schools, and Irish speakers were 
sought out to train as teachers. Irish was made compulsory for Civil Service entry. fie 
made possible Galway's Irish language theatre and initiated the Irish publishing 
13 Ibid. 
14 O'Gadhra, N., Earnan de Blaghd. 
" Kevin O'Higgins was assassinated by members of the IRA. Ile was a conservative hardliner and was 
Minister for Justice and External Affairs. 
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house, An Guni. 16 He tried to improve conditions in the Gaeltacht areas, which he saw 
as the repository of Irish language and culture. He encouraged employment initiatives 
and introduced housing grants and other measures to benefit the Gaeltacht. If 
independence was to have any real meaning, Blythe believed, it would have to be 
within a Gaelic cultural framework. 
Blythe lost his Dail seat in the election of 1933, though in the following year he was 
to take up a seat in the Senate, a position he held until that body was abolished by the 
Fianna Fail government in 1936. However, Blythe had found a new cause; the Army 
Comrades Association. In fact it was Blythe who suggested that the colour of the 
shirt be St Patrick's blue. 17 The blue shirt made its first appearance at the Kilkenny 
County Convention of the A. C. A. on 5 April 1933 and a week later Blythe was 
photographed in uniform at an A. C. A. at-home. 18 The United Irishman, began to 
produce a weekly column on A. C. A. activities written by'Onlooker, ' who Manning 
suggests may have been Blythe. 19 It was Blythe and Michael Tierney who encouraged 
O'Duffy to enter politics as head of the A. C. A after his dismissal from his post as 
Commissioner of Police. Blythe had been advocating the merger of the A. C. A and 
Cumann na nGaedheal since the end of 1932 in order to attract more young people, 
and to alleviate his party's chronic organizational problems. 20 
Blythe and O'Duffy were often to be seen on the same platform at party rallies as 
Blythe quickly became a leading figure in the Blueshirt movement, and he began to 
move in a more authoritarian direction. He was especially strident in his demands for 
an end to partition. At a rally in Tipperary in June 1934 he said: 
16 O'Gadhra, N., Earnan de Blaghd. 
17 Cronin, M., The Blueshirts and Irish Politics (Dublin 1997), p. 47. 18 Manning, M., The Blueshirts (Dublin, 1987), p. 57. 19 Ibid. p. 57. 
20 Regan, J. M., The Irish Counter-Revolution 1921-1936, p. 339. 
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"The first great national task that lies before us is to secure that the whole of Ireland 
shall be one State under one Government, that Government representative of the Irish 
people and responsible to them alone. , 21 
Blythe was always keen on the theatre and with drama. He had links, via the Abbey 
Theatre, Dublin, with the poet and fascist sympathisers W. B. Yeats and Walter 
Starkie. 22 He was a firm supporter of corporatism, deriving his ideas from men like 
Tierney and Hogan and converting them into practical policies for Fine Gael and the 
Blueshirts. With the creation of Fine Gael, Blythe had been one of the six men 
nominated by William Cosgrave to sit on the new party's 1 8-man Executive 
Committee. Blythe promoted corporatist ideas and saw a key role for the Blueshirts in 
the corporate state, supporting the National Army and Civic Guard, 23 an idea that was 
taken up with enthusiasm by O'Duffy. He portrayed the Blueshirts as the successors 
to the Irish Volunteers. 24 
O'Duffy resigned in late 1934 as President of Fine Gael, but in the Blueshirt split 
which followed Blythe stayed loyal to the Fine Gael faction now led by Ned Cronin. 
Blythe had become increasingly disillusioned with O'Duffy as a politician and had 
ambitions of his own. 25 O'Duffy was furious and declared: "Mr Ernest Blythe has 
,, 26 been a traitor to me. 
With the winding up of the Blueshirt movement over the next two years by Fine 
Gael, and his departure from the political scene with the end of the Senate in 1936, 
Blythe concentrated more on his work at the Abbey Theatre in Dublin, where he 
became a Director, and on writing and broadcasting in Irish. He returned to politics in 
21 Blythe speaking on 17 June 1934 in Tipperary, as quoted in The Irish Press, 18 June 1934. 
22 Professor Walter Starkie of Trinity College, Dublin was part of the Centre International d'Eludes sur 
la Fascisme based in Lausanne. He was an editor of its journal which published articles in praise of 
fascisrn. He was a director of the Abbey Theatre, like Blythe 23 Regan, J. M., The Irish Counter-Revolution 1921-36, p. 353. 
24 Ibid. p. 358. 
. 2' Ibid. p. 369. 
26 Manning, M., The Blueshirts p. 167, quoting O'Duffy. 
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the forties with his involvement with Ailtiri na hAiseirighe, a corporatist political 
party that advocated an Irish-speaking, authoritarian republic, that would act to 
preserve Irish language and culture within the framework of a strong state (see 
Chapter 6). He left politics after this but continued to write, largely in Irish. He died in 
1975. 
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APPENDrX TWELVE 
THE NATIONAL AND POLITICAL POLICY OF THE NATIONAL GUARD 
"To promote the reunion of Ireland. 
"To oppose Communism and alien control and influence in national affairs and to 
uphold Christian principles in every sphere of public life. 
"To promote and maintain public order. 
"To make organized and disciplined public service a permanent and accepted 
feature of our political life and to lead the youth of Ireland in a movement of 
constructive national action. 
"To promote the formation of co-ordinated national organizations of employers and 
employed, which, with the aid ofludicial tribunals, will effectively prevent strikes and 
lockouts and harmoniously compose industrial differences. 
"To co-operate with the official agencies of the state for the solution of such 
pressing problems as the provision of useftil and economic public employment for 
those whom public enterprise cannot absorb. 
"To secure the creation of a representative national statutory organization of 
farmers, with rights and status to secure the safeguarding of agricultural interests, in 
all revisions of agricultural and political policy. 
"To expose and prevent corruption and victimization in national and local 
administration. 
"To awaken throughout the country a spirit of combination, zeal and patriotic 
realism which will put the state in a position to serve the people efficiently in the 
political and economic spheres. " 
367 
